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
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I T A L Y

IN

1848.



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IN

1848.

By L. MARIOTTI.

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ITALY IN 1848.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction—National Tendencies—Retrospect, 1530-1814; 1814-1846; 1846-1848—Moral and Physical Force—Reform and Revolution—Rise of a Moderate Party—Mazzini—Gioberti—Reforming Movement—in Sardinia, in Tuscany, at Rome—Charles Albert—Pius IX.—Naples—Italian League—Italian Municipalism—Position of Austria—Her Attack on Ferrara—Character of the Pope—Count Rossi—New Position of Austria—Lombardy—Attitude of Italy—England and France—State of Parties in Italy—Prevalence of Moderate Views—Character of the Italian Movement—Position of Italy in January 1848.

EVERY nation has its own destinies. Every nation has a share in the destinies of mankind. The independence of any human tribe or community is always relative. It may move more or less unconfined in its orbit; but is no less whirled along with the whole human system, in obedience to general laws of motion and gravitation of which it does not always comprehend either the impulse or the tendency.

It has been said, rather vaguely, that nations never die: that means, merely, that their period of existence is not always within our ken; that their rise and incre-

ment are often wrapped in miraculous obscurity, that theirs is often a lingering, imperceptible decline ; but for the rest we do actually see them go through every phasis and modification of being ; nothing in them is permanent, nothing assured ; nothing perhaps so certain as their death. Not merely their legislative provisions, their social, moral, and religious institutions, but the work itself of nature, the very type of nationality, obeys the law of incessant vicissitude.

Ethnographical limits are no more inviolable than territorial confines. There are races of mankind that have vanished from the earth, utterly ; others that are wandering among us, trodden and scattered ; others, again, that are undergoing a slow process of denaturalisation, merging more or less willingly, more or less consciously, into other more enterprising, more intelligent races.

Fortune strikes eternal compact with no living being ; with no man, no aggregate of men. There is a God above us,—an inexorable, no less than unfathomable necessity. Much may be achieved by man individually ; much more in his collective capacity, by indomitable strength and unanimity of will ; much also remains subject to the iron force of circumstance. It may always be in our hand to meet our fate with dignity ; to evade it, not always : and when our utmost is done, when our best endeavours are baffled, and our good confidence broken, there is a certain sublimity in our resignation, if we feel that it was with God we were wrestling.

Italy has lost one more battle in her long disastrous campaign against fate. Once more is she foiled in

the assertion of her rights to existence; once more has the world come to the conclusion, that there are five-and-twenty millions of Italians, but no Italian nation.

It is important for us to observe, how far this latest reverse must be ascribed to the Italians themselves, to their own infatuation, disunion, and cowardice; or, on the contrary, how far it may be accepted as the result of extraneous, irresistible causes, of the inscrutable severity of Heaven's decrees. Nor is it of less moment to ascertain to what extent the events of the last two years may be looked upon as decisive; to what extent their melancholy issue will bear on the merits of the question: whether it behoves the conquered nation to resign all hope of future redemption; or whether, on the contrary, it may not be in the designs of Providence to turn this and all previous defeats into an ultimate triumph, working, as His wont is, a happy end through a chain of signal calamities.

Nothing is certainly less settled in men's minds than this same question of Italian nationality. There is a set of men, both in and out of the country, who have faith in an undying Italy, to whom the existence of an Italian nation is a long-established, growing, teeming fact, who refer to the sway twice held by Rome over the world—by Imperial Rome, by Catholic Rome—to point out in that city, in that land, in that climate, the germs of a phœnix-like vitality, a self-redeeming power,—an eternity, not of existence merely, but of greatness, of sovereign ascendancy.

These men look forward to a third epoch; that of democratic Rome, or "Italy of the people." In their

mind the existence of Italy is tantamount to "Italian Pre-eminence."

There are other less sanguine thinkers, on the other hand, who look in vain for a nation in Italy, not in the present or future merely, but even in the past. They can see nothing in it, save only an idle, chimerical abstraction. To them the history of the country, since the time of the Cæsars, suggests no idea but that of decline: of a slow and gradual, but no less unintermitting decline; Rome, they think, could not fall, so to say, vertically. It could not perish, as it was not made, in one day. The different altitudes occupied by that queen of nations at successive periods—from the Vatican throne, from the Sistine chapel—as the metropolis of Christendom, as the mother of the arts—were only as many steps by which she was descending from her old exalted station. They might break and retard her fall; they could give it majesty and composure; but it was no less inevitable; it is now no less thoroughly consummated. There never was anything like a second rise—there is now no possible resurrection.

For these men, also, Rome is Italy. They know nothing of the country, save only as an appendage to the great metropolis; a passive and not very strenuous auxiliary to Roman greatness. Italy was one with Rome so long only as that city was identic with the world. Except as the first province of the empire, no one ever heard of Italy as having an existence of its own. It never exhibited any unity of either action or purpose; it never originated anything, save only disorganising Guelphism. Strong symptoms of vitality,—the rebound, as it were, of old Roman energy,—developed

themselves in mediæval republicanism here and there, at Florence especially, and at Venice; but never a tendency to cohesion and harmony: anything like Italian nationality never was in the nature of things; hence the cutting conclusion—it never can be.

So many different ways there are of reading history!

Unquestionably Italy has long been unconscious of its own being; is so still to an incredible extent. Hardly a deep, intuitive poet, like Dante, in the fourteenth century—hardly a keen, precocious thinker, like Macchiavello in the sixteenth, could be found, to whom this word “Italy” conveyed any clear, definite meaning. Even at the present day, nineteen out of twenty among the living Italians are ignorant of their own appellation, and use it with hardly any discrimination or precision.

Still the idea exists—no matter wherefrom sprung, no matter how far spread—the idea that there *is* an Italy, entitled to the enjoyment of a united, independent existence, destined to a mission of its own, to a share in the common destinies of the human race. Scarcely any one of the men of the present generation but can bear witness to the rapid growth and development of that redeeming idea.

There may, indeed, be something terribly true in the assertion of those who reject as improbable all that is simply unprecedented. The moral world may be subject to laws as uniform and impreterible as the material. As we are not likely ever to see the sun rising from the west, so may the Jews never again be gathered round the Temple of Jerusalem, so may never the

Italians live to realise that fond dream first attributed to Julius II., and see the last of the "barbarians" out of the country.

That fond dream, however, that idea of nationality, with all its vagueness—to be or not to be realised to all eternity—has, however, become universal, uppermost, clearly inextinguishable.

It were idle, perhaps, to attempt to trace that idea to its first recondite sources. It was not merely such stern and exalted intellects as Dante's and Alfieri's, that the thought of their country's humiliation inspired with their sublime and touching disdain of the world; it was not only such deep and teeming brains as Macchiavello or Lorenzo de' Medici, that fretted and raged against a coincidence of fatal circumstances, against an aggravation of evils which no human foresight could anticipate, no human endeavour avert.

Italian patriotism, such as it is now, with many a mere matter of instinct, made up of vain repining and vague longing, always harboured in the heart of the great and good—always was the test of loftiness and gentleness in that weary Italian land.

Even such amiable triflers as Ariosto or Berni never happen in the midst of their frolicsome narratives to stumble, as it were, on that sacred subject—the name of Italy never comes to their lips—without at once sobering them. The vein of irresistible mirth suffers sudden intermission, and the gladsome notes sink into a long plaintive strain of "*Italia! Italia!*"—a strain of woe familiar to Italian ears since the days of Petrarch.

But with the poets and thinkers of former ages, the sorrows of Italy were, in a great measure, mere pro-

phetic abstraction. The most far-sighted could hardly be aware of the real extent of the evil. They hardly knew what to dread or wish. Their mournful strain arose not so much from a sense of present dejection, as from a foreboding of sorrows to come. Theirs was a dirge for dying, not for dead Italy.

When Julius II. first dreamt of preaching a crusade against the "barbarians," these were still, so to say, strangers in the land. The fiery odes of Petrarch, and the good lances of Alberico di Barbiano, of Braccio and Sforza, had driven them beyond the Alps with ignominy nearly two hundred years before. They had now, it is true, once more come to the charge;—once more they had poured in from west, and south, and north, by land and sea. They had startled Italy by their headlong fury, by their wanton ferocity. Italy had been taken by surprise. She was stunned, not overthrown. She had favoured their onset by unnatural feuds and dissensions. But for the rest, her strength, they fancied, was still unbroken. She had only to lift up her hand—so it were only with one heart and mind—and the invading hordes would still be crushed.

Alas! when did Italy ever act with one mind and heart? The proud Julius II. died of impotent rage. The Italians took part, some with France, some with Spain, till, at last, all Italy laid her arms at the feet of the fortunate Austrian, in 1530.

All the interval between Julius II. and Pius VI., between Charles V. and Napoleon, was for that country a long agony. Italy was dying, dying by inches, dying unconsciously. The chill of death was at the heart; but by an unnatural anomaly from the wonted course

of nature, symptoms of vitality were still discernible at the extremities. Milan and Naples were lost ; but Venice and Genoa still stood magnanimous wrecks of mediæval Italian fortune ; and Rome, papal Rome, still preserved some of its old prestige, the vain shadow of spiritual sovereignty.

Moreover—and that was yet a third style of supremacy—men still looked up to Italian genius ; for political annihilation had not yet brought with it mental prostration and degeneracy.

These circumstances contributed to keep up the sad illusion of an Italian existence. The foreign ruler was permanently settled in Lombardy, the centre of Italian life in modern times ; he lorded it over both Sicilies ; and from these his head-quarters, his nod was law at Florence and Rome. He kept the remaining states in continual alarm by open threats, by perfidious intrigues ; and these had no defence against him besides the most selfish, subservient, pusillanimous policy.

All this for nearly three centuries. At the breaking out of the French Revolution in 1789, the death-blow was scarcely needed. Napoleon, in 1797, or his conquerors in 1814, blotted out Venice and Genoa, the last states of genuine Italian growth : 1820 and 1831 stripped even Naples, Piedmont, and Rome,—those foreign structures of the Holy Alliance on Italian ground,—of their tinsel of nominal self-existence, by throwing them helplessly, for very life, on Austrian protection. From the Alps to the sea, the Austrian made himself at home. Where he was not to-day, he might be expected to-morrow. All the princes still bearing the name of “Independent” were only the

first of his vassals. Compelled by him, even when not prompted by natural inclination, to arbitrary measures, they engaged in a perpetual struggle with their subjects; thus putting themselves at the mercy of an overbearing ally, who used them as blind instruments of his anti-national policy. Their weakness and servility abroad were only commensurate with their arrogance at home. An Austrian minister at Turin or Florence, an English admiral or American commodore at Naples, were more than sufficient to bully an Italian potentate into abject submission; and this not merely from the immense disproportion between the contending parties, as from an intimate misgiving in the heart of those Tuscan, Sardinian, or Sicilian despots, that any attack from without would be the infallible signal for a general commotion within, that hardly one of their subjects—hardly one of their very minions—but would be sure to turn against them, would loudly exult at least, if he did not actually aid, in their humiliation and defeat.

Every one of those Italian states presented the melancholy spectacle of a "house divided against itself;" and it was especially this deep-rooted animosity between the government and the people that made Italy Austrian throughout. It was a state of things to make many a patriot wish for an actual annexation of those mere Austrian dependencies into the Austrian monarchy. The Roman, Neapolitan, or Sardinian governments were, in fact, Austrian "with a vengeance."

To what extent of utter helplessness the princes of Italy had fallen, they knew not themselves,—the Holy Alliance had no adequate idea. The experience

of the last thirty years has at last made it clear to the world.

This universal conviction that all was lost—that the brightest Italian diadem was merely the badge of Austrian lieutenancy, gave Italian patriotism some scope and consistency. Nationality was raised into a prominent idea.

It was by her foreign oppressor himself that Italy had been made aware of the enormity and irreparable-ness of her loss, aware of the doom that awaited her, and of the necessity of a combined effort to escape it. The Italians had come to this at last, that they must all be crushed utterly, or must assert their rights to a united existence.

After all the efforts of 1848-49, the question still presents the same formidable, inevitable alternative.

All revolutionary attempts from 1820 to 1848, the demands for a French charter or a Spanish constitution set up at Naples or in Piedmont in 1820-21, the attacks upon priestly government in Romagna ten years later, were absolutely nothing but preliminary steps by patriots who did not consider themselves sufficiently strong to take up the national contest.

During these last thirty years, the Italians had only been feeling their way. They cared very little, and understood even less, about the representative forms of Transalpine freedom. The thorn in their side was plainly the foreigner. They tried him by indirect attacks, by a feint upon the Bourbon, or the Pope, at Naples, at Rome, at Turin. Before they were fairly on their guards, down he came upon them; and this

ubiquity of the Austrian, this promptness and decision of his movements, this omnipresence and omnipotence, ought, if anything, to have, as it actually had, the effect of simplifying the question and identifying Italian interests.

At the time in which the national feeling for the first time began to assume colour and shape, in 1814, these were the main obstacles it had to overcome,—the armed power of foreign dominators, the want of good faith, the jealousy and timidity of the native Italian princes, and the apathy and supineness of the mass of the people.

Those partial insurrections of 1820 and 1831, their tragical results upon individuals, and the consequent aggravation of hard, senseless, suspicious despotism—those eight-and-twenty years of hard-won experience—had to a great extent done away with the two last-named difficulties. Before 1848, a very great part of the population, at least of the towns, had been gradually aroused; and some of the Italian princes had, by a very skilful management on the part of moderate patriots, by artful appeals to their pride, to their natural love of independence, or by the strong development of public opinion, or, at last, by unforeseen and extraneous motives, been reassured and converted, reconciled or compelled, won over, in short, to the national cause.

The two powerful sovereigns of Naples and Piedmont especially felt it in their hearts even more than they would have wished to avow it: there was no escape from Austrian thralldom, save only in the arms of their subjects.

The Italians were now, therefore, more than ever in the presence of the only remaining enemy, the Austrian; but with him they knew all compromise was out of the question. It was, or would be, between them, sooner or later, a matter of life and death.

Be it understood, the word "Austrian" is here employed as emblematic of all the extraneous evils that gravitate upon Italy. The foreign enemy Italian nationality had, and will ever have, to contend with, was not Austria alone, with all the resources of her colossal empire,—the real enemy was that iron fatality of the treaties of 1814, to which Italy, Poland, and some other hapless nations, were no party, and which not only all the established governments, but every man who had only a penny at stake dependent on the maintenance of order and peace, was equally interested, equally determined to perpetuate.

France could pass from one to another dynasty, and even to no dynasty at all if she wished it, without disturbing that European balance about which all the "fuss" was made. The great powers tried once to interfere with the matters of that country, and saw what they had to gain by it. But the Neapolitans or the Piedmontese could seek no redress against their government without interference on the part of Austria; nor could they resist the aggression of Austria with any success without kicking the beam. The disturber of the peace, no matter what flagrant iniquity he might be smarting and writhing under, was a common enemy. Woe to him if he relied on the sympathy—away with the sickly word!—but on the justice and charity of his Christian brethren. He must fight his way against all

odds, until, at least, he can prove that there is less danger in acknowledging than in resisting his claims.

It was even so that France had her own way in 1789. A nation can still in our days make its own destinies, but it must be either in a manner consonant with the destinies of mankind, or with a firmness of will capable of bending the very chains of this common fate.

True enough, Greece and Belgium had already known how to wrench from the reluctant hands of diplomacy exceptional modifications of those fatal treaties of 1814 in their favour. But the Italians were aware that they had to deal with a far more powerful and more determined antagonist than either the Sultan or the King of the Netherlands. They knew that Austria would run any desperate chance, would risk all, sooner than relinquish her grasp of the Lombardo-Venetian provinces; they knew that theirs was a complicate question, or, what is exactly the same thing, that their enemies had no lack of means of representing it as such, and of making out a strong case against them; that a struggle for emancipation on their part must, unless it could rely on an almost miraculous rapidity of success, soon involve them in manifold difficulties, and lead to a universal outbreak of hostilities.

In a general European war, they knew they would lose all control over their own destinies: they would, as during the campaigns of Napoleon, be ravaged and trampled, and end by falling an easy prey to the conqueror.

Every friend of peace was, at heart, a foe to Italy; and would continue so, until Italy could make her

start, having on her side that only acknowledged and consecrated right of our times—the right of the strongest.

Other unforeseen and arduous obstacles developed themselves in the course of the late mournful events, which showed but too clearly how much Italian nationality will have to undergo, how much to overcome, before its cause is sanctified by success. Enough that it was “Italy *versus* Europe,” and although the odds may not in reality be so fearful as they sound in words; although in truth Italy—or, for that matter, any nation, provided it be only *willing*, can make her will good against all odds—although Europe had a variety of other matters to settle, and the less interested parties soon get weary of a struggle against a nation that shows itself to be terribly in earnest; although even the most inveterate utilitarianism is apt in the end to be carried away by admiration in sight of that most sublime of earthly objects—a man, or set of men, bravely wrestling with Fate—still the strife was, in the case of Italy, sufficiently momentous to call forth all the energies of a divided and enervated nation.

The Italian problem remains always on the same terms since many centuries: it will only find its solution when all Italy be sufficiently aware of the supreme importance of going to work with one mind and one heart.

All Italy felt this: every man with a sane mind in Italy, I mean, knew and felt this, and kept quiet. From 1814 to 1844 enough had been done to demonstrate the total inefficiency of violent means. Even all attempts previous to the latter epoch had been merely initiatory

and experimental; they had been more and more ephemeral and unimportant. The revolutionary spirit in Italy seemed to have lost in breadth what it had in reality gained in intensity. It had acquired distinctness and consistency, but had also learned caution and discretion. It began to understand its true position, and knew how to bend to necessity. The party that had brought those revolutions to pass, who had had recourse to physical force, to secret conspiracy, to partial insurrection; whose undaunted perseverance, and whose very failures, sufferings, and sacrifices, had had such luminous effects in stirring up the dormant energies of the people, felt now that their work was done, and allowed free scope for more deliberate and methodical operations.

Carbonarism was long since out of date. *Young Italy* closed her martyr-mission with the appalling tragedy of the Bandiera.

Henceforth legal opposition—moral force was the order of the day. Italy could only conquer by union—revolution must, therefore, begin by conciliation.

Mazzini, still an idol in the heart of many, was, however, set aside as a dangerous, unpractical man. Not that he had been averse to compromise at the outset. In his famous address to Charles Albert of Savoy, in 1831, he seemed to think it still possible for that prince to retrieve the fatal past, and to aspire to the crown of Italy by throwing down the gauntlet to Austria and putting himself at the head of the national party.* But Charles Albert did not listen to him at

* "A Carlo Alberto di Savoia, Un Italiano," 1831. See "Prose Politiche di Giuseppe Mazzini," p. 14. 2d edition. Genoa, 1849.

the time. There was war between that king and young Italy; a war from which the latter party only desisted when it had exhausted all means of offence. Baffled in his expedition of Savoy in 1834, defeated in Romagna, in Calabria, during all successive attempts, heart-broken at the result of that cruel tragedy of the Bandiera in 1844 (July 25th), Mazzini, himself, seemed at last to feel that his day was gone by. He sat himself down in London, with a few obscure partisans, perplexed, lost in contemplation of the signs of the times. The tragic catastrophe of those two heroic brothers, Bandiera, with which his name was ominously associated, had taken him by surprise. The first communication of Attilio, the elder of the two brothers, resigning, as it were, the whole of the Austrian fleet into his hands, startled him. He looked in vain among the scattered and disheartened partisans he had been at such trouble to rally around him, for the means of a prompt co-operation with those brave youths, and of furtherance of their venturous scheme. The Bandiera, too long held in suspense, and strongly suspected, had to seek their safety in a precipitate flight to Corfu, where, in a fit of disgust, unwilling to give up their faith in him, yet unable to receive any aid from his associates, without his knowledge, or indeed against his express wish, they hurried to their doom at Cosenza, with their dying breath assuring him of their undying devotion.*

* See "Ricordi dei Fratelli Bandiera e dei loro compagni di martirio in Cosenza," London, Oct. 1844, and reprinted in Mazzini's "Prose Politiche," p. 166, Genoa, 1849. Attilio Bandiera, it seems, put himself in communication with Mazzini in 1842 (Aug. 14). He and his brother were compelled to desert the Austrian fleet, and to

Nor did Mazzini only desist from all violent attempts after that cruel Calabrian execution; not only did he frankly and manfully disavow all participation in the riots of Romagna of 1845,* but he condemned himself to a dignified silence during the whole of that and the following year; and when he again made himself conspicuous in the early part of 1848, it was only to acknowledge that a change had come over public opinion—that “there was no party in Italy except the *national party*”—that “all questions as to forms of internal policy would be put off till after the close of the war of independence”—that “the hope of finding in Charles Albert an emancipator had to a great extent done away with the sad reminiscences of 1821 and 1833.”† He was even the first to propose measures of conciliation and compromise; sought an interview with Gioberti, Mamiani, and their associates in Paris; made a formal renunciation of the “more narrow views” of young Italy (these are his own words), and gave out new

take refuge in Corfu, before May 1844. In that very month they were meditating a descent either upon Calabria or Romagna. The project was, however, given up owing to Mazzini's dissuasions. Mazzini sent from London an Italian exile, by name Ricciotti, with his last instructions; these instructions, we are told, were of a nature to give the Bandiera and their friends no hope of success. And yet the expedition to Calabria was resolved upon almost immediately upon Ricciotti's arrival, and Ricciotti himself was among its leaders. This is sufficient to show, notwithstanding the mystery that involves the whole of that bloody transaction, what two-edged tools these were Mazzini was playing with.

* See “*Due Parole sugli eventi recentemente occorsi negli Stati Romani.*” London, 1845. “*Prose Politiche,*” p. 215.

† Mazzini's “*Letter to Guizot,*” London, Jan. 14, 1848. “*Prose Politiche,*” p. 235.

plans for a "National Association," which should adjourn all extraneous questions, and join the patriots of all political colours or principles for the coming national death-struggle.*

All this from Mazzini, from a man too long committed to extreme measures, too long the representative of "physical force"—a man, too, whose inflexibility of mind, whose iron consistency have never been called in question—an incorruptible man, never actuated by views of personal advantage or ambition, inaccessible to all mean feelings of jealousy and resentment.

But, as we have seen, the day was not favourable to Joseph Mazzini. The blood of the Bandiera, however innocent he might be believed of it, rose between him and his former partisans. Even in Romagna, the head-quarters of insurrection, his best friends had long deserted him.† Many, it is true, were won back by his profession of a more rational policy in his "Programme for a National Association;" but the faith of most Italians in his practical talents, or in his fortune, was shaken. No one was unmindful of his important efforts to mature the great national crisis; yet that crisis was now about to take place, and if not absolutely without him, at least in obedience to views with which he differed widely, which he had hitherto opposed to the best of his powers.

* "Programma dell' Associazione Nazionale Italiana," March 5, 1848. "Prose Politiche," p. 246.

† See the despatch of Sir John Hamilton, Florence, Sept. 2, 1846. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. p. 25. "The liberal party in Romagna has yielded to the advice of the leading men in that (the moderate) interest, Sardinian as well as other Italians, and are disposed quietly to await the good intentions of the sovereign pontiff," &c. &c.

There were now other agencies at work in Italy; the public mind acknowledged the sway of other masters. These were especially Cesare Balbo, Gino Capponi, Terenzio Mamiani, Massimo d'Azeglio, and, mightier than all, that great apostle of expediency, the Abate Vincenzo Gioberti.

These men, and Gioberti in the loudest tone, proposed at first, not merely a conciliation of all parties—not merely a cessation from all hostilities against national princes, but even adjournment of the great contest with foreign dominators.

The object of all their endeavours was to bring Italy to a unanimity of mind and heart, to bring all conflicting opinions to form one opinion, and give it all the utterance that the law of circumstances would allow. The whole theory developed by Gioberti in his "*Primato Civile e Morale degl' Italiani*," published in 1843, seemed to amount to a thorough adoption of "non-resistance" principles. The battles of Italy were to begin by a cessation of hostilities. The revolution was to be preceded by a universal mutual amnesty. He wished for a mental and moral regeneration, to which all classes, all governments should equally be invited to co-operate for a peaceful reform, in which not only the native princes, the pope and clergy, and all the monastic orders, but even the rulers of Lombardy, could equally participate. By an overstrained optimism, he found it possible to allow the continuation of all that existed—of all that for the moment admitted of no possible material change. He thought a moral redemption compatible with all the powers that were; where that redemption would lead, time would show.

Gioberti thought that too much energy had hitherto been wasted in movements which had only tended to disunite. Redemption was to be the work of love; and when effected by such means, not only would it never endanger the peace of the world, but would enable a gifted nation to confer upon the world those signal benefits which, owing to a natural pre-eminence of genius, it had so often to acknowledge from Italy in former ages.

There was much merely specious in Gioberti's theory; there was much of that insincerity, of that fulsome adulation, of that "justification of means by the end," which Jesuitism, for so many years rampant in Italy, had made but too prevalent in that ill-fated country. Never was there a more consummate arch-Jesuit than Gioberti, as we shall often have occasion to prove, though no man's intentions were ever more upright and generous. He himself soon saw good cause to modify those ultra-philanthropic views of his. The enmity raised against him by the sly Jesuits, who saw through the flimsiness of his schemes—who could not, would not be propitiated even by all the subtle arguments of their crafty panegyrist; the bloody executions in Naples, and the aggravation of the iron rule in Lombardy, caused him to come to some exceptions against those powers of evil in his "*Prolegomeni al Primato*," which first came into light at Brussels in 1845. He felt from the beginning the extent of his powers. Those who had refused to fall in with his conciliatory views—Austria, Loyola, and all their friends and abettors—were put out of the pale of Italian nationality; the Bourbon of Naples, and some other incorrigible princes,

were gravely admonished; and Gioberti was thus brought into contact with Balbo, d'Azeglio, and others, partisans of an equally pacific, but bolder and more enlightened policy. The so-called "Moderate" party acquired, by Gioberti's accession, a more definite consistency of views and purposes.

The theory of these patriots could be reduced simply to the following terms:—

"Given in Italy from twenty to twenty-five millions of friends, and only one enemy, how all the friends might be made to co-operate to the expulsion of the common foe?"

The theory admitted of no exception, so far as countrymen were concerned; it rested on the abjuration of all retrospective animosities; it was the opening of a new leaf—the ushering in of a new political phasis. It did not suppose in any Italian heart the possibility of hostile feelings against the cause of the country. If ever local, dynastic, or private interests, unfavourable precedents, or other causes might incline a prince, a courtier, a priest, or soldier, to consider his own advantage dependent on, or his power bound to, the cause of the foreign enemy, this must needs arise either from perversion of judgment or from the worry and vexation of former dissensions. The erring ones might and ought to be reclaimed; the brotherly hand of reconciliation must be tendered to those whom rancour, suspicion, or jealousy, had alienated. Let by-gones be by-gones; brotherhood with all Italians—with the most reckless despot, with his very worst minion and satellite, if so be they will only listen to reason, and accept the new pledge of brotherly union.

"Long live the Republic!—Death to no man!" cried Parini in days of Jacobinical anarchy and bloodshed at Milan. "Long live Italy, and peace to all Italians!" was to be the watchword nowadays.

The revolution was to be inaugurated without a single deed of violence to any Italian,—with the utmost regard for the interest, for the self-love of all.

It was a plausible scheme—excellent, perhaps, if it had not been too obvious and easy. It was a revolution without a revolt—a conquest without a war—a bloodless victory of right against might.

Such a consummation the world never witnessed; it had no faith in such.

The scheme had its own practicable good side nevertheless; and so far also its own period of signal success. Gioberti had converted the clergy, both regular and secular; Balbo had won over some of the princes, namely, those of the house of Savoy; and d'Azeglio, by a rare display of moral courage, which may have splendid effects hereafter, had shown how far opinion may be emancipated under the most senseless and bigoted despotism. Conciliation on the part of these liberals led to concession on the part of the princes. In more than one of the Italian states, chiefly in the north, a good understanding began to spring up.

It was Charles Albert of Sardinia who gave the first example. He was an ambitious and irresolute, but, as it proved in the end, a well-meaning, generous prince. The Italians, as they too often do, had given him credit for a depth of mind—they had given him blame for a dark simulation—which proceeded from sheer timidity and uncommunicativeness. His real character was

misconceived throughout. Mazzini has depicted it with powerful, indeed, but terrible truth.* Crushed under the weight of the cruel past, filled with ardent aspirations for the future, he was deterred by that "conscience which maketh cowards of us all," from taking any decisive measure; for he felt he could rely on the faith neither of friends nor enemies. 1821 was ever thrown at his face. That unfortunate slip of youth and inexperience, that *harum-scarum* movement, in which he was made the scape-goat for all the sins and blunders of a rash and discordant party—had set him for ever at war with Italy. On the other hand, Austria and the Holy Alliance harboured no good-will towards him. The foreign yoke proved galling to him even more than to the meanest of his subjects. He fretted, he chafed, but he still held his peace and temporised. That he had faith and moral courage sufficient to venture all in order to win all—to stake Piedmont for a chance of the crown of Italy—his staunchest friends will not assert. He sought, it would be difficult to say whether a comfort or a screen in the observance of religious practices; he solaced his dark humours by the display of warlike forces and the glance of military array. He prayed, he paraded and drummed. Sly priests, oily Jesuits, and starched field-officers, shared his favours alternately. He was thought to be playing a part, whilst he was only an instrument in the hands

* See Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti intorno all' Insurrezione Lombarda e alla guerra regia del 1848. Estratto dall' Italia del Popolo," Bruxelles, 1850, pp. 12-14. It is the same work afterwards translated by George Sand into French, under the new title, "Republique et Royauté en Italie," Paris, 1850; also into English, London, 1850. Gilpin.

of his advisers. "Some of his friends," says Mazzini, "whispered that he was threatened with insanity." More truly, beset with a fitful melancholy, the result of latent bilious disease.

So it was from 1831 to 1846. So it would have been to the end of time, had it not been for some trivial differences with the imperial government, first on the subject of railways, then about some matters of custom and finances, hardly worth at the present time to be inquired into, in which he deemed himself thoroughly in the right, and which afforded him only the shadow of a pretext for shaking off all allegiance, and — what he had never lost sight of in all his waverings and misgivings — assuming the tone and attitude of an independent prince.*

That little matter of "wine and salt" was a great gain for Italy. Ambition made a breach in the king's breastplate of cautiousness; it gave him into the hands of opinion. He listened to its leaders; he consulted with Balbo; he read Gioberti. The Jesuits were removed from his side; the Carbonari, his former allies, were restored to his councils.

Sardinia was in the way of progress. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, always a weak and improvident ruler, lenient even to immorality, was already too far committed by long-established popularity to remain behind-hand in the way of liberal reforms. Tuscany had invariably been the country of half-measures, even such as were now in immediate contemplation.

* See Mr. Abercromby's despatch from Turin, Jan. 12, 1847, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. p. 29; also, March 30th and April 5th, *ibid.* pp. 33, 34.

Now every one in Italy, prince or subject, very well knew, that if Piedmont or Tuscany proposed, it was for Austria alone to dispose. The adoption of any humane and enlightened measure without the sanction of the imperial government had the effect of an open rebellion against it. Every public benefit, every approach to liberal institutions, *octroyed* either at Turin or Florence, was, from that very cause, hailed, not in proportion to its real and immediate value, but as an earnest of anti-Austrian tendencies on the part of the donor.

As a proof of the real aim of all those partial movements in Italy, it may be observed that, in states in which every branch of administration was the prey of corruption, in which there existed no security for the liberty of the subject, the first demands of the people were not for redress of wrongs, or cessation of arbitrary rule, but were invariably limited to "Liberty of the press!" and "Civic guards!"—the emancipation of opinion and popular armament. All the Italians were in need of was, a tongue to declare war against Austria, and a sword to wage it.

These demands the "converted" princes were as yet loth to comply with. They would at first go no farther than to introduce a few salutary reforms in every branch of administration; to organise municipal authority upon a liberal elective system, which might train their subjects to a sense of the dignity and responsibility of representative government; and, above all, to throw open the courts of law to the public, and suffer all the might of opinion to bear on the dispensation of justice. As to further concessions, such especially as the Italians more loudly called for, the princes well

knew that Austria would not fail to make them an immediate *casus belli*, if she was in a position for hostilities; nor did they deem themselves secure from dangerous extremities from the rashness of their own subjects, when trusted with those perilous engines of offence.

Public opinion made tremendous headway, notwithstanding; and there was no mistaking the direction the popular tide set into. In October 1846, the centennial commemoration of the expulsion of the Austrians from Genoa lighted up bonfires all along the Apennines. The Italians did not as yet attempt to imitate that glorious achievement. They could not drive the Austrians from Lombardy, but gave the palpable hints of their obnoxiousness there. A mere act of clemency of the new pope was construed into a design to drive all foreigners out of Italy. The populace at Ancona did not know how to celebrate the papal amnesty otherwise than by cries, "Down with the foreigners!" and insults to their consular agents.* The governments made but feeble attempts to moderate this vast exhibition of popular feelings. The courts at Turin and Florence had no slight trouble to pacify the incensed representatives of their former protector. What could they? The proscribed and disaffected from the Lombardo-Venetian provinces found not only a safe refuge, but a hearty welcome, under the Sardinian standard. Grey-headed exiles, notorious old offenders were seen walking the streets of Turin and Genoa —

* Consul Moore's despatch, Ancona, August 26, 1846, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. p. 24; also, Sir George Hamilton's, Florence, Sept. 2, 1846. Ibid. p. 25.

it said, to the honour of the unfortunate king, notwithstanding flagrant outrages against his person in less auspicious times. As for Rome and Tuscany, they were no sooner freed from Austrian thralldom, than they fell helplessly into the hands of their subjects. The most ardent partisans of "young Italy" joined hands with Carbonari of the old school. There was a universal, mutual, sincere reconciliation—a fusion of parties. In this good understanding lay the people's force. The old cry, "Italy! Italy!" was set up; and whose fault was it if it sounded like a death-knell to Italian cars?

Against this general, consoling harmony in the northern division of the country, it is true, there was something jarring in the south. King Ferdinand of Naples, deeply committed in the ways of benighted absolutism, bound, as he deemed himself, to the policy of Austria and Russia, all stained with the recent blood of the Bandiera, battled *à l'outrance* with storming opinion. He listened to bigoted advisers; he put his trust in his few thousand foreign hirelings, in the demoralised native soldiery, which he had been at no slight trouble to attach to his person.

To those who held out the example of Sardinia and Tuscany, he answered that his subjects were, and had been since the restoration of 1814, in possession of those very institutions, the granting of which was made the theme of endless rejoicings at Turin and Florence,—an assertion sufficiently correct, for the French code of laws was, with some modifications, still in vigour in the kingdom of Naples; the question there was simply reduced to the fitness of the men charged with the

administration of those provident laws. The code there, the patriots said, but only to impose on the dulity of careless lookers-on—only to cloak the doings of the arbitrary ruler, who knew too well to frustrate the beneficial effects of those institution the appointment of unscrupulous executors, whom favoured and promoted in proportion to the flag corruption of their characters, and to their ready servieney to his tyrannical behests.*

Up to the middle of 1846, matters had borne more sinister aspect in Rome, where Gregory gave signs of a stubborn and unrelenting disposition. But so far as he was concerned, the testiness of pontiff was anything but unwelcome to many a patriot. There were men in Italy who had long utterly despaired of the papacy, who were glad that it proceed in the way of error and perdition. They deemed it too old a fabric, and too corrupt, to be the work of demolition. They thought it the height of hypocrisy to show any regard or forbearance towards the clergy, it was thought, might still be formed either as friends or foes. The Catholic religion still some hold upon men's minds; but the ten sovereignty of the pope was a thing exploded. The priest's cause was to be gradually separated from the clergy to be weaned from a system as injurious to the true interests of their order as to the very existence of the country.

No European power, it was then thought, with

* Massari, "I casi di Napoli dal 29 Gennaio 1848 in poi. tere Politiche," &c. p. 15. Turin, 1849. Ricciardi, "Cenni intorno agli ultimi casi d' Italia," p. 57. Italia, 1849.

exception of Austria, and she from pure views of conservatism, had any interest in upholding the court of Rome: her destinies were interwoven with those of the Austrian empire; she could by no chance survive the shock that was to level Austria with the dust.

Subsequent events have proved the fallaciousness of all these sanguine expectations. The pope has found more friends than he would himself have dreamt of. But in 1846, France had not reached the acme of republican sublimity; and as for Spain or Naples, no great apprehensions were entertained of their quixotic championship.

Gregory XVI., it then seemed, had signed the death-warrant of the papacy. To the most sober thinkers, indeed, it seemed an impossibility that he could be suffered to die on his throne.* Death, nevertheless, providentially removed the wrathful old priest, and Pius IX. was raised to the papal chair (June 16, 1846).

The world has by this time come to a sufficiently clear understanding respecting the character of this unfortunate priest, and has set a right value upon the amnesty and other humane and would-be liberal measures which signalised his accession. Those measures

* "At the death of Gregory XVI. the situation of the Roman States was so critical, and the public discontent so menacing, that everybody felt the necessity of putting an end to them."—*Quarterly Review*, clrv. p. 215. And elsewhere, "That system, indeed, must have fallen, had Gregory himself lived a short time longer," clxiii. p. 235. "No naval or military precautions will be able to stifle public indignation:" Mr. Scarlett's despatch, Florence, June 18, 1846, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. p. 2. See, also, Whiteside's "Italy in the Nineteenth Century," Preface, p. 10.

were slow and insufficient, in many cases specious and nugatory. The reluctant hand of the timid, crafty, bigoted priest was visible through the concessions of the well-meaning, perhaps, but weak and vain, irresolute prince. Inadequate as they were, and out of keeping with the spirit of the age, Pius's reforms were further frustrated by the bad faith and iniquity of their executors; utterly powerless to redeem the country from deep-rooted, all-pervading abuse. They were, above all, circumscribed within the narrow limits of the pope's own pusillanimous mind, who had from the very outset pledged himself to the maintenance of all the privileges and immunities of the clergy, and who could not see how the spirit of the age would soon put to a severe test the determination he professed to have taken, to resist all innovation, however harmless in itself, which might be deemed incompatible with the principle of a sovereign hierarchy.

From the beginning there was mutual bad faith and wilful deception between Pius and Italy. The pope, "short-sighted and self-conceited,"* flattered himself that he could make Italian patriotism a prop to the Church. The patriots, hardly less blind, fancied they could use the pope as a tool to be broken on the first opportunity. We do not, indeed, think that many entertained the fell intention expressed by a Venetian old reprobate to Mr. Macfarlane of "cutting off the old fool's head;"† but most Italians were too true to

* "Quarterly Review," clxvii. p. 223.

† Macfarlane, "A Glance at Revolutionised Italy," vol. i. p. 17. London, 1849. This author professes to be *viscerato* in his love for Italy and the Italians; but on perusal of his work, his affections are found to be centred on the king of Naples and the minions of his court.

Alfieri's teaching, not to be aware that it was of the most vital importance for Italy that the "high-priest should ultimately be sent back to the fisherman's net."*

The Italian movement, in short, had already far proceeded, and could have reached its end, without the friendly help of a pope; nay, was sure to thrive best under the frowns of any man that had trod in the footsteps of Gregory; but since Pius had given, or was supposed to have given, hints of a better disposition, it was natural that a movement that had already dragged Charles Albert and Leopold of Tuscany along with it, should include even the Roman pontiff in its temporary and conditional adoption. It was certainly not unnatural, though questionable both as to honesty and expediency, that the Italians, beset as they were with towering difficulties, should find their advantage in flattering the Pope's "intense, imbecile vanity;"† that they should lead him on by stunning applause; that out of a zealous priest and clement sovereign—the utmost extent of his ambition—they should endeavour to represent him as an arch-reformer and agitator. It was natural for Gioberti—the precursor of this new Messiah—whose prophecies about the plenitude of the times, to be brought about by an Italian league, or Guelphish bond, with the successor of Alexander III. at its head—such as announced in his "Primato" only three years before—received such a signal confirmation by the phenomenon of a liberal pope; that he should so far forget all man's dignity as to tell the Italians that if they worshipped Pius IX. as an immortal being,

* "Il maggior Prete
Torni alla Rete."

† "Quarterly Review," clxv. p. 237.

and offered sacrifices to him as to a god, they would commit only a venial sin; that the pope was the real author of that wondrous movement that was then convulsing all Europe; that he was the Redeemer, the Creator of Italy.* (We blush to confess that such is too often the language of Italian adulation, and are sorry that it ever should have come from one of the leaders of public opinion, no matter how good and great the purpose to which it was made subservient.)

But, truly, it would have been difficult to conceive to what extent the well-assumed enthusiasm of the wily Italians for their new pope had imposed upon the whole world—Protestant no less than Catholic, hostile no less than friendly. The conceit of a reformer on the Vatican throne had something in it so novel and strange as to prove irresistible to the natural marvellousness of mankind! They “believed because it was incredible.” It would be amusing at the present day, were the sequel not too melancholy, to inquire upon what ground rested the charge laid upon the Popedom, amongst others, by that deep Lord Brougham, of its “being the origin of all the European convulsions.” In Italy, at least, Pius IX. originated nothing. With all his silly vanity and imbecility, we do not think the poor pope could justly be charged with inconsistency, had he always been allowed to speak and act as he actually intended. The beginning and end of his offence was, simply, that amnesty of the 17th of July, which he suffered his people to clamour for for more than a month; which, imperfect and conditional as it was at first, was matter of sheer necessity, and which, we are informed, Pius

* “Delle Condizioni Presenti e Future d’Italia, per Vincenzo Gioberti.” Paris, 1846.

only granted, after long solicitations, to a priest, by name Graziosi, his former tutor, "whose death was a loss not to his patron merely, but to Rome and Italy."* That amnesty had, nevertheless, the effect of placing him in the hands of the pardoned,—that is, of the liberal party. His lips were scarcely opened to utter the first word of forgiveness, when the Italian movement—that movement, as we have seen, based on universal amnesty and reconciliation—took hold of him. It was, in fact, the pope himself, or the papacy, that was *amnestied*. He was whirled along—unconscious—reluctant. It is fearful to think to what extent he was, from his very accession, mystified and practised upon. Italy never received any boon from him that was not actually wrested from him. The men, whose office it was to watch him, were bewildered by the perpetual instability of his purposes. Rome, that head-quarters of intrigue, never presented a more insoluble riddle to the looker-on. In more than one instance, decrees and measures, most strenuously opposed by the pope, were, nevertheless, issued and carried through, as if bearing the sanction of his seal and signature. There were adroit men about him, who did not scruple to personify him—wilfully to misinterpret or falsify his words.† Filippo

* "Il Papa Pio Nono, Note di Filippo de' Boni," p. 62. Capolago, 1850. For the terms of the amnesty, see "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. p. 21.

† Witness the ceremony of blessing the standards, previous to the departure of Roman volunteers to the war in Lombardy in April 1848.

"Ferrari, appointed general to these unorganised legions, wishes Pius IX. to bless his standards. The pope refuses.

"Ferrari insists; new, unconquerable refusal.

"No matter; the deputation sent to the Quirinal asserts that the

de' Boni, a violent republican and foe to the pope, has given a circumstantial account of poor Pius's backslidings; which, notwithstanding a considerable amount of virulence, often bears the mark of irrefragable truth.* The pope's mind, in more than one instance, broke through the magic ring of intrigue and falsehood that environed him; and then his admonition to the *Consulta* on the opening of its sessions on the 15th of November, 1847, "that they should not fancy themselves the embryo of a future legislation;" † his wrath at some wag from the crowd shouting out, "Long live the constitutional pope!" and similar occurrences, without number, gave sufficient intimation of the pope's consciousness of having been dragged too far, and of his determination to go no farther.

Those designing persons, who stood between him and his expectant people, endeavoured for a length of time to lay all the blame of the pope's wavering to the baneful influence of the Jesuits; and cried out loudly for their suppression. The works of Gioberti had lately aroused the dormant, though inextinguishable, hatred

Head of the Church, associating himself with all his heart to their brave hopes, *has prayed for their holy banners*; on this the bandits quit Rome."—*D'Arincourt*, "*L'Italie Rouge*," p. 56. Paris, 1850. We would not have quoted this writer, whose book is a mere tissue of gross and base falsehoods, if his assertions in this particular case were not strengthened by persons at that time enjoying free access at the Quirinal.

* "*Il Papa Pio Nono*," throughout.

† See the Pope's allocution in the "*Diario di Roma*," Nov. 16th, where, however, we are informed, the Pope's words and his tone were softened down by men who dreaded their effect on popular irritation. See Mr. Petre's despatch, Rome, Nov. 17, and Lord Minto's, Rome, Nov. 18, "*Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy*," part i. pp. 246, 250.

of the Italian people for that devoted community. Their hour had struck throughout the country. Turin was impatient to turn them out; Piacenza, Genoa, laid a rough hand upon them; Naples, itself, was compelled to give them up. The pope alone pertinaciously refused to the last to part with the obnoxious order.

With all these drawbacks, however, the pope's popularity continued unabated; and so long as he, from sheer helplessness and heedlessness of consequences, suffered it to be believed that the Court of Rome was liberalised, it was but too natural that he should give the tone to the policy to be pursued throughout Italy. He put an end to the eternal waverings and misgivings of Sardinia; he urged on Tuscany, and made it, in fact, imperious upon all governments, either to follow his own conduct in what was vaguely called the "way of progress," and which simply meant rebellion against Austria, or else to throw themselves unconditionally into the hands of the imperial power; thereby filling the measure of popular execration.

Two only of the Italian princes, and those quite harmless from sheer insignificance—the dukes of Parma and Modena—followed the latter course. The former, just arrived from Lucca, where ignominious defeat had brought his reign to a premature close; where he had given proofs of an arrogance, bad faith and cowardice, unexampled even in the annals of royalty (September 1847), had but lately ascended a throne vacated by the demise of Maria Louisa (December 1847); the latter was too far committed by the senseless, even more than ruthless, despotism of his father (dead since the 21st of January, 1846), to seek his safety anywhere but in the

perpetuation of the same system. Both of them summoned Austrian bayonets to their aid, rather to cover their retreat in the days of discomfiture, than with any hope of being able, even by the strength of these auxiliaries, to weather the gathering storms; and when the other Italian states made some attempts to bring about a federative union, by the preliminary stipulation of a commercial league, these bound themselves to an alliance with Austria; an act which, after long discussions during the autumn and winter of 1847, appears to have been concluded on the 24th of December of that year.*

In the south, King Ferdinand of Naples held out to the last, and made semblance of standing his own ground single-handed. Once more he startled the world with scenes of wanton butcheries in Calabria (September 1847). But alarming tidings from Sicily (January 12th, 1848), where his best troops met with a decisive and repeated check at Palermo, open insurrections in Calabria, at Salerno, under the very walls of the capital, and a great display of "moral force" at the very doors of his palace, at last inclined his ears to better counsels. It was, however, only when General Roberti, the commander of the castle of St. Elmo, refused to bombard the city, when Generals Statella and Filangieri made him aware of the necessity of yielding, that he could be prevailed upon to dismiss the detested Del Carretto, and to surround himself with men fit to reconcile him with his subjects; trusting with the formation of a new ministry one who was then thought the personification of the most pure and exalted—

* See the "Vienna Gazette," Feb. 13, 1848.

militant patriotism—the Cavaliere Bozzelli.* Such were the Italian princes—such the materials patriotism had undertaken to work upon. Fatal to the Italian cause as a friend even more than as an enemy, Ferdinand gave in to the prevailing spirit with a recklessness that partook of despair. Under a strong necessity of out-doing all that had been done at Turin and Florence, with a hope also, perhaps, of reclaiming the Sicilians, who were already in a position to enforce their exorbitant demands—he was the first to launch out that word “constitution,” which spread dismay in the councils of the moderate party throughout the Peninsula; purposely, as it was said of him, and as it might be thought of a cleverer man, to perplex his new allies of Rome, Piedmont, and Tuscany, to urge them on his turn, as he had been driven by them, and to bring on universal confusion by rash measures, which threatened the “slow and sure” system of Italian patriotism with sudden subversion,† (January 29th, 1848).

We need not repeat : reforms, concessions, the new-fangled statutes, of which successive experiment was made at Turin, Florence, and Rome, were, however, in themselves, nothing to the eyes of the Italians. There was nothing spontaneous, nothing indigenous to recommend them. We shall, perhaps, have occasion to turn our attention upon these improvised palladiums of liberty,

* Massari, “I casi di Napoli,” pp. 22, 23.

† “It is said that when he made up his mind to this course, having been previously so goaded and tormented by the diplomacy of his neighbours, Ferdinand said spitefully, ‘They have been driving me on; now I will drive them on,’ (Hanno voluto spingere a me, adesso spingerò io a loro).”—*Macfarlane’s “Revolutionised Italy,”* vol. i. p. 117.

inasmuch as one of them at least, that of Piedmont, has survived the wreck of Italian hopes. They were copies, and miserable copies, of the French charter of 1830, and came forth at the very moment when that short-lived document was about to be torn to tatters. It did not matter for the moment. The Neapolitan constitution, such as it was, was looked upon as the test of *nationalism*—the king's pledge to the Italian covenant.

It is difficult not to be sick of the eternal remarks of unfriendly writers about the fitness or unfitness of the Italian people for constitutions, implying a belief that the best school to train them to the enjoyment of free institutions consists in the continuation of the less than human despotism they have been so long groaning under.* "In Germany and Italy," it has been said, with rare felicity of expression, "a charter has been thrown from the windows like the head of an obnoxious vizier in a Turkish revolt."† True as the remark is, it does not, however, apply to Italy. The Neapolitans "were frantic with joy at the bare promise of a statute," not because they knew or guessed "how far it would meet with their hopes and wishes," but because that bare promise had the effect of a demonstration of a renunciation of Austria and her tenebrous allies. And Austria was evidently of the same opinion, for the king's intentions had to be carried into effect, in defiance to the earnest remonstrances of the Austrian and Russian ministers, backed then, as it seems, even by the agent of that misguided Prussia, who, throughout the course of these melancholy Italian affairs, never

* Macfarlane, *ut supra*.

† "Quarterly Review," clxv. p. 232.

understood her true interests, and ever played in the hands of those northern potentates that were preparing her own humiliation and enslavement *

A great point, the Italians felt it, had been carried; a great fact achieved—in peace and silence. Four of the principal Italian monarchies had cast off their Austrian fetters, and asserted their mastery over their own actions.

Nothing remained for the present but to see how far they could be drawn together by a permanent bond of union, to present them as a compact body before the European community, to bring foreign nations to recognise and respect Italy in them.

The seeds of this national union had already been sown long since. The Italians had, in sheer defiance to their despots, mustered up in literary and scientific associations. A trade and custom union had been freely discussed, and finally concluded at Turin on the 3d of November, 1847.† After the accession of Naples it was but easy to convert that merely commercial agreement into a political compact.

After the experiment of Italy itself, and, what is more flagrant, of Germany, it must be confessed that this federative work developes, in practice, greater difficulties than the framers of its theory anticipated. We hope, nevertheless, to be able to prove, so far at least as Italy is concerned, that such difficulties were purely

* See Lord Napier's despatch from Naples, Jan. 31, 1848; and Earl Westmoreland's, Berlin, Feb. 10th, 14th, 24th, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. 64, 73, 78.

† See the Declaration to that effect in the "Gazzetta di Genova," Nov. 8, 1847.

dynastic; that the Italian people, notwithstanding the scandal given by the natives of the Two Sicilies, were at heart united long since. Parma and Piacenza, Modena and Bologna, too sadly famed for their ample share in the old Guelph and Ghibelline feuds, had shown the very best spirit of harmony in the troubles of 1831. At the very dawn of the new Italian hopes, in 1846, Florence, anxious to efface all bitter remembrances, hastened to send back to Pisa those chains of the old Pisan harbour, which, taken from the emulous city in the darkest middle ages, had hung, a melancholy trophy, on her cathedral walls for centuries.*

Genoa and Turin, cities that were thought to hold together merely from the cementing power of despotism, gave signs of the most consoling reciprocation of good feelings from their very first assumption of the dignity of free existence. They proceeded hand in hand through all the disasters of two successive campaigns of 1848-49, when all means of coercion, all armed force, had been withdrawn; and if it is but too true that the former city manifested some symptoms of insubordination at different intervals, and ended by breaking out into open revolt, when the cause of Italy was despaired of in April 1849, it can at least be satisfactorily demonstrated that the scissure arose from no *municipal* wish for separation, but merely from a desire for a new experiment on democratical principles, in which the Genoese expected to be seconded, not by the people of the whole monarchy merely, but by all the rest of Italy.

* Massari, "I casi di Napoli," p. 66.

For the rest it will, we trust, be made sufficiently obvious, that the Italian people, notwithstanding the bickerings of the Lombards and Piedmontese respecting the choice of a capital, magnified as those evils have been by prejudiced parties, were anxious to form but one people: that the provincialism, or *particularismus* (to use a German expression), of rival seats of government, grounded merely on the petty ambition of a few hundred courtiers and *employés*, has nothing to do with the fierce rancours of ancient municipalism: that those rancours are really no longer in the way of national good understanding, and the new divisions that resemble them are only the result of recent injustice, or are fomented by personal ambition or party animosity: that provincialism, even if it were a serious obstacle to the *unity*, is not equally calculated to thwart the efforts of the Italians for a *union* of the country: that nothing, perhaps, has been more fatal to the cause of Italian federation than a departure from the views of the *Unionists* and a first step in the way of the *Unitarians*; when circumstances, in an evil moment, suggested the expediency of a *fusion* or *unification* of a northern Italian kingdom.

The Lombards and Piedmontese were sufficiently disposed to look upon each other as brethren at the opening of the year 1848. The moving part played by the Lombard exiles in the solemn celebration of the Constitutional Grant of Sardinia,* the sympathy evinced

* See the description of the festivities of Feb. 27, 1848, in Turin, in the "Mondo Illustrato," by Cesare Cantù, No. 9, 1848. Also, Mr. Abercromby's despatch, Turin, Feb. 28, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," p. 113.

in their behalf by the whole population of Piedmont, made it sufficiently evident that the joy of one branch of the Italian family could not be complete whilst another was left to mourn: the same kind brotherly feelings survived that long series of mutual wrongs, now expiated by common sufferings; and the unbounded hospitality tendered in Turin and Genoa to thousands of exiles; the eagerness of the whole population of Piedmont to join hands with their Lombard brethren, across the barrier that Austria has once more raised between them; the subventions sent to the sufferers from inundations at Brescia, and the words that accompanied them, are a sufficient earnest of the real disposition of the Italian people towards one another, however overlooked it may have been by short-sighted, or abused by selfish and unprincipled politicians.

The Italians were not, it is true, alive to the importance of that supreme movement; those, at least, who were charged with the destinies of the country were not sufficiently ready to comply with the demands of the multitude for an "Italian league." They thought that much had already been carried; that it was now merely a question of time. They did not as yet know how their domestic and peaceful arrangements would stand the trial of foreign aggression. That in the formation of a league lay their only means of virtual resistance was intelligible enough; and yet they were aware that their enemy would have recourse to all extremities, would run any risk, sooner than suffer this league to become a *fait accompli*. A *political* league might be construed into an infraction of the arrangements of 1814; Austria might have relied on

the support of all Europe in combating it. Thus the Italian politicians thought. Hence their delays and tergiversations ; hence their half-measure of a purely *commercial* league. An offensive and defensive alliance was only seriously proposed after the declaration of war in April and May 1848, when it was too late.

Austria saw the precariousness of her situation ; she resolved to surprise the Italians in the midst of their too-leisurely deliberations. She had already meditated an armed interference in Tuscany ; she was not without aggressive designs upon Sardinia ; but her determination was taken when the pope filled the measure of wrath by a decree providing for the organisation of a civic guard, on the 6th of July, 1847. The citizens of Bologna and Ferrara had already been mustered up into a national militia for the preservation of order, from the very January of the same year ; and the Austrian garrison of the latter-named place had already received repeated reinforcements, and taken a hostile attitude from that period ; but it was only after the decree of July 6, when the whole Roman population, and after that, it might be presumed, that of Tuscany and Piedmont, would be called to arms, that Austria resolved on her bold stroke of policy, by a conspiracy at Rome, and an open attack upon the town itself of Ferrara (July and August 1847).

Sensible persons never had much faith in Pius IX., as a pope, previous to that memorable occurrence : they can have none in him, as a man, since. Had there been only a spark of the soul of Alexander III., or of Julius II., in him—whatever may be said of the falsehood of the one and of the arrogance and ambition

of the other pope—that was the day for Italy and Rome; for his country and his Church.

The Austrian was the aggressor. Supposing even Metternich to have no part in the plot of cardinals, of prelates, and of old *sbirri*, against the reforming pontiff; supposing even the whole plot to have been a baseless fabrication,* got up with a view to throw Pius helplessly into the hands of the patriots (for the whole of that dark transaction is buried in hopeless mystery), the occupation of the city of Ferrara was a sufficiently flagrant outrage to justify immediate hostilities. The recent differences between the Czar and the Porte, on the subject of Hungarian refugees, go far to prove the immense advantage you gain upon an adversary, even in these days of might-the-only-right, by putting him clearly and thoroughly in the wrong. The sympathies of all the friends of justice, by a rare luck, coincided here with the interests of the lovers of peace.†

Austria was the peace-breaker. Had the pope stepped down from St. Peter's chair in the Vatican; had he raised the standard of redemption aloft, and appended a tri-color streamer to it; had he marched

* For a new version of the conspiracy of July 1847, see D'Arlicourt, "Italie Rouge," p. 30.

† "It was the dread of innovation that prompted the occupation of Ferrara—a measure in our opinion precipitate and impolitic; the dominions of the pope should have been held sacred from invasion; and the pretences, too, by which the measure is excused are most frivolous."—*Quarterly Review*, clxiii. p. 260 (Dec. 1847). "Had the pope declared war on Austria at the time of the occupation of Ferrara, a pretext had at least been afforded."—*Ibid.* clxv. p. 238 (June 1848). The writer had strangely changed his mind on the subject, a year later.—*Ibid.* clxx. p. 567 (Sept. 1849).

himself at the head of a national crusade, all Italy would have thronged on his footsteps. Austria had, at the time, no more than thirty-five thousand men in all Italy.* Subsequent events have shown how much could have been expected of the Lombardo-Venetian people; how zealously the pope would have been supported by all the minor clergy, consequently by all the otherwise inert mass of the rural population; with what earnest impatience the half-bigoted, half-ambitious Charles Albert was burning to declare himself the pope's champion and Italy's.†

It would have been a victory without a battle; but it was necessary, above all things, to proceed with resolution and expedition, to allow no time for the meddling of diplomacy; the name of Pius IX. was in itself a host. Even if the pope had not actually succeeded in ridding Lombardy of its foreign oppressors, he would have put a stop for ever to their further interference with himself or with any of his emancipated Italian allies. The National League would have become a well-established fact from that day, and the pope would have found himself at its head as naturally as in the days of old Italy.

But Pius IX. still lent his ears to the Jesuits about him. He was himself a Jesuit in all but the cunning; heartless, and therefore hopeless. He had not the

* See Consul-general Dawkins' despatches from Milan, Jan. 9, June 27, and Aug. 22, 1847, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. pp. 28, 64, 99, &c.

† See Mr. Abercromby's letters from Turin, Aug. 19, 24, 31, 1847. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," pp. 88, 92, 99. Also, Lord Minto's, Turin, Oct. 8, 9, 12, 15. Ibid. pp. 164, 165, 185, 186.

courage to banish one of the obnoxious cardinals from his councils ; even Lambruschini himself was necessary for the integrity of the Sacred College. In the integrity of that college, in Pius's estimation, lay all hopes for the preservation of the unity of the Church. Austria was also one of the daughters of the Church : some threats of a schism in Catholic Germany, artfully held out by Austrian agents, shook the little resolution Pius IX. would still be capable of. Naples was at that time still in the interests of despotism, and the pope suffered himself to be terrified by the imaginary league of the two Ferdinands, of Naples and Austria. The mean-spirited priest contented himself with a feeble protest ; he negotiated, he referred the matter to diplomatic arbitration. His Holy Ghost, for the time being, was that ill-fated Count Rossi, whose mission it was to bully him in Louis Philippe's name, and under pretence of a zealous friendship.

The count had come to Rome, in 1845, for quite a different object, and in quite another character and capacity, in the days of Pius IX.'s testy predecessor. Both the ambassador and his royal master were then advocates of opportune reform and cautious concession. But Pius IX. had outstripped them, and they were now alarmed at the consequences of their own suggestions. The idea of Italian nationality, in the abstract never very popular with either French or other foreign statesmen, in the present case fraught with so much danger to the European peace, had always been far from the contemplation of Louis Philippe's advisers. Recent differences with England on the subject of the Spanish marriages, had thrown them more decidedly into the

Austrian alliance. The part Rossi was now bidden to play at Rome amounted to positive hostility to the cause of Italy—to that very cause for the sake of which himself had been driven into exile in 1815.

What share Count Rossi had had in the elevation of Pius IX.,* how long and firmly he opposed “the indiscriminate amnesty, the formation of national guards, the convocation of a *Consulta* of laymen, and cautioned the pope in secret against granting these concessions,” few men are at the present moment in a condition to ascertain. Certain it is, that the belief was universally prevalent in Italy,† that he played a retrograde part in

* “Quarterly Review,” clxviii. p. 529; clxv. p. 215; clxiv. p. 224. Also Cochrane’s “Young Italy,” p. 59, and De Boni, “Il Papa Pio IX.,” p. 133. Also Mr. Scarlett’s Despatch, Florence, June 26, 1846. Lord Cowley’s, Paris, July 31, 1846, “Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy,” pp. 18–22. Beaumont-Vassy, “Hist. des Etats Européens, depuis 1815,” vol. v. p. 253.

† “For a time, I believe, the weight of French influence at Rome was added to the other resources of his holiness in support of the policy which he had followed. From information that has reached me, I believe that, of late, a change in this respect has occurred, and that the opinions and conduct of the French ambassador at Rome are now more in harmony with those of his Austrian colleague than they formerly were.”—*Mr. Abercromby’s Despatch*, Turin, p. 69. July 2, 1847.

“On the news from Ferrara reaching Rome, the French ambassador, Count Rossi, proceeded to the papal palace, and had an audience of the pope, at which he tendered to his holiness the assistance and protection of France in case of emergency. I am informed that this proposal of the French ambassador was declined by his holiness in terms that showed that he refused, from the conviction that France and Austria were acting together in Italian politics. Such is the information that has reached me from a source which admits of no mistrust, and which I therefore submit to your lordship’s consideration with perfect confidence in its correctness.” P. 88. Aug. 19, 1847.

“His Excellency (Count Solar de la Margherita) said it was his

the papal councils, almost immediately upon the accession of Pius (and this, not probably from any objection on his own or on his master's part to opportune and temperate reforms, but from sheer terror of the spread of that national spirit, which could only lead to a collision with Austria); that either from a regard for peace, or from less worthy considerations, he took part with Austria at the time of the pope's differences with that power on the subject of the occupation of Ferrara. It was this belief, so fatal to his character as an old Italian patriot, that at a later period was to cost Count Rossi his life.

The reforming pope turned diplomatist, and the golden opportunity was lost.

There are those, indeed, who in their implacable aversion to Pius IX., do not hesitate to attribute to him from the first, the darkest designs against those very liberties of which he was thought to have made himself the promoter. His apostasy from the cause, not of Italy alone but of his people, would according to them date from the very amnesty, and from the turmoil of popular passions which that humane edict had so suddenly aroused. Pius IX., they state, frightened at his own work, aware of his utter helplessness, and inability to retrace his steps by his own efforts, could see

belief, though he possessed no actual proof of the fact, that in the conduct of Italian affairs France and Austria had come to a mutual understanding. Of the correctness of this last supposition your lordship will no doubt have better means of judging than myself; but I may add, that *at Rome, and generally throughout Central Italy, and in this country, such is believed to be the case.*"—Aug. 24, 1847, p. 93. Compare with Lord Ponsonby, Vienna, July 30, Sept. 30, 1847, p. 72, 159, &c. D'Arlincourt, "*Italie Rouge*," p. 25.

no refuge against the demon he had conjured up, save only in the arms of Austria. They describe him as the first author and mover of that tenebrous conspiracy of the 15th of July, of which Cardinal Lambruschini, Colonel Freddi, and other instruments of Metternich's policy, were the ostensible originators. That military manœuvre on the Po on the 16th and 17th of the same month, by which Generals d'Aspre and Nugent unexpectedly redoubled the Ferrara garrison, would thus have taken place at the pope's own request. It was only on the 6th of August, when after some affray with the people, the Austrians stepped down from the citadel to occupy the main square and the gates of the town, that Cardinal Ciacchi was under compulsion to protest in what the friends of Austria called at the time "an unusual and intemperate language,"*—to protest against those very auxiliaries whom himself and his pontifical master had called to their rescue.

That protest, therefore, and a similar act from the Vatican, in date of the 13th of the same August, would, in the opinion of these writers,† have been merely a feint. Terrified by the outcry of all Italy, dreading the effect of popular resentment, seeing that Austrian protection was far and Italian vengeance at hand, Pius IX. shrunk back from the precipice into which he had so nearly fallen. He felt the necessity of pausing in his reactionary attempts. He disavowed the Austrians in a tone which was all the louder, as he felt himself more helplessly committed with them; consent-

* "Quarterly Review," clxx. p. 567. See the Protests in the "Diario di Roma," Aug. 10 and 17, 1847.

† De Boni, "Il Papa Pio IX.," pp. 123, 125, 135.

ing for a few months to keep on his mask, and play the farce of the liberal pope.

It is not easy to make clearly out against Pius IX. a case of such consummate duplicity. It is even difficult to give him credit for such depth and dexterity. The Italians, naturally a cunning race, are too apt to refine on the cunning of their rulers. Those plots, at the best, were too deeply laid for the sagacity of any inquirer. Lord Ponsonby, at Vienna, who had interest and ample means to arrive at the truth of such machinations, who had often fancied he was on the scent of them, seems to have come to the conclusion that, however sore tried, however treacherously tempted,—however, in fact, inclined to turn, now to France, now to Austria for support, the pope never ventured on an open and formal demand for an Austrian armed interference in his own States at that epoch.* Till these dark conjectures are better substantiated therefore, it is but fair to give the pope and his cardinal legate the benefit of the doubt, and to accept their protests of August 1847 as given out in perfect good faith. Those protests did not, indeed, come up to the ardour of the Italian people, who were impatient for immediate hostility; but they were even such as France, by her obtrusive officiousness, by her unavoidable arbitration, peremptorily prescribed.

The protests had their signal results, nevertheless. Austria had met with a severe check. If she was not actually driven out of Ferrara by sheer force of arms,

* Lord Ponsonby's Despatches, Vienna, July 15 and 27, 1847. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. pp. 60, 61, 72; also Sir G. Hamilton's, Florence, July 25, p. 72; Mr. Petre's, Rome, July 23, p. 73; and Lord Palmerston's, Aug. 10, p. 77.

as it was all important that she should be ; or, at least, that a strenuous effort should be made to that effect, she felt the expediency of *amicably* withdrawing within the citadel. Her first open attack had drawn upon her the animadversion of the whole civilised world. It is astonishing to see to what extent Prince Metternich had abated from his former pretensions. The Emperor of Austria, he said, " seeks nothing beyond the frontier of his empire ; his intention is to secure the integrity and the internal peace of his dominions, from whatever quarter, or by whatever means, they may be assailed."* Not a word more was said about the high protectorate hitherto exercised by Austria on the minor Italian States ; not a word about family rights upon Tuscany, grounded on the reversibility of that State to the house of Lorraine,—not a word. Metternich, in a *patelin* tone not usual with him, even refuses the benefit of his advice to the sovereigns of Lucca and Tuscany in their perplexities.† He sees the differences between Modena and Tuscany, on the subject of the succession of Lunigiana, settled by the interference of Italian arbitrators. The pope and his minister, Cardinal Ferretti, flatly and harshly refuse a free passage to the troops which Austria contemplated sending to the succour of her Neapolitan ally.‡ Never was Austrian influence in Italian matters at a lower ebb since the coronation of Charles V.

* Metternich's Despatch, Vienna, Dec. 14, 1847. " Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. p. 281. See also Lord Ponsonby's Despatches from Vienna, Oct. and Nov. 1847.

† Lord Ponsonby, Vienna, Oct. 26, p. 191.

‡ Lord Minto's Letter, Rome, Jan. 18, 1848. " Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 39.

in 1797. Against the secret intrigues of Austria, it was very difficult to guard; but on a second open aggression, that power could not for some time be expected to venture.

Her sovereign sway was henceforth limited to the banks of the Po and Ticino.

Even within those limits her Lombard subjects had discovered her vulnerable side. In those provinces where open rebellion seemed so decidedly out of the question, the new theories of "moral force" and "legal resistance" were the only remedy pointed out by necessity. The Milanese in a body deserted the Theatre la Scala. They organised themselves into a vast total-abstinence society as to tobacco-smoke. They rebelled against that "eat, drink, and be merry," that seems to be the code of despotism all over the world. They dashed from their lips the cups of pleasure and vice, by which their rulers had too long lured them into ignominious submission.

One of their sternest monitors, Botta, had, in his "History of the American War of Independence," laid before them the example of a sober, virtuous people, baffling the unjust pretences of an arbitrary government, by refusing themselves to the consumption of excisable articles, when "the Boston harbour was converted into a vast teapot." The lesson was not lost upon the Lombards, even after a lapse of forty years. They laid the plan of a vast cigar conspiracy,—a childish plot in appearance, if brave self-denial, consistency, and unanimity, had not hallowed it. The Lombards had learned to "act as one man;" no easy matter, as we shall have reason to see, for an Italian population.

This matter of "tobacco-smoke" was, perhaps, carried too far. There may have been something overbearing in the demeanour of the less tolerant, less circumspect patriots. It is possible that good pretexts were afforded to the Austrian authorities for the employment of strong measures. But, in spite of all underhand management, it was apparent to all Europe, that aggression was, in every encounter, on the part of the government and soldiery. The blood spilt at Milan, Padua, and Pavia, in September 1847 and January 1848, had a startling effect on an age, whatever its many faults may otherwise be, decidedly averse to bloodshed. Still stained with the massacres of Gallicia, Austria could gain nothing by the no less revolting butcheries of Lombardy.

The Italians saw their advantage, and continued to the last true to their system of passive resistance. That system had now reached its climax. The system itself was in Italy the revolution, in so far as it was the work of the Italians themselves, in so far as they were allowed to act free from foreign influence. It would have been difficult, at the time, to contend that it was not the only practicable one.

Up to the very opening of the year 1848, the Italians had proved themselves tolerably shrewd and skilful tacticians. They had won their ground upon the enemy without affording him an opportunity—a good reason, at least—for unsheathing his sword. They had fairly kept on their own ground; given no alarm to the anxious guardians of European order. They had, in fact, listened to them; to a certain extent acted by their advice and abeyance. Lord Minto had been posting

up and down the country, intimating to impatient patriotism, that "so far it should go and no further."

The conduct of French and English diplomacy, throughout the reforming period of 1846-47, had been sufficiently loyal and consistent. Lord Palmerston's instructions to Lord Minto are before the world. The seal of the English minister for the independence of the Italian States—and *that* he was fain to call the "Independence of Italy"—may or may not have been actuated by a private feeling of hostility to Austria, arising from some smarting of wounded pride at the result of the Spanish marriage intrigues. But, independent of this, and independent of all the *sentimentalism* with which his policy is said to have been affected, it may be fair to attribute to him sufficient discernment to impress him with a necessity for the course he steadily and invariably advised. His aversion to the old system of blind, bigoted despotism may have been all the more earnest, as it arose from a conviction of the impossibility of its continuation. Reform appeared to him the only preventive against revolution. Hence his efforts to aid in the great and good work of reconciliation of the most enlightened Italian princes with their subjects. Hence his countenance to the measures of the pope, his unflinching support of Sardinia, up to the declaration of hostilities against Austria; hence his frequent remonstrances with the cabinet of Vienna, and with those Italian governments that followed its dictates. Lord Minto's mission had, apparently, no other motive or object.

The policy of France did not, in the main, clash with that of the emulous power. It was certainly in the in-

terests of neither that Austria should too unconditionally lord it over all Italy. The Holy Alliance had, they fancied, provided for the self-existence of the Italian states in 1814. Only for the sake of quiet living they had, not without great reluctance, connived at the invasion of almost all those states during the troubles of 1820, 1831. They had tried to counteract that high dominion of Austria by all the means of officious diplomacy; France, even by an armed demonstration at Ancona, in 1832; a step from which she had reaped little advantage and less honour. But the desire of restoring the same states to all the dignity of independence, was still an object of great importance with French statesmen; and towards the attainment of that object nothing could be more conducive than a revival of good understanding between princes and subjects; a good understanding that should result from the establishment of liberal institutions. Hence Louis Philippe's agents,—his very sons, D'Aumale and Joinville, during a visit to Naples,—the king himself, in his parting interview with the Neapolitan ambassador, Duke of Serracapriola, had been recommending necessary reforms and concessions; had been advising that the Bourbon throne at Naples should stand on a basis of rational freedom,*—and that on the eve of the day in which the shrewd old monarch, not too wisely perhaps, prepared to resist analogous demands on the part of his own people. Rossi's mission to Rome—the very choice of an old Carbonaro for an envoy to an incorrigible Italian court—had no other object; and although, as we have seen,

* Massari, "I Casi di Napoli," p. 20.

dynastic interests soon threw the French court into the arms of Austria, for all that concerned the great national question, although his own experience of the exorbitance of the people's demands made Louis Philippe, and still more so his pedantic adviser, partial to half measures, yet the advice of France, so far as the domestic policy of each single state was concerned, was always in favour of progress. With Guizot, as with his English rival, it was no question of sentiment; it was no anxiety for the welfare of the Italian people. It was the effect of his faith in the inalterable laws of human advancement; interpretation of the law of necessity.

But when we say that the movement of the moderate party in Italy was countenanced by England and France, we do not mean to say that it originated with, or was in any manner indebted to them. They beheld in the success of that party a certain amount of good done to the general cause of humanity; the accession of a great part of a gifted nation to the ideas of social improvement, the cessation of an undue supremacy of an overbearing power over states that 1814 had placed beyond its reach; the "liberty and independence of Italy," as they understood it, that is, of Rome, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Two Sicilies, was matter for European congratulation. They would not have raised a finger, they would not have run the remotest risk of a war even for that; but as the Italians had already gone so far towards the consummation of so happy an end, England and France were ready enough to step in with kind offices and advice, to sanction with their authority what the Italians had achieved with their prudent and intelligent conduct.

Ever since the attack on Ferrara, it was evident that Austria could not meddle with the above-named states, without the strong animadversion of England and France.*

How little Lord Palmerston and Guizot understood the real nature of the Italian movement, how different the Italian notions of their true freedom and independence were from those of their benevolent patrons, it was for subsequent events to demonstrate. They (and especially the French minister, who was deaf to the rumbling of the volcano that was so soon to yawn under his feet) could be no good judges of the tendencies of a nation hitherto shackled and gagged. Italy was, and still continues to be, a sealed book to all but the Italians themselves.

The Italian patriots of 1848, however, were too wise not to accept the good wishes of powerful patrons in the spirit in which they were tendered. From choice and from necessity, they were fain to push on as far as it could go, that "bloodless revolution," that elicited the European plaudit.

In Calabria and Sicily, indeed, an appeal to arms had, in an evil hour, been found inevitable. King Fer-

* "With the welfare of the country, with the real liberties of the people of Italy, they (England and France) troubled themselves but little. But the certain result of their meddling was, that, owing to the influence of those two powers, Austria would henceforth be prevented from interfering with the affairs of Piedmont, Tuscany, Rome, or Naples, as it had done before in every conjuncture, even if her interference was solicited by the Italian rulers themselves: an important event for the patriots of Italy. Parma and Modena were excepted from this prescription."—*Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug des Jahres, 1848,"* Berlin, 1849, p. 26.

dinand had so willed it. But even there nothing rash and inconsiderate had been done; above all things, nothing irreparable.

The grant of a constitution at Naples, in January 1848, by which the king so far exceeded, not the expectations only, but the very wishes of some patriots, bid fair to settle matters to the satisfaction of all parties. Lord Minto found the Sicilians amenable to reason, and a revered arbitrator and peace-maker was not wanted in the person of Pius IX., whose fiat in those days neither kings nor subjects would have ventured to impugn.

Nay, more; all differences with regard to the occupation of Ferrara, to the partition of Lunigiana, all other ground of offence had been removed by diplomatic mediation, about the close of the year 1847. The two parties, Austria, with Parma and Modena on the one side, and the other Italian States on the other, stood in presence, each within well-defined limits, each without the power or the wish to trespass them; both silent, awed, measuring the chances of unavoidable, yet indefinitely remote conflict.

Nothing more perfect than the lull that reigned in Italy previous to the Paris outbreak in February.

The "conversion" of the King of Naples, however late and ungracious, completed the Italian system. It added the last link to the chain of the National League. A congress at Rome, under the auspices of the miraculous pope, would have smoothed all differences, balanced all interests.

An Italian prince must by this time be aware, on the one hand, that he had nothing to lose, all to gain by

this national compact; that the compact conferred upon him all the proud feeling of self-dependence, and secured to him the support of true natural allies, against those arrogant foreigners whose patronage had always been so onerous, so galling : and on the other, that his first steps in the way of concession had already too far committed him before these latter, that he may now look for any aid at their hands,—that moreover his foreign auxiliaries were now themselves labouring under too great a stupor to be able to afford efficient aid, were they ever so willing.

It seemed, indeed, impossible even for Modena and Parma to resist the cogency of these arguments ; it did not even seem natural that Austria herself would long persevere in her senseless course. There were sanguine men in Italy, who flattered themselves that the very government of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom might be ultimately *nationalized*, by being made over to some of the princes of the Imperial House, to be held on terms of virtual independence, on conditions analogous to those of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. A state of that importance would naturally have taken the precedence of all other Italian states, and Austria would still, though indirectly, have exercised a paramount influence on Italian destinies.

These, at the present state of affairs, appear but idle dreams ; but they are sufficient to show the degree of omnipotence public opinion had then reached, and the confidence it had acquired in its own unarmed forces.

Italian matters, it must be observed, were now in the best possible hands. Cesare Balbo, Gino Capponi,

Ridolfi, Mamiani, Bozzelli, eminently upright and high-minded personages, as they were then reputed, long known for their devotion to their country's cause, were now all-powerful in the councils of the four liberalised sovereigns, and these were no men to swerve from the line of policy they had so long adhered to. Gioberti and D'Azeglio, then at the acme of their moral influence, kept a tight rein over the passions of the multitude. Under these masters the Italians were pledged to forbearance; the most ardent, at least, seemed well agreed to put off the onset, till at least they felt assured of a combined and simultaneous effort, until they had it in their power to choose their own ground and time.

This moderate line of policy, so prevalent in Italy from 1846 to 1848, found nevertheless a certain number of opponents; although, as we have said, the ranks of "Young Italy" were rapidly thinning, and some of its boldest spirits had passed over to Turin and Florence since 1846, leaving their more consistent, or more unmanageable associates behind them in the land of exile.*

* "Around them (the moderate party), since the accession of Pius IX., many youths had clustered—far better men than they—all of whom had been trained up to the national idea in our brotherhood—very candid souls and devoted to their country, but of a facile disposition, not sufficiently strong by nature, or hardened by sufferings to a severe energetic faith in the unchangeable truth, &c. &c."—*Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti,"* p. 8, and elsewhere.—"To the friends who forsook us we looked up with sadness, thinking, 'You will return to us when the experiment has failed; but God grant that the issue may not be of a nature to wither your soul and to destroy your faith in the destinies of Italy!'"—P. 12.

"The opposite party (*gli avversari*), during the epoch of reforms, either were always silent, or followed the impulse given by Gioberti, Balbo," &c.—*De Boni, "Il Papa Pio IX.,"* p. 79.

There were men still, who had inexorably determined that no faith should be put in princes,—not in them alone, it would seem, but not even in that opinion, which had however power to reclaim princes in spite of themselves; such princes, they said, as Charles Albert, the apostate of 1821; Ferdinand of Naples, the murderer of the Bandiera; Leopold of Tuscany, an Austrian by choice even more than by origin, and Pius IX. a priest at heart, even more than by his ministry. They laughed to scorn the idea of a "princely" league, in which "the people," they said, had no share—a scheme of nationality having for its head a rotten papacy, and for its right arm stiff and starch Piedmont. Against this state, and its ill-fated monarch, their envenomed shafts were especially levelled. A province, they called it, up to a very late period of amphibious nature, a stranger to Italian tendencies—(a most wicked blasphemy in our judgment, implying a wilful forgetfulness of the intensely Italian character of Ivrea and Asti, Tortona, Casale, Novara and Alessandria, to say nothing of Turin and Genoa, all foremost in the battles of the Lombard league of old, and forgetfulness of the signal services performed by the house of Savoy for the honour of Italian arms, a house acclimated to Italy since the days of Emanuel Philibert)—a priest-ridden community, they added, organised on the principles of a courtly aristocracy, presided over by a tenebrous monarch, twice a renegade, twice a traitor.*

In contempt of this state, they designated the moderate by the name of the *Savoyard* party; they charged it

* Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti," p. 12. De Boni, "Il Papa Pio IX.," pp. 72-77. Ricciardi, "Ultimi Casi d' Italia," p. 29.

with insincerity and political jesuitism, with want of faith in "the people," with a proneness to sacrifice their inmost convictions for the sake of a base, shuffling expediency; to fawn upon despots, whom they loathed in their hearts, with a vague design of leading them to their ruin, of breaking them as useless tools as soon as their work was complete; and they concluded by saying that the princes could not fail to see through their shallow intrigues, that they would be beforehand with them and fall upon them as soon as the pressure of revolutionary simooms allowed them to breathe; the scheme being, in fact, as improvident as it was mean and unworthy.

They even made themselves strong of the words of Metternich, who, in his despatch to Count Dietrichstein (Aug. 2, 1847), warned his French and English allies against the Italian patriots, whose tendencies were essentially republican* (the wily diplomatist well knowing the ominous sound of that word), and gave some ground for the assertions of the English Tory press, which inveighed against the hypocrisy of the Italians affecting constitutionalism, federalism, &c., whilst the whole of the liberal party were at heart "socialist, communist, and infidel."†

Subsequent events would seem to have to some extent substantiated these melancholy assertions: but it must be observed, that such assertions were made after the failure of the experiment of 1848; and that that failure was owing to extraneous causes which

* Reported in "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part i. p. 78. Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti," *ibid.*

† "Quarterly Review," clxv. p. 560.

it was in the power of no man to anticipate. It should be borne in mind, that the project of an Italian league, based on the principle of constitutional liberties, and conceived with a view to the utmost possible tolerance and conciliation, was proposed and discussed before the February revolution of Paris, previous to the opening of a campaign in Lombardy, when no actual and immediate collision with Austria could be seriously contemplated. The Lombard insurrection was not in the programme of the moderate party, not, certainly, in the programme of any party, and less than all in that of "young Italy," who had long since desisted from all attempts against Austria, and all whose efforts were turned upon Calabria and Romagna, where the weakness and improvidence of government offered some chance of partial, feeble disturbance. Indeed, before the revolution of France and Germany, the Lombard movement seemed an utter impossibility, even to the least sober men. Cattaneo, the most ardent of Milanese republicans, would have discountenanced it as a rash, impracticable scheme, even on that supreme 18th of March.* The suddenness and rapidity of events, the panic of the Austrians in Upper Italy, the triumphant progress of Charles Albert, the hasty and ill-digested project of a "kingdom of Upper Italy," unexpectedly upset all those fair and equitable terms on which a good understanding between the Italian states was to be based. But the establishment of a league, according to all human provisions, should by all means have preceded any hostile attitude towards Austria: abstraction

* Cattaneo, "L'Insurrection de Milan en 1848," p. 39. Paris, 1848.

made of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, the powers and interests of the four contracting states, Rome, Naples, Tuscany, and Piedmont, were sufficiently well balanced and reconcilable.

It is most idle, we think, to charge the Italians with hypocrisy because they affected a confidence in their princes, which they were far from entertaining in their hearts. The Italians have truly seldom been troubled with exaggerate qualms of loyalty ; and there are many very good reasons why the reigning dynasties, without exception, should be looked upon with, to say the least, an indifference perfectly incomprehensible to the Teutonic races. We certainly cannot sufficiently express our abhorrence of the fulsome adulation with which the first symptoms of unbending on the part of their despots were hailed by the Italian multitude under the guidance of designing men. But it is not true that either the Italian people or their leaders ever had any faith in princes ; they relied, we repeat it, on that opinion which had already driven the princes to the first step, and which, properly managed, would equally have urged them to the last. It is perfectly true that the Italian patriots were not "in earnest" with regard to the constitutional forms for which they were clamouring ; but it is not equally true, whatever Metternich, the "Quarterly Review," or "Young Italy" may say, that they were bigoted to republican views. Their only real object — common, universal object — was union and independence ; and for its attainment they thought a war with Austria, however remote, all but inevitable : and if we bear in mind the magnitude of the enterprise, such as it appeared in January 1848, we shall not only find it

difficult to charge them with hypocrisy, because they masked their real object by calling for local reforms and preparatory ameliorations, but shall rather have good reason to wonder at the rashness with which they suffered their aim to break through, at the insufficiency of their powers of dissimulation, at a time and for a purpose which would have justified the deepest measures of prudence and concealment.

They did not, it is true, think a civil war the best prelude for a war of independence; they strove to unite from a consciousness of the strength arising from union. Their union, we are told, was of a shallow, precarious nature; yet, as we have already hinted, there was no party in Italy at the time strong enough to disturb it. The opposition of "Young Italy," too long merely negative, had become, if not quite extinct, at least inaudible. We have Mazzini's own avowal that his "young believers" were deserting him: his party, if not broken up, had, at least, no definite plan of its own to propose.

Indeed, we will venture to say, that never, perhaps, since the very dawn of the Christian era, had the Italian people exhibited such loving unanimity, such harmony of hopes and fears, as it did at the opening of that eventful 1848. The most violent opposers of the federal party bear witness to this fact, though they would seem to deplore it, and contend that a "misunderstood love of concord was the evil by which Italy was undone,"* and that "the unanimity of the Italians concealed a source of disasters."†

* De Boni, "Il Papa Pio IX.," pp. 79, 85.

† Cattaneo, "L'Insurrection de Milan," p. 16.

The concessions hitherto wrung from the hands of the Italian princes, if not adequate to the establishment of a new order of things, were at least quite sufficient to allow free scope for unbounded discussion. All had been laid open to the public gaze. The veil of mystery so long hanging on the proceedings of Italian statecraft had been for ever torn asunder. Public opinion was utterly emancipated; to an extent, indeed, that did not seem warranted by the timid and imperfect laws on the press hitherto emanated. Indeed, the difficulty consisted now in preventing that liberty from transcending all limits of discretion; for the burden of every newspaper article was "War to the foreigner!" and the dread of giving untimely offence to Austria was still strong in most minds. That same overwhelming fear of the "colossal empire" had the good effect of cementing union and rendering it sincere and durable. Beyond the national contest hardly any man had carried his speculations. Indeed, the achievement of that great enterprise was quite enough for the present generation. The impression was, that the struggle would be a long and severe one—a most salutary impression, which the astonishing hurry of events too soon wore away.

The Italians profited by the very first glimpse of sunshine to prepare for the contingencies of that great national trial. Their most urgent demand, as we have seen, was for a national armament: and for this, indeed, they did not always wait for the consent of their rulers. The soundness of the institution of national guards has been called in question in countries like France, placed beyond the risk of foreign aggression;

but it was nevertheless matter of life and death in Italy, a country, above all things, in want of fighting men.

The Italians flew to arms. The whole nation assumed as warlike an attitude as its long-cherished enervating habits of ease and luxury would allow. But material means were wanting; a good school of discipline and efficient leaders. All this time might perhaps have given. Had six months or a year been allowed for the purchase of muskets, and for the initiation of the youth of the towns to the handling of them, history might have a different tale to tell of the exploits of Italian volunteers.

Meanwhile, such weapons as the country provided were already in the people's possession. There was no longer a question of the wisdom of putting one's trust in princes. The Italians had taken their princes, such as they were, and held them in their power. No Bastille had been stormed, and yet the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany were in the same situation as Louis XVI., when, on his last journey from Versailles, he received Bailli's intimation, that "the people had conquered their sovereign." The Italian rulers were utterly at the mercy of their subjects, and would be spared so long only as the sword which the people had already in their hands could be more worthily employed in a fight à *Poutrance* with the dreaded enemy in the north.

That dispute being settled, the Italians would turn back on their native princes and deal with them according to their deserts, according as their steadfastness in the cause of the country had entitled them to a share

in its triumph, or their apostasy had unavoidably involved them in the fate of its foes.

The present state of Piedmont, as contrasted with that of Rome and Tuscany, is a sufficient earnest of the retributive justice of the Italian people towards their princes, even though their indignation or gratitude had to evince itself in days of disappointment and defeat. Every one may see what the pope and the grand duke might have had to expect had the Italians come off masters of the field.

We need not fear to repeat it too often : the Italians have little of that "morbid loyalty" by which the Germans were paralysed in their late movements, and the Frankfort Assembly stultified itself in a vain attempt to bring its six-and-thirty princes to act with one mind.

The Italians have too seldom been blessed with "fathers of the people" among their crowned heads, to be stayed by scruples of filial dutifulness. Indeed, it required no slight trouble to acknowledge Tuscan Archdukes and Neapolitan Bourbons as brethren and countrymen. And the princes, on their own hand, were well aware of this feeling. They were not to be deceived by the clap-traps of patriotic declamation. They accepted the olive-branch in the same spirit as it was tendered. Their compromise and alliance with their subjects was matter of mutual expediency—mutual necessity. In one instance only—that of Sardinia—the uprightness of the prince and the soundness of the people—add to it their mutual interest—made it sincere.

The year 1848 dawned, and found the Italians planning and mustering; but their work was far from complete. Less than one year, perhaps, less than six

months—perhaps, also, more than ten years, were wanting ere their plans could be pronounced mature, and their martial array full and compact.

It would be difficult now to say how long their final trial of strength might have been put off, for they stood within tolerably safe entrenchments; there was no good cause of precipitate hurry from within, nor, since August 1847, any apprehension of open attacks from without.*

Who can say, at the present time, what the probable issue might have been, had Italy stood alone isolated in the world, in presence of that one Austrian enemy, safe from extraneous impulses, examples, and promises?

Austria had struck the first blow and failed. It was now from Italy herself the attack was to come; and would she not follow her own course, bide her own time?

The events of 1820, 1831, had taught her the importance of rejecting all foreign influence; of relying on her own resources. Since 1846 she had but little reason to look to Paris, to Louis Philippe, or his agent, Count Rossi, for guidance. Yet even from them, no less than from the temperate men now in power in England, no hasty, inconsiderate advice could be apprehended. Not

* The apprehensions that were still entertained in and out of Italy, respecting either an open attack or a *coup d'état* on the part of Austria against Tuscany or Rome, are ably summed up by Lord Normanby in his despatch, Paris, Feb. 3, 1848. See also Mr. Abercromby's Letters from Turin at the same epoch. From a mature examination of these and other documents, it is impossible not to come to the conclusion, that *Austria would have done it, if she had dared*. As she dared not, there was no end to her declarations of strict adherence to a non-intervention policy. See Lord Ponsonby's despatches, Jan. and Feb. 1848.

only was Italy at this present period freely allowed to pursue her own path, but she had secured the consent and good-will of Europe; she might be said to have taken the initiative of all just and rational European movements. Her plan of attack, however defective, was at least original; eminently and essentially appropriate to her peculiar position. How much ought she not to have endured — how long waited, rather than depart from it?

But Providence had decreed otherwise. All the Italians wanted was time, and it was not given them.

The success of their enterprise rested on their consciousness of the magnitude of its difficulties, and Fortune made it all at once appear portentously easy.

CHAPTER II.

The Revolt in Lombardy—Austrian Rule in Italy—Hostile Disposition of the People—Their Hopes and Fears—Riots of September 1847 and January 1848—Peaceful but determined Attitude of the People—Effects of the French Revolution of February 1848—Consequences of the Events of Germany and Vienna—Rise of Milan—Causes that determined Radetsky's Retreat—Unanimity of the Lombard People—Their Conduct towards the Vanquished—Conduct of the latter—Progress of the Revolt throughout Lombardy—Fall of Venice—Causes that determined the Capitulation of the Austrian Governor—Panic and Confusion of the Austrian Army—Revolt at Modena and Parma.

THE contest that was to decide on the destinies of Italy was, at the early dawn of 1848, brought on the fields of Lombardy, where alone it could come to a final issue. All that had previously occurred in other parts of the Peninsula, the more or less rational reforms at Rome, Florence, or Turin,—the more or less plausible constitutions, hastily framed for Naples, Piedmont, and Tuscany, and even for the states of the Church; above all, the more significant revolutionary outbreaks in Sicily, although of so much moment upon Italian matters in general, and of the greatest consequence on the Lombard movement itself, may, however, be considered as merely preparatory, merely episodal.

It mattered little where an Italian revolution began,

Austria and Italy were equally well aware where it must end. Foiled in their treacherous plots at Rome, compelled to draw back with but little honour from Ferrara, unable to stem the current that was setting in from abroad, the Austrians began to grow desperate at home. All their proverbial system of slow wisdom and cautiousness, of silence and forbearance, was suddenly overthrown. The Austrians lost their temper,—the very quality by which they had hitherto prevailed over the more hasty and mercurial Italians.

No man who was not born in Italy, in Poland, or in any country fallen to the same depth of misery and degradation, can form an idea of the bitterness the subjection of one's country bears with it. It deadens a man's heart to all other political considerations, it blinds him to all the real failings and short-comings of his countrymen. He insists that no fair play is allowed to them; that all their vices and crimes should be ascribed to their oppressors. No mild or conciliatory measure can assuage his resentment.

Up to the year 1848 we had heard but too much about the "paternal" character of Austrian rule. It was not difficult to find, even among the Italians, upright and intelligent persons willing to admit that "Austrian administration was more just and impartial, more provident, above all things more passionless," than that of any of the so-called independent Italian governments.* There were many reasons why it should

* "No honest man of the liberal party (Azeglio, for example) ever denied the liberty, prudence, impartiality, with which the administration of Lombardy was conducted under Prince Metternich."—*Whiteside's "Italy in the Nineteenth Century."* London, 1848, vol. i., preface, p. xiv.

be so. It was, perhaps, partly Austria's own will that so it should be, nor does it seem right to infer from it that "it is extremely difficult to find among the Italians a sufficient quantity of the sober and manly qualities necessary for administrative justice." For good or for evil, the Italian princes were even such as Austria wished them to be. To do evil was more in their power than to do good; nor, for all that, can it easily be proved that "with the mass of the people the German government is infinitely more popular than that of their native sovereigns."* The Lombard provinces had, during the last five-and-thirty years, reached a degree of material well-being, which was perhaps not wholly owing to the uninterrupted continuance of peace, or to the exuberant fertility of the soil. Venice, in 1848, presented a less melancholy sight than when it first came into Austrian hands, exhausted and prostrate from the consequences of the continental system, when "her palaces were sinking to their watery foundation, and two-thirds of her oldest nobility swelled the list of her fifty thousand paupers."

All this may be readily admitted:—nor will it be of great moment to question the fairness of a comparison between Milan in the nineteenth century and the same

"Austria prescribed liberal ideas, but she repressed the clergy and nobility. Before the courts of law, under Austrian administration, there were no privileged classes. Perfect equality for all subjects," &c.—*S. Ferrari*, "*La Révolution et les Réformes en Italie*." "*Révue Indépendante*," Jan. 1848. "Austria had reigned peacefully on her Italian provinces in consequence of the comparative inferiority of the administration of all the other Italian princes."—*Cattaneo*, "*Insurrection de Milan*," p. 23.

* "*Quarterly Review*," cxliii. p. 233.

city under the blind and bigoted rule of the Spaniards in former ages ; or between Venice in days of profound tranquillity and Venice in times of universal war, under the hurried and harassed sway of Napoleon's lieutenants, or in the dotage of its own agonising republic. Nay, for what concerns the Queen of the Adriatic, it may even be allowed that her fate was decreed long since, and that the sacrifice of her commerce in behalf of her upstart rival Trieste, was, perhaps, as much matter of geographical necessity as of a cold, cruel reason of state.

All was not death and desolation, even though all was silence and gloom under the Austrian rule. Even if all the broad assertions of Austria's panegyrists cannot be accepted, respecting "her astonishing munificence, the millions of millions lavished on the six roads across the Alps, on the costly reparations to the cathedral of Milan, and even on that triumphal arch of the Simplon, terminated with Austrian money, though originally intended as a monument of Austrian humiliation : " * even if we are utterly to disregard the counter-statements of the Italians, that "two thousand millions of Italian money were buried in the imperial treasury ; that although the Italians formed but *one-eighth* of the population of the Austrian empire, they had to bear *one-third* of the public burdens : † we are willing to allow that respect to the laws, such as they

* "Quarterly Review," clxv. and clxxi. "Blackwood's Magazine," vol. lxxiii. June 1848. Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug, 1848." Berlin, 1849, p. 22.

† Cattaneo, "L'Insurrection de Milan en 1848." Paris, 1848, pp. 2, 8.

were, was rigidly enforced; that Austria ruled with a strong hand, even such as the Italians required; and that, up to the year 1848, nothing could well be more edifying, nothing more astonishing, than the discipline of the Austrian army, and the gentle and respectful behaviour of the soldiery in what they were fain to look upon as a land of conquest,—nay, their “meek endurance of the most contemptuous treatment.”

“No charge,” sums up one of the friends of Austria above quoted, “is preferred against the Austrian government to justify the hatred it excited, excepting its despotic nature.”* That charge might have been deemed sufficient, but it was certainly not the most heinous. Not all the pedantry and pettishness of the irksome censorship of the press, not the hundred vexatious trammels on personal liberty, were half as galling to the Italian people as the *anti-national* character of the government: those swarms of German, Sclavonian, and, above all, Tyrolese *employés*, daily brought to supersede native functionaries, “the very judges often unacquainted with the language of the country, and discharging their office through interpreters”†—a system

* “Quarterly Review,” clxv. p. 242. See also Whiteside’s “Italy in the Nineteenth Century,” preface, p. xiv.

† Pepe’s “Scenes and Events in Italy,” vol. i. p. 89. The “Quarterly Review” stoutly denies all this (clxiii. p. 259): “When the Austrians first reassumed possession of Lombardy, Italians were named to numerous offices; nor were they removed except at the reiterated complaints of their countrymen. It would be easy, if it were not invidious, to quote examples. Municipal jealousy interfered also with these appointments. The Venetians thought it hard that a country which had governed itself for many centuries should receive a governor from Milan, and Milan would have resented the appointment of a Venetian governor as the last degradation.” All these are flat asser-

of *denationalisation* which led to the aggravation of those two main evils for which Napoleon's rule had been held up to universal execration, the police and the conscription—the police acting in open defiance to all established juridical or constitutional forms; jealous, all-prying, hideous, and so much more harsh and arrogant at Milan and Venice than at Vienna, than in any of the provinces north of the Alps; spreading mistrust in the bosom of families, putting a check upon all domestic intercourse, giving the hearty and cheerful Lombard those habits of low cunning and dissimulation, which are too falsely deemed innate: and the military conscription, which in 1814 only bound the youths of the country to a three years' service, but which was subsequently extended to a period of eight and even fifteen years,* with a view to wean the Italian soldiers from all domestic associations, by a protracted sojourn on the borders of Hungary and Transylvania, to secure their allegiance by long habits of discipline, and to prevent by unfrequent draughts the spread of martial spirit among too great a mass of the Italian people.

tions. The writer should have quoted instances. The appointment of Italians, if it ever took place, may have been made with a view to disgust the Italians with the sway of their own countrymen. Austria could certainly be at no loss for rogues in Italy — no rogue, in fact, is so thorough as an Italian rogue. The administration of the police was almost entirely in the hands of Italian Tyrolese. But the governors, their officers, and even the dignitaries of the church, were mostly German, Hungarian, &c. The whole organisation of the army was strictly German. As for municipal jealousies, we do not see, if there were any truth in the assertion, why a trial might not have been made of Milanese governors at Milan, and Venetians at Venice.

* D'Azeglio's "Austrian Assassinations in Lombardy." London, 1848. See the documents in the Appendix.

Nothing is further from our purpose than to countenance the Italians in these grievances. We will, on the contrary, give the friends of Austria all the benefit of their statements, because, when all is said that can be said; when the wisdom and benignity of the Austrian government and the partiality in favour of its Lombardo-Venetian provinces, evinced by the "half-Italian" dynasty that reigned at Schönbrunn, of which the sister provinces bitterly complained, and the signal ingratitude of the Italians and their blindness to their real interests*—when all this has been sufficiently brought into light, it will only become the more evident that no real parental solicitude, no inestimable advantage conferred by a foreign master, can ever quell the ill-smothered resentment of a people that looks upon itself as robbed of its birthright of self-existence.

A total amalgamation or adoption, the unreserved and unconditional awarding, not only of all material advantages, not only of all political rights and privileges, but even of the moral feelings, of the very pride of nationality, as was tried by France in the Rhenish provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, may, in some rare instances, and to some extent—and we ought rather to say *might, in times different from our own*—bring about a sincere and permanent fusion of races. Material wants, local advantages, political helplessness and insignificance, intellectual or moral inferiority, may, as it actually did in the cases of Norway, of Ireland, of the Slavonic provinces of Austria, render a connexion of that nature matter of mutual expediency, sometimes of imperious necessity. But so far as Austria and Italy

* Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 22.

were concerned, a whole era of mutual grievances, rancour, mistrust, and scorn, were not likely to remove the barrier which natural limits, incompatibility of temper, and conflicting interests, seemed to have raised between them to all eternity.

Austria was too well aware of it ever to attempt it. The task of proving the validity of her claims, of urging the manifold obligations under which her munificence lay her Lombardo-Venetian subjects, devolved upon some Prussian patriot, some Hessian or Swabian soldier of fortune, who won his spurs under *Vater Radezky*, or some of her amateur champions of the English Tory press. Up to 1848 hers was a dumb, undemonstrative rule. All she exacted was silence, well knowing the idleness, nay, the impolicy of any appeal to sympathy. That the Italians repaid her alleged benefits with unqualified detestation, with that mixture of contempt and rancour, more inextinguishable than any sense of real injury; that their ill-will was matter of instinct, with which it would be useless to reason; that the Austrian soldier walked the streets of Milan as utter a stranger in 1848 as he ever was in 1814, in 1745, or in 1530, are facts which, although quoted with different views and for other purposes, were ever readily admitted by the stanchest friends of the imperial power—facts of which the late insurrections were to give the most unanswerable confirmation.

Up to 1848 the Austrians had been hated and endured; nay, what is called “order” reigned at Milan or Venice more thoroughly undisturbed than in any other town or province of Italy. The cobweb plots of the Carbonari of 1820 had, it is true, stretched as far as the north-eastern kingdom; though even then Aus-

tria's fears were greater than any harm done or intended ; but from the year 1814 to 1848, the Austrian provinces alone were made the theatre of no political outbreak. The very name of Spielberg was sufficient, as it seemed, to nip all private conspiracies in the bud ; and Austria always felt quite strong enough at home to take upon herself the high police of her subservient lieutenants abroad. There was something in the conceit of the colossal dimensions of her empire, of its inexhaustible resources, of its actual omnipotence, that subdued the imagination and crushed the spirit of the awe-stricken Italians. All Italian movements of 1820, of 1831, were always made under a false impression that Austria's might would be neutralised by extraneous causes. The moment it was known that she took the field, the Italian sword fell, ere it was fairly brandished, to the ground. There was also something narcotic and stunning, no less than overwhelming, in that changeless, plodding, leaden rule : it stupified and disheartened as efficiently as it degraded and broke.

There was a spell in the sight of an Austrian uniform to wither hope in Italian breasts, even as it blighted the green of Italian fields, and saddened the sun in the Italian skies ; a prestige about the mere mention of Austrian bayonets, which the struggles of 1848, disastrous as they proved in the end, has, we firmly trust, more than partly dispelled.

Had the Austrians, in 1814, been far-reaching enough to extend their sway, and establish garrisons over the whole Peninsula, we are not prepared to deny that the whole nation might have as passively submitted to her fate as did then the Lombardo-Venetian division. "Young Italy" itself had ceased to aim its

shafts against Austria's "wadded shield." With the exception of the self-offering Bandiera, it never, indeed, numbered very active proselytes in that quarter.* Austria had found the means to strive, and was, or at least deemed herself, able to slumber on her subjects' hatred.

The differences between Charles Albert of Sardinia and the cabinet of Vienna in 1846; the accession of Pius IX.; the commotions in the Roman and Neapolitan states, had undoubtedly created new, vague feelings of uneasiness. The catastrophe of the Bandiera, although another state was its theatre, was made, especially in the two brothers' native town, Venice, matter of domestic mourning. The improved state of their material condition contributed to raise the spirits of the long prostrate people, and gave them the first longing for a more unconfined use of their mental faculties. Daylight broke through: the heightened tone of the press at Turin and Florence rendered the Lombards fretful against the stolid strictness of Austrian censorship. The new pulsation of life at the various extremities of the Peninsula, in short, could not fail to react upon that very heart of modern Italian nationality.

Austria had always felt it. Any spark that she suffered unextinguished at her neighbour's was sure in the end to bring the flames to her own door. And it was with this view that she had always made it her policy to bend the Italian princes to a blind adoption of her own rule. But now she saw herself threatened with a conflagration all round. The very princes re-

* See the "Archivio Triennale delle cose d' Italia," serie 1^a, vol. i. p. 533, Capolago, 1850, edited by Carlo Cattaneo, a fiercer republican than Mazzini, though a *Federalist*, and, in so far, at variance with *Unitarian* "young Italy."

belled : Charles Albert, whom she had spared in 1831; he of Tuscany, himself an Austrian; the pope, whose predecessors she had in so many instances held up or chastised. And she had tried repression in vain. She sat down with crossed arms, watching the progress of the irresistible element.

The theories and examples of Tuscan and Roman patriots were hardly needed to keep the Lombards to a line of legal, passive resistance. The salutary dread of Austrian bayonets was there to preclude the possibility of any other course. The most ardent among the Milanese liberals were convinced that "a popular insurrection was not to be thought of; that Lombardy was only a small fraction of an empire larger than France; that to rise was to expose the country to a terrific reaction—to deliver up the Lombard cities to plunder, defenceless families to military outrage—to compromise the best chances of future emancipation; that their tactics should consist in holding the enemy on the hard and thorny ground of legality."*

From 1846 to 1848 Italy had fought with no other weapons than shouts of "Viva Pio Nono!" the Lombards caught up the strain, they had a "Pope's Hymn," which did duty instead of a *Marseillaise*. With this they greeted their new pastor, the Archbishop Romilli, on his solemn entrance into his diocese, on the 5th of September, 1847. The appointment of an Italian after the decease of a German prelate (Gaisruck) was hailed as a return to national principles. Austria was here forced to depart from that system of *denationalisation*

* Cattaneo, "L'Insurrection de Milan," pp. 18, 19.

which had included the very clergy. Romilli was an Italian, and came in the name of the Italian pontiff. The rejoicings, renewed on the 8th, and assuming a character of political demonstration that could not be overlooked, led to the first bloody collision : the riots of the 8th September called forth for remonstrances on the part of peaceful and respectable citizens. These were, for the most part, acts of a strictly legal and constitutional nature. The government of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was not meant to be based on unmitigated despotism. Like most provinces of the Austrian empire Lombardy had a "constitution:" it was the grant of the emperor, Francis the First, and grounded upon old local institutions.* It had, however, been suffered to fall into almost total desuetude ; partly owing to the actual abuses and flagrant encroachments of the omnipotent police, but partly, also, owing to the indifference or stubbornness of the people ; always determined "to spurn Austria and her gifts," always reluctant to incur the charge of complicity with her government, even in the exercise of the most sacred duties. But a recourse to those forms of national franchises, such as they were, well suited the peculiar mood of the patriots of the day, bent as they were on trying the effect of lawful demonstrations, on "forcing

* "It was hateful to hear these Austrians boasting of their *gift* of our municipal institutions, systems of taxation, &c. &c. These wise institutions were entirely our own. Some were handed down with our ancient civilisation ; some were the work of those legislating philosophers whom, in the eighteenth century, Maria Theresa had trusted with the government of the duchy of Milan."—*Cattaneo*, "*L' Insurrection de Milan*," p. 29. For particulars of the Lombard Constitution, see Turnbull's "*Austria*." London, 1839.

Austria on her last entrenchments, and testing the truth of her benevolent intentions."

There were central congregations in Milan and Venice, besides provincial congregations, one for each of the seventeen provinces,—representative bodies, based on no very free system of election, concentrating in themselves all the municipal powers of the state. To these the Lombards turned for redress: they aimed at raising them from their wonted state of impotence and subserviency. They stormed them with addresses, petitions, demands for committees appointed to inquire into the present condition of the country. Men utterly obscure, or only known for their modest and pacific dispositions, gave the first move; in some instances, even men long devoted to the imperial government, and thereby exposed to popular animadversion. The whole country was astir with municipal meetings, commissions, &c.; whose ostensible aim was merely to put into vigour the Constitution of 1816, and see how far Austria could be amenable to her own laws and compacts.*

In Venice, however, Daniele Manin, an advocate, and Nicolo Tommaseo, a literary man of long-established reputation, thought they could find in the letter of those statutes of 1816 the basis of a freedom of the press. The first-named gentleman presented a petition to that effect on the 21st December, 1847; the latter read a speech to the same purpose before the Athenæum on

* D'Azeglio's "Austrian Assassinations in Lombardy," see documents in the Appendix. Also, Consul-General Dawkins' despatch of Dec. 31, 1847; "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 10.

the 29th of the same month, which the government were fain to consider as a seditious cry. This filled the measure of Austria's wrath; who, determined to rid herself of further remonstrance by a stroke of her own clumsy policy, ordered the arrest of the two Venetian patriots on the 18th January, 1848.

The people did not for all that swerve from their peaceful line of policy. They followed up their advantage by demonstrations in the theatres, in the churches, in the public squares; by funeral services in honour of defunct patriots, by ovations to the pope, by festivals and anniversaries without end; by all that could have a meaning, that could convey an allusion, however vague and remote, to the hope nearest to their hearts. The stir of men's minds was immeasurable! In proportion as the Italians made advances in the school of resistance, the Austrians lost sight of the compass of timely concession.

For the first time since the last three-and-thirty years the Lombards had at last found a tongue: for the first time they stepped boldly forward before their imperial master, insisting on their right to be treated like men.

It was a first experiment only, and one of doubtful success. But from it the people had learned to proceed with calmness and deliberation, to rely upon combination, and to wield the irresistible weapon of opinion. Upon this they grounded that system of opposition, which, as we have seen, attacked the government in its very vitals of financial existence; that abstinence from the immoral lottery, upon which Austria raised so heavy a tribute; and that open war against tobacco-smoke,

which would have taken four millions of lire from the yearly revenue.

It may not be desirable, after the lapse of three disastrous years, to enlarge upon the self-denial of the Milanese; upon their steadiness and unanimity in these preparatory essays of their forces; upon their consideration and care that their hostilities should hit the government alone against which they were aimed; by screening from losses the *appaltatori*, or shop-keepers, who farmed the public revenues, by private subventions. Nor is it necessary to dwell upon those massacres of the 3d and 4th January, 1848, to prove how greatly their horrors were aggravated by long and deep premeditation on the part of the government, and by the absence of sufficient provocation on that of the defenceless population; how iniquitously the rules of a proverbially strict discipline were slackened, for the purpose of urging a good-natured but less than half-civilised soldiery to deeds of atrocity. Reference need only be made to the testimony of Massimo d'Azeglio, a man well known for an attachment to truth, stronger even than all regard for his country, and, above all, to the documents with which he corroborates his statement.*

We will not, indeed, contend that the Milanese, in the flush of success, did not at times lay aside the dictates of discretion; that some of the officers who themselves gave the first example, and encouraged their soldiers to act in defiance to the aroused populace, did

* "Austrian Assassinations in Italy," *ut supra*. See, also, Consul-General Dawkins' Letters from Milan, Jan. 6 and 11, 1848. "Correspondence on Affairs of Italy," part ii. pp. 16, 21.

not meet with rough usage at the hands of the latter (whatever we may think of the statement of a treacherous attempt against Count Thun, and of similar cases*); we cannot even easily understand how the Austrians could find their interest in the frequency of bloody scenes, which called down upon them the execration of all Europe: but that the soldiers were officially reminded that they carried a sword by their side, and allowed the free use of it, upon any provocation, are facts that rest upon the testimony of their own writers;† and by this single fact—by this deliberate breaking loose of military license—Austria departed from all her precedents, and took upon herself the responsibility of the atrocious deeds of Milan (where no less than sixty persons were killed or wounded), and of similar outrages in Padua, Pavia, Bergamo, and elsewhere.

The bloodshed in these encounters gave that "matter of smoke" a touch of the sublime: and the sullen spirit which deserted the Opera-House, or a favourite promenade; the outcry of indignation visiting any Lombard woman that ventured to show herself arm-in-

* See "Souvenirs de la Guerre d'Italie, sous le Maréchal Radetzky," par M. George de Pimodan, in the "Revue de Deux Mondes," Aug. 15, 1850, in which the version of the "Allgemeine Zeitung" is given, without examination. All Italian authorities, however, describe that encounter as the result of a dispute, in which the young officer was the aggressor, and vindicate their countrymen from all charge of assassination. See I. Cantù, "Storia della Rivoluzione Lombarda," Genoa, 1850, p. 74, and Cattaneo, "Insurrection de Milan," p. 57. The latter, on meeting Count Thun in the riots of Milan of March 1848, reproached him for having allowed the misstatements of the "Allgemeine" to pass unchallenged. The officer answered he had acted "by order."

† Pimodan, "Guerre d'Italie," p. 624.

arm with an Austrian;* the ingenuity which turned a "Calabrese hat," or a "macaroni feast," into subjects of political meaning; that unity of mind and heart, which in trifles no less than in weighty matters made a vast population act together as one man, and engendered the belief in an imaginary "managing committee" to account for the miraculous instincts of the multitude, gave sufficient evidence that even the Italians,—those "dramatists without the power of tragedy, who turn by their nature to farce, and in their boldest affairs do nothing without burlesque;"† could, nevertheless, be for once terribly in earnest, and know how to turn those apparently silly farces into a tragedy of the deepest dye.

Whilst the people did thus, in imitation of Franklin's countrymen, fit themselves for independence by self-denial, the cabinet of Vienna did all in its power to aggravate the evil, by its uncourteous refusal to admit a Lombard deputation (Jan. 10); by its senseless proclamation precluding "all hope of change" (Jan. 17), and that in flat contradiction to the promises of redress to which the viceroy, Archduke Rainer, had solemnly pledged himself in his proclamation to "his beloved Milanese" only eight days before (Jan. 9); by the intemperate and unmannerly bragging of Marshal Radetzky (in his order of the day, Jan. 15), too confident of cutting all hard knots with his "good sword of five-and-sixty years' temper," by arbitrary arrests, proscriptions, and banishments of men, too often conspicuous for rank and character, in some instances perfectly

* Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 27.

† "Blackwood's Magazine," June 1848, p. 738.

innocent; and, finally, by that proclamation of martial law (Feb. 22, though bearing the date of Nov. 24, 1847), which, after the violent scenes of the two previous months, seemed hardly needed to add to the unbridled licentiousness of the soldiery.*

This appeal to the argument of force was made at the very moment in which force had ceased to be on the government's side; at the moment in which the people, aroused every morning by fresh tidings of new accessions of Italian princes to the national cause; of popular triumphs at Naples; of the preponderance of right against might at Palermo; of demonstrations of the warmest sympathy in their cause on the part of Piedmont, Romagna, and Tuscany; of a universal impatience of all Italy to fly to their rescue; was more than ever strengthened in the conviction that the hour of redemption was at hand, that it behoved the Lombards to be up and doing, not to be behindhand with their brethren.

Had things stopped there; had the deadly struggle to be decided between Austria and Lombardy, independent of extraneous causes, there is little doubt as to the probable ultimate result. For, unless Austria had it in her power to put the whole population to the sword, this latter felt itself so strong of its unanimity, knew so well how to baffle all attempts on the part of its enemies to spread mistrust and jealousy between the different classes, or suspicion against individuals, that it would in the end either have brought its proud rulers to terms; (for complete success seemed as yet out

* D'Azeglio's "Assassinations in Lombardy," "Correspondence on Affairs of Italy," part ii. pp. 98, 104.

of the question), or would, in despair, have startled the world by one of those terrible vespers, of which the history of Italy afforded more than one instance.

But it was otherwise decreed by Providence. It was fated not only that Italy, in her helpless condition, should look up to other countries for guidance and support, but that, in an evil hour, the very example of Italy, and particularly of Sicily, should work miraculous effects on the mercurial population of France.*

The February Revolution of Paris removed from the Italians all control over their own actions: it did away with all the spontaneousness and unanimity of their movement. Not, indeed, that they could, or ever did, actually build any hope on the sympathy of the French republicans, or on the magniloquent proclamations of Lamartine; for Italy had been able to set a right value on French promises and declarations in 1831. Indeed, the promulgation of a republic was by no means in the programme of the patriots of the Gioberti and D'Azeglio school now at the head of public opinion; who had hitherto,—many of them in good faith, most of them from a sense of expediency,—acted under the auspices of popes and princes, who

* "No doubt of it, this hearing continually of the very pope's glory as a reformer, of the very Sicilians fighting divinely for liberty behind barricades, must have bitterly aggravated the feelings of every Frenchman as he looked around him at home on Louis-Philippism, which had become the scorn of all the world. Had there been no insurrectionary Sicily, no reforming pope, France had certainly not broken out then and so, but only later and otherwise."—*Carlyle's "Latter-Day Pamphlets,"* No. I. pp. 5, 6. For more direct evidence of the effects of the revolt of Palermo on the Parisians, see Ricciardi, "Cenni Storici intorno agli ultimi casi d'Italia." *Italia*, 1849, p. 88. Also, "Quarterly Review," clxv. p. 284; clxvi. pp. 559, 560, 576.

proceeded hand in hand with their nobility and clergy, who had just framed their own statutes on the model of that now down-trodden French charter of 1830, and whom the vague terrors of ancient Jacobinism and recent Communism were not likely to remove from their already firmly adopted system.

Indeed, the first announcement of a French outbreak had only a stunning effect.* The lull that occurred in Lombardy at the time was not altogether astonishment—it was sheer dread and horror of French interference. We will not enter here into the question of the real tendency of the Lombard movement, whether aristocratic or democratic; but we contend that the Milanese, the most ardent republicans among them, acted under a strong impression that the line of policy they were to follow, however arduous and perilous, however low and crooked, was at least to be their own; that they alone, or their Italian brethren alone with them, were to fight out the battle with Austria, however terrific the odds; and that the battle should be put off, no matter for how long a time, no matter if for ever, but certainly till the time when they should feel equal to the task. The French could not help them—would not if they could—or would only play the game of 1796 over again, make their Lombard plain a cockpit for all the warlike nations of Europe, to leave them in the end to the mercy of the stronger party.

Had the French revolution been without results in

* Read the very important despatches of Consul-General Dawkins from Milan, March 6 and 14, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. pp. 143, 174. We have seen private letters of the same date, in great number, all adverting to the same apparent phenomenon, and at a loss how to explain it.

any other part of Europe, had Austria otherwise been able to keep her seat, there is reason to believe that the Lombards would have continued in the inaction to which they seemed to have resigned themselves from February 22 to March 18, hanging back in suspense, ready even, perhaps, for the present, to listen to suggestions of reconciliation or compromise, ready to submit to Austria, if unbroken and invincible, if inclined to the measures that the terrible juncture seemed inexorably to dictate.

It was not the promulgation of martial law that spread the "order of the grave" through the streets of Milan, as many might be willing to suppose; for the Milanese were long since under the rule of the sabre, and a mere imperial decree could add nothing to their terror. That decree, however, simultaneous as it was with the tidings of the Parisian riots, gave evidence of the perseverance of the Vienna cabinet in its relentless course. Anon, and that cabinet itself had ceased to be. All Europe was on fire. Prussia—all Germany—convulsed throughout. Vienna without government: the great bond of Austrian unity dissolved. Why should Lombardy be behindhand with her neighbours? What prudent considerations could prevail on the trampled, goaded Milanese, to endure any longer?

The revulsion of feelings was sudden, violent, irresistible.

They rose—they bled. On the 17th of March the news of tumults at Vienna, and of the "proclamation of a republic there," reached Milan and Venice. That was the signal for attack. Within five days a host of seventy thousand combatants was routed and scattered,

with a panic and confusion such as the world never witnessed since the days when angels smote the host of the Assyrian.

God is great! But it was fated that the Italians should forget that that astounding defeat was God's work, not their own.

It was—and we shall have occasion to see flagrant proofs of the melancholy fact—it was by the very promptitude and facility of that first success that Italy was undone. Only on the 10th of March Austria appeared invincible; on the 22d it was thought she had ceased to exist.

A nation may be aided in its work of emancipation by extraneous and fortuitous circumstances; but woe to her if she relies upon them, if she derives from them arguments to slacken from exertion, or to swerve from the duty of grappling with fortune and making her own destiny!

Italy, Germany, and Poland, owe their greatest calamities to their blind inability to separate their own cause from that of France. There is, however, no point of contact between them. France has long since vindicated her mastery over her own actions. Hers is no longer a struggle for existence; nor can she have any true sympathy with those who are yet at those very first rudiments of revolution, even if, as it might be easily proved, she does not actually harbour downright hostile feelings against them. The Allied Powers that traced her limits in 1814, are but too happy to let her alone, if so it be that she only keeps within those boundaries. And France knows that very well; in ordinary times, at least, her shopkeepers and other

industriels are well aware of the fact. It is only on the morrow of one of her mobs, when the men of "order and legality" again take up the reins which they ought never to let slip through their fingers, that to the fit of revolutionary exultation a shiver of panic invariably succeeds. Like all cowards—for utilitarianism makes a coward even of that proverbially gallant nation—France hides her fears under a great show of vapouring and blustering. She takes upon herself the quixotic task of friend of the oppressed and redresser of wrongs. She launches forth that magic word "Nationality," and lays down new laws of nations, new principles of non-intervention. She makes Warsaw or Milan, Brussels or Bologna, her advanced guards against Germany, Austria, or Russia. What of it? As soon as she becomes aware of the groundlessness of her apprehensions, as soon as the perplexed attitude of those great powers affords her a chance of making her own terms with them, not only does she "sell her *natural allies*," one by one, or by wholesale, according to the opportunity,—not only does she eat every syllable of her own proud words, but, to regain credit for good behaviour and respectability, she takes the lead in the way of reaction, ready not only to do the dirtiest work, but to overdo it.

Such were the results of French propagandism in Central Italy in 1830, and of the high-sounding proclamation of Casimir Perier and his colleagues under Louis Philippe. After that example it was natural that the Italians should be, as they were, sufficiently averse not only to the material aid, but even to the mediation and good offices of France, or indeed of any other

foreign power. Charles Albert never uttered any word so sublime, any word more consonant with the intentions and wishes of all parties in Italy, than when he made use of that expression, "*L' Italia farà da sè*," which was afterwards to become the theme of inexhaustible ridicule.*

But the Italians had only learnt half their lesson. It was not enough to come to the conclusion that they had no friends beyond the Alps. They should have acted as if under conviction that their seeming friends were sure to turn out ruthless enemies. It was through a fond error of the democrats that the conceit had prevailed that all unnatural ill-will against the cause of nationality was owing to the jealousy or ambition of princes. Experience has satisfactorily shown that the maxim, "*Homo homini lupus*," is acted upon by no state or community more constantly or unblushingly than by those governments which boast of being based upon popular principles. Nothing so selfish in the world as republican policy. Had all chances of success for Italy depended on the tender mercies of the ultra-democratic Student-Legion at Vienna, or of the extreme left of the Frankfort Assembly, the struggle would only have been longer and deadlier; the pretensions of these "friends of humanity," were certainly not less outrageous than those of the governments they had superseded, only more egregiously absurd: such mercy would they have shown to Italy as the Mexicans met with under the talons of the American Eagle. Enough has been seen and heard to make one sick at the mere mention of "sympathy and brotherhood of nations."

* Proclamation dated Turin, March 23d, at midnight.

But we anticipate. It seems sufficiently well proved, then, that the Milanese, far from rushing to arms on the first report of the cannon from the Louvre, seemed to be for a moment disheartened by it; and that they only began to stir when they felt convinced that their revolution had been providentially achieved by other hands at Vienna; that Austria was no more; that they were, in fact, left without government, and that nothing any longer stood between them and their Italian brethren, save only the hirelings of Radetzky.

Upon these they fell. Between soldiers and citizens the exasperation had for the last three months been extreme. The desperate valour of the Milanese during their ever-memorable "five days," (18th to 22d March) was only exceeded by the improvidence, imbecility, and actual pusillanimity of their adversaries. At the very first moment, when the vague tidings of a revolt at Vienna had convulsed the people of Milan with ungovernable excitement, the viceroy, Archduke Rainer, and his family, turned their backs upon the riotous city. The order to the archduke to take up his habitation at Verona had been issued from Vienna as early as the 3d of March;* but it was, to say the least, unfortunate, that compliance with it should be delayed until the most critical point. The viceroy had certainly received the first tidings of the Vienna outbreak of the 13th early on the morning of the 16th; in the course of the same day the news were already known to most persons;†

* See Lord Ponsonby's despatch from Vienna, March 3. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 123. Mr. Abercromby's, Turin, March 11, *ibid.* 147.

† Consul-general Dawkins, from Milan, March 16.

and it was at five o'clock on the morrow, the 17th, in the dark, that the viceroy slunk off. The governor of the province, Count Spaur, had, from other motives, preceded the archduke in his flight a few days previously. No reason had been given for these extraordinary movements. But as anything like civil government had, in fact, already ceased since the proclamation of martial law, it was natural for the people to surmise that they were left to settle old scores with a lawless soldiery, at the discretion of Radetzky, who would not fail to burn and level the city with the ground, sooner than suffer it to fall into its own power.

On these emergencies, the vice-governor, Count O'Donnell, gave official communication of a telegraphic despatch from Cilly,* containing promises of redress, of extension to the Lombardo-Venetian provinces of the free institutions wrung from government by the Viennese for the whole empire, and a reference to a convocation of the provincial congregations at some future day, no later than the 3d of July. The delay implied by these words was not calculated to allay the impatience and natural mistrust of the Lombards. Faithful to that instinct which had hitherto guided all other Italian movements, they clamoured for arms and insisted on the immediate organisation of national guards. The Cilly despatch had been only posted up at nine o'clock. Two hours later the town was in full insurrection. The people rushed to the

* See vice-consul Campbell's letter from Milan, 18-22 March: *Corresp.* part ii. p. 210; also Cantù, "*Rivoluzione Lombarda*," p. 25; Cattaneo, "*Insurrection de Milan*," p. 38; Lavelli, "*Rivolta di Milano*," London, 1850, 39; Willisen's "*Italienische Feldzug*," p. 29.

Broletto, the town-hall, with their demands hastily drawn up, asking for arms of the municipal authorities. The *podestà*, or mayor of the city, was at the time Count Gabrio Casati, brother-in-law of Count Confalonieri, who, invested with the same dignity, had borne the brunt of the contest during the September and January troubles, and taken the lead in that system of legal resistance which had thus far advanced the cause of the people. For the more decisive scenes that were now forthcoming, it is possible that the worthy magistrate's weakness and irresoluteness unfitted him. The democratic party,* who were soon at war with him, have brought against him and against his colleagues, especially Count Vitaliano Borromeo, charges of petty vanity, of a courtly thirst for orders and decorations,†—charges which it is no part of our office to disprove. These men were now at the height of a well-earned popularity. The people obeyed an instinctive necessity by placing them at their head; Casati's words

* Cattaneo, "Insurrection de Milan," p. 30. According to this writer (p. 39), Casati's progress from the municipal palace to the governor took place according to a preconcerted plan that was known in Milan on the 18th at daybreak. According to other authorities of the same party, the mayor was so far from anticipating the part he was to play, that the multitude that clamoured to have him at their head, found him at his ease in *his slippers*, and in this plight he appeared before the vice-governor.—*Lavelli*, "*Rivolta di Milano*," p. 40.

† The Princess Belgiojoso, no less than Cattaneo, have a sneer at the *patriot* Count Borromeo, because he had accepted the order of the Golden Fleece at the hands of the emperor. See "L'Italie et la Revolution Italienne de 1848. *Revue des Deux Mondes*," Sept. 1848, p. 790. It would be at least fair to add that Borromeo tore the unmeaning bauble from his breast on the 3d of January, 1848.—See Cantù, "*Rivoluzione Lombarda*," p. 65.

of moderation and prudence were drowned in the uproar of the storming multitude, who, taking him and his municipal colleagues along with them, rushed to the governor's palace, there to urge their demands. It was now twelve o'clock at noon.

On the first show of resistance on the part of the Hungarian sentinels at the palace-door, the crowd fell upon them, bore them to the ground, tore the muskets from their hands, and gained possession of the palace. The astounded O'Donnell, forced from his hiding-place, gave in to all the demands of the people with a readiness which only four-and-twenty hours before might have averted the catastrophe. He had been hurried from the palace, taken as a prisoner to the *Casa Vidiserti* in the *Contrada del Monte*, where the municipal authorities, by means of the orders which the people wrenched from his hands, issued a decree for the formation of a civic guard, which was carried into immediate execution.

Marshal Radetzky, who had fled for refuge to the castle (leaving, as the Milanese unanimously aver, his hat and his famous "sixty-five years' sword" behind), incensed at the tricolor standard already waving from the roof of the municipal palace, disavowed all the acts of O'Donnell, whom he declared to be a prisoner in the rebels' hands, and ordered a battalion of Hungarians to take possession of the town-hall. There were only three or four hundred citizens in that building, peacefully proceeding to the organisation of the militia. Unarmed as they were, they ventured upon some show of resistance; but the doors of the house were forced open with cannon, and three hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the assailants.

Then there was strife and bloodshed—confusion for five days. Radetzky's troops were stationed at the vice-regal palace, they had drawn up their cannon on the square of the cathedral, and militarily occupied the sacred building itself, lining the galleries, the pinnacles of the marble roof with Tyrolese sharpshooters. Their cannon were equally ready for action at the main-guard in the *Piazza Mercanti*, and they marched triumphantly along the broadest streets or Corsos of the city.

But the Milanese, not unmindful of the 3d of January, were this time resolved not to suffer themselves to be butchered with impunity. From the very first alarm they entrenched themselves within that vast labyrinth of streets and alleys, narrow and crooked, which harbours the densest population of Milan; they reared up their barricades two and three stories high; streets were unpaved; arms searched for; the alarm-bell pealed from every steeple.

In these preparations the 18th drew to its close, and the night fell, dark and stormy. The following morning (Sunday the 19th) was spent by the troops in unsuccessful attacks upon several points of the barricaded quarters; the soldiers almost invariably falling back before a well-aimed fire from every window, before a shower of tiles, paving-stones, and other missiles, from every roof.

During the night (from the 19th to the 20th), the city, now screened from any chance of sudden onsets, thanks to its complete line of solid barricades, confident of the newly-gained mastery over itself, felt the necessity of proceeding to the organisation of some kind of government. The municipal council had in the same

night been removed, for greater security, from that first refuge of *Casa Vidiserti* to the more central palace of Count C. Taverna, in the narrow *Contrada Bigli*. Here the mayor of the city, Count Casati, and his municipal colleagues, who, it would seem, acted with some reluctance and misgiving, who to the last would have kept the people within just limits of legality, "mistaking a revolution for a mere pacific demonstration,"* were prevailed upon to add to their numbers some of the old patriots of 1820, such as Porro and Durini, General Lecchi, and Borgia, Guerrieri, Guicciardi, &c. It was only on the night of the 21st that these men assumed the name of provisional government. To make up for any deficiency in energy and activity on the part of these men, younger and more venturesome patriots stepped forward (the same who had taken the lead at the first outbreak, and urged the timid and irresolute municipals on), who now constituted themselves into a "council of war;" they were Giulio Terzaghi, Giorgio Clerici, Carlo Cattaneo, and Enrico Cernuschi—names, some of them of frequent occurrence in the sequel.

Under these leaders the revolution was thus strongly organised, and the people found themselves, on the morning of the 20th, enabled to take the offensive. In the course of that and the two following days (21st and 22d), the vice-regal palace, the cathedral, the main-guard, the criminal court, the custom-house, the school for cadets, Radetzky's palace, the head-quarters (*Comando generale*), the engineer and other barracks, and the police barracks, were successively taken. Most of

* Cattaneo, p. 41.

these buildings were manned with Croatsians, who, expecting no quarter, defended themselves with the courage of despair, who in some instances, also, did not shrink from stratagems little in accordance with the laws of civilised nations.

During the night of the 19th, German authorities inform us,* the marshal had given the signal of retreat. From the first alarm he had taken possession of the gates and bastions of the town. Thither his scattered forces drew together, retiring, with or without his orders, from before the insurgents who pressed upon them from street to street, who overpowered, one after another, their strongholds. Here they mustered up, still a formidable, even though a disheartened array, riding with a large train of artillery along the spacious *chaussée*, the magnificent promenade, which connects those lofty ramparts, hanging over the devoted city with threats of instant destruction.

Milan had engaged single-handed with Radetzky, who is variously reported to have had from 8000 to 15,000, and even 20,000 men, and from fifty to seventy cannon under his orders.† There were not, it is stated, more than three hundred sporting guns in the town—

* Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 33.

† Willisen, p. 28, gives the following statement of the number and position of the Austrian army in Italy, on the 18th March :—

"1st corps, Count Wratislaw, stationed in Lombardy, 30 battalions (8 of them Italians), 22 squadrons, 80 cannons, and 1 battery of congreve rockets.

"Two brigades, Strassoldo and Maurer, on the Ticino, to guard the frontier; three brigades, Clam, Wolgemuth, and Rath, in Milan; nine battalions scattered as garrisons about the towns of Cremona, Brescia, Bergamo, Modena, Parma, &c.

"2d corps, Baron d'Aspre, in the Venetian territory, with head-

all the firearms which could be aimed against the Austrians on the first attack.* But most of the gendarmes, the custom-house guards, and the fire-brigade, a well-appointed, high-spirited corps, from the very outbreak sided with the people. The spoils of the grenadiers who had fallen on the first encounter, of those who had been overpowered in small detachments in isolated posts, the arms found at armourers' shops, at the custom-house, at some of the barracks (some of them only yielded after a terrific onslaught), had gradually been supplying the popular combatants with the means of more extensive operations. Experienced officers, veterans from the old armies of the Italian kingdom, soldiers of fortune from Algiers, from the Levant, from South America, were also not wanting; and Milan had, besides, a few Italian Swiss, of the Canton Ticino, within its walls, whose deadly rifles performed no inconsiderable service in behalf of the city of their adoption.

Thus from the 20th to the 22d the struggle, now on somewhat less unequal terms, had been slowly brought to the very outskirts of the town. From the

quarters at Padua. 33 battalions (11 Italians), 16 squadrons, 56 cannon, 1 battery of congreve rockets.

"One brigade at Venice, one at Verona, one at Mantua, some battalions in Padua, Vicenza, Treviso, Udine, Bassano, Modena, &c.

"The whole army 65,000 to 70,000 men, full one-third Italians.

"A reserve, under Count Nugent, was forming at Udine.

"Besides the garrison, Milan had a police-guard 900 men strong, militarily organised." See, also, "*Archivio Triennale*," vol. i. pp. 262-273.

* "Several families had previously sent such arms as they had into the country, expecting to be compelled to deliver them to the police, in compliance with the ordinance of martial law."—*Cattaneo*, p. 44.

height of the overhanging bastions, from the walls of the *Castello* (all that was left of the ancient citadel), Radetzky had it in his power, if not to reach his foes in the centre of the town,* at least to inflict a severe chastisement on the quarters more immediately exposed to his fury.

As after the experiment of the battles of Custoza and Novara, it would be impossible not to speak of the old marshal with great respect, impossible to deny him great power of command, of combination, of rapidity of movement, great watchfulness and knowledge of his position, above all things, great coolness and self-possession, it becomes important to inquire what strange bewilderment had in the present instance power so utterly to perplex his judgment and paralyse his energy.

It appears certain, that Radetzky had for many months entertained serious apprehensions of an attack on the part of the King of Sardinia, and had given repeated warnings to his superiors at Vienna, which had been received with scornful incredulity.† As storms gathered round the Austrian head-quarters at Milan,

* "To threaten the town with the cannon was not to be thought of."—*Willisen*, p. 30. This writer, however, insists that "Doubtless the field-marshal, in spite of the insurrection, quitted the city voluntarily, and that the Milanese could never have compelled him to retire."—P. 55.

† *Willisen*, p. 27. "Old Metternich treated this (warning) as a timorous apprehension of the still older Radetzky;" and elsewhere, "Marshal Radetzky had foreseen the attack of Sardinia and the general rise of Lombardy early in the preceding year. He had throughout the autumn and winter demanded that his forces should be raised to one hundred and fifty thousand men; but always in vain."—P. 50. "The marshal himself had no apprehension whatever as to the insurrection alone, and only asked for reinforcement against the king of Sardinia."—*Ibid*.

resolutions were nevertheless taken to remove the centre of government from the defenceless capital to the stronghold of Verona. It is possible, that the precipitate retreat of the viceroy were only the first steps of that move, and that Radetzky was expected to follow on the first pressure from without. The attitude of the government, and still more of the people of Sardinia, had become sufficiently alarming. But, if the marshal actually contemplated a retreat from the 17th, and before the town had given any sign of revolt, it is not easy to explain why he tarried there on the breaking out of the first tumult on the 18th, why he gave the signal for an attack, which, in his precarious position, he must have felt could not prove successful, suffering thus his men to lose ground inch by inch, suffering thus his retreat to bear all the appearance of an ignominious defeat.*

There was enough, to be sure, in the complicate state of things, in the suddenness of European vicissitudes, to shake the firmest resolution. The absence of instructions, of positive information from Vienna, the dread of the awful responsibility he would have incurred by a deed of Vandalism, which might eventually have proved less acceptable to the opposers and demolishers

* Radetzky himself writes, on the evening of the 18th, "He was resolved to keep possession of Milan at every risk, and if the contest did not cease, to bombard the city." On the evening of the 19th, "he began to fear that no other choice would be left to him" (but a bombardment). On the 20th, his resolution was shaken by the remonstrances of the foreign consuls. On the 21st, his dread of the advance of the Piedmontese and of ten thousand Swiss had already determined his retreat. See the Marshal's Report, "Wiener Zeitung," April 8.

of Metternich's system—seemed certainly to put a bombardment of the Lombard city out of the question. From the sheer instinct of soldierly pride and obstinacy the marshal had on the 18th engaged in a street fight, in which he had before the 20th been very clearly worsted. From the same instinct he was now riding round the barricaded city, reluctant to depart, and yet loth from a better feeling, or unable, or afraid, to wreak on the town a vengeance which would surely be unprofitable, might at the best be incomplete, and eventually fraught with danger to himself.

It does not seem just, however, to insist that "his retreat was occasioned by his knowledge of the treacherous purpose of the King of Sardinia."* Charles Albert, it is well known, and one party at least in Italy has loaded him with endless reproaches on that score, only resolved on hostilities on the night of the 23d, and the Piedmontese vanguard did not appear before the gates of Milan before the 26th. Radetzky had no greater reasons to dread a molestation on the part of the Piedmontese on the 21st, when his first measures for a backward movement were taken,† than he had on the 18th, when retreat would have been so much less

* "Quarterly Review," clxxi. p. 189. Pimodan's "Souvenirs de la Guerre d'Italie," p. 625. Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 28. Radetzky's reference to the news he received about the march of the Piedmontese was altogether destitute of foundation. His own brigades, Strassoldo and Maurer, protected the line of the Ticino, at Magenta and Saronno, till they received his orders to join him on the 21st. See the Report as above.

† Willisen, p. 34. Radetzky's Report, *ut supra*. Willisen very justly contends, that the marshal ought to have quitted Milan, and retreated upon the Mincio, *even without waiting for an insurrection*, if indeed he dreaded any attack on the part of the Piedmontese.—P. 54.

like flight. If we are told that he acted not from any positive knowledge, but from an instinctive apprehension of the coming Sardinians, then we must lower our opinion of his boasted omniscience, and are still at a loss to conceive how the worst fears of a yet distant danger could hinder the consummation of a measure of rigour, which, however the Piedmontese might come in time to avenge, they would always have been too late to prevent.

"The Milanese," we are further informed, "stood in great dread of a bombardment, and were greatly relieved by Radetzky's departure;"*—very likely. That departure, however, hardly took place in consultation of their wishes. Nor was Radetzky, in good sooth, so hard pressed for time as he is described, since he himself made repeated offers of an armistice, which were magnanimously rejected.†

For once in his life, it must be confessed, Marshal

* "Quarterly Review," clxv. p. 242.

† "An armistice, which was negotiated by the foreign consuls, was rejected (by Radetzky) in short and strong words: 'We shall know how to bring the rebels to their duty.' Such was the marshal's answer, as conveyed by General Schönhals."—*Willisen*, p. 33. When the Prussian officer made that bold assertion, he did not expect that the whole transaction should come to light, with the correspondence between the consuls and Radetzky; where it is made very clear that the armistice of three days was proposed by the marshal, and rejected by the provisional government. See the Inclosures to Vice-consul Campbell's Despatch of the 18–22 March, 1848, in "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. pp. 214–221. For the rest, a major of a Croatian regiment, Sigismund d'Effinghausen, had been sent by Radetzky with offers of an armistice as early as the morning of the 20th; but no terms could be made acceptable to the people. See Campbell's Despatch, as above, p. 213; also Cattaneo, "Insurrection de Milan," p. 60, &c. &c.

Radetzky knew not what to do ; and it must be equally allowed, he suffered himself to be beaten by the despised Milanese. He tarried, he hovered about the beleaguered city, aware, though he must be, of the courage accruing to the besieged by his very indecision and delay ; and he delayed merely because retreat itself was fraught with danger,—a danger magnified by uncertainty. And he only withdrew when fear had risen to the very pitch of despair, when the country bands summoned to the rescue of the labouring city by the alarm-bell from every steeple, and from messages wafted aloft by flying balloons, and hastening forward from Como and Varese, from the mountain and the plain, had increased to such numbers as to threaten an attack on his rear ; when the intrepid youths of Milan, led by Carlo Cattaneo, Luciano Manara, the Marquis Villani, and others, had, by the aid of movable barricades, come up to the cannon's mouth at *Porta Tosa*, and carried it at the point of the bayonet, when the other gate, *Porta Comasina*, had by the combined efforts of town and country people, equally fallen into the insurgents' hands, and when, consequently, the marshal had good reason to apprehend, in his turn, a siege in his untenable position in the citadel.

Then, and then only, was the retreat of the Austrian effected,—in the course of the night from the 22d to the 23d ; and the movement was concealed by a violent and ruinous cannonade from every part of the bastions, and by a fire in the citadel, the lurid glare of which added not a little to the horror, anguish, and anxiety, of that terrible night. Twelve hours after it might, perhaps, have been too late. Even then great praise is due to the brave veteran for the order and conduct of

his retrograde march ; the result clearly of his rare firmness and presence of mind. The troops which he had summoned to his aid on the first alarm came up in this terrible juncture ; those, that is to say, that did not fall under the blows of the insurgents, or did not lay down their arms before them. The two brigades (Strassoldo and Maurer) joined him on the walls of Milan on the 22d.* With this seasonable reinforcement, in the face of a rising population, hotly pressed by the citizens, he was enabled not only to carry with him all his artillery, his prisoners and hostages, but even his mutinous Italian soldiery, who, it is insinuated,† had by their defection caused his greatest disasters in the town, and whom he had now to encompass all round with more devoted troops, and to spur on with German and Croatian bayonets.

Those who are anxious to account for Radetzky's discomfiture by all arguments, fair or otherwise,‡ may, if they like, contend that he, as well as D'Aspre at Padua, and all other Austrian commanders, were taken by surprise. This assertion, however, is only in so far true, that the revolt of Vienna came upon them like a clap of thunder. But since September 1847 and January 1848, the Austrians in Italy had been trained to almost daily street-fights. Their numbers had increased from

* Willisen, p. 35. Radetzky's Report, "Vienna Gazette," April 8. No mention of this important fact occurs in any of the Italian accounts.

† Willisen, p. 33. Radetzky himself, however, strongly contends, "that no desertion had taken place among the Italian troops under his immediate command;" that "during the contest at Milan they emulated the other troops in the discharge of their duty." See Report, as above.

‡ "Quarterly Review," clxxi. p. 189.

35,000 to at least 70,000. The Venetian cities were almost daily startled with the arrival of fresh troops, Croatians, for the most part, and borderers, dismal to look upon ; * the troops were consigned to their barracks, horses always saddled, cannon always in readiness. Orders had been issued early in February, that on the first threat of a rise, the army-corps of Lombardy should march on Milan, and that of *Venetia* upon Verona. The troops were in the utmost state of exasperation, and the officers did not scruple to appeal to their worst feelings.

The only oversight on the part of Austria consisted in allowing so large a number of native Italians to form part of the garrisons of Italian towns. Willisen accounts for it † by referring to the loyalty exhibited by those same troops during the revolts of Romagna in 1831, by remarking that the men were recruited from the rural population, always supine and inert, and broken in by German and other officers, subjected to a discipline which takes the very soul out of them, and converts them into mere marching, drilling, killing machines. Even on that subject, however, the evil had been counteracted by all possible precautions. A regiment of Italian grenadiers had been ordered to quit Milan on

* Pimodan's "Souvenirs de la Guerre d'Italie," p. 625. Radetzky himself states that he had received numerous intimations "that the revolution would break out at Milan on the 18th." See his report in the "Wiener Zeitung," April 8, 1848.

† "Italienische Feldzug," p. 29. Out of twenty battalions at the outbreak of the insurrection, seventeen passed over to the enemy, either in a body, or for the most part.—*Ibid.* p. 53. For a more accurate account of the numbers and disposition of the Italian troops, and of the reasons which explain their presence in Lombardy, see "Archivio Triennale," vol. i. 262-273, and 472.

the very week previous to the revolt,* the new arrivals, without exception, consisted of the rough and rude savages from the military borders. The Italian soldiers in Milan could have been but few, nor were they numerous in any part of the Lombard district, with some exceptions at Brescia and Cremona. Whatever may be said of the fall of Venice, it cannot be denied that the Milanese earned their victory with the best blood of their heart.

Whether we take into consideration the magnitude of the means of repression the marshal could still dispose of, or, on the other hand, the scanty numbers of his assailants, the want of previous understanding and combination among them, their long habits of submission, of pusillanimous trepidation, the frequent recent inflictions which should have broken their spirits, the massacres, arrests, and banishments, which had thinned their ranks, we have endless reasons to be amazed at the final issue of the contest. Nor will we dwell on the intrepidity, merely, and contempt of life exhibited by a people who were held in the estimation of a craven-flock, who had been systematically enervated, whom to disarm morally, as well as materially, had been the main study of their rulers for so many years. We will not mention deeds of heroism, which have given so much lustre to the names of Broggi, Anfossi, Guy da Belgiojoso, and their more fortunate survivors, Arcioni, Manara, Cernuschi, Cattaneo, and a hundred more, as we would point to that keen intelligence, that ready ingenuity, that fertility of resources, that "talent des révolutions," monopolised hitherto by the Parisians, by

* Cattaneo, "Insurrection de Milan," p. 64. "Archivio," 266, 472.

which the greatest dangers were obviated, and the most serious obstacles overcome. To say nothing of the movable barricades, of the signals of distress sent through the air on flying balloons, of wooden or leather cannons with iron hoops, and other contrivances of the moment, it is on record that the militant people made their way to the most exposed localities, by breaking down the walls from house to house, and thus came up with the enemy safe from the artillery that swept the broader streets.*

The lovers of chivalrous exploits may, if they like, sneer at this "discretion, best part of valour;" but the Milanese have sufficiently shown, that they could be no less lavish of their blood whenever occasion required or warranted its sacrifice.

Neither would it be easy, even by searching through the revolutionary annals of the "city of barricades," to quote instances of greater unanimity on the part of a vast population, of a livelier co-operation of both sexes, of all ages, of all ranks, to a common object, nor of greater proofs of disinterestedness and devotion. Party spirit may afterwards have attempted to question the earnestness of the higher classes, and their loyalty to

* The Austrian version of these events does full justice to the nature of the revolt. "In Milan the very foundations of the city were torn up. Not hundreds, but thousands of barricades, crossed the streets; and the enemy displayed in the execution of their plan so great a circumspection and an audacity, that it was evident that military leaders of foreign extraction must have been placed at their head."—*Radetzky's Report*, Vienna Gazette, April 8. With the exception of a few Italian-Swiss, residents of Milan, it does not, however, appear that there were any foreign combatants, much less leaders, in the Milanese ranks.

the cause of the people.* Moments of titubation at the prospect of so desperate a strife, want of faith, if not on the energies, at least on the material means of the people, may have prompted Casati, and his colleagues and adherents, with an anxious wish to put off the onset, even when daring was unquestionably the safest course; or inclined them to listen to proposals of an armistice, which, by cooling the people's ardour, might for ever have done away with the best chance of success. Perhaps these men were no heroes; but their fears, at the utmost, were the result of errors of judgment, and we can see no reason why they should be ascribed to their aristocratic jealousy of the people's enfranchisement, or to their courtly subserviency to the interests of the house of Sardinia.

But we shall return to the dolorous subject. Suffice it for the present to state, on the evidence of unprejudiced strangers,† that up to the 23d of March these men enjoyed all the confidence of the Milanese: that their gold, their dependants, had a principal share in the triumph of the five days; and that the revolution was mainly their own work. Patrician names, the highest in the land, swell the list of the foremost combatants. The most costly furniture was hurled from the palace windows, to add to the height of the already towering barricades. The proudest ladies ministered

* Cattaneo, ch. v. throughout. Radetzky, however, gives the Milanese patriot a flat contradiction: "The character of this people," he says in his report, "has become quite changed; fanaticism has seized every rank, every age, and every sex."—*Wiener Zeitung*, April 8.

† Vice-consul Campbell's Despatch, *ut supra*.

to the wants of the wounded in the hospitals. The rural population, more or less bound to the landed aristocracy, seemed only anxious to give the lie to those ill-omened prophets, who fain expected in Lombardy a repetition of the servile war and massacres of Gallicia, who had forewarned the noble of Northern Italy that "he had the worst warfare to expect, should he be abandoned to the tender mercies of his peasantry by the protecting hand of Austria."* Notwithstanding treacherous appeals to their revengefulness,† to their avarice; notwithstanding the real grievances of this much-enduring class, it was not true that "careless landlords and tyrannical stewards were objects of greater dislike with them than the phlegmatic Germans."‡ The peasantry of the Venetian provinces continued, it is true, in their stupid and pusillanimous apathy, but in Lombardy they rose *en masse*. From the tops of the steeples of the besieged town bands were seen traversing the vast prairies and rice-grounds in every direction. They were masses of mountaineers from Como and Varese, armed with the very muskets they had wrenched from their surrendering garrisons, often under the captainship of their parish clergy, car-

* "Quarterly Review," clxiii. pp. 234, 259. This in Dec. 1847.

† Cantù, "Rivoluzione Lombarda," p. 82. "The police excited the credulous multitude, inactive and in despair from want, to inveigh against the rich. On the walls of Milan, and more so of Verona, were seen inscriptions, '*Morte ai Nobili! Morte ai Signori!*'"

‡ "Quarterly Review," *ibid.* Even after the events of March, Count Ficquelmont flattered himself that "it was always in the power of Austria to raise the Lombard peasantry against their superiors."—See Lord Ponsonby's Despatch, Vienna, April 2. "Correspondence," part ii. p. 290.

rying the sign of redemption before them. There were columns from the Brianza, troops from the Bergamasque valleys, conveyed to Milan by railway trains from Treviglio. Vast numbers also hastened forward from the plain; the wealthy farmers of Lodi, at the head of their sturdy labourers. These were the foes that determined the flight of Radetzky, and they had indeed worked themselves to so high a pitch of daring, as almost to venture to confront him at the head of all his host on his retreat. They fell upon the Tyrolese riflemen of his vanguard at *Melegnano* or *Marignano*, a small town on the road to Lodi, twelve miles from Milan; they took prisoner their commanding officer, Count Wratislaw, and demanded the arms of the whole troops. The main body of the retreating army came up at this juncture: the puny barricades that the rustics had reared up after the pattern of the capital were stormed with cannon, and the town delivered up to military execution.*

The aroused peasantry returned to the charge, nevertheless. They harassed the enemy in the rear; they threw every obstacle in his way, by broken bridges, blocked-up thoroughfares, and flooded fields; they fell on small detachments, couriers, and staff-officers, and swelled the Manara and Arcioni legions, when these, after a short rest, set out in pursuit of the foe from the emancipated city. These swarms of irregular combatants never lost sight of the Austrian, until the Piedmontese battalions came to take the contest upon themselves. The gates of Milan had hardly been forced

* Cantù, p. 144. Willisen, p. 35. Radetzky's Report, *ut supra*.

open, on the 22d, when the streets were already invaded by no less than thirty thousand of these rustic auxiliaries.* So fatal had been the aim of those Swiss and Milanese rifles, both within and without the town, that Radetzky is said to have lost, in the course of the five days, no less than five thousand men, dead or captive; and so many of his artillerymen had been stretched dead on their pieces, that he is represented at Montechiari, near Brescia, on the 30th, as having barely five or six of that corps left to man the fifty or sixty cannon which he had dragged along in his flight.† The Milanese compute their loss, in dead, at three hundred and twenty-nine.

Still the real glory of the Milanese, during those five days, is due to their humanity towards their conquered foe. The magnanimity and disinterestedness of a people in the first flush of success, is a fact too constantly observed in the records of most revolutions for the Milanese to claim any extraordinary merit on that score, were it not for the long and manifold provocations they had undergone, and for the contrast their behaviour afforded to the less than human doings of the opposite party. The Tyrolese and other police-officers of every rank, the family of the director-in-chief of that corps, Baron Torresani Lanzenfeld, and, finally, Count Bolza, a man well known to the readers of Pellico and Andryane, all fell into the hands of the people, and all were spared, either by a spontaneous impulse of for-

* Vice-consul Campbell, p. 214. Cantù, 145.

† Pepe's "Narrative of Events in Italy," vol. i. p. 75. Cattaneo, p. 107. "Radetzky's own forces, at Lodi, on the 24th, were reduced by one good fifth."—*Willisen*, p. 39.

giveness, or on the slightest remonstrance of the leaders of the revolt. The excited young men who had taken Bolza turned to Cattaneo, to ask how the old offender should be dealt with: "If you kill him," said the people's man, "you will do an act of justice; if you spare him, your deed will be holy;" and the man was spared.* The wounded enemies were tended in private houses, in the hospitals, by the fairest and tenderest hands—a charity too sadly contrasting with the heedlessness or brutality of the Austrian authorities, who, at the time of the January riots, had suffered the wounds of their prisoners to fester, undressed, till more than one of the unfortunate people died of gangrene;† still more with the unheard-of and inconceivable atrocities which were, during the same five days, perpetrated against defenceless women and children, against the sick and dying, both at the gates and in the suburbs of Milan, and all along the road, by the retreating soldiery. History may have some reluctance to make itself a voucher for the authenticity of deeds of wanton cruelty, for wholesale massacres, for maiming and torturing of limbs, for nameless outrages, at which imagination revolts. But we cannot and will not suffer the accounts of those disgusting scenes to be classed among the "enormous lies by which the Italians were encouraged in their own undenied atrocities."‡ Even due allowance being made for exaggeration consequent upon general

* Cattaneo, p. 55.

† See D'Azeglio's "Assassinations in Lombardy," p. 35. This writer evinces some repugnance to give credit to such atrocious charges, but is compelled to yield to irrefutable evidence.

‡ "Quarterly Review," clxv. p. 48. Macfarlane, "A Glance at Revolutionized Italy," vol. ii. p. 97.

excitement, consequent upon deep-rooted, long-cherished animosity, it is impossible to resist the evidence of a whole city, which, only ten days after the event, was still ringing with the terrific recitals, and pointing to the spots where the traces of those odious butcheries were still discernible. Even setting aside the testimonies of eye-witnesses, such as Ignazio Cantù, Carlo Cattaneo,* and a hundred others, we cannot at least resist the authority of unimpassioned foreign residents,† who have numbered the instances in which the bearers of a flag of truce were barbarously fired upon by the soldiery; the instances in which the flag itself was made the means of alluring the confiding citizens into an ambush; who have described the “shocking manner in which whole families of women and children were murdered and mutilated.” We cannot, finally, resist the Austrians’ own words, who, even whilst trying to explain and account for, acknowledge the harsh treatment of the prisoners they had taken at the town-hall, and thrown into the most horrid dungeon of the castle.‡

We may so far force our own convictions as to clear Radetzky and most of his officers—who have proved themselves brave men, and ought therefore to be abhorrent from cruelty—from all direct blame. We are not unwilling to throw it upon the Croats, borderers, and other savages, which Austria keeps in her pay, seemingly for similar services, and whose subse-

* Cantù, p. 126. Cattaneo, p. 55.

† Vice-consul Campbell’s Despatch of March 22. “Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy,” p. 214.

‡ See letter of Count Walmoden to the French consul, in the Inclosures to the above despatch, p. 221.

quent conduct at Vienna, in Hungary, and elsewhere, was but too much in keeping with the cannibal excesses here alluded to; much may be allowed for mutual aggravation, for relaxation of discipline, for the maddening effect of sudden terror, and the feeling of unmerited disgrace. But we have less patience with those who would do away with the sensation of horror that was aroused throughout Europe at the time, either by a flat denial of incontrovertible facts, or by a retort upon the Italians themselves;* for it must be said in honour of a nation who has too long—and not always unjustly—been charged with vindictiveness, that they did not in this instance return hatred for hatred; that in the exultation of unhopèd-for deliverance they showed the greatest anxiety not to stain their victory by wanton bloodshed; that, falling into opposite extremes of chivalrous generosity, they tended and feasted their prisoners in many instances with even exaggerate kindness, being anxious, above all things, to act up to the words of their proclamation of the 21st of March, in which, whilst expressing their determination to drive

* "Quarterly Review," clxv. p. 243. Willisen, "Italienische Feldzug," p. 34. The latter writer states, that "*All that was German sought their safety in flight.*" It is very true that Radetzky had with him more than three hundred German families when he left Milan; but we might quote many instances, not only of German bankers, merchants, &c., but even of Austrian officers, at Milan, Cremona, and elsewhere, who remained unmolested all the time, from March to August; some of whom, indeed, did not scruple, on the return of Radetzky, to add their taunts and boasts to the bitterness of a nation's defeat. A young man, who in the heat of street-fighting, on the 20th March, at Parma, shot an Austrian officer treacherously from behind, was pointed at with well-deserved detestation by all his townspeople.

the enemies beyond the Alps, they add their best wishes that, "once there, they too might enjoy those very blessings of freedom and well-being which they hoped to have secured for themselves."*

All this on the first triumphant outbreak. There are pages in the sequel an Italian may not read without regret.†

Meanwhile, it would be difficult to point out in history a more sudden or general consternation than that which had now seized on the Austrians all over the country. A battalion at Como, a company at Varese, a considerable force at Monza, were fallen upon and overpowered. The same happened to all the detached posts in the Valtellina, and the districts of the Lake Maggiore and Como. Two Italian battalions of the "Archduke Albert," and another of the "Ceccopieri" regiment, joined the insurgents at Cremona. With them the battery of their brigade, and the ancient

* See the proclamation in Cattaneo, p. 91. Cantù, p. 113.

† The "Quarterly Review," as above, quotes the instance of Marshal Bianchi, a man who ought never to have shown his face in Italy since 1814; of Fanny Ellsler, Radetzky's own minion at Milan, whose insolent behaviour at the Theatre La Scala had wounded the feelings of the people. These, and some other intriguing women, together with the daughter of General Nugent, were simply taken as hostages, when the success of this officer had driven the people of Venetia to despair, but they were subjected to no harsh treatment. However, we greatly lament even that act of violence; and still more do we deplore the massacre of three Austrian agents or spies, who fell into the hands of the populace of Treviso, at a time that the authorities had, owing to the absence of the troops to meet the enemy, lost all control upon the passions of the multitude. See Dawkins' Despatches, Venice, May 17 and 25, and his communication with the Venetian Government on the subject. Correspondence, part ii. pp. 499, 526.

stronghold of Pizzighettone, were lost to the emperor. The mutinous soldiery disarmed their German officers, allowing them, however, to depart unhurt. These fugitives, with their commander, General Schönhals, among them, afterwards fell into the hands of a party of insurgents at Desenzano, by whom they were led to Brescia, and there made use of to induce the garrison of that place to surrender. A part of the "Haugwitz" regiment had already in that city declared for the people; and the commanding officer, Prince Schwartzberg, was perhaps too soon convinced of the impossibility of further resistance. A battalion of the regiment "Geppert" equally determined the fall of Bergamo; one of "Zanini" passed over to the enemy at Treviso, one of "Este" at Udine; the impregnable stronghold of Rocca d'Anfo, near the lake of Idro, was taken by a coup-de-main; Osopo, another fortress, on the Tagliamento, equally fell without a struggle. The same was the fate of Palmanova, a frontier citadel on the extreme border of the Venetian territory, toward the Isonzo. The stores of this fortress supplied the Italians with thirty cannons and thirty thousand muskets. The borders of the lake of Garda, the steamers, and a flotilla of gun-boats, were soon in the power of the Lombard insurgents. The revolt spread to the Italian Tyrol: the troops of that nation, the best riflemen in the Austrian army, in some instances, fell off from their allegiance: four companies of these *chasseurs* decided the fall of Rovigo.

Nay, there was a moment when the Austrians were not without uneasiness even with regard to Mantua and Verona. The garrison of the former place was weak,

and divided against itself. Some of the Italian and Hungarian soldiery—artillerymen amongst them—were ready to aid the efforts of the national party, and only awaited the signal of the first attack. Nothing was required but promptness and determination on the part of the citizens; but these, with the proverbial timidity of the inhabitants of garrison towns, trusting that negotiation would lead to better results than any show of hostility, sent a deputation to the commander, Gorgkowsky, headed by the bishops of the diocese, offering an honourable capitulation. The old and wary officer, aware of their hesitation, and only intent upon gaining time, entertained them in long discussions of the terms of surrender. The golden opportunity was lost to the Mantuans; and the general, when he saw that rescue was at hand, dismissed the deputation with a haughty declaration of his readiness to blow up himself and the whole town and fortress into the air sooner than yield. Ere the citizens summoned up sufficient courage to put his brave words to the test of experience, Radetzky had the means of throwing the whole of his trusty brigade Wolgemuth into the place.*

At Verona, the Archduke Ranieri had humoured the people, by promises of constitutional liberties, by the immediate grant of a free press, and organisation

* Custozza, "Histoire de l'Insurrection et de la Campagne d'Italie en 1848." Turin, 1850, p. 27. The author is said to be a French officer of artillery. "Quarterly Review," clxxi. pp. 188-190. The Princess Belgiojoso attributes the loss of Mantua and Verona to wilful treachery on the part of the bishop of Mantua and of the nobles of Verona. See "L'Italie et la Revolution Italienne de 1848, Revue de deux Mondes," Sept. 1848, p. 789. See also Sir G. Hamilton's Letter, Florence, April 1, "Correspondence," part ii. p. 297.

of a civic guard. The citizens of Verona, always a quiet and timid flock, except when set up by the priests, by long habits of allegiance, or rather of apathy, extending to all their rural population, averse to innovation, did thus for a few days parade their lonely streets with shouts of "Viva Pio IX.!" hugging the Austrian officers, and calling them brothers.* They only ventured so far as to summon the garrison to surrender the "castle" into their hands; but on a laconic reply from General Gerhardt to "come and take it," they fell back into their state of passive expectation, until General d'Aspre, with such fragments of the second corps as he could gather from Padua, Vicenza, and other cities of Venetian *terra firma*, came to secure the possession of that "military capital of Austrian Lombardy."†

All did not, however, turn out equally favourable to the Austrians in Venice. That city was lost, not from any show of desperate courage on the part of the people, not from any chance of success that strong city offered even to the most venturous heroism, but owing merely to the blindness and utter cowardice of the civil and military governors of the place. The garrison was composed of two German battalions, and one of borderers, against whom were mustered four battalions of mutinous Italians. The town, which had never been at rest since the arbitrary imprisonment of Manin and Tommaseo, was thrown into a fever of excitement on the first vague report of a "constitution at Trieste," on the evening of the 16th of March. On the following morning, on the promulgation of the famous bulletin from Cilly, the

* Pimodan, "Souvenirs de la Guerre d'Italie," p. 625.

† Willisen, "Italienische Feldzug," p. 39.

people assembled before the palace, clamouring for the liberation of the patriots Manin and Tommaseo. Hardly waiting for a reluctant assent, they force open the prison-doors, and bear their rescued leaders off on their shoulders, crowding round them on the main square, to listen to the thunders of eloquence of the man that was from that day to them what Kossuth was to the Hungarians.*

Daniele Manin was, previous to his motion in December 1847, unknown to fame, out at least of his native town. There are few persons now unacquainted with the real nature of his connexion with the last doge of Venice, whose name he bears.† He is said to be of Hebrew extraction, the son of a converted Jew, who, agreeably to usage, took at his christening the name of a noble patron, the doge's brother, who held him at the font. Daniele, born in 1804, was brought up to the legal profession; we are not aware that he had reached any degree of eminence until public events called forth his latent energies. But he proved himself equal to the most arduous circumstances. To rare abilities, to great dexterity and versatility, he added that vehement and passionate flow of language which takes a multitude, especially a southern multitude, by storm. From

* "Sunto Storico-Critico dei Fatti avvenuti nelle Province Venete, del Marzo 1848, all' Agosto 1849," Vicenza, 1850, p. 5. De Brunner's "Venise en 1848-49," "Aventures de la Compagnie Suisse," &c. Lugano, 1850, ch. i. Consul-general Dawkins, "Despatches from Venice," March 18, 22, 25. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. pp. 267-275.

† "Quarterly Review," clxxi. p. 192. "Una Giustizia di Daniele Manin, e suoi portamenti in Venezia, Relazione di G. Soler," p. 15. Turin, 1850. The author was killed in a duel, by some of Manin's partisans, in consequence of some assertions in the above pamphlet.

the 17th of March, Venice, unlike Milan, which had only honest and well-meaning, but not very far-sighted citizens at its head—Venice was under the control of a leading mind. With a wisdom and suppleness which has wrongly been construed into duplicity, he knew how to abdicate in turn, and resume the semblance of power—the substance was always with him. Venice never swerved from her allegiance to her dictator; and he was wise enough—was sufficiently alive to the difficulty of his own and his country's position—to keep the yielding crowds within limits of "order and moderation."

Riots and collision between the people and the German soldiery could not, however, be prevented, especially as the citizens were cheered on by the Italian grenadiers, impatient to join them. There was some blood shed on the 18th, on the square of St. Mark, before the doors of the palace, to which the people had been suffered to come with demands, increasing hourly in daring and importunity. The palace-doors were guarded by a band of three hundred Croatians, who had but slight trouble in dispersing the people by a volley of musketry, which killed five, and wounded as many of their number.

But what violence failed to obtain on the square, a show of legality was meanwhile happily accomplishing at the Council Hall. The podestà, Carrer, and other municipal authorities, entered into negotiations with the civil governor, Count Palfy, an Hungarian, for the carrying into effect the new constitutional grants obtained at Vienna for the whole empire. The gravity of the present circumstances would have entitled Palfy to a refusal; but the man was old and irresolute, and con-

sented to every demand, even to the armament of the people and organisation of a citizen-guard. This suicidal act of weakness on the government's part was followed by the gradual removal of the obnoxious foreigners from the palace, and the substitution of Italian troops, or even of the burgher-militia.

There was a short lull for three days,—something even approaching to a fraternisation of the people with the dreaded foreign soldiery;* the authorities were partly reassured, and the national flags and cockades were even laid aside.

The news of mortal hostilities at Milan soon, however, renewed the popular convulsion. Tumult and strife were heard from the arsenal, where the workmen had long been at variance with their harsh taskmasters. The director of the works, Colonel Marinowich, commander-in-chief of the Austrian navy, fell by their hands.† This man, whose unpopularity seems to have arisen chiefly from his severity and rudeness of deportment, was now vaguely suspected of harbouring treasonable designs against the city, and denounced to public vengeance by those who had no other means of

* Willisen, p. 38.

† Princess Belgiojoso (" *Revolution et République de Vénise, Revue des deux Mondes*," vol. xxiv. p. 798) throws out some hints of a popular belief that Marinowich had years since broken the heart of the young Archduke Frederic, the hero of Syria—the idol of Italian sailors and marines—who had the nominal command-in-chief of the navy, but who was given in charge to Marinowich, his lieutenant, as to a gaoler, to cure him of an unfortunate passion for a lady of a rank inferior to royalty. Hence, she thinks, the colonel's unpopularity. He was, besides, at this juncture, suspected of a design to blow up the arsenal, and thereby cause the destruction of the city.

venting their private animosity against him. On the afternoon of the 21st he had escaped with life, owing to the exertion of some officers of the national guard. Dragged by his fate once more to confront his enraged workmen on the morrow, the 22d, he fell a victim to his own unaccountable infatuation, giving thus the lawless multitude that first taste of blood, of which it is so difficult to calculate the consequences.

In the afternoon the civic guards, led by Manin, hastened to take possession of the arsenal. A party of the regiment of marines, which had orders to resist them, rebelled against their leader, Major Bodai, and, having murdered him, declared for the republic. The sight of the mangled remains of the commander of the arsenal struck terror into the heart of Count Palfy, who forthwith resigned his civil command into the hands of Count Zichy—like him, an Hungarian nobleman—commander of the city and fortresses. Zichy, a man of high spirit and some military capacity, but long enervated by the indulgence of epicurean tastes and habits,* accepted the perilous charge, which thus combined all civil and military powers in his hands. The previous removal of all reliable forces, however, had taken from him all liberty of action; and nothing was left to him but to sign a capitulation with the municipal authorities, by virtue of which impregnable Venice, with all its fortresses by land and sea—with all the *matériel*

* Princess Belgiojoso, always alive to anything approaching to feminine intrigue, accounts for Zichy's weakness of purpose, by attributing it to his fondness to a Milanese girl, out of the people's rank, his affection for whom had, by long habit and residence in the country, engaged his partiality in favour of all Italy.—*Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. xxiv. p. 799.

of war—30,000 muskets, the military chest, with thirty-six millions of Austrian lire (1,200,000*l.* sterling)—were given up to the insurgents. The Italian soldiery, nearly 4000 men, were to remain in Venice; the foreign part of the garrison, with three months' pay, to be sent by safe conveyance across the sea to Trieste.

The never-ending disgrace with which those unfortunate Hungarian noblemen covered themselves, and which one of them had to expiate by a degrading sentence of a council of war at Olmütz, must not induce us to suppose that any different course adopted by them, any attempt at resistance, however imperiously demanded by military honour, could be attended with certain success.

Venice, truly, was not Milan. Its population was as comparatively irresolute and prostrate, as its water-girt fortresses were strong and inaccessible. Any show of good countenance at the outset, any decisive measure taken in time, might have hushed up discontent and scared rebellion for ever. Those three hundred Germans or Croatians on the square of St. Mark had shown it on the 18th. Had Palfy persisted in the negative, and sent another detachment of the same troops to clear the municipal palace, or had he merely refused admittance to the deputation therefrom, there was probably an end for ever of the revolution of Venice. Even after the contest had been decided in favour of the people, even after the capitulation, the German regiment Kinski refused to lay down their arms; and although gun-boats were brought up from the arsenal, and placed in front of the barracks where those brave men had shut themselves up, still were they stubbornly refusing to

acknowledge the convention of Count Zichy so late as the 25th, and were only got rid of by a compliance with all their demands as to military honours.* With men of this temper much could certainly be attempted; but with the air that blew from the north, with the positive orders from Vienna, and the example of Trieste, where the citizens were already entrusted with arms in their hands, it was not easy to resist demands that bore all the weight of legality.

After that first acknowledgment of rights on the part of a riotous multitude, after a first instance of indecision—the readiness of a large number of land and sea troops for defection—the terrible example of Major Bodai, the national tricolor already superseding the Austrian flag on board the guard-ship and a brig of war in port, all tended to convince the military governor that the revolt was not to be quelled without a terrible effusion of blood. The non-Italian troops consisted, as we have seen, only of three battalions, a force, we are told, of two thousand five hundred men: they had been removed from the most commanding positions, and the attitude of the Italian troops, though not amounting to positive mutiny, was anything but reassuring. The populace is not warlike in any civilised town, least of all in Venice, where the oligarchy of St. Mark had broken its spirit time out of mind. But behind the ranks of that craven people, some of Austria's best soldiers, her marines, the hardy workmen at the arsenal, were hourly ranging themselves: the whole army was in a state of disorganisation, which it

* Consul-general Dawkins, pp. 270–275.

took all the disciplinarian genius of Radetzky and D'Aspre to keep under control. The latter, far from hastening to the rescue of Venice, was in full retreat on Verona. Reinforcements by sea, owing to the disposition of men's minds in the Austrian navy, were not to be relied upon. The most that could be attempted was a sanguinary contest, of very doubtful issue.

From this Zichy shrank.

Thus had Venice, almost by a miracle, come into the hands of its native people. Malghera hoisted the Italian flag on the evening of the same day (the 22d). The Republic of St. Mark was proclaimed by Manin, a provisional government hastily installed, of which he had the presidency. The old standard of St. Mark was brought to light—the old war-cry revived. Rovigo, Treviso, and other towns in *terra firma*, hastened to send in their adhesion.

So low had Austria fallen on the 22d of March, 1848: the two capital cities of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom fallen, as it were, at one stroke; her scattered hosts, in utter confusion, driven from some of her firmest strongholds, hunted from town to town, with trembling hearts crouching under the protecting cannon of the four fortresses of the Adige and Mincio.

It was not many days since some English journal, friendly to that power,* had sent forth these memorable words: "The Italians don't fight. They bluster and talk big, like the Spaniards, and run away ere the first shot is fired. Ten thousand Germans or Frenchmen

* "Blackwood's Magazine," lxxiii. p. 104 (Jan. 1848).

may march from one end of Italy to the other without meeting any man that dares to fire at them, except from behind a rock or stone wall." The sheet upon which those ungenerous words were printed was scarcely dry, when, behold, seventy thousand Austrians gave way before the Italians in every direction; when their utter destruction was perhaps unavoidable, without those very "stone walls" on which craven hearts were said to place their reliance!

After the chastisement of Melegnano on the 23d, Radetzky conducted his discomfited host to Lodi on the 24th, the brigades Strossoldo and Clam taking the same direction over Paullo and Landriano. The news of irreparable disasters from all quarters determined his further retreat beyond the Adda, and over Crema, Mannerbio, and Montechiari; he at last reached the Mincio on the 31st: hence he repaired to Verona on the 2d of April, where he was met by D'Aspre, who, by capitulation or by show of firm countenance, having brought with him from seven thousand to nine thousand men of the garrisons of Padua and Vicenza, was able to greet the desponding marshal with the assurance that "all was saved."*

The weather, terrific during the whole of that terrific contest, added to the difficulties of that disastrous retreat. Heavy rains, such as only fall in Italy in spring and autumn, had converted those Lombard flats into dismal swamps. Bridges were cut down, roads broken up or otherwise made impassable; not a paltry village but was busy at the erection of barricades. The

* "Quarterly Review," clxxi. pp. 191, 192. Ricciardi, "Ultimi Casi d'Italia," p. 116.

peasantry screened themselves behind piles of felled trees, or dug deep ditches across the broad thoroughfares. They fell on the stragglers and disbanded troops; they seized ammunitions and transports of artillery; the horses of disbanded troopers fell exhausted into their hands. The sufferings of men and beasts were appalling.

All communication between the different corps was at an end. The account given by one of Radetzky's state officers,* who went from place to place with a daring that would seem almost quixotic, and with an activity almost amounting to ubiquity, gives us an insight into the depth of confusion into which the best organised troops of all Europe had suddenly been thrown. On the 19th of March nothing was known at Verona of the conflict at Milan, but the province all round was under the rule of revolutionary committees; staff-officers, sent out to reconnoitre, were seen hanging by their own scarfs, on the trees, by the road-side. The same uncertainty continued in that place up to the 24th, when D'Aspre had concentrated there a force of sixteen thousand men. Three squadrons of *hulans* and four companies of Croats were met by our adventurer on his way to Peschiera; they were the fragments of the garrisons of Bergamo and Cremona, who had been for the last six days wandering all over Lombardy under the pelting rain, destitute of food or shelter, without leaders, without a fixed purpose or definite course. The garrison of Peschiera was without tidings from Milan up to the 29th. On the 30th Radetzky himself,

* Pimodan, "Souvenirs de la Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes," (Sept. 1850), p. 626, &c.

at Montechiari, was uncertain as to the fate of Verona, and strongly apprehensive of the fall of Mantua and Peschiera. It was only, as we have seen, on the 2d of April, that, leaving his own troops to the defence of the Mincio, he proceeded to Verona, where he was able not only to take breath, but to ascertain the real extent of his losses, and to survey his actual position.

But the disasters of the Austrians were not limited to their own territory of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The dukes of Parma and Modena, the last allies now left to Austria amongst the crowned heads of Italy, could hardly fail to be involved in her sudden, and, to all appearance, irretrievable fate.

He of Modena, who had been blustering not a little about the one hundred and fifty thousand men he had always ready at his beck *nell' oltrepò* (on the northern bank of the Po), in any case of emergency, was ever on horseback at the head of fifteen hundred Croats, and perhaps as many of his native hirelings, though more ready, in good sooth, for a flight than a fight. On the first news of a rise at Milan, and of the march of two thousand volunteers from Bologna into his territory, he turned his back upon his subjects with indecent hurry, and crossed over to Mantua, his native troops deserting him at every step, even during the short retreat.

The duke of Parma had not even courage to run away. The youths of Parma fell upon the Austrians (about one thousand eight hundred in number), whom the duke had mustered on the main squares and along the streets of his little capital, with a great display of cannon and other instruments of destruction. Several

engagements had already taken place on the streets, (March 20th), and the townspeople gave evidence of a headlong daring which might have emulated the splendid exploits of Milan; but the duke, who had already shown the white feather at Lucca upon a like contingency, in September 1847, was now completely unmanned by the first report of fire-arms. He raised a flag of truce, acceded to all the immediate demands of the insurgents, called together a provisional regency, composed of some of the municipal authorities with moderate but popular citizens; charged them with the task of drawing up a project of constitution, resigned all his powers into their hands, and retired to silence and obscurity in his own palace, with no reliance save on his own insignificance and the magnanimity of his conquerors.

The native troops, who had shown a hostile spirit to the population on former occasions, now made common cause with them. The Austrians marched out of the city, and, unable to cross the Po, on account of the disturbed state of the provinces on the opposite bank, unable to make good their retreat across the rising territory of Reggio and Modena, lay *perdus* for several weeks in the ducal woods near Colorno, whence, by capitulation, after having either sold or given up their horses, arms, and ammunition, they were conveyed, under escort, to the nearest port in the Adriatic.* The strong citadel of Piacenza, the second city of the duchy, but garrisoned by the Austrians since 1814, was equally evacuated by amicable agree-

* Vice-consul Campbell's Despatch, Milan, April 8, 1848. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," p. 338.

ment.* That of Ferrara, in the Roman states, owing to the peace still existing between the pope and the emperor, remained in the undisturbed possession of the Austrians. Comacchio capitulated.

Out of Ferrara, therefore, and Peschiera, Mantua, Verona, and Legnago, they had not an inch of firm ground left in all Italy.

* Orders to that effect had, it appears, been issued by Radetzky. See Report, as above.

CHAPTER III.

Efforts of Italy for the War of Independence—Magnitude of the Undertaking—Popular Demonstrations—Volunteers—Their early Exploits—Austrian Deserters—The Austrian Fleet—The Provisional Governments—Swiss and French Aids and Sympathies—Movements of Italian States—Piedmont—The King and Ministry—The People—Rome and Tuscany—The Grand Duke—The Pope—Papal Encyclic of 29th April—Roman Expedition—Naples and Sicily—The King and the Ministry of the 29th January—The Sicilian Revolution—The 13th April at Palermo—The King and the Ministry of the 3d April—The Neapolitan Expedition—The 15th May at Naples—Recall of the Neapolitan Expedition.

THE insurrection of the Lombardo-Venetian provinces in the month of March 1848, notwithstanding its astounding success, had done no more than to throw the gauntlet to Austria. Italy found herself thus suddenly engaged in that national struggle, which was, indeed, the final aim of all her partial endeavours; for which she clamoured loudly, but which it was, nevertheless, her interest—and in the secret of her heart her wish—indefinitely to put off.

There was, indeed, no doubt but the gauntlet would, sooner or later, be taken up. So far as regarded Italy, Austria was all but immortal. Notwithstanding the disorder into which the empire had been thrown, in consequence of the Parisian convulsion of February, notwithstanding the sudden panic which had seized the cabinet of Vienna, and driven its master-intellect into

an ignoble flight, Metternich's theories were sure to revive, no matter under what forms or guises. It is an error, we believe, to suppose that only the interests of the dynasty are implicated in the subjection of Italy to Austria. The court had long been at work to identify its cause with that of the Austrian people, especially with that of German, Bohemian, Moravian manufacturers. Supposing even the "year of revolutions" to have proved final to the bond of Austrian unity, some Germanic or Slavonic monarchy, confederacy, or commonwealth, was sure to rise upon the ruins of the old fabric, an heir to its claims upon Italy, making either Tyrol or Trieste, or the navigation of the Adriatic, a pretext for unceasing—perhaps for more strenuous and systematic—attempts upon the independence, at least, of the Venetian territory.

The year 1848 was, at its opening, a period of fond illusions. It would, indeed, have been scarcely possible, at the time of Radetzky's retreat from Milan, to anticipate the senseless and unfeeling speeches that were soon to be delivered before the Frankfort Assembly—an assembly called together to establish the sacred principle of nationality; speeches not by Schmerling and his Austrians merely, but by Radowitz and other Prussian patriots, by other Germans apparently less concerned; not by Von Raumer, and other aristocrats, professed foes to the very name of Italy, but by Von Gagern, and other upright and generous men, coolly debating on the expediency of making the Mincio or the Adige the boundary line of their great German empire. Such blindness to the commonest rules of justice, no less than to their own interests, it was, we

repeat, hardly possible to expect of the German nation : and yet Austria had already long since won over all Germany to her own views on Italy. The "*Allgemeine Zeitung*" had, by a signal bad faith, done the most of that equivocation by which the Austrians are in Italy designated under the general name of *Tedeschi*.* She represented Italy as animated with an indiscriminate hatred against all Germany. The Austrian army, to a very great extent officered by Germans, not by Austrian-Germans merely, but by soldiers of fortune from all the Confederacy,—subjected to the rule of German discipline, was thus represented as a great vanguard of the Teutonic host. Every victory of Radetzky was hailed at Frankfort or Berlin as conferring lustre on the German arms. Had Austria succumbed, Germany would infallibly have stepped forward to take the contest upon herself.

The Hungarian Diet and army, on the other hand, the Bohemian and Slavonian assemblies, whenever and wherever they gave free utterance to their mind, were equally eager in their display of loyalty, so long as it could be made at the expense of their Lombard fellow-sufferers.

Truly all of them—Germans, Hungarians, Slavonians—have received their due meed of gratitude at the hands of Austria ; still all the vicissitudes of these last revolutionary years gave Italy a sufficient earnest of what she had to expect from the sisterly love of neighbouring nations.

All the Italians might gain by the universal turmoil of 1848 was merely time. The struggle by which they should assert their rights before the world was only

* Cattaneo, "*L'Insurrection de Milan en 1848*," p. 22.

adjourned, but it was no less inevitable—it could be no otherwise than long and severe. And it was of vital importance to themselves that it should be so ; for only in the death-pangs of (say) a ten years' national war, could the regeneration of their character be virtually effected, and that strong moral discipline established which alone could qualify them for self-government.

Italy had nothing to gain from the fortuitous aid of extraneous circumstances. She could hardly look abroad without falling into false hopes, more fatal than the most chilling despair. Beyond the Alps, it was wise and salutary to think, she had nothing but enemies.

But admitting even that chaos were to hold an undisputed sway north of the Alps for an indefinite period, and that Italy had, consequently, nothing to fear from abroad, there was still in the country, and in the heart of Lombardy, a certain amount of material evil with which it was necessary to contend,—an evil sufficient to call forth all the energies of united Italy.

Hard pressed as he had been by the revolutionary tide, Radetsky had yet not much less than 50,000 men under his orders. Desertion, treason, sudden panic, and surprise, had already done their worst with him. The men that still mustered under his standard, though perhaps eight or ten thousand of them were native Italians, had been tried, and might now be relied upon. The iron discipline which at all times constituted the great bulwark of the Austrian monarchy was rapidly regaining its ascendancy. The marshal had drawn the main body of these troops within the fatal quadrangle of the four fortresses of the Mincio and the Adige—Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago ; but he still

kept the open field. He hovered round those strongholds like the lion on the entrance of his den; and even previous to his junction with D'Aspre at Verona—even previous to his positive knowledge of the safety of that fortress and of Mantua, he was still bold enough at Montechiari—the very camp of the yearly musters of the Austrian troops—to lay the defenceless town under a heavy contribution. He would, of course, shrink from no plunder that could enable him to victual his citadels in expectation of a prolonged siege.

The elation of the Milanese after the achievement of their great five days was, indeed, too natural; and no less reasonable their confidence in their capability of still greater victories. The feeling was not merely confined to the lower orders, where the conviction of the impossibility of the Austrians ever retaking their city—a boastful “*A Milan i ghe vegn’ pu,*” continued unshaken to the very eve of the capitulation of the city on the 5th of August: but even men, if not more provident, at least sobered by age and experience,—even the deputies of the provisional government, Count Borromeo and Signor Beretta, greeted Charles Albert at Pavia, on the 29th of March, with assurances that the Austrian troops were in the actual impossibility of dreaming of resistance, and urged the propriety of following up success by carrying the war into the Sclavonic provinces of Istria and Dalmatia, once the possessions of the Venetian republic.*

* Custora, “*Histoire de l’Insurrection et de la Campagne d’Italie en 1848.*” Turin, 1850, p. 34. “*Memorie ed Osservazioni sulla guerra dell’Indipendenza d’Italia, nel 1848–49, raccolte da un Ufficiale Piemontese.*” Turin, 1850, p. 24.

The Venetians, on the other hand, were still so far from having settled scores with Austria, when they already gave umbrage to unfriendly parties in England, by idle, though unmeaning, allusions to the subject of the Ionian Islands.*

But all the mad intoxication of that miraculous success could not blind the Lombards to the fact that, with all their transcendant valour and good-will, they were destitute of the material means of warfare by which the four fortresses could either be stormed or reduced ; that they even could not, by any effort of their own, shut up those strong garrisons within their walls ; that Marshal Radetzky would soon gain sufficient composure to take the offensive, and from behind his impregnable bulwarks form strong columns of ten and twenty thousand combatants, able to scour the country in every direction, and to carry havoc and desolation wherever strong walls or patriot barricades were not ready to stay their fury.

After that terrible example of military rigour at Melegnano on the 23d of March, the marshal, however

* See the appeal to the Greek Government in the "Gazzetta di Venezia," of April 5th, 1848. The few words referring to the Ionian Islands are altogether of a retrospective, inoffensive character. They were, however, construed into a direct attack upon English sovereignty there by the "Quarterly Review" (clxv. p. 244), and must, at any rate, have seemed of serious import to the Consul-general Dawkins, since he calls the particular attention of Lord Palmerston on that document. See despatch, April 3d, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 339. No Italian, however extravagant in his ambition, however disposed to grudge the English the possession of Malta, can entertain a wish for the recovery of any part of the old eastern possessions of Venice.

harassed in his rear, had not met with any attempt at resistance on his march to Verona. D'Aspre had equally been able to effect his retreat from Padua to that same town without having to unsheath his sword. Even during the first panic and dissolution of all Austrian order, the Lombards had not summoned sufficient courage to meet them—the main body of them—in the open field. Had it not been, therefore, for any other purpose than to prevent Radetzky from turning the open plain and the smaller towns and villages into a smoking wilderness, it was necessary to set up the cry, "Italy to the rescue!" As a Milanese deputy, soliciting the aid of the Sardinian army, had expressed himself from the balcony of his hotel at Turin, "The Lombards had made the revolution; it was now for the Piedmontese—indeed for the whole Italian nation—to make the war."

Nor was Italy deaf to the call—indeed she anticipated it. Not only did she not wait for the consummation of the victories of Milan and Venice, but she did not even need the signal of the Lombard outbreak. The revolt at Vienna turned every head in Italy. From the first announcement of that event there was a general rising of the people of Florence, Naples, and Rome. The Imperial arms were torn down from the palaces of the Austrian embassies; at Rome on the 21st of March, at Florence on the 23d, at Naples on the 26th. The same scenes, and even stranger, were performed at Leghorn, Civitavecchia, all over the Tuscan and Roman provinces, and far away in the Italian colonies on the Bosphorus, at Pera and Galata. We have the evidence of unconcerned foreign

ministers* to the effect that these outrages, equivalent to a declaration of war, were perpetrated in the most open and clamorous manner; not by the mob merely, but by men apparently of the higher orders, acting in the presence of innumerable crowds, before the very windows of royal residences, under the very eyes of authority; everywhere the national guards, the regular troops, and even the Swiss mercenaries, looking on with unconcern, even when not with sympathy and applause. Austrian ministers, after vain demands for reparation, backed by Prussian and Russian diplomacy, quitted their residences, with loud protests against so flagrant a violation of the laws of nations.

The challenge could not have been given more simultaneously by the whole of Italy: nor were the deeds far from corresponding with the tone of those proud words of defiance. All Italy was eagerly rushing to arms: 2000 national guards from Bologna broke into the Modenese territory on the first report of a popular outbreak. Citizen and regular troops from Leghorn, the whole body of students from Pisa, set forth on their march across the Apennines, without waiting for guidance or orders. The youth of Turin and Genoa stormed for arms and ammunitions the palace-doors of their equally willing but more cautious and deliberate rulers. Masses of armed men were mustering in the streets of Rome. Naples was dragged along by an ungovernable multi-

* See Mr. Petre's Letters, Rome, March 22d and 24th; Sir George Hamilton's, Florence, 25th; Lord Napier's, Naples, 28th; &c., &c. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," p. 231, &c.; also for the conduct of the Italians at Constantinople, Macfarlane's "Revolutionized Italy," vol. i. p. 22.

tude, anxious not to be the last in the national contest.

"It is the will of God!" was the cry; the same as in the old wars of the Cross. Such tears of joy as were then shed Italian eyes were unused to time out of memory.

The alarm spread far and wide. The commotion was felt in Switzerland and France; at Corfu and Malta; at Constantinople and in Egypt; in Spain and Algiers; at New York and Montevideo. Wherever an Italian heart beat, there—truth must be said—was a soldier of the country. No consideration of age or infirmity, no private interest or domestic tie, proved a hindrance: old military men, grown hoary in the pursuit of humble literary occupations, girt on a sword that had lain inactive since Napoleon. Unrecognisable by long absence, denaturalised by long exposure to distant climates, by the adoption of outlandish manners, they stood on that native soil they had long given up all hope to revisit. A moving sight, and sublime, was that meeting of exiles under the walls of Mantua and Verona. Thither most of them repaired; many actually having, many refusing to have, any other home than the camp. It may be easy for a sneering traveller in the East to state, that "of the refugee Italians who were going back to their own country to eat up the last remnant of the Austrians, after all very few went."* We could quote sufficient instances of men whom an overstrained sense of public duty made too utterly regardless of other no less sacred duties of a private nature.

* Macfarlane, "Revolutionized Italy," vol. i. p. 19.

But, alas ! it soon became obvious that it was not by numbers alone that Radetzky could be overpowered. Had mere bands of volunteers been a match for the Austrian soldiery, the Lombardo-Venetian provinces alone might and should, out of four or five millions of souls, have been able to produce a force adequate to the task. But for a modern war—a war of fortresses, too,—something more than men was wanted. The insurrectionary war was well-nigh at an end. Those who had so long been teaching that an Italian revolution should rely for success on “God and the people,” may tell us how two fortresses of the very first order, such as Mantua and Verona, could be taken, as everything else is to be done, by the people ; or even how their garrisons could be sufficiently surrounded and besieged therein. There is no great sense in referring to the achievements of the French revolutionary armies of 1789. The French were, by long habit, a martial race : the Gardes Françaises, with other of the best regiments of the ex-royal army, had merged into the popular ranks ever since they fraternised with them at the taking of the Bastille. These veterans of the Flemish and American wars were the soul and nerve of that sansculottic rabble, which was, however, disorderly only in dress and appearance. Nor is it less idle to point to the glorious example of national warfare, such as given by the Spaniards in 1810. The guerilla consisted of the sturdy mule-drivers and smugglers—half-bandits—the very kernel of those Asturian and Catalonian tribes, proverbial for their sobriety and power of endurance. They stood on the vantage-ground of their vast, broad, bleak mountain-range, and were headed by a priesthood

who shrunk from no appeal to their worst, no less than to their best passions ; they relied, besides, for their sustenance on the inexhaustible supplies of a foreign power.

The Italian volunteers—students most of them, and young men from the most effeminate classes of the cities—were indifferently provided with arms, still more indifferently familiar with the use of them ; utterly unacquainted with any, either regular or irregular, mode of warfare ; fighting on a ground not always friendly ; ill seconded by the still stupified rural population ; often compelled to violent means for subsistence, they were sure to prove as expensive a weapon as they were inefficient and unwieldy. There is no doubt but a volunteer in Italy, probably in any other country, costs three times as much as a regular soldier.*

The Italian volunteers, by their gallant spirit, by a certain dashing impetuosity, and even by their perseverance under hardships and privations, far exceeded the expectation both of friends and enemies. These their brilliant qualities might and should, most certainly, have been turned into account, but only for auxiliary work,—only for that kind of desultory warfare for which they were properly intended. It would have been arrant folly to hope that, by themselves, not only they could ever bring the war to a happy issue, but even that they could avert the most dire calamities from the defenceless country.

These free corps, besides, had, properly speaking, no officers : Austria had left nothing unattempted that could utterly break the spirit of a population naturally

* See "*I Volontarii e i Bersaglieri Lombardi*," by Emilio Dandolo, Turin, 1850, p. 24-32.

not warlike. The veterans of Napoleon's Italian army were mostly dead; some of them had pined away as state prisoners at Layback and Spielberg, in consequence of the conspiracies of 1816 and 1820. The very few remaining were in their dotage; they understood nothing of that blind, reckless temerity, with which revolutionary wars must be carried on. General Theodore Lecchi, a name shining with sufficient brilliancy in the pages of Napoleon's history, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Milanese forces on the 25th of March. Had it depended on his consent, no irregular troops would have been suffered to take the field.* General Allemandi, an Italian Swiss, of Piedmontese extraction, lately a colonel in the federal army, charged with the high command of the free corps on the Alps, would have utterly paralysed their movements, had they been sufficiently dutiful to obey his orders, or, at least, to listen to his counsels. General Zucchi, another of the heroes of the kingdom of Italy, the same who had damped the fine spirits of the insurgents of Romagna in 1831, was now no less unsuccessful at the head of a Venetian free corps on the eastern frontier. A few younger and more venturous leaders, more suited to the peculiar mode of warfare now in contemplation, might have been supplied by the numerous exiles who had served as soldiers of fortune in Spain, Africa, or South America. Some of them, as we have mentioned, fought and bled with rare heroism in the streets of Milan; but by far the greatest number were still under a foreign standard in far-off countries. Hardly one of them but obeyed his

* Cattaneo, "*L'Insurrection de Milan*," p. 124.

fatherland's call with sufficient alacrity; but the need was instant, and it could only be with time that their manifold ties could be broken through, and the intervening space travelled over.

For the rest, the first encounters of the Lombard volunteers at the opening of the campaign are a sufficient earnest of all the good and evil that might be expected of them.

The Manara and Arcioni legions, which had taken the field after a very short breathing, on the 24th of March, with no clear purpose, save only a very natural instinct of giving chase to a retreating foe, had followed Radetzky on his disastrous march to Lodi and Crema; they had entered the latter town on the 28th, just as the last Austrians were running from it; they had crossed the Serio and Oglio, and reached the Chiese, always in sight of the enemy's rear. Here, however, as Radetzky made semblance of turning upon them, and as by this time they were aware of the advance of the Piedmontese, they turned northward, and put themselves under the orders of General Allemandi, who directed their attacks upon Salò, on the Lake of Garda: they fell suddenly on the Austrians at that place, took possession of the steamers, which gave them the mastery over the lake, effected a landing at Desenzano; hence they went across the lake, under the very walls and within cannon-shot of Peschiera, and there seized upon one of the powder-magazines of the fortress. There, as it seems, taking no heed of the orders of their commanding officer at Salò, not only did they tarry beyond the limits of discretion, but, elated with success, they pushed on as far as Castelnovo, a small town on the road to Verona, with about

two thousand inhabitants. They found here the Austrian outposts, a company of infantry, which were speedily overpowered. The victorious adventurers now pushed their rashness so far as to take up their quarters for the night in that dangerous position. The result may be easily anticipated. On the morrow they were surrounded by three thousand men of the Veronese garrison, amongst them infantry of the Taxis brigade—all native Italians. The volunteers fought with a desperate courage; many fell, others were taken; a few were able to make speed to their boats on the lake. The Austrians celebrated their easy victory by setting the town on fire: 400 of the people perished in the flames, or were shot down by the soldiery as they issued from them. This happened on the 12th of April.*

After this severe chastisement, Manara, now utterly at variance with his commanding officer, Allemandi, conducted the remnant of his column to Tione (April 16), there to join other volunteer legions which had been sent to revolutionise the Italian Tyrol. The free corps had thus been directed to that line of operations which best

* Custozza, "Campagne de 1848," p. 39; Lavelli, "Rivolta di Milano," p. 56; Pimodan, "Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes," Aug. 1850, p. 637. The last-named writer, one of Radetzky's staff-officers, bears ample testimony to the bravery of the volunteers, as also to the horrible excesses committed by the conquerors; five houses only left standing, streets full of half-roasted corpses, dogs feasting on them, men, women, and children *pêle-mêle*, unburied from under the ruins, &c. &c. Princess Belgiojoso ("Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiv. p. 143) does not hesitate to attribute the disaster to sheer treachery on the part of General Allemandi. Dandolo ("I Volontari," &c. p. 44-50) gives the most minute particulars of that bloody affray; ascribing its result to the rashness and insubordination of the volunteers, and mad improvidence and dissension among their leaders.

suited them. Whilst the Piedmontese were measuring their forces on the plain, it was of the greatest moment that their irregular auxiliaries should protect their flank by occupying the passes of the mountains, and cutting off Radetzky's communication with Austria, by taking possession of the roads of Tyrol. The Italian portion of this province had already declared in favour of the Italian movement, and bands of armed peasants from the Trentine valleys had come to Milan, under the guidance of their priests, to express their sympathy, and to ask for 2000 armed men to aid them in the expulsion of their German garrisons. Trent was held then by no greater force than two companies of Croats. From Tione, Manara advanced towards the fortress of Stenico, which the Austrians seemed disposed to evacuate at his approach (April 19). As the volunteers eagerly rushed forward to the spot, they fell in with a party of the enemy, who, by the assumption of Italian colours and language, drew them into an ambush, wherefrom the patriots only extricated themselves after a sanguinary contest, and not without leaving seventeen of their foremost combatants in the hands of the enemy. The prisoners, by a severe stretch of military laws, were afterwards shot as brigands, in the moat of the castle at Trent.* Another column, composed of Milanese and Tyrolese adventurers, always against the express wish of General Allemandi, were rash enough to enter at random into the valley of Non, with a

* Lavelli, "Rivolta di Milano," p. 57. Princess Belgiojoso ("Revue des Deux Mondes," vol. xxiii. p. 795) reckons the number of volunteers "mutilated and then shot" at Trent, by order of General Welden, at twenty-seven.

design to take possession of the strong places of Males and Cles : after wandering in the valley from the 13th to the 19th of April, they were, on the latter day, attacked by a body of 1000 Austrians, with artillery, before whom they were obliged to retreat, after very serious losses. These repeated disasters spread consternation and disorder among the combatants. Dissensions and recriminations soon loosened the bond of discipline, which had never been very strong among them. Various reasons, which we shall examine, in an evil moment seemed to render advisable the abandonment of the Tyrol. The volunteers, under pretext of being reorganised, were recalled to Brescia by Allemandi, upon orders from the provisional government, and never afterwards allowed to act upon their own wayward, however generous, impulses. Allemandi, on the 25th of April, was succeeded by Giacomo Durando, a Piedmontese officer, who held the supreme command of the volunteers to the end of the war.

The free corps that took the field from Padua, Vicenza, and Treviso,—from Venice, and every part of its territory, met with no better fate. The legion of Treviso, Padua, and Vicenza, which had set out on the 30th of March and the 2d of April in pursuit of General d'Aspre, suffered themselves to be enveloped by a superior Austrian force at Montebello, on the road from Vicenza to Verona, on the 8th of April, and only made good their retreat after leaving more than eighty of their number killed, either in fight or under the ruins of burning edifices, besides a considerable number of prisoners. Their defeat spread alarm and consternation at Vicenza, Treviso, and throughout Venetia.

Udine gave the first example of the incapacity of the people for Spartan sacrifices, by surrendering, on capitulation, so early as the 22d of April.*

It was sufficiently clear that the "people," so long as it could only send forth free corps, could not come off conqueror in the end. Nay, notwithstanding the astonishing success which the mere suddenness and violence of its attack had hitherto obtained, there is no doubt but a little more wisdom or energy on the people's part might have secured a more complete victory. It was owing to the pusillanimity of the Mantuans, and to the apathy or irresolution of the Veronese — or, if it please the Princess Belgiojoso better, to their blind confidence in their bishops and nobles — that Radetzky was able to find a ready shelter in those formidable strongholds. An overstrained horror for the effusion of blood gave the regiment Kinsky, at Venice, good reason to boast that they had alone braved all the wrath of a victorious population. The same prudential regard was shown to the Hungarians at Parma, when, from a military point of honour, highly commendable in them, these troops plainly refused to lay down their arms. The Italians were too eager to rid themselves of these northerners on any terms; whereas, however, both the interest and the honour of the country should have prompted them to insist either on their unconditional surrender, or on their total extermination.

Nor did the popular leaders at Milan or Venice know how to avail themselves of the regular forces

* "Sunto Storico-Critico dei fatti avvenuti nelle Province Venete." Vicenza, 1850, pp. 23, 28.

which the defection of from ten to twenty thousand Italian fugitives from the Austrian standard had providentially placed in their hands. Eighteen hundred of these deserters were marched from Cremona to Milan on the 8th of April, there to be armed and equipped, previous to their joining the Sardinian army. Cattaneo states* that their services were dispensed with by the provisional government of Lombardy, in obedience to that craven, treacherous policy, by which the aristocratic party aimed at depriving the country of all its own resources, to throw it helplessly into the arms of its Sardinian auxiliary. The republican government of Manin and Tommaseo at Venice, however, evinced no better skill under the same circumstances. They were no less at a loss how to turn to account the four battalions of grenadiers, and eight hundred dragoons, who manned the forts of the sea-girt city; the very men whose attitude had, above all things, contributed to the unhopèd-for result of the Venetian revolt. Deprived of the German officers, who alone could command them, freed from the terror of the lash—the *hazel-stick*—which is the real staff of Austrian discipline, it was found impossible to bring these otherwise excellent soldiers to any rule. The Italian peasantry, from which, agreeably to a corrupt law of conscription, these troops were almost exclusively recruited, are by nature abhorrent from military service, and can only be made soldiers either by education or compulsion. Under the sway of good officers, the Ceccopieri and Zanini infantry, and the Kress chevaux-légers, fought with signal bravery, both at Vienna and in Hungary,

* "L'Insurrection de Milan," p. 122.

they little cared whether for or against Austria. Jella-chich used to take off his hat when he passed the latter-named troopers—all recruits from the Venetian provinces—greeting them as the main instruments in saving the monarchy. General Klapka is no less prodigal of his praises to the Lombard grenadiers that served under his orders. Nay, more: in Italy itself, at the very time that the deserters of Cremona and Venice were disbanded, as worse than useless to the cause of Italy, Radetzky was still using the Italian soldiers of the Taxis regiment with good effect at Castelnovo (April 12), and received them victorious at Verona, loud in their acclamations to the officers who had led them to the slaughter of their own countrymen, and vowing to follow them wherever they might lead.* Nay, more: sixty of these recreants, who had deserted and joined the insurgents at Lasize, by a double treason, turned against these latter at Castelnovo, fired their muskets at them, and once more passed over to the Austrians.†

But under Italian commanders, and for the sake of their country, it was found extremely difficult to bring a single battalion of these men on the battle-field, and when actually brought there, impossible to obtain from them a manly and steady behaviour. At Venice, as at Milan, Brescia, and Cremona, after a few days' rioting, after offering their arms and equipments for sale, they began to be clamorous for home, and home they were sent (April 8), and were to be seen, useless as citizens,

* Pimodan, "Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes," August 1850, pp. 637, 638. "The Haugwitz battalion (Italians) carried the first barricade by assault, at Castelnovo."—*Vienna Gazette*, April 16.

† Dandolo, "I Volontarii," &c. p. 50.

from long desuetude from work, as they had been as soldiers, wandering lazily about the country, in a state of squalor and destitution, for weeks and months after their dismissal.*

The Austrian fleet at Pola was equally lost—irretrievably lost—by an unaccountable oversight on the part of the Venetian government. The disposition of mind of the Italian seamen on board these vessels might be judged of from the conduct of the marines, both in the harbour and at the arsenal. Still more clearly from the resolution taken by men and officers on board an Austrian frigate stationed at Naples, and two brigs cruising in the Adriatic, who, on the first announcement of the Lombard movement, hoisted the national colours, and made sail for Venice. The government of the Lagoons made sure of the same result with the whole of the Austro-Italian fleet, amongst whom the spirit of the *Bandiera* was still at work, and issued orders to that effect. But they entrusted with that despatch the captain of a steamer that was destined to convey to Trieste the ex-governor, Palfy, and other Austrian officers, released in accordance with the terms of the capitulation, instructing the captain to call at Pola on his way, and deliver first of all that important message to the fleet. The captain was, as it appears, compelled by his passengers to make for Trieste without delay. His despatches fell thus into the hands of the Austrian authorities, who took the opportune measures at Pola, and had it in their power, by the means of the land batteries, to keep the

* "Fatti avvenuti nelle Province Venete," p. 24. Princess Belgiojoso, "Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiv. p. 809.

fleet in check, and secure by main force the allegiance of the mutinous crew.

Only twenty-two officers were able to make their escape from Pola, and came to Venice on the 13th of April.*

So far the People of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, unaided. We are told, indeed, that the people were true enough to themselves, and that the blame of those untoward mischances, by which the country was thus irreparably deprived of the most efficient means within reach, is to be laid to the charge of its too often improvident, imbecile leaders. Nor are we willing to take up their defence, further than by adverting to the suddenness and overwhelming complication of events. But then doubts are thrown upon their good faith and devotion to the people's cause, and on that subject we think it fair to answer. The provisional governors at Venice were looked upon as the people's own men: they had proclaimed a republic, and professed to govern in the name of St. Mark. Their blunders were not certainly committed with a view to promote monarchic or aristocratic interests. Those of Milan were mostly noblemen, not too partial, it may be presumed, to democracy, such as it was then professed at Paris. They were, however, even by the confession of their most dashing opposers,† for the most part eminently upright and high-minded men. Some of them, such as the Marquis Guerrieri, notwithstanding their feudal

* Lord Napier's Letter, Naples, March 27. Consul-General Dawkins, Venice, March 28, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," ii. p. 283-286. "Fatti accaduti nelle Province Venete," pp. 15, 26.

† Princess Belgiojoso, "Révolution Italienne, Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiii. p. 790.

titles, were known to have embraced republican views. Pompeo Litta's name has been spared, even by the most inveterate malevolence.* Beretta and Rezzonico were, by their precedents, suspected of harbouring a secret attachment to the house of Austria; but we do not hear that their influence or activity were of any great moment in the government councils. As to Casati, Borromeo, Durini, Porro, Giulini, they had indeed lived at peace with the Imperial government up to the year 1848. Austria had left nothing unattempted to attach these and other members of the wealthy Lombard aristocracy to her party by the means of courtly titles and distinctions. She had signally failed, nevertheless. We have the testimony of Cattaneo to the effect, that "after a domination of four-and-thirty years no trace remained of an Austrian party in Italy; there had, in reality, never been one."† The few noblemen who had accepted crosses and cordons from the court of Vienna had no less declared against it in the most uncompromising manner at the time of the flagrant abuse of power of her military agents in September and January. They had shown sufficient energy and decision to win the people's suffrage; they had, naturally, inevitably found themselves at the people's head when legal opposition suddenly assumed the character of insurrection. The provisional government, such as it was, was for Lombardy a necessity.‡ They were not equal to their mission, it is true; but we question whether the people

* Cattaneo, "L'Insurrection de Milan," p. 93.

† Ibid. p. 15.

‡ Cattaneo (p. 48) was convinced of the impossibility of dispensing with the men of the Casati and Borromeo party. He expresses a fear, that if the people had looked for other leaders, the nobility would have passed over to Austria with all their favourers and dependants.

could have looked anywhere else for more efficient leaders; whether any equal or greater number of men, no matter wherefrom chosen, could better have acquitted themselves of the arduous task. Utterly shut out from public life, no other notability could be acknowledged in Lombardy than that of rank and wealth. Capacity of every kind may have been latent among the middle and lower ranks; but none that emerged from the turmoil of the five days. Political genius had no chance of developement under Austrian training. Lombardy could have no more able statesmen in the cabinet than it had commanders in the field. Cattaneo and Cernuschi could no more have improvised a government than Manara organise an army,—Manara the brave and chivalrous, but unsuccessful *condottiero*, whose band in less than a month had dwindled from 800 to 400 men.

The Milanese government had neither faith nor ability that could enable them to carry on the contest with such means as the country afforded. Hence did they look abroad for help; they looked especially to Sardinia.

But we are told, not only did they not know how to make use of their own means, but wilfully suffered such means to lay waste, to be utterly lost, lest they should in any manner interfere with the success of that only ally, who, they were determined, should win all honour and profit of the victory. From the 23d of March, if not before, we are told, the provisional government became a willing tool in the hands of Sardinia. Their supineness and passivity, the egregious slowness, inefficiency, inopportunity of their measures, their anxiety to put an end to the war of insurrection to make way for more regular and deliberate hostilities, arose from a fixed purpose to lay their country helpless,

hopeless, at the mercy of a royal emancipator. There was nothing they dreaded so much as the developement of popular energies,—nothing they so longed for as a master to rule over them, and to enable them to lord it over the people. They were no sooner off with one yoke than anxious to submit to a new one.*

We shall have frequent opportunity to test the soundness of these assertions; in the meanwhile it is important to observe, that even the men who bring the most serious charges against the Lombard government confess that it could not be got rid of without such civil brawls and disorders as were not likely to add to the people's strength and resolution. Their fairest and most formidable opponents, Cattaneo amongst them, from a very early period withdrew from the contest.† It was in his power, he asserts, yet to bring the whole Milanese youth after his views. But he shrunk from the deeds of violence which a change of policy might have occasioned, and resigned himself to voluntary inaction and obscurity.

It is very probable that those good Milanese noblemen did not well understand their position. They were not, certainly, the men to "raise aloft the republican banner;" but had they indeed done so, had they, as Mazzini recommends, "made themselves the interpreters of the thought that was stirring in the heart of the multitude,"‡ we do not think with him, that "the independence of Italy was safe." The people who

* Cattaneo, "L'Insurrection de Milan," p. 68.

† Ibid. p. 128. Princess Belgiojoso, "Revue des Deux Mondes," xliii. p. 813.

‡ Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti intorno all' Insurrezione Lombarda," p. 34.

neglected to secure Verona and Mantua, the popular leaders who knew not how to dispose of their own soldiery, and press their own fleet into service, when the Austrians had lost their senses, were not likely to repair such errors when the Austrians recovered them. The republicans of Venice knew not how to turn their own means to better purpose; they were not less anxiously on the look-out for help from abroad than the Milanese aristocrats, though they certainly looked to other quarters. Nay, Mazzini himself, in the same breath that he blames the Milanese for throwing themselves into the arms of an Italian, however monarchic, confederate, felt no less convinced that Lombardy could not fight her own battles, and was bringing Swiss, Poles, and French auxiliaries to her aid.

It is most painful to hear him—a man who had always denounced as a crime any reliance of Italy on foreign aid—talk of the willingness of the Swiss to “afford a republic that aid which they denied a king,” or to hear him say, that “the enthusiasm of the people would have compelled the French government to assume the championship of democratised Lombardy.”*

In the first place, it is not true that the Swiss, either as a government or as a people, were to any great extent ready to take up arms for any of the revolutionary parties in Italy. The diet had already, on the 31st of March, prevented the march of republican adventurers into Germany, and established military cordons upon the whole line of her frontier, to warrant the tranquillity of neighbouring states; it had denied arms and ammunitions to the delegate of the Milanese

* Mazzini, “*Cenni e Documenti*,” p. 34, 63.

government, under the plea that Switzerland had none to spare : it had, after mature deliberation (from April 9 to May 4), declined the proffered alliance with Sardinia, and even put its veto upon the enlisting of volunteers for the Italian wars which were carried on at that time, both by the Sardinian chargé d'affaires, General Racchia, at Zurich, and by Prinetti, a delegate from Milan, at Lausanne, and Canetti, an agent from Venice, also at Zurich.* It had issued an edict peremptorily opposing such enlistments, except in favour of those states with which a previous agreement or capitulation existed. We have the testimony of Debrunner, an honest soldier, who performed excellent service on the walls of Venice, proving what strong measures had been adopted to bring that resolution into effect. We have his experience of the immense difficulties, delay, and expense with which a few scores of men could be smuggled through the frontier from the Canton Zurich to the Lake Maggiore.† Himself a Swiss, he cannot help smiling at the "exaggerated notions" the Italians entertained of the Swiss soldiers, judging "from the regular regiments of that nation in the pay of the governments of Rome and Naples;" well aware that, notwithstanding personal intrepidity and skill in the use of the rifle, the raw recruits from the Lake Waldstätten, or of the Four Cantons, could not be much more fit for immediate field-work than men of the same

* Mr. Peel's Despatches from Berne, March 31; April 9, 23; May 4, 7. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 275, 319, 350, 412, 427.

† Debrunner, "Venise en 1848, 49," ch. ii. Lugano, 1850. "Enrolmens Vénitiens en Suisse," p. 21.

class taken from the mountains of Lecco and Como, on the "better" side of the Alps. More frankly still does he laugh to scorn the idea that the confederacy could be induced to depart from its old system of the strictest neutrality in favour of the Italian patriots, whatever else may be thought of individual sympathy, or of the sterile congratulation of the ultra-liberal party in the success of its Lombard associates.

The poor soldier of fortune was not bound to know—though Mazzini could not plead the same ignorance—that there is scarcely an instance of treachery and breach of faith that history does not record as practised by the "honest Swiss" in Italy, at all times, from the very first appearance of that nation on the European stage, whenever any Lombard ruler or people were ill-advised enough to summon those mercenaries to their aid. But volunteers from Switzerland, chiefly from the Canton Ticino, were to be found in the ranks of Lombard combatants, both on the streets of Milan and in the expedition of free corps to Tyrol; and we find it reported that the exactions of these rapacious auxiliaries, who certainly did good duty as fighting men, and could not be expected to be actuated by disinterested patriotism—had no slight effect in determining the losses of the national cause in those districts, by arousing the wrath of the Tyrolese peasantry.*

* "The Lombard Legion, commanded by Manara, is reduced from eight hundred to two hundred men: the whole of the Swiss volunteers have returned to their own country. *The contributions raised by these Swiss volunteers roused the Tyrolese peasantry into action; who, with the Austrian regular troops, attacked and had nearly cut off all the free corps.*"—Vice-Consul Campbell, Milan, April 23, 1848. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," ii. p. 391.

As to the French, Mazzini's assertion of their goodwill towards his country, or his party, was made in August or September 1848, before, that is, his own experience at Rome had taught him what he was to expect from "republican fraternity." And it would be superfluous on our part to add, by any reflections, to the bitterness of his disappointment. Only it would be well for him and his countrymen if they at last ceased to ascribe France's heartless desertion, or eventually oppression, of her "natural allies" to any particular form of government, or to any man at the head of it. A united Italy or Germany never can suit a French statesman so well as an aggregate of small states, insignificant in power and discordant in will. "The French republic," said a man who read more deeply into the character of that nation than any of her rulers before or afterwards, "can never adopt as a principle to make war for the sake of other people: it is easy enough for a handful of *bavards*, whom I cannot better designate than by calling them fools, to cry for a universal republic. I only wish I had these gentlemen here to make their experience of a winter campaign."*

We shall probably have it in our power to refer the policy of France to its true sources, and to prove how its selfishness increases in proportion to the popularisation of its government; what climax its Austro-Russian tendencies have reached, as the country passed from the conservatism of Louis XVIII. to that of the "King of the Barricades," and of the "Chosen of December."

In the meanwhile, we have to regret that Mazzini should—if not have directed the hopes of his country-

* Bonaparte's Letter to the Directory, 1797.

men into that quarter—at least suffered their hopes to dwell there for one moment. We remember the time when Mazzini held—as we always did, and do—that it was even more guilty than utterly insane to lay any direct or indirect expectation on foreign aid for a popular cause; that the Italians must fight their battles entirely and exclusively by themselves,—and this not merely because no foreign people could ever be found able or willing to help them,—not merely because the hands that give a nation its liberty may have it in their power to wrest it from them,—not merely because independence gained by extraneous aid—independence at second-hand, as it were—can never be based on safe ground, and too often amounts to mere change of masters,—but, indeed, because a long and bloody war, so it be only a war against foreign evils, is a great desideratum for Italy: and we also are in so far “red,” that, far from wishing to shorten and lighten the national struggle by fortuitous aids, we would wish it to continue so long and to extend so far as to prove for the nation a baptism of regeneration: the blood spilt for so holy a cause would be as much blood saved in civil feuds and fraternal dissensions.* For a war of that nature, however hastily undertaken, however clumsily

* We must be fain to accept a well-merited reproof, even from the hands of decided opponents:—

“A longer education than Italy has yet submitted to, in privation, in sacrifice, and in self-devotion, is needed to prepare her sons to fight this battle; and, above all, if it is to be fought, and if it is not to bring with it a change of masters, *it is by patriot hands alone that the sword must be wielded. This great lesson the Italians have not learned. In spite of all experience, they will lean on foreign support.*” — *Quarterly Review*, clxiii. p. 257. Dec. 1847.

managed at the outset, there is no doubt in our mind but that the Italian, or indeed any nation, has always sufficient means at its disposal, without looking for extraneous sympathies. Only by the "nation" we mean something else than Mazzini's "people." The nation in Italy is a more formless, more complicate body, than in most other civilised communities; it consisted, in March 1848, of the governments, four in number, and their subjects—of a clergy and laymen—rich and poor—above all of a stirring, more or less enlightened, population of the towns, and of the inert mass of the labourers of the soil. The efficient means for a prolongation of hostilities were generally in the hand of the governments, more or less dependent on the good-will and pleasure of the wealthier classes. It was therefore necessary, either to secure the co-operation of those who could dispose of these means, or begin by forcing them from their hands.

Those who, after the event, heartlessly sneered at the "Royal" war, as if any other than Italian blood had been shed in it, should say, or rather should *then* have said, what was advisable to do. If "by raising the republican banner and interpreting the real tendencies of the people" it was expedient to cut the throats of all rich men, to take the commission from all the aristocrats in the royal armies, and trust with the command mere sergeants and corporals—if a universal massacre and spoliation, a universal civil war, was the best prelude to the national war,—the friends of such extreme measures should at least have said so. But if, on the contrary, themselves preached that there was in Italy only one *national* party, that the new attitude

taken by princes made amends for the errors of the past,* how could they expect that the Italians, already so far gone into the ways of conciliation, should now break out into sudden revolution? If, indeed, such a course could safely and honourably be recommended, then it was the republican chiefs themselves who, by their silence and inaction, were false to the people.

But, indeed, the times were by no means favourable for violent extremities. A milder course had already been acted upon since 1846, and could not be so suddenly abandoned. That course had its faults and inconveniences, it is true, especially as it was very far yet from its completion. Its peaceful nature unfitted it for so unexpected an outbreak of hostilities. But the Italians were too far committed to it to recede from it on so critical an emergency. This course had hitherto consisted of a combination of the whole of their old social system in behalf of the national cause. That cause was now to be debated on the fields of Lombardy. It was necessary to bring the whole system — pope, clergy, princes, and nobles — above all, armies — into those fields.

First, Piedmont was looked up to. It was the nearest at hand, the mightiest, the farthest committed by precedents. Charles Albert had been at variance with Austria for the last three years; he had been in serious apprehensions for his own security.† He had

* Mazzini, *Letter to Guizot*, *Prose Politiche*, p. 295. Programme of a National Association, *ibid.* p. 246. De Boni, "Il Papa Pio IX." pp. 79, 150.

† The arming of Sardinia began in January 1848, when the Austrians resolved to canton a force of twelve thousand to fifteen thousand

assumed a threatening attitude at the time of the occupation of Ferrara, and on the occasion of the succession of Lunigiana in the following autumn and winter. He affected a high protectorate of the minor Italian states, talked very loftily of "his Italian crown." He had thrown himself on the good-will of his people, and endeavoured to attach them to his cause by signal benefits. His decrees respecting a system of popular education, municipal institutions, the administration of justice, were considered as adequate to the wishes of his people on the 30th of October, 1847. They were certainly less irrelevant and more judicious than those by which Pope Pius was at the same time gaining golden favour with public opinion. Finally, he had obeyed the pressure of the times by his constitution of February 8, 1848,—all that the people wished for in the way of local liberties. But the object of the people, it was well known, was only the national war; and for that the government had done all that could be done without actually venturing into a premature outbreak. They had organised a national guard, which, by relieving the army from domestic duties, enabled it to pursue more extensive operations abroad. The army itself had been raised on a war-footing. Volunteers were enlisted, and new military depôts established at Chivasso and Vercelli.* On the very first report of a fight at Milan, the Piedmontese forces were mustered in a strong array

men at the Ticino. So far Sardinia might be supposed to act merely in self-defence. See Mr. Abercromby's Letter, Turin, Jan. 26, 1848, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 47.

* See Mr. Abercromby's despatch, Turin, March 2. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 123.

on the frontier. The first line, thirty thousand strong, occupied Novara, Mortara, Voghera; the second was gathering round Alexandria, Casale, and Vercelli; whilst the reserve still occupied Turin and Genoa.* It is important to note all these facts, inasmuch as it has been the ill-fortune of the King of Sardinia to be equally blamed by those who thought that he moved too slowly and by those who found his movements too quick.† As things actually turned out, there seems little doubt but a sudden rush of the Piedmontese on the rear of Radetzky might have added to the consternation and disorder of the Austrian army, and routed them past retrieving. But this would have supposed a thorough knowledge, on the part of the Sardinian government, of the real state of things at Milan. All that was known at Turin, up to the 21st of March, was that Lombardy had risen. The success of the Milanese, in presence of so strong and so strongly organised a force as Radetzky had under his orders, proved contrary to the expectation of their most sanguine well-wishers. Riots at Milan, at Padua, and Pavia had been of frequent occurrence before March, and had always ended in the annihilation of the insurgents. Their present success was little short of a miracle. Had the king and his advisers had faith in miracles, or had they been sufficiently generous to share the fate of Milan, whatever

* Abercromby, Turin, March 20, p. 174.

† "Radetzky's retreat from Milan was rendered necessary by the treacherous conduct of the King of Sardinia, who professed friendly intentions till his forces were actually on the march."—*Quarterly Review*, clxv. 234, 235. See also Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 33, and Radetzky's own report in the "Vienna Gazette," April 8.

it might prove in the end, they might have crossed the Ticino only to find Milan in ashes, and themselves engaged in a struggle absurd from immense disproportion. The court of Turin received more correct information as to the real state of affairs at Vienna than such as could find its way into distracted Lombardy. They felt assured that Austria, or at least the Austrian principle, would soon get the upper hand of the constitutional or democratic factions now battling for supremacy — that the first effort of the reconstituted, rejuvenised monarchy, would be for the recovery of their ascendancy in Italy. In the long and disastrous war on which Piedmont must thus venture, it was of the greatest importance to start fair. Had the Milanese succumbed, and a few Piedmontese battalions been hastily thrown into Lombard ground, to come into collision with Austrian troops flushed with their street-victory, it would have been difficult to calculate the effects of a first check on their subsequent ardour and perseverance. The Sardinian army, it must be remembered, numbered but few old, and scarcely any veteran soldier or officer. Raw troops like those can do wonders if properly managed; but they seldom rally if imprudently exposed to a first reverse.

The Sardinian government, therefore, “looked before they leaped.” It was from considerations like these that they saw themselves compelled to check the ardour of Genoese and other volunteers by refusing them arms, and directing them to look for them at the depôts, where they would be properly organised and subjected to discipline; and to the same motive should be ascribed the disarming of eighty Lombard volunteers on the Lake

Maggiore, alluded to by Cattaneo, we know not on what authority.* If the government fairly intended to take the field with all the forces of Piedmont, and yet deemed it wise to bide its time, it was but just that it should prevent a few such adventurers from compromising the success of its arms by a hairbrained bravado that could have no serious meaning.

Matters did not, we repeat, bear the most promising aspect. The brigades of Strassoldo and Maurer were still lining the bank of the Ticino up to the 21st. Colonel Benedek at Pavia, and the Archduke Ernest at Lodi, kept their ground till Radetzky came up with them in his retreat. The leaders of the Sardinian forces expected hard fighting, and prepared themselves accordingly.

That the government of Charles Albert, either from inclination or necessity, contemplated a great move upon Lombardy from the very first Milanese riots, we have no means to ascertain; but they undoubtedly looked upon it as a near contingency, and as it was a very grave one, they proceeded with as much deliberation as the stormy hurry of the times would allow. The Italian league was not yet as much as initiated. Piedmont had only feeble allies in Rome and Tuscany†—a very doubtful one at Naples—doubtful from his own weak and treacherous nature, still more so from his complicated differences with his people. Beyond the Alps France could be looked upon, at the best, as a very dangerous neighbour; and, for the rest, Piedmont

* "L'Insurrection de Milan," p. 137.

† Only on the 8th of March, Rome and Tuscany made some move towards establishing a good understanding with the court of Sardinia. See Mr. Abercromby's note of that date, "Correspondence," p. 147.

would have had to act in defiance of the desponding counsels, or of the open protests and threats, of the whole European diplomacy.

The expedition of Lombardy was undoubtedly a revolutionary move — one, that is, in which all established rules should have been departed from — in which the most straight-forward and uncompromising, the most desperate policy, was likely to prove the wisest and safest. Had we had a vote in the Sardinian cabinet, we would certainly have been in favour of that “unsheathing the sword and throwing away the scabbard,” which young Italy recommended as early as 1831. We would have shut up shop as diplomatists, and dismissed all foreign advisers, whether official or officious. But, alas! Piedmont was a constituted state, bound by long-established ties to the old compact of the European family. Had Charles Albert possessed sufficient resolution for so hazardous a game, the least he could expect, in case of defeat, was to be cut adrift and abandoned to his fate. Prussia and Russia protested, almost in anticipation of the deed;* France hardly yet dared to show her face amongst honest people; and England raised her finger in the act of solemn, ominous warning.

Previous to the Parisian revolution of February, the conduct of Charles Albert had been smooth enough.

* See Nesselrode's despatch from St. Petersburg, Feb. 12, 1824, “Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy,” p. 118. Also, the account of Radowitz's mission to Vienna, in Lord Ponsonby's despatch, Vienna, March 3, p. 123. Also, Lord Bloomfield's from St. Petersburg, Feb. 25, p. 141. Prussia and Russia opposed to the last even the grant of constitutions by the Italian princes.

England and France made him strong of their combined support. The policy of the latter power had, indeed, been tortuous to the last. On the very eve of his fall, Louis Philippe had given his consent to Austria to occupy the pass of the St. Gothard, from which she could thus strike Sardinia to the very heart of her territory.* But after the downfall of that treacherous king, France was in the impossibility of taking any definite course. From February to June it was not clear whose friend she would declare herself, and whose enemy. Glad of the security accruing to her from the universal disturbance of neighbouring countries, she threw out vague promises, established new oracular laws of nations. As a diplomatic power she had not yet proceeded to business. Not only was she far from knowing her own mind, but she was under the control of men who made her play against her own convictions and tendencies.

Piedmont had not much to fear from France, but, at the great critical moment, nothing to hope; it had no one to look up to but England—England, at all times temporising, ambiguous, but now hardly less dumb-struck and perplexed than Piedmont itself.

It is of little importance, we think, to talk about the perpetual vibrations of Charles Albert's weak mind at this period. Ever since the accession of Cesare Balbo, Lorenzo Pareto, and other liberal men to his council (March 8), the king had ceased to be its actual head. The fates of the monarchy were now in the hands of people who cared more for Italy than for the

* Mr. Peel's letter, Berne, Feb. 17, p. 79.

house of Savoy—who looked upon the Sardinian crown as a great trump-card to be staked on the game of Italian nationality, but only with sufficient odds in their favour to justify so decisive a venture. Men like these were not only burning with desire, not only bound in honour, but driven by necessity, to march forward. Princess Belgiojoso, certainly not partial to the Piedmontese ministers or their party, informs us that Marquis Pareto had taken office on the express condition of immediate hostilities.*

Still were they anxious to diplomatisé. The aggression of Piedmont against a neighbour and old ally, in the midst of profound peace, in a moment of supreme danger to the latter, in defiance of the sacred treaties of 1814—those treaties by which Sardinia herself was made, which had given Genoa to Piedmont as they had given Venice to Austria—was an unheard-of enormity, a deed of unexampled atrocity, if judged by any other moral standard than that of nationality—the only one, alas! unrecognised by respectable diplomacy.

Thus reasoned old-fashioned wisdom—English wisdom. France would, perhaps—ought, at least—to have held a different language; but, independent of the little reliance at all times to be put on French words—independent of the real or affected aversion evinced by the Parisian demagogues towards “tyrants and renegades,”—the rulers of Piedmont were men too honourable to be altogether free from a conscious dread of a communion of that nature. Hardly a man in Europe but exulted in the fall of Louis Philippe and the old

* “*Revue des Deux Mondes*,” xxiii. 788.

system, yet hardly an honest man but was revolted at the base acts by which the public wish was subsequently practised upon—hardly one but expressed his disbelief in the continuation of a state of things resulting from so palpable an *escamotage*. The cause of Italian nationality would have been sullied by a contact with that ephemeral democracy; and we truly never admired Mazzini, who could tarry in Paris to parley with that deluded optimist, Lamartine, and to shake hands with his unprincipled associates. As soon as “better men” came to power, in June, France immediately developed her real tendencies towards Italian nationality; her policy became what it had always been—always must be—no matter under what standard or principle.

The Sardinian government was therefore right in shunning an alliance with France: and as it was impossible to avail one's self of France as a friend, it was expedient, at least, to look upon her as an enemy; expedient, at least, to make the best of the terrors which her abnormal position and her contemptible attempts at propagandism might be supposed to inspire.

Such terrors on the part of Charles Albert and his patriot ministers could not be real. Kings are by nature royalists, and nobles mostly aristocrats. But that the socialist excesses of Paris might cause any serious uneasiness to such men as Balbo, Pareto, and their colleagues, no man with a sane mind would suppose. They knew very well what the country expected of them: it was not a republic, it was not even the immediate fruition of the newly *octroyed* constitution, for the Sardinian chambers were ever ready to abdicate their powers in favour of the king during the war; it

was merely the prompt and active devotion of the government to the national cause. So long as they exposed their breasts to the Austrians, they must have been assured — and subsequent events satisfactorily proved it — the love and gratitude of all Italy was sufficient to guard their back, to screen them from France and all democratic attacks.

The attempt of a few thousand fugitives upon Savoy, early in April, at a time when that province was left not only without an armed force, but actually without a government, owing to the cowardice of an unworthy Piedmontese officer, defeated by the mere common sense and indignation of the people of Chamberi,* are sufficient evidence that, no matter how strong the bias of the province towards democracy, the word "republic" sounded like sacrilege, so long as the king proved himself the truest of patriots.

All this the ministers knew beforehand. They knew that as nothing in the world could save them, if they were deaf to the call of the Milanese, so they were "the best of republics" if they drew the sword for them.

But it was in their calculations to affect a fear which they did not really feel. It was the great stroke of their policy — laugh at it who will — to represent themselves as acting under compulsion, to make the most of their dread of popular ferment, of the awful bugbear of a "republic threatening from France." The name of republic, they knew, had power to frighten

* Lord Normanby's despatches from Paris, April 6 and 8; and Mr. Abercromby's, Turin, April 6, pp. 288, 296, 308. The present writer was at Chamberi on that occurrence.

England out of her senses: it was that dread, as Lord Palmerston himself stated, which led him to all but sanction the election of the Duke of Genoa as King of Sicily. On that dread the Piedmontese ministers practised *à outrance*. By that dread, if they did not actually go to war with England's consent, they at least prevented that power from joining in the protest of Russia and Prussia, and preserved a friendship which was not without its uses, when Fortune had twice done her utmost against the arms of Sardinia.

All the delays and equivocations of the Sardinian cabinet, upon which arguments have been founded to prove their bad faith and actual reluctance to aid the Milanese from the dread of a republican spirit rife in Lombardy, are only the consequences of this pusillanimous, perhaps, but dexterous and by no means culpable policy. They wished to urge upon the world, and especially upon England, the inexorable fatality which they were in their hearts most anxious to obey. The letters of Mr. Abercromby during the whole of that momentous march contain irrefragable proof of what we advance. He had been at no slight pains to assure his government that since the concessions of November 1847, and the constitution of February 1848, the very best spirit of order and unanimity prevailed, not only in Piedmont, but even in the more stirring, unmanageable Genoa.* He had described the processions of the 27th February, and the little sympathy for the republican doings in France, the first rumours of which coincided with the constitutional rejoicings at Turin.† On

* See his letters, Nov. 2, 5, 9, 13, &c. and Feb. 14, 26, 28.

† March 2 and 6.

the 2d of March the population of Piedmont is represented as "animated by a spirit of steady loyalty and devotion." On the same day the minister, Saint Marsan, shows the greatest anxiety to do away with any unfavourable impression likely to arise in London from the warlike preparations in Sardinia—preparations called forth by "the threatening attitude of the French republic." On the 6th, Mr. Abercromby assures Lord Palmerston that "the recent unexpected events in France have not been productive of any disorder in this country;" that "all classes see the necessity of firmly establishing the new institutions which have been granted by the wisdom and generosity of the sovereign;" and that "the public mind, so far from having been disturbed by the late revolution in France, has continued steadily occupied with the internal position of affairs in this kingdom, and has shown an increased desire to rally round and to support the order of things created by the fundamental statute of Sardinia."* On the 20th, the same diplomatist justifies the measures taken by the Sardinian ministry—come into power only on the 8th—a rush of the whole army to the frontier—upon the ground of the difficulties "arising from the Lombard movement," and expresses his confidence that the "king's government will limit itself to a negative policy and to the strictest neutrality."† On the 21st‡ he quotes, as a proof of the honesty of their intentions, the dismissal of Count Arese, who had come to solicit the aid of Piedmont in behalf of the Milanese; saying nothing—probably because he knew nothing—of the

* Letter, March 6. Cor. p. 143.

† Cor. p. 174.

‡ Cor. p. 182.

agent sent by the Piedmontese government to Milan (Count Martini). On the 22d, Marquis Pareto was still assuring the Austrian ambassador, Marquis de Buol, of the "anxiety of the Sardinian government to persevere in their friendly relations with their Austrian ally." * On the 23d the same Pareto writes a long address to the English minister,† stating the reasons which have at last driven the king's government to interfere in the affairs of Lombardy—being "the dread of the proclamation of a republic at Milan, and the consequence of such a step on Piedmont itself, and more especially on Genoa." Mr. Abercromby, however, even in the act of enclosing Pareto's letter to Lord Palmerston, adds the expression of his evident disbelief of the representations, both of Pareto and of his colleague Balbo, with respect to any danger accruing to the monarchy from the example of the Milanese—who, as we well know, never had dreamt of a republic—and contending that "a firm and decided demeanour" would have enabled the government to weather the storm without having recourse to a remedy, in his estimation, worse than the evil.‡

All these and similar tricks practised by the Sardinian minister, Marquis de Brignole, on the Marquis of Normanby§—and the very words of the appeal of the Milanese government to Charles Albert—purporting their apprehension of "the cry for a republic" as the probable consequence of any longer delay on the king's

* Count Ficquelmont's Despatch, Vienna, April 5. Cor. p. 325.

† Cor. p. 186.

‡ See the letter, March 23, at midnight, and March 25. Cor. pp. 184, 207.

§ Normanby, Paris, March 28. Cor. p. 206.

part * are, we suppose, mere fair-play in that *art-of-lying* which has too long presided over the most sacred interests of nations. Undoubtedly the government was acting under compulsion. Had it any longer trifled with the ardour of the people and army a civil war would have been the inevitable consequence. But since 1846 the people, especially of Piedmont, had faith in their king, and proceeded hand-in-hand with the ministers which the public voice had been successively placing by his side. To them they looked, even under the pressure of maddening excitement; from them they awaited a signal. They did not attempt, as we have seen done elsewhere, to forestall the deliberations of the king's council by any wanton outrage against the arms of Austria, or by any other untimely show of impatience. They felt that it is not for a mob to declare war, and did not presume to decide on the proper time and mode of declaration. Proud of their military organisation, they were not even as eager for the arming of a national guard as the Tuscans and Romans had been. That institution only came in with the constitution, on the 8th of February. Young men were impatient for a start, no doubt: 300 Genoese youths set out against the wish of the authorities on the 22d. On the previous day a crowd assembled under the windows of the minister's palace at Turin, loudly calling for arms. They were, however, soon dispersed without difficulty by the national guards.†

On the 23d, at last, the king relieved friends and enemies from anxiety by a formal declaration of war to

* Normanby, Paris, March 28. Cor. p. 206.

† Mr. Abercromby's letter, March 21st, p. 182.

Austria, and by a proclamation to the Lombardo-Venetian people, expressive of his honourable and disinterested intentions. General Passalacqua, collecting such forces as were quartered in and about Novara, marched upon Milan, which he reached on the 26th. Three days later the king himself, his sons, and an army of 25,000 combatants, had their head-quarters in Pavia. On the 31st the king, at Lodi, could congratulate his troops on the expedition with which they had, "in seventy-two hours, marched over one hundred and ten miles of ground."

So far Piedmont. Tuscany and Rome had no sooner emancipated themselves from Austrian High-dominion, in consequence of the excitement resulting from the occupation of Ferrara in July 1847, than they gave symptoms of incipient anarchy. Those governments had really never stood upon their own ground. That of Tuscany had based its popularity on a culpable leniency, especially towards the lower classes, which had gradually undermined the very basis of social order. That "vacillation and weakness," that worst of all faults in a government, with which the Grand-Ducal cabinet have been during the late occurrences charged by their Tory friends,* was, however, traditional. It was not the sanction given "to license in the press," nor "the arming of the subjects with blunted swords, likely to remain idle except when mischievous," that turned Leghorn into a nest of brawlers and cut-throats. That "mistaken lenity," that "loose enforcement of the penal code, amounting almost to impunity to notorious

* Macfarlane, "Revolutionized Italy," ii. 113. "Quarterly Review," cixiii. 255; cixv. 231; cixvi. 556.

offenders," were not evils of recent date. Tuscan order never extended beyond the gates of the capital; nor is there reason to wonder if, in troubled times, the assassin ventured within sight of those gates, since, in the most profound peace, the professional beggar had always been suffered there to ply his scarcely less disgraceful trade.

Tuscany had, properly speaking, never been governed—never, at least, by the facile prince in whose smiles Florence and a few other favourite haunts of foreign travellers were basking. Those smiles could only wilfully be mistaken for enlightened Liberalism. They had never won favour except with the idlest populace. But it was well known, where Tuscan smiles failed in keeping up at least an appearance of order, recourse must be had to Austrian frowns. The Imperial legation had always exercised supreme rule. It willingly incurred the odium of the most arbitrary measures. Under its powerful ægis the Grand Duke had long been enabled to afford to play his humane and affable part.

There was now an end of Austrian patronage. The extradition of *Renzi*, a refugee from *Romagna*, towards the expiration of *Gregory XVI.*'s pontificate, had filled the measure of popular wrath. It was in vain to have recourse to a display of force and numerous arrests in the early part of 1847. Austria had left the Grand Duke in utter helplessness. It had not only no material aid, but not even counsels and suggestions to bestow. Tuscany had been cut adrift—left to weather the storm as it best could. The prince's struggle with his people was but short and contemptible. He invariably granted, with an ill-grace, in the morning what he had stub-

bornly refused in the evening. The astonishing circulation of seditious writings from clandestine printing-presses in all Tuscan towns wrested from him a free law of the press, on the 6th of May, 1847.* Student-plots at Pisa, porter-riots at Leghorn, and demonstrations at Florence, forced from him, after two months' hesitation, a decree for the organisation of national guards (Sept. 4th). Ridolfi and Serristori, with other popular characters, were now thrown upon the Grand-Ducal councils. Finally, the same coercion, and the example of Naples and Sardinia, determined the grant of a constitution on the 17th of February, 1848.

But the Tuscan people had other aims besides the establishment of local liberties. The abdication of the Duke of Lucca, in October 1847, and the consequent reversion of a part of Tuscan Lunigiana to Parma and Modena, afforded the first ground for the assumption of a martial attitude on the part of the Tuscan population. From that time Leghorn became ungovernable; the firmness of Ridolfi and other liberal ministers had scarcely restored calmness to the turbulent spirits of that city, when the news of the Milanese outbreak convulsed the country throughout. Already, both at Leghorn and in Florence itself, the government had been at no slight trouble to protect the Austrian agents from popular insults. On the 24th of March the Imperial arms were torn from the Austrian embassy, and burnt before the Grand Duke's own windows at the Pitti palace. The news of a declaration of war on the part

* See Montanelli's "National Movement in Tuscany;" Pepe's "Events in Italy," vol. ii. ch. viii. p. 178; also Sir G. Hamilton's despatches throughout 1847, &c.

of Sardinia gave rise to frantic rejoicings. The government had already so far yielded to the popular will as to order about five thousand men, regular troops, volunteers from Leghorn, and a student-legion, officered by their own professors from Pisa, to the frontier. Unwilling, even in these extremities, to depart from its wonted system of equivocation, whilst on the 21st it proclaimed the object of that movement to be the "completion of Italian regeneration," it protested on the following day (the 22d) that its only object was to occupy a part of the Modenese territory, with a view to secure the tranquillity of its own states, compromised by the convulsions of Upper Italy.* On the 29th the Grand Duke, shorn of his titles of Austrian Archduke and Prince of Hungary, directs his troops to proceed to Modena and Reggio, there to co-operate with the Sardinian and Pontifical forces. Even yet the formidable word "war" was carefully avoided; and on the same day the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Neri Corsini, was still endeavouring to justify that measure by urging the necessity of the maintenance of order in Tuscany and the preservation of the Grand-Ducal throne. Finally, on the 9th of April, orders are issued to the troops to march into Lombardy, "to fly to the rescue of their Lombard brethren." On the 10th of the same month the Grand Duke dropped the title of "Imperial Highness," broke off all diplomatic connexions with Austria, by recalling his own agent from Vienna, and, still with many expressions of reluctance and intimations of the necessity that drove him, deli-

* See both proclamations, in "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," pp. 208, 259.

vering the passports to the Austrian chargé d'affaires at his court. The Tuscan troops, under General De Langier, came under Mantua almost at the same time with the Piedmontese (April 19th).

Whatever leaning the pope might have had towards Austria previous to the occupation of Ferrara, his course of policy was no less imperiously pointed out by the force of popular opinion since that occurrence. The Austrians did not withdraw from that city till the 23d of December, 1847. The feeling of resentment and suspicion arising from those differences could be allayed by no diplomatic contrivance. The remotest hint of a transit of Austrian troops through the States of the Church, on their way to Naples and Sicily, created a ferment which dictated the firm and haughty answer of Cardinal Ferretti and the pope himself in January 1848.*

The pope was now thrown upon his own resources. His predecessor, Gregory XVI., had been at great pains to surround his throne with a reliable force, by increasing the number of his Swiss mercenaries, till it had nearly reached ten thousand. These had been the subject of fierce animadversion on the accession of Pius, and their immediate dismissal would have been insisted upon but for the threatened outbreak with Austria, which rendered their services of the greatest avail to a state otherwise utterly disarmed. The Swiss became from that moment the vanguard of a Roman host that was to be, and in that capacity they had been removed from the capital and marched to the northern frontier. The pope, left thus to the mercy of the national guards,

* See Lord Minto's despatches, Dec. 31st, and Jan. 18. Cor. part. ii. pp. 15, 39.

was compelled to give in to all their demands, the constant burden of which was merely the secularisation of his government and arming of the nation. The cry, "Down with the Foreigner!" the waving of national *tricolor*, the shouting for arms for Italian independence and union—what were then called "Demonstrations"—became daily more frequent and importunate. Rome acknowledged no sway save that of its civic guards, its clubs, its mobs. The pope was fain to put himself under the patronage of the demagogue, Ciceroacchio. Without the walls of the capital, in the distant provinces, at Ancona, in Romagna, utter anarchy reigned. The Sicilian revolt, the consequent humiliation of Ferdinand at Naples, the constitutions granted to all Italy, and, finally, the Parisian outbreak,—every European movement conspired to force the reins from Pius's feeble hands. The war-ministry was resigned into secular hands on the 18th of January. A cabinet, almost exclusively composed of laymen, was organised on the 11th of March. Three days later Rome had a constitution: a hybrid document was given out, drawn up, it is said, by Count Rossi, professing to reconcile the interests of the sovereign church with the rights of the people. The pope, in short, shrunk from no concession that might be pointed out as conducive to the internal welfare of his subjects. All he would have shrunk from was a collision with Austria; and on that, however, his people were most resolutely bent. The challenge—we have seen it—was given on the 21st of March, by flagrant outrages against the residence of Count Lützow, the Austrian ambassador, and the imperial escutcheon. The Bolognese, however, were

beforehand with their Roman brethren, and had already begun hostilities by their inroad upon Modena. On the 23d, vast masses of the Roman people crowded the ruins of the Colosseum : Father Gavazzi, a Barnabite monk, electrified them by the sallies of his theatrical eloquence. He it was, we think, that gave the national struggle the character of a holy war ; the Roman volunteers took the cross at his hands, and were addressed by him as " Crusaders,"—an appellation which, with that of " Sword of Italy," as applied to Charles Albert of Sardinia, supplied foreign newspapers with many a bitter and not altogether unmerited sarcasm.

The Romans set out ; the government, no matter how reluctant, sent its consent, and leaders after them. These were General Ferrari, charged with the organisation of the militia and volunteers, and General Giovanni Durando, trusted with the command of the regular forces. The latter amounted to seven thousand men, Swiss infantry and native Roman dragoons ; the former constituted a mass of nearly ten thousand combatants. These forces were to meet at Bologna on the 20th of April ; by the 17th, however, their ardour had already brought them to Ferrara.

Durando crossed the Po on the 21st.*

This is not the place in which the military conduct of this general may be inquired into. Durando was a political exile from his native state, Piedmont ; he had gone through his martial apprenticeship in Spain, and only returned to Italy and settled at Rome when the first symptoms of a liberal policy in 1846 had rendered that

* *Curtoza*, p. 67 ; *Willisen's " Italienische Feldzug,"* p. 94.

city an eligible sojourn for one of his principles. His manifold talents, amiableness of disposition, and devotion to his country's cause, have invariably been acknowledged, even by those who too hastily censured his behaviour during the present emergencies. A universal cry was set up in Lombardy, at Venice, all over Italy,—“What is Durando tarrying for at Ferrara?” His delay is now satisfactorily accounted for—the pope had never given his consent to the expedition. The men who environed that poor pontiff had the greatest difficulty in concealing his reluctance to the war, and screening him from popular indignation. Already, in his encyclic of the 10th of February, he had mildly admonished his subjects to lay aside all warlike spirits, and to rely for their security on the protection of all Catholic Christendom.* He had, on the following day, from the balcony of his palace, protested against some cries (for “Independence and War with the Foreigners!”)—cries which he “*could not, would not, ought not to hear;*” and with that intimation qualified his blessing to his subjects. During the whole of March and April the movement of the Roman forces to the frontier had been represented to him as a mere defensive demonstration. That frontier never was crossed by his consent. The burst of chagrin and indignation with which he received the news of Durando's decisive step was not to be smothered by all the precautions of his wary advisers. The pope had always acted with consistency. The mission of Monsignor Corboli Bussi, who reached Charles Albert about the 15th of April, it

* See the encyclic, “Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy,” p. 81.

seems now very clear, had no other aim than to arrest that king on what seemed then his victorious career, by all the authority of pontifical remonstrance.* The troops that the Neapolitan government was preparing to send to Lombardy were allowed no free passage through the Roman dominions. The Court of Rome would not suffer them to land at Ancona—would not permit them to form a camp at Bologna; and could only with difficulty be prevailed upon to let them through by single battalions, with every possible mark of unwelcome.† No intrigues were spared in the meanwhile to damp the ardour of the marching crusaders, to lay all the obstacles of want and discouragement in their way. Durando lost, perhaps, a few days in the hope to be able to march with Pius's consent, ere he made up his mind to proceed without it. The Jesuits had withdrawn from Rome on the 30th of March, carrying with them the regrets of the soft-hearted pope; but there was no lack of jesuitical priests left behind, to arouse the spiritual and temporal fears and scruples of the parents and friends of the departed volunteers. These were followed by alarming, heart-rending letters, all along their northward progress. The remonstrances thus conveyed even, we are told, effected the disbanding of a whole legion.‡ The pope may, perhaps, not be chargeable with these underhand

* Sir G. Hamilton's despatch, Florence, April 14, "Correspondence," p. 358.

† Pepe's "Events in Italy," vol. i. p. 145; Lord Napier's despatches, Naples, April 9, pp. 25, 27, "Correspondence," part ii. pp. 382, 406.

‡ De Boni, "Il Papa Pio Nono," p. 170.

managements ; they were, however, the contrivance of men who made themselves interpreters of the pope's own mind. Nor was it long before his real mind was made known to the world, by that fatal encyclic of the 29th of April, in which he disavowed and condemned Durando's conduct, pleaded the sacredness of his ministry of a God of peace, the impartiality of his paternal feelings towards every member of the Christian family, and issued orders for the immediate recall of his subjects from Lombardy.*

Count Lützow, on his departure from Rome, had it in his power to boast that he had left in the pope's heart a thorn which would rankle there for a long time.† The wily Austrian diplomatist had been representing the whole Catholic part of the German nation as if willing to look upon the cause of Austria as its own. The waving of a Roman standard on the fields of Lombardy, he urged, would be the signal for a second schism of the Teutonic races. The pope, with sufficient straightforwardness and consistency, seems to dwell on no other argument in that unfortunate encyclic. His country was to be immolated to the world-wide interests of his church.

It is possible that, in his single-mindedness, the pope believed in the possibility of a peaceful solution of the national contest. Other agents besides his were busy with Charles Albert to bring about an armistice, the first step towards a plausible peace. At any rate,

* See the encyclic, and the following events in Mr. Petre's despatches, May 3 and 4, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 421, &c.

† Massari, "I Casi di Napoli," p. 136.

the pope's resolution was taken—he would give no sanction to the shedding of Christian blood.

The fury of the Roman people, the disappointment and wrath of all Italy, baffles description. The pope was soon made aware that the crosier was no more than a broken reed in his hands. His first thought on the breaking out of the popular storm-wind was—immediate flight. He asked for refuge at Naples, and received a favourable answer from the liberal men then at the head of that government;* but flight itself was fraught with the greatest dangers, and then no resource was left but—compliance.

He hastened to summon Mamiani to his council; Terenzio Mamiani della Rovere, a man distinguished alike by rank and talents, for long time an exile in France, and since his return, after the amnesty, the very soul of the moderate movement. Mamiani's first word was war: he proposed a separation of the temporal from the spiritual power; took upon himself and his colleagues the responsibility of the warlike operations; recalled Monsignor Corboli Bussi from the camp, and despatched Dr. Farini in his stead; and allowed the holy father to pray for peace, to write letters to Vienna to soften the emperor's heart, and incline his ears to the cession of his Italian dominions; and even, if the report is correct,† he did not know how to prevent Cardinal Soglia, and other intriguing priests, from carrying on a clandestine correspondence with the imperial court at Innspruck.

* Massari, "I Casi di Napoli," p. 138; Lord Napier, Naples, May 4, "Correspondence," p. 433.

† De Boni, "Il Papa Pio Nono," p. 174; Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti," p. 42. An intercepted despatch was printed at Milan in the "Italia del Popolo."

Already, on the 10th of April, the court of Vienna had issued orders for the recall of Count Lützow, but the despatch only reached that minister on the 4th or 5th of May, when the exasperation of the populace at Rome was so great that the count could only effect his departure by the interference of British agents and the means of an English steamer.

The reconciliation between sovereign and people at Naples, effected by the grant of a constitution on the 29th of January, had been neither complete nor sincere. It had not settled the difference with Sicily, where the people, triumphant since the 12th and 16th of the same month, insisted on the choice of its own form of government, and demanded that Constitution of 1812, which was thought to sum up all the ancient charters, liberties, and privileges of the realm. Whether we take into consideration the many and various grievances of the Sicilians, and the undoubted justice of their claims, or the forbearance, calmness, and deliberation with which they proceeded in their vindication, or the daring and constancy, the unanimity with which they rose to enforce them, we shall have little hesitation in looking on the revolt of Palermo as an unparalleled event.* No instance of a people sending an open challenge to their despot, and appointing the day and hour of the outbreak, is certainly set down in the

* For the Sicilian revolution, consult "A Sketch of Events in Sicily in 1812 and 1848," by Messrs. Granatelli and Scalia, London, 1849; "Mémoire historique sur les Droits politiques de la Sicile," par MM. Pantaleoni et Lumia, Paris, 1849; "Palermo e l'Esercito Regio," Palermo, 1848; "Documenti della Rivoluzione Siciliana, illustrati da G. La Masa," Turin, 1850; "La Sicile et les Bourbons," par M. Amari, Paris, 1849, &c. &c.

annals of any nation. Palermo had scarcely any arms on the 12th of January, and but little previous understanding or concert. But the sense of deep injury and long pent-up animosity made up for all deficiency. A force of seven to eight thousand men was hunted down from street to street with all the alacrity, though not with all the ferocity, of which Palermo had given such terrible example in the thirteenth century. A reinforcement of five thousand men and nine steam-frigates, sent from Naples on the 16th, under the command of General Desauget and the Count d'Aquila, the king's brother, was repulsed with equal disgrace. The interference of foreign consular agents put a bombardment of the city out of the question; and ere four weeks were fairly over, the craven troops were even driven from the forts that surround and command the city. In the provinces, the garrisons of Trapani, Alicata, Melazzo, and Termini, were almost simultaneously overpowered. The citadel of Syracuse was evacuated at a somewhat later period; but before the end of March the royal standard had ceased to wave any where out of the citadel of Messina.

From their first commotions the Sicilians had established a Provisional Government, the presidency of which was given to Admiral Ruggero Settimo, one of the veteran patriots of 1812, to whom the Sicilians had never failed to pay hero-worship. Ruggero Settimo is one of the very few eminent men in Italy whose names were allowed to go unscathed through the whole ordeal of the disastrous events of which we are giving a narrative. Personal enemies he had none; and even the enemies of his country and cause always seem fain to

make an exception in his favour, and never mention him without reverence.

By his grant of a charter on the 29th of January, King Ferdinand II. could never have hoped to bring the victorious Sicilians back to their allegiance. But he fancied, perhaps, that he could by that measure put them thoroughly in the wrong, designate them as incorrigible rebels, and, above all, engage the interests and passions of his continental subjects into a co-operation in his attempt to subdue the island-kingdom. But no space was left for the developement of his schemes. Almost the same post that brought him the account of the Sicilians' perseverance in their original demands, and of their consequent convocation of a parliament in conformity with their own statute of 1812, conveyed also the tidings of the first Parisian commotions. King Ferdinand, made aware that the popular cause would soon be in the ascendancy all over the world, was so far willing to bow to necessity as to sanction the act of convocation of the Sicilian parliament, by a royal decree, bearing date of March 6th ; at the same time that he showed some disposition to come to terms, by referring the matter to the mediation of England, and requesting the good offices of the Earl of Minto to that effect. The king, however, even in the act of allowing his Sicilian subjects the enjoyment of their own constitution, had by the very words of his decree, and by the terms he had empowered Lord Minto to tender in his name, provided for the preservation of the integrity of the monarchy, and kept to himself all the prerogatives of royalty, and especially that armed force which would have enabled him at

some future period to bring the Sicilians to his own terms. The Sicilians, on their own hand, mindful of the violation of royal promises in the year 1816—mindful of the inefficiency of English protection in that conjuncture, and anxious now to put their liberties upon a surer basis than even the sacredness of royal words, or the patronage of a distant potentate, were resolved, even whilst they expressed their readiness to vest the royal power in the person of the King of Naples, to add such conditions as would place their constitutional franchises beyond all possibility of royal encroachment,—conditions which would have amounted to the virtual independence of the kingdom.

Both parties were determined, above all things, to secure force on their own side.

It was mutual mistrust, then, rather than any constitutional right, that put all compromise out of the question—that compelled Lord Minto to break off the negotiation, by which, from the 24th of March, an end was put to all communication between the two kingdoms.

The Sicilian parliament met on the 25th of the same month, and on the 13th of the ensuing April decreed the forfeiture of the throne of Sicily by the king and his dynasty; declaring, at the same time, that after a revision of the constitution of 1812, and its adaptation to the present exigencies, it would proceed to the election of an Italian prince to the vacant throne. This led to the unanimous choice of the Duke of Genoa, younger son of Charles Albert of Sardinia, who was proclaimed King of Sicily, under the name of Albert-Amadeus I., on the 11th of July, 1848.

The Italians who, with all the rest of the world, had looked on the first exploits of the Sicilians with unqualified admiration, were now alarmed at the turn the revolution had taken; the new division arising between people intended, by the very nature of their geographical position, to constitute but one state, was the source of as much scandal as sorrow. The voice of the most illustrious patriots was raised in the tone of remonstrance and warning. Mazzini—whose instincts are as good, true, and warm, as his reasoning powers are cramped and his views bigoted—addressed them from London in that peculiar language of his, in words that found an echo in every Italian heart.* He pointed to the example of his own native town, Genoa, whose local independence had, like that of Sicily, been sacrificed, and its splendid traditions trampled down, to suit the purposes of a cold reason of state in 1814; and which, however, hailed that sacrifice as a first step towards the union of Italy, and was now cheerfully resigned to a loss which would prove a gain to the common country. The Sicilians felt all the weight of the admonition; they sent forth repeated declarations to the effect that their differences with Naples, whatever the issue might prove, would only bring about a more intimate union of Sicily with the rest of Italy; that it was especially with a view to take its place as a member of the great Italian family that Sicily was so eager in the vindication of her independent existence; that even in the terms offered to the King of Naples, on the 12th of March, it had been expressly stipulated that,

* See his address, "Ai Siciliani," dated London, Feb. 20, 1848. "Prose Politiche," p. 241.

"in the event of a commercial and political league being formed between the Italian states, which all Sicilians so ardently wish for, Sicily should take part in it as an independent nation;" finally, that the very resolution of the 13th of April, declaring the forfeiture of the Sicilian throne by the Bourbons, was actuated by a necessity on the part of the Sicilians to take part in the great events that were maturing the destinies of the common country in Northern Italy, seeing that Naples showed itself backward and lukewarm in its cause.* As a pledge of which patriotic disposition, the island, notwithstanding its own grave difficulties and dangers, did not fail to fit out and send a Sicilian legion to Lombardy, which, under the command of G. La Masa, arrived at Ferrara, and hence crossed over to Treviso, early in the month of May.†

The obduracy of the Sicilians, and their declaration of absolute independence on the 13th of April, could not fail to cause the greatest irritation in the king's mind, or to throw the utmost disorder and perplexity into the council of his advisers. The Bozzelli ministry, the same that had been called into power by the events of the 29th of January, who had worked at the constitution promised at that juncture, and given it to the public on the 10th of the following February, was formed of old patriots, wedded to the constitutional ideas of the year 1820; whose views could by no effort stretch beyond the limits of their native state, whose measures aimed no higher than the establish-

* Pantaleoni et Lumia, "*Mémoire Historique*," p. 119.

† See a narrative of the progress of the Sicilian Legion, in La Masa's "*Rivoluzione Siciliana*," vol. i. p. 266.

ment of the Procrustean liberties which the movement of 1820 had taught them could best fit that state. Towards the furtherance of the great scheme of Italian union these men had done absolutely nothing. For what concerned the Sicilian question, they had, perhaps unwittingly, played in the hands of the king himself; advised concessions and proposed conditions at the very moment that the astounding march of events had rendered them ill-timed and insufficient; they had attempted resistance or compliance, coercion or compromise, always at the wrong moment; always when both were sure to be met by the Sicilians with that inexorable watchword that shook at that time the thrones of half Europe,—the terrible “Too late!”

All chances of a good understanding between the king and his subjects, at Naples itself, was, nevertheless, dependent on the favourable issue of the Sicilian question. The Neapolitans themselves had, since the Parisian revolution of February, put forth new demands for the further extension of their liberties.* The constitution which Bozzelli had framed, on the model of the French charter of 1830, had been promulgated on the 10th of February, and received the sanction of the solemn oath of the king, of his family, and of all civil and military officers, on the 24th of February, the very day on which its French prototype

* For the revolution of Naples, see “I Casi di Napoli Lettere Politiche di Giuseppe Massari,” Turin, 1849; “Cenni Storici intorno agli ultimi Casi d’Italia, di Giuseppe Ricciardi,” Italia, 1849. Also, Pepe’s “Narrative of Events in Italy,” and Macfarlane’s “A Glance at Revolutionized Italy.” Also, “Cenni e Documenti intorno alle vere cagioni de’ fatti del 15 Maggio in Napoli,” in La Masa, “Rivoluzione Siciliana,” p. 429.

had been found inadequate to the wants of a free people. From that time modifications of the statute began to be considered as necessary in Naples, especially with regard to the House of Peers. Nothing daunted by these first symptoms of discontent, Bozzelli followed up his scheme by an electoral law, published on the 29th of the same month, which was but too much in keeping with the fundamental statute. The dissatisfaction of the people became now so evident as to determine the resignation of the ministry on the 4th of March. It would seem, however, that the real position of affairs was not sufficiently understood; since, notwithstanding slight modifications and additions, the old cabinet was almost altogether restored, and Bozzelli, whose character was not yet sufficiently well known, continued to be its leading mind. The government had, however, so far profited by the crisis, as to perceive that something must be done for Sicily, though it could do no better than to propose, on the very day of its reconstruction, that compromise with the Sicilians, through Lord Minto, which, as we have seen, led to no favourable results.

In the meanwhile the passions of the multitude, good and evil, had been widely aroused. The lowest classes, unable to understand the meaning of the word constitution, seemed inclined to put upon it the wildest construction. Mad notions of socialism, of arrant communism, such as the sheerest ignorance alone can entertain, began to circulate. The payment of taxes was frequently refused; in Venosa, the people even seized upon the public treasury as on their own—the people's property. Emissaries from France, the noto-

rious agents of Ledru Rollin and his colleagues, were but too early seen travelling, by preference, through the over-excitables districts of Southern Italy.* The unlimited freedom of the press was nowhere more flagrantly abused than at Naples. Nowhere was the hunt after government offices, pensions, and sinecures, more universal, more riotous, more impudently importunate and insatiable.†

The first shafts of public animosity were directed against the Jesuits. Gioberti had long since launched his formidable anathema against that brotherhood, who had otherwise, even before him, always been the object of the execration of the cultivated classes. A demonstration made against that order in the capital on the 9th of March, was followed by an official order for their expulsion on the 11th. The resolution was not adopted without serious dissensions in the cabinet, which led to the resignation of Saliceti and of his liberal colleagues. The reverend fathers were not the less provided with English passports, and embarked for Malta, to the number of 114, on the 13th. That was an ill-fated day for Naples and Italy. Their departure was made tragic by a display of hardship and suffering, which could not fail of its effect upon the susceptible minds of

* Massari, "I Casi di Napoli," p. 110. "The land-tax is unpaid, the laws remain unexecuted, and the police and municipal authorities are powerless."—Lord Napier's despatch, Naples, April 15, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 386.

† Massari, pp. 110–114; Macfarlane's "Revolutionized Italy," pp. 100, 101. The picture of Naples given by this last writer, though evidently high-coloured, and written under the influence of the worst feelings, bears, nevertheless, all the marks of terrible truth. See chap. v. to xii. in vol. i.

a bigoted multitude. They were conveyed from their college to the pier, where they were to embark, in a long row of carriages, the last of which exhibited the shocking sight of an old man on the last stage of agony, lying between two of his brethren, who read to him the prayers for the dying. "The cunning of those venerable fathers knew how to take advantage of that awful scene to give their exit all the appearance of an aggravated martyrdom."* The consequence was a riot of the lowest classes against the liberal party, which gave the Lazzaroni the first consciousness of the extent of their forces, and first suggested to the king the advantage he might derive from that formidable instrument.

But the remedy, or else the aggravation, of all local evils for Naples, for Sicily, no less than for all other Italian states, was to be found in the issue of the great national debate. The Bozzelli ministry had done nothing towards a preparation for that event, and the first tidings of the Milanese movement, naturally enough, sounded the death-knell to their cabinet. The outrage committed against the Austrian legation on the 25th of March, the stormy crowds pressing round the gates of the king's palace, day after day, and wresting from his hands a decree for the enlistment of volunteers for the war in Lombardy on the 26th, determined the resignation of Bozzelli and his colleagues, at the very moment that Prince Schwartzberg, the Austrian envoy, effected his retreat, by the aid of an English man-of-war boat, on the evening of the 28th.

* Massari, "I Casi di Napoli," p. 78.

Then there was utter helplessness and confusion in the king's councils for five days. The great stir of European events had brought home to Naples, together with a swarm of other exiles, General William Pepe, one of the most determined and chivalrous, but ill-starred leaders of the constitutional movement of Naples in 1820.

A witty and accomplished English novelist, whose grandfather came from Venice, has said, in mercy to the Italians, that "they were better than their reputation;" he might have said, both better and worse. Many of the virtues they get credit for, no less than many of the vices they are charged with, belong to the past—perhaps merely to the romance of the past.

The dolorous events of which we are weaving the mournful web, will go far to prove how deficient the Italians have showed themselves, especially in those political talents for which, as inheritors of all the keen wisdom of Macchiavello, they were thought to take the precedence of their neighbours.

General Pepe, for one, was undoubtedly as far above the moral as he is below the intellectual standard commonly assigned to his countrymen; a rare phenomenon in Italy, a foreigner would say, of a man whose heart was better than his head. More uprightness and consistency, truth and soldier-like candour and simplicity, are not to be found amongst the most genuine Teutons. But as for his statescraft and political foresight, the old Calabrian conspirator was little more than a very child.

He arrived at Naples on the 29th of March, and was almost immediately sent for by the king, who

wished to trust him with the formation of a cabinet. Pepe was fresh from Paris, where, with many others, he had looked upon the February riots as the clear result of the omnipotence of democratic convictions in France, and had carried away the conclusion that no throne could stand in Europe but by stooping to the level of the most uncompromising popular sovereignty.

He drew up a programme, in which, besides the immediate co-operation of all the forces of the kingdom to the war of Lombardy, he advised the abolition of the peerage, and sweeping reforms in the constitution and electoral law.* The good general had, however, a narrow escape of being prime minister; and on the 3d of April a cabinet was formed without him, which took its name from the eminent historian, Carlo Troya, and which was mainly composed of the liberal patriots that the public voice pointed out, and Pepe himself recommended. Pepe was destined to a task more suited to his tastes and abilities, and trusted with the command of the expedition to Lombardy.

It seems very clear, at the present day, that the most plausible course to be followed by Neapolitan statesmen was, a general adjournment of all the painfully complicate local questions, and the direction of all thoughts and efforts towards a speedy termination of the national war. Pepe spoke from a consciousness of the real nature of their position, when he advised the king to take himself the command of all his forces, amounting to 70,000 men, and to win the hearts of

* See his programme in Pepe's "Narrative of Events in Italy," vol. i. p. 126. Lord Napier's despatch, Naples, April 1, "Correspondence," p. 366.

both Neapolitan and Sicilian subjects, by an unequivocal show of devotion to the sacred cause of Italy.* The ministers of the 3d of April were equally impressed with that great truth, when they, overwhelmed as they were with bitterness of heart at the fatal resolution of the Sicilian parliament on the 13th of April, still proposed an armistice with the rebel islanders, and assured the king that "on the fields of Lombardy he would effect the recovery of his Sicilian crown."† The programme of the Troya cabinet, though less decisive as to local liberties than the one that the king had declined at the hands of Pepe, did not less contain the germs of those dissensions that brought about the fatal 15th of May.

The very character of that ministry was, however, its *Italianism*. Its predecessors had gone no farther than to suffer a tricolor pendant to be added to the old flag of the kingdom on the 24th of February, on the day of the king's oath to the constitution, an alteration which had afterwards been officially announced on the 11th of March. It would seem, also, that they had sent instructions to Count Ludolf, the Neapolitan minister in Rome, in order that he should signify the adhesion of the Neapolitan government to the national league. This was only done, however, on the 26th of March, on the eve of their downfall. The Troya ministry took up that project of a league as a primary object; their very programme contained, amongst its essential articles, "the immediate appointment of diplomatic agents to form a free and loyal league with

* Pepe's "Events in Italy," i. 141.

† Massari, "I Casi di Napoli," p. 118.

the other Italian states,"* and "the placing at the disposal of the Italian league a large contingent of troops, which should immediately leave the frontier."

There can be no doubt but those upright and earnest ministers meant punctually to fulfil their engagement. A deputation was sent to Rome, whence they were afterwards to proceed to the other Italian states, and there come to an immediate understanding as to the terms on which Italian matters should stand after the favourable solution of the question of national independence. This deputation, however, owing to the manifold difficulties which surrounded the new cabinet, left Naples too late, and only reached Rome when the pope's encyclic of the 29th of April had rendered any steady course of national policy impossible in the pontifical states. The warlike preparations of the Neapolitan government were no less characterised by slowness and inconsistency. The ardour of the people had so utterly baffled all control that a band of volunteers, to the number of 184, was suffered to embark as early as the 29th of March, under the captainship of the Princess Christina Trivulzio di Belgiojoso, who led them through the towns of Lombardy, bearing aloft the national standard before them.† Another legion of the same strength followed on the 3d of April, two more in the course of a few days; finally the government sent a regiment of regular troops by sea to Leghorn, on the 5th.

At this early stage of the matter, however, the ministry was still compelled to struggle with the same

* See the programme, "Corresp. Aff. of Italy," ii. 368.

† See the Princess's own account of the expedition, "Revue des Deux Mondes," vol. xxiv. p. 139.

difficulties that had paralysed the movements of the Sardinian government, and was driven to undignified evasive answers to Lord Napier, the British minister, who, from the very first marching of volunteers, had given very plain hints of his dissatisfaction, and who, upon more explicit instructions from his government, warned Ferdinand's advisers against the iniquity no less than impolicy of their warlike dispositions.* The tenth regiment of the line, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made shift to answer, "had been placed at the disposal of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and would act in concert with his royal highness's troops, but the minister could not at the present moment state with confidence whether it was destined to cross the frontier of Lombardy or not." This was on the 6th of April. On the 7th the same minister put forth a royal proclamation, calling upon the king's subjects to aid in the government's efforts for the war of independence.

We have noted this with a view to satisfy exacting persons that those tricks of diplomatic fencing, which were ascribed to bad faith and lukewarmness in the national cause when practised by Piedmontese statesmen of the so-called aristocratic school, were, however, resorted to as matter of political expediency, even by the unsuspected patriots of the Troja cabinet at Naples, and by the Marquis Dragonetti, of all men, who held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and who has certainly never been charged with backwardness, or insincerity, or propensity to half-measures.

The proclamation of the 7th April had nevertheless

* Lord Napier's Despatches, April 9, 25, 27. Cor. part ii. pp. 362, 406.

irrevocably committed the government, and the expedition of 14,000 infantry, with horse and artillery, was resolved upon. Some difficulties arose as to the choice of a commander-in-chief of this force, because not a few of the old Neapolitan generals had made themselves unpopular: some were disabled by age or infirmities, and some positively refused the command of an enterprise they objected to on political grounds. William Pepe himself was at last appointed, but not without hesitation, as the absence of eight-and-twenty years had rendered him an utter stranger to the soldiers that were to fight under his orders.

We are informed by Pepe himself, that the force to be placed under his orders was at first understood to consist of 40,000 men.* He found, however, that obstacles were rising against the departure of that force, on the part of the king himself, of some clandestine advisers who excited him to act in opposition to his ministers, and especially on the part of the staff of his generals, a council of whom was held, who did not hesitate to give their opinion as unfavourable to the undertaking.† With all these intrigues, however, and with all the hostilities carried on against the Troya cabinet, and their national views by some reactionary publications, Pepe had obtained that "seven battalions should be embarked in six magnificent steam-frigates," the destination of which was Venice.‡ An illness of six days prevented the general from carrying this design into immediate execution; that short respite had enabled the king to alter his resolution. It was settled

* "Events in Italy," vol. i. p. 133.

† Massari, "I Casi di Napoli," p. 121. ‡ Pepe, as above, p. 145.

that the largest part of the troops should go by land, submitting to the hard and humiliating conditions set on their passage by the papal government, and that the general should meet them at Ancona.

Poor Pepe was only able to effect his departure from Naples on the 4th of May, and only issued his first order of the day to the troops assembled at Ancona on the 10th of the same month.

Previous to his taking leave he received a letter from the war ministry, ordering him to concentrate his forces on the right bank of the Po, and not to cross that river without further instructions from the regal government.*

This letter, which the general seems inclined to consider as a manifest proof of the king's treason from that early period—the contents of which, he thinks, if made known to the public, would have cost Ferdinand his throne and life—he quietly put away, resolved upon considering it as *not received*.

There could, however, be no bad faith on the part of the minister of war that signed that letter, or on that of his colleagues; and Pepe could not for one moment suppose them capable of conspiring with the king to the defeat of an expedition which they had promoted with their best endeavours.

The state of matters in Italy at the beginning of May offers, perhaps, an easy solution of the mystery which puzzled General Pepe, and to which he could hardly help giving the most sinister interpretation.

At that time, it should be remembered, Charles

* See the letter, dated May 3d, in Pepe's "Events in Italy," vol. i. p. 148.

Albert was running his glorious career without yet meeting a check, and scarcely a doubt was entertained of the complete success that awaited his efforts. Pepe himself, and almost every man in Naples, must, consequently, have thought that the Neapolitan expedition, however imperiously demanded by the popular voice, however necessary to the national honour of the southern kingdom, was scarcely needed to make assurance doubly sure. The southern troops, it was thought, must march with great speed if they wished to be in time to see the last of the barbarians out of Italy; but the king and the people thought it worth their while to try what share in the glory, perhaps in the profits, of the emancipation of Lombardy would be secured by at least a show of good intentions: hence it was that Pepe, who had been promised an army of 40,000 men, was satisfied to set out at the head of a division of 12,000 or 14,000.

The fitting-out of the armament did not keep pace with the general's own impatience, but this may partly be accounted for by the proverbial improvidence and indiscipline of Neapolitan troops; or, if it must be so, by the bad faith and reluctance of the subalterns of the staff and the war-office. If we reflect that the fatal 13th of April in Sicily took place in these very emergencies, if we call to mind the unsettled state of the kingdom, the exorbitance of the demands of the democrats, the dread of falling into utter helplessness in his own capital, we think that even a far better king than Ferdinand might have shown hesitation, and attempted tergiversation. The war of independence was a necessity for him as it had been for the sovereigns of Piedmont, Rome, and Tuscany. Italy willed it—God willed

it—opinion drove him to it. But Naples was far away from the scene of action. Ferdinand's own share of the spoil could never be so large as that which was sure to fall to the lot of his Piedmontese rival. On the other hand, the democrats, with even poor deluded Pepe, and the high-minded patriots of the Troya ministry at their head, who seemed to think that an obdurate despot may be won to the people's cause in two days, harassed him without ceasing, came to him daily with fresh demands, about one chamber, about extension of suffrage. They made him too soon aware that the footfall of the last Austrian across the Alps would be the death-knell to all that remained of royalty in Italy.

Pepe and the cabinet of the 3d of April were honestly pledged to the support of constitutional orders, it is true; but they were perhaps too strongly impressed with the notion that after the fatal events of February in Paris, the Italians, in Naples especially, began to repent their moderate course, and to be anxious, now they could act without their princes, to rid themselves of their presence.

Under this impression they wished to make the king aware that his throne could now only be based on "republican institutions." Sicily was lost, they represented. Naples would follow the same fate, unless the broadest concessions averted it.

The king chafed in the secret of his heart: he had no lack of advisers of a different stamp—a *camarilla*, made up of cunning priests, base courtiers, and old military aristocrats, who encouraged him to resistance. Had Ferdinand and his tenebrous council been able to anticipate the results of the war in Lombardy as likely

to turn out in favour of Austria, we would willingly admit that he harboured his reactionary schemes from the outset. But if we are able to prove, as we hope, that in April, and up to the fall of Vicenza, on the 11th of June, no man in Europe dreamt of a possibility of the Austrian ever having the advantage, we must insist that the King of Naples, for his own interest, for his own existence, must feel compelled to join in the national hunt after the Austrian, and even anxious to be "in at the death."

In a private interview with Pepe, the king had assured that general that "he had always detested Austria;"* and although we are quite willing to put never the slightest faith in the king's words, yet we must avow that the arrogant tone invariably assumed by Austrian agents might have induced even a man like Ferdinand to long for his riddance of a degrading thralldom.

Had the king been too hasty in his retreat, had he ventured on a recall of his troops whilst Charles Albert had still the chance of carrying all the honour and price of the liberation of Lombardy, he would have had to bear all the brunt of liberalism at home, with an increase of popularity consequent upon his dastardly defection. In his reactionary contest he would then have stood alone and unaided; Russia being too far, and Austria, in that hypothesis, out of the question.

However willing to throw obstacles in its way, the king could not harbour a thought of seriously countermanding the expedition. Up to the 14th or 15th of May, it must be remembered, all his acts bore the sig-

* Pepe, vol. i. p. 141.

nature of responsible ministers. It is very true that those upright and generous men had to struggle with the invisible enemies that surrounded the person and alone biassed the mind of the king. But it is no less true that the letter of the 3d of March, which caused the first pang of alarm and suspicion to honest Pepe, was dictated by the ministers themselves, and in obedience to political views which will be better explained by circumstantial evidence.

"I asked Marquis Dragonetti," writes Lord Napier, so early as the 9th of April,* "what were the views of the Neapolitan cabinet as to the future disposal of Lombardy, should it be severed from the Italian states, and whether it would be agreeable to their wishes that it should be united to the Sardinian crown? His excellency declared that such a settlement would be inconsistent with the balance of power between the Italian states, and that the Austrian territories must be erected into an independent kingdom."

It was this great anxiety about "the balance of powers in Italy" which suggested the deputation to Rome, charged with the mission of hastening the stipulation of an Italian league. It was the same anxiety which, as Charles Albert's progress appeared now too rapid and sure, as some hints respecting a *fusion*, or annexation of Lombardy and the duchies of Parma and Modena to Sardinia, were already thrown out, prompted that letter of the 3d of May, in which it is most distinctly stated, that "the most energetic measures were being taken in order to establish a convention among

* "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 382.

the Italian princes," which should determine the part belonging to the Neapolitan troops in the national contest.*

This jealousy of too great and speedy a success of the Piedmontese arms prevailed in many a heart in southern Italy besides Ferdinand's. It would seem it had no little influence in prompting Pius IX. with his fatal encyclic of the 19th of April. Many of the constitutionalists of the old school in Naples, the ex-ministers of the Bozzelli cabinet, with Blanch and Cianciulli, Filangieri, and others of the chief officers in the army, were hard at work to represent the increment of Sardinia as fraught with humiliation and danger to the southern kingdom. The old jealousies of the Visconti of Milan and the Anjou dynasty of Naples seemed ready to revive; and the ministers, whatever their personal feelings on the subject might be, deemed it but reasonable that the share each Italian state should have in the work of national emancipation should be clearly set down by previous agreement.

The only error in all this was—and their predecessors were more to blame for it than themselves—that the mission to Rome was only sent simultaneously with their military contingent. Piedmont, deeply engaged in the war, declared it had no leisure for negotiations; the pope would hear no word, either about wars or alliances, and the negotiation broke up ere it was fairly commenced. Another, even graver error, lay in the supposition that the war in Lombardy admitted of leisurely deliberation, as the ministers assured Pope that

* See, again, the letter, in Pepe, vol. i. p. 149.

“his instructions would reach him before his troops were re-united.” Still the intentions of those ill-fated ministers were good, and had they come into power in January, instead of April, they might, by a previous understanding, have given the warlike operations in Lombardy a far more distinct aim—a far different steadiness and consistency.

From the date of that letter to that of the final recall of the Neapolitan expedition, on the 18th of May, only a fortnight elapsed; but that short interval had changed the whole aspect of things at Naples,—king and people had come to a trial of their forces, and the spell of the omnipotence of the latter was dissolved. But the 15th of May! Who was the author of the 15th of May? Whoever could satisfactorily answer that question would have found the solution of all mystery that still hangs on those melancholy Italian matters.

Was the king attacked in his own palace, and did despair lend him an energy of which he had no previous consciousness? or was the pretended insurrection a plot of his own contrivance?

Our answer will be found in a clear and concise statement of facts—such as results from a variety of conflicting evidence; premising merely a few obvious reflections.

The king was, on the 15th of May, comparatively disarmed. Admitting even that he had from twelve to fourteen thousand men in and about the capital, never questioning the staunch fidelity and intrepidity of his Swiss regiments, his situation was certainly more precarious than it had been on the 19th of January, on the 28th of March, in all other junctures in which he

had found it expedient to bow to the will of his people. It had certainly not been improved by sending a division with Pepe on a fool's errand on the banks of the Po, and the whole of his fine fleet, under Admiral De Cosa, to the Adriatic. He had from twelve to fourteen thousand men, possibly ; but it was not long since equal and even larger forces had fallen back before unarmed citizens at Berlin, at Milan, in his own Palermo. The bloody work of Cavaignac in June had not yet been done, and Ferdinand's reactionary experiment was actually the first of its kind. He could rely on the Swiss, doubtless, and had been at great pains to attach most of the generals and the regiments of the royal guard to his person. Still, even on the 15th, one of those officers, General Roberti, for the second time, refused to act against the people from the Castle St. Elmo. Of the disposition of mind of the national guard the king could know nothing ; and yet, as we shall see, it was only the indecision of that body, the surprise and inaction of the mass of the people, that gave the king the victory.

A more desperate game was certainly never ventured upon than King Ferdinand is here supposed to have deliberately played ; and, notwithstanding unforeseen contingencies which the sheerest chance turned up in his favour, the odds, for more than one hour of anxious suspense, were clearly against him.

We are quite willing to go hand in hand with Ferdinand's enemies so long as they describe him as a thoroughly bad and base man, but not when they attribute to him either the brains for plotting or the heart for hatching so sublime a *coup d'état*. We are

firmly convinced that he acted at random, as almost every man did, in 1848; that circumstances did all the miracles that are attributed to his transcendent kingcraft; and that, at the close of the contest, no man was more than himself thunderstruck at his own success.

Of the essential perverseness, obstinacy, bad faith, and ferocity of the king's nature, subsequent events must have sufficiently satisfied the most sceptic; but we remain no less firm in our conviction, that, notwithstanding a certain cunning of the very lowest description, that poor king *Bomba* is only a sad mixture of the craven and *imbecile*.

There were at the time in Naples, notwithstanding great perturbation of men's minds, very few elements, and positively no preparation for a civil conflict. The ministers, bent as they almost exclusively were on the furtherance of the great Italian cause, had to struggle not only with the king's own duplicity, and with the incorrigible set of dull conservatives who aimed at utter reaction, but also, on the one hand, with the old constitutionalists, who insisted that a thorough organisation of the kingdom, and the settlement of the Sicilian question, should precede any interference in the affairs of northern Italy, and, on the other, with the rabid democrats, who wished their sweeping innovations to go hand in hand with the work of Italian redemption,—nay, who were ever losing sight of the common country in their fanatic eagerness for the immediate popularisation of local institutions.

These opposite parties, though doubtless in existence, were, however, by no means powerful, even by the confession of the most exaggeratory witnesses; and we

may judge of their respective position by the result of the elections of the 15th of April, in which, it is satisfactorily proved, men of upright, moderate views, obtained a most decided majority.*

The opening of parliament had been fatally, though perhaps unavoidably, postponed from the 1st to the 15th May. During that interval the papal encyclic of the 19th April, and the king's tardiness and visible reluctance to aid the Italian cause, had greatly contributed to aggravate the suspicions and rancours by which men's minds were agitated. The ministers had given out a programme of the ceremony,† in which the form of the oath to be administered to the deputies was set down. Objections were made to the oath by some

* Massari, a man whose candour and moderation make the strongest appeal to our confidence, thus expresses himself on the subject of these elections :—" Every deputy was elected by thousands of votes. Out of 164 deputies, about a score may be looked upon as belonging to the *exalté* party ; four or five are to be numbered amongst the sheer *retrogrades* : the immense majority consisted of sincere and honest *constitutionalists*, anxious above all things to free Italy from the foreign yoke."—*I Casi di Napoli*, p. 139. Also Ricciardi, the chief of the ultra-radical party ("Ultimi Casi d'Italia," p. 124) ; and the anonymous writer in La Masa's "*Rivoluzione Siciliana*," p. 152 ; as well as all other Italian authorities, confirm Massari's opinion respecting the Neapolitan deputies. Mr. Macfarlane, however, an out-and-out partisan of King Ferdinand, states,—“ The members for the chamber of deputies were elected by the manoeuvres, and violence, and dictation of the political clubs. This was particularly the case in the provinces the farthest from the capital, where no moderate candidate (except in a few rare instances) had the remotest chance of success. Some quiet men, who were returned against their wish, and without their knowledge, begged to be excused, fearing to be mixed up with such a set of firebrands.”—*Revolutionised Italy*, i. p. 124.

† The programme for the opening of the Neapolitan Parliament, in "*Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy*," part ii. p. 489.

conscientious liberal deputies, inasmuch as it pledged them to the support of the constitution of the 10th of February, although, in consequence of the hurried march of events, it had been deemed necessary, and it had been solemnly promised, to submit that constitution to a thorough revision. Not individuals merely, but whole electoral colleges, in no less than seven provinces, had declared against an upper house, even although based upon the broadest principles of popular suffrage: they wished for a single house, and that invested with all the attributes of a constituent assembly.

The deputies had several meetings on the subject, — one at the town-hall, or palace of Montoliveto, on the 14th. Report of their reluctance to the oath, and consequent differences with the king and ministers, spread abroad: the people took strongly the part of the deputies, and forthwith barricades rose in the Strada Toledo, and in other streets leading to the royal palace.

On the first symptoms of popular effervescence, the king, always haunted by the most pusillanimous fears, was perhaps in too great a haste to draw up a body of the royal guards and the Swiss round his palace. This display of force on his side called forth the hostile demonstration on the part of the people.

The constitutionality of the deliberation of the chamber previous to the verification of its powers has been questioned, even by men most anxious to vindicate its conduct.* Still much might have been allowed for parliamentary inexperience; and the clause of the oath being rescinded before the night was over, the pretexts for a collision had been happily removed.

* Massari, p. 150.

Still the barricades were left standing. On those who had first reared them up—on those who resisted all entreaties, all orders for their removal, rests all the responsibility of the awful deeds that were to ensue. Writers of all parties agree that the chief workmen at those unhappy structures were strangers to the town. Naples was then swarming with men of every description; national guards from the provinces, chiefly Calabrians, men of exaggerated notions and violent passions,—the sons of the same men who had so freely shed civil blood in the revolutions at the close of the last century (the men of Ettore di Ruvo and of Cardinal Ruffo, so powerfully painted by Botta), who had now come as an armed escort to the deputies of their respective districts.* Against these men, and against their acknowledged leader, Giovanni Andrea Romeo, one of the chiefs of the Calabrian insurrections of 1847, a man of well-known energy and determination of character, the royal party endeavoured to raise the worst suspicions. The same Romeo, however, professed, on the 13th, the most unequivocal devotion to constitutional principles, and manfully disavowed all participation in

* "Between the 1st and the 15th of May a good many of the deputies arrived in the capital from the provinces—and wild-looking deputies most of them were—from the Calabrias, from the mountains of Basilicata, from the deep glens of the Molise, and from the forests of Capitanata. A good many of them came attended by guardsmen of their own districts, just as in former times the barons came up each with a long tail of armigeri. On the 12th a steam-boat brought a considerable number of passengers from the coast of Calabria, every one of whom was armed to the teeth, and all of whom were allowed to land; for the constitution had been promised, and no one could say nay to them."—*Macfarlane's "Revolutionised Italy,"* i. p. 124. His words are echoed by D'Arlinecourt, "*L'Italie Rouge*," p. 223.

an incendiary proclamation which had been attributed to him and his party.* A stronger case is made out against La Cecilia, one of Mazzini's earliest friends, who, at any rate, avows that the word "Barricades" first "*slipped from his lips*."

The Calabrians, however, were there, and with them that nameless, intangible set of evil-doers, who belong, properly speaking, to no party, and whose excesses are invariably attributed by each party to its adversaries. In those unknown faces the *reactionists* were determined to recognise French agents, some dressed as seamen, some even wearing a French officer's uniform (for, by that inevitable curse of a weak and divided country, which enables arrogant foreigners to convert a mere right of hospitality into an assumption of authority, the French fleet under Admiral Baudin was there, riding insolently at anchor under the very mole of the capital, by its fatal presence, and by the fine phrases of citizen Levraud, the envoy of the provisional government of February, ministering to the worst passions of a too credulous people)†; the patriots of the most bigoted school, on the other hand, were determined to see nothing in those sinister-looking countenances, and from no other reason than that they were unknown,—so many emissaries of the royalist party, bent on turning popular excitement to account, and urging the masses to a conflict, in which the court had taken all possible measures to secure the advantage.‡

* Massari, p. 132; La Masa, "Rivoluzione Siciliana," p. 451.

† Macfarlane, pp. 132; 147. Also Ricciardi, p. 160. M. Levraud was in Naples as French chargé d'affaires since April 25, but had not been officially acknowledged by the Neapolitan government.

‡ La Masa, p. 463.

The barricades had risen: the powers of evil had brought the two parties in presence, and each perhaps listened to its own impulse to come to a trial of forces, though neither had perhaps fairly anticipated so immediate a collision, or had thought of opportune preparations. The suspicion and animosity was equally strong on both sides. Each party blindly followed its worst instincts, and it was the merest chance that gave the signal for the onslaught.

Between these two extreme factions there was a party which took no share in the conflict, but looked on in amazement and perplexity, unaware, as it seems, that the result, whatever it might be, could not fail to be fatal to itself. The deputies assembled at Montoliveto, most of them belonging to the moderate party, were terrified by the first announcement of that hostile attitude of the people, and sent several of their members—amongst others Gabriel Pepe, the commander of the national guards—to remonstrate with the authors of that insane movement, and to remove the barricades. Their good offices, however, were of no effect with the men actually in charge of those popular breastworks, some of whom even levelled their guns at Pepe. The national guards who had assembled round the palace of Montoliveto for the protection of the popular representatives, but few of whom had taken an active part in those riotous preparations, looked on with unconcern, and refused to obey the orders of their commander to employ force against the insurgents.*

* "The insurgents were mostly from the provinces, Calabrians especially, besides a small number of national guards, and a few of the people. The civic militia either did not answer the call, or looked on

The king, who had a considerable force under his command, had, either from sheer cowardice or from a deeper design, abstained from all interference with the barricaders, when their work was so slovenly done that it could offer no serious resistance, and, whilst showing his disposition to comply with the demands of the deputies with regard to the oath, had charged them with the arduous task of dealing with the insurgents. The remonstrances of the representatives of the people were, as we have seen, of no avail; yet the report of a compromise between king and chamber had, late at night, the result of calming the minds of those among the revolvers who were acting from conscientious motives; and at the break of day the barricades, which had never reached a very formidable height, were almost entirely given up by their defenders.*

There was evidently a lull in the storm, which might have been turned to account, and allowed some hope of a peaceful termination. At five o'clock in the morning

with unconcern on the work of the insurgents, disregarding the voice of their chiefs without exception, even of that of Pepe, popular as it was."—*Ricciardi*, "*Ultimi Casi d'Italia*," p. 142. *Massari*, p. 153.

* *Macfarlane* ("*Revolutionised Italy*," vol. i. p. 126-136) gives a long description of the Neapolitan barricades and their defenders, quoting the testimony of foreign consuls and ministers, and other uninterested parties. He describes the whole scene in a tone of utter contempt:—"A single patrol of horse or foot might have scattered the insurgents—seven good London policemen would have beaten them all—an English pony would not be worth his oats that could not have leaped over most of those wretched breastworks," &c. &c. "The defenders of the barricades during the night were not many, their works contemptible;—nothing easier than to take them by storm."—*La Masa*, p. 459.

(of the 15th), upon a communication from the king that the objectionable oath would be dispensed with, the deputies, after new endeavours to calm the multitude, both by proclamations and by deputations, adjourned their meeting to ten o'clock of the same morning, when they were again to meet at the same palace of Montoliveto, hence to proceed in a body to the solemn inauguration of their parliamentary labours.

The day advanced: the king, who was still uneasy at the sight of the barricades, sent for reinforcements; the threatening attitude of his troops gave rise to a new commotion, and the *générale* was beaten. The streets were already swarming with people, who, in the absence of other incentive, would naturally enough have been drawn together to witness the coming solemnity.

The two factions were thus, once more, face to face, but with different preparation, with very different disposition of mind,—the royal party compact, unanimous, with well-mustered forces, acting in combination, and with a well-defined object before them. Some officers—treacherously, as it seems—sent to reconnoitre, gave but too favourable a report of the utter disorder of the enemy's forces.* The people, in helpless amazement, without a rational, well-understood motive of action, without acknowledged leaders, gathered together at random, from vain excitement, from idle curiosity. The

* Ricciardi (p. 146) does not hesitate to charge with this unworthy stratagem some Swiss officers, and chiefly a colonel of that nation. See also Massari, p. 155. Macfarlane, on the contrary, quotes several instances of Swiss officers, and especially of Colonel De Salis, basely shot at by the insurgents whilst he was holding a parley with them.—Vol. i. p. 138.

national guards, neutral and passive from the outset, had retired early in the morning, and did not reassemble. Scarcely one-tenth of that militia was at any time engaged in the conflict : * those few, without exception, took part for the people. Masses of insurgents from the country, who would have come to the rescue of their fellow-citizens, and who, on the first report of a commotion, had been mustering in the districts of Salerno and Avellino, were stopped in their march by the tidings of the good accord between king and chamber. † The people as a mass, the sane part of the deputies, the whole of the civic militia, had evidently laid aside all thoughts of an encounter, and were disinclined to it. But there were those among the barricade-builders who were determined that matters should not end so smoothly, and whose criminal designs were but too greatly favoured by the menacing attitude of the troops.

The king, on his own part, was tired of that long suspense, and his very fears were turned into despair.

At about half-past eleven o'clock a shot went off in the air. Most witnesses agree that it came from the foremost barricade in the Strada Toledo, where that street faces the square of the royal palace; and only those who wish to make out as strong a case as they can against the king's party ‡ aver that the shot was fired by one of the king's own emissaries, purposely mingling with the insurgents. The shot might have

* See, besides all the Italian authorities, *Maefarlanc* himself, vol. i. p. 133.

† *Ricciardi*, p. 167.

‡ *La Masa*, p. 463.

been fired at random, as will happen a thousand times when inexperienced hands are rashly trusted with fire-arms; but it was thought—and it had all the effect of—a signal. A fight ensued which lasted eight hours. The royal guards were repulsed, but the barricades were beaten down with cannon, and carried by the Swiss at the point of the bayonet.* Some resistance was still shown at some of the principal palaces in the Toledo, especially the Palazzo Gravina, where many of the republican deputies and other chiefs of the revolt were said to have entrenched themselves; but even these last strongholds were stormed one by one, when pillage and slaughter, fire and sword, put an end to the tragic catastrophe.

The deputies, who had all that time been in anxious consultation at Montoliveto, who had appointed a very useless committee of public safety, and a still more ineffectual deputation to the French admiral, were now summoned to disperse by an officer of the royal guard, acting in the king's name—an order which, after a sufficiently firm and dignified protest, they were under necessity to obey.

During the whole of this disgraceful conflict the king was in a state of trepidation, which could be

* Massari, p. 155. Ricciardi, p. 151. Macfarlane (vol. i. p. 136) contends that the barricades were given up almost without a struggle, and that there was no fight except from the houses. The return of the dead, however, even as given by the government (five hundred and odd), imply a tolerably tough resistance, since it is well proved that not more than seven hundred were engaged on the part of the insurgents. See Ricciardi, p. 150. See Lord Napier's account of the 15th of May, in his despatch, dated Naples, May 16. "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," p. 495.

allayed neither by the presence of his generals, who to a man thronged around him, not excepting worn-out veterans—not excepting the unblemished patriot, Florestan Pepe, the brother of William, whose infirmities scarcely allowed him to drag himself to the palace*—nor by the support of the diplomatic body, who crowded the royal apartment without venturing on a remonstrance†—nor by the professions of unbounded devotion on the part of the lowest classes, the Lazzaroni, whose deputations came with offers of service at the very outbreak, and whose share in the contest was but too well calculated to add to the horrors of a contest of that nature.‡

Reluctant as his own fears might have made the king to commence the fray, he was, however, sufficiently clear-sighted and resolute to insist upon “seeing its end.”§ The division and indecision of his adversaries

* Macfarlane, i. p. 134.

† Massari, p. 156. Lord Napier’s despatch, May 16. “Correspondence,” p. 495.

‡ The partisans of King Ferdinand are not satisfied with meeting the charges of revolting excesses of the populace with a flat negative: they even deny the existence of the Lazzaroni, as a class; they see nothing in the lower classes at Naples but a set of industrious, well-behaved artisans and labourers. See “Quarterly Review,” clxvi. p. 563; clxv. p. 245. Macfarlane allows that murder and pillage were freely indulged in by the unbridled multitude, though he endeavours to screen the Swiss soldiery and their officers from all blame on that point.—Vol. i. p. 143. Ricciardi and the Italians in general did not hesitate to point at the Swiss as the authors of the greatest enormities. The federal government, it is well known, instituted an inquiry on the subject, and the report was altogether favourable to their troops.

§ La Masa, p. 463. “The king coldly answered that, since the fray had commenced, it was necessary to make an end of it.”

did not escape him ; he saw the supineness and hesitation of those true patriots whom he had the greatest reason to dread : against a handful of mere fanatics he was sure to prevail. The resignation of the ministry, almost at the very commencement of hostilities, consequent upon the king's refusal to withdraw his forces, allowed him to act unshackled by constitutional forms. During the whole of that terrible day none of his decrees bore a ministerial counter-signature ; and from that day no man was admitted to his cabinet that did not lend a passive hand to the arbitrary will of the monarch.

A few traits of meekness and tenderness of disposition on the part of the king, during the hottest hours of the *mêlée*, are related by his panegyrists, which we wish, for the sake of humanity, it were in our power to believe.*

Some of the deputies — amongst them Giuseppe Ricciardi, a hot-headed partisan, fresh from France, and too eager to push matters to the worst extremities, after in vain proposing to the terrified assembly at Montoliveto measures which would have placed that body at the head of the insurrection, had himself appointed as a messenger to Admiral Baudin, and, together with another deputy, Giuliani, and the French chargé d'affaires, Levraud, went on board the *Friedland* to demand the interference of the French fleet in favour of the popular cause.

Admiral Baudin, well aware of the course hence-

* Macfarlane, i. p. 135. D'Arincourt, "L'Italie Rouge," p. 228. The only advocates the king can boast, such as they are.

forth to be pursued by French policy, received the Neapolitan deputies with an air that soon damped their too sanguine anticipations. It was with the greatest difficulty, and after more than an hour's deliberation, that he could be urged by the citizen chargé d'affaires to draw up a petition to the king, recommending the rebels to mercy*—a forbearance which did not prevent the admiral from clamouring with indecent hurry, and in a bullying tone, for the immediate indemnity of the real or pretended losses of the French residents at Naples, and from enforcing their claims without scrutiny or examination.†

Ricciardi did not the less proceed on board a French vessel to Malta and Sicily, and hence to Calabria, where he was joined by men of his own extreme party; and, with the support of Sicilian auxiliaries, he was enabled once more to raise the standard of insurrection, and to keep the southern provinces in a commotion which lasted the whole of that and the following month.

The blow had fallen, in the meanwhile, so far as Naples itself was concerned, and, what is of greater moment, so far as anything could be hoped from that quarter in behalf of the national cause. The first act of the new ministry, as soon as the king was able to form one, was the recall of the land and sea forces which had so improvidently been ordered to the north, May 18th.

* Ricciardi, p. 146. Massari, p. 156. La Masa, p. 467. Beaumont-Vassy, "*Histoire des Etats Italiens*," vol. v. p. 307. See the absurd scene described by D'Arlincourt ("*L'Italie Rouge*," p. 234) as having taken place between Levraud and Baudin on board the *Friedland*.

† Macfarlane, i. p. 146.

The king was anything but easy at the reception his orders would meet in the camp and on the high seas. That old General Pepe would prove contumacious was tolerably certain, and, for that matter, provisions had been taken in the same despatch to the effect that the Neapolitan volunteers under his orders should be allowed to join Durando's troops in Lombardy, if so inclined; and that the commander-in-chief himself might, if he objected to the backward movement, resign his command into the hands of his lieutenant, General Statella, a man whose scruples could cause no uneasiness.

The first impression of Pepe, on receiving the order at Bologna, on the 22d, was immediate compliance; but the show of devotion of the national guards of Bologna infused a new spirit into him, and he signified his intention to disregard the king's orders, and keep the command. Upon this, Statella took his departure.

But the extravagant bounty and unworthy familiarity with which the king had at all times striven to win the good-will of his soldiery made him justly confident that they would not desert him in his need. The troops everywhere rebelled against their "rebel" leader. The example was given by a Sicilian regiment at Ferrara, who had been, Pepe says, "made up of galley-slaves and pardoned highwaymen, who, knowing themselves to be invidious to their countrymen, had placed all their hopes on the king's kindness."* The general soon found himself alone; and all he could bring with him, besides volunteers, was a rifle battalion, a field-

* "Events in Italy," vol. i. p. 185.

battery, and a company of sappers, who all did good service at Venice during the eighteen months' siege of the Lagoons. The 10th regiment, who, with the Tuscans, was already under the walls of Mantua, and had given proofs of signal bravery in more than one encounter, did also ask and obtain leave of Charles Albert, and hastened to join the retreating division, though a battalion of that brave corps only left the camp at the end of July, and with as much sorrow as shame on their faces.* Likewise, Vice-Admiral De Cosa, the commander of the Neapolitan squadron, old patriot as he was, "obeyed with grief," says Pepe; "but he obeyed." He had put to sea on the 27th of April, with seven splendid steam-vessels, two large frigates, a man-of-war brig, and 4500 land forces, the vanguard of Pepe's army, which he was to land at Ancona. He was fired at from the coast in the Strait of Messina by the Sicilians, who mistook the aim of his expedition, and fancied it directed against themselves. He touched at Ancona on the 10th of May, and pursued his course towards Venice as soon as he could obtain leave of his temporising and reluctant government. He reached the Lagoons on the 16th, operated a junction with the Sardinian squadron under Albini on the 22d, and proceeded with it to Trieste on the same day. Here the first despatches from Naples, ordering his immediate return, reached him. Encouraged by the remonstrances of Pietro Leopardi, the Neapolitan envoy to the camp of Charles Albert, a patriot entertaining all the generous

* "Memorie sulla Guerra dell' Indipendenza d' Italia," Turin, 1850, p. 175.

views of the cabinet of the 3d of April, De Cosa ventured to disregard the orders of the king till the 11th of June, when, on more positive and peremptory injunctions, he saw himself under necessity of leaving his Sardinian brother-at-arms, and sailed for Naples.

The horror of all Italy at the dastardly defection of troops that had almost, as it were, reached the field of combat, cannot be easily described. There was a moment, indeed, when the indignation of the people of Romagna seemed ready to visit on the troops the treachery of their king; but, with their horse and artillery, the Neapolitan division was too strong for an unarmed multitude. The royal battalions effected their backward movement in good order, and under strict discipline, sneaking along bye-roads and avoiding large towns,* followed merely by the hearty but harmless execrations of their countrymen. General Statella, on his way to Naples, had a narrow escape of being torn to pieces by the aroused populace at Florence.†

It was not merely Pepe, De Cosa, Leopardi, and the colonel of the 10th, that were keenly alive to the stain that retreat would for ever inflict on the Neapolitan flag. Lahalle, a brigadier-general, in sheer despair at being forced along by the troops in their

* Lord Napier, Naples, June 8, "Correspondence," p. 550.

† Pepe, vol. i. p. 174. Macfarlane, vol. i. p. 161. It is not true, as the latter writer affirms, that Statella was on his way to Naples, as bearer of Pepe's remonstrances with the Neapolitan government, though such was believed to be the case by Sir G. Hamilton (see his despatch, Florence, May 29th, "Correspondence," part ii. p. 540). This is contradicted by Statella's own letter to Pepe, on his leaving Bologna. See Pepe, as above, p. 172.

movement, died by his own hand; Colonel Testa was struck with apoplexy. Not a few of the land officers refused to part with Pepe, and shared his fortunes beyond the Po.

There was no lack of men, however, who prized their commission above all other considerations.

CHAPTER IV.

Campaign of Lombardy—Position of Charles Albert—Sardinian Army—Attack of the Bridges on the Mincio—Combat at Goito—Irresolution of Charles Albert—Affair of Pastrengo—Political and diplomatic Difficulties—Germany—France—England—Disposition of men's minds in Italy—Battle of St. Lucia—Strictures on this first stage of the Lombard Campaign.

MORE than in any other human affair is there a tide in political vicissitudes. There are eternal limits set upon the ebb and flow of popular passions: no chance of success—no headway—except by sailing with it.

Every political movement implies a certain amount of self-denial on the part of the multitude; the sacrifice of numberless private interests, inclinations, and pursuits. On the first abatement of popular excitement, self regains its ascendancy—all the more irresistible from the natural law of reaction. The citizens and heroes of to-day are mere men to-morrow: the people's voice has ceased to roar omnipotent: the people is not only silent—it is no longer in existence—at least, nowhere to be found.

In Italy, in March 1848, the national feeling—blind instinct as it was with the many—had been

more than a match for all existing powers. It had forced four of the Italian princes along with it: it had perplexed, struck dumb, European diplomacy: it had strained—all but snapped—the chains of what is revered as fate among nations.

Only two months later the Italian nation was no more. Of those four princes, one threw himself on the ground at Rome, and, unable to do more, offered all the resistance of passive inertia; another, in Tuscany, was ready, though with greater cautiousness, to follow the same course; whilst a third, the most utterly despised of the number, ventured on an open outbreak with the people, and, by a single stroke, annihilated it.

It was not merely a prince that deserted the national cause in Southern Italy: out of seven millions of souls, the kingdom of Naples hardly supplied one combatant for the War of Independence,—after the 15th of May hardly subscribed one farthing. It could not be the king's might that put a check on all individual enthusiasm; volunteers would have been suffered, as they had actually been suffered, to march, either singly or in masses. But the Neapolitan people had vanished. The 15th of May had thrown it into consternation and stupor: to that, again, apathy and inertia had succeeded; more fatal, more hopeless, because more habitual. The leaders of the multitude were still astir, indeed, but most of them had lost sight of the main object; engaged in a hopeless struggle against local evils,—in some instances, too, strange to say, almost unconsciously won over to the views of the author himself of those evils.

With the exception of those scanty subsidies which

Rome and Tuscany had no power to recall, Sardinia was, therefore, alone in the war. Sardinia had come forth in a body—compact—with one mind. Round the king were mustered soldier and citizen, priest and student; all that could bear arms—all that the limited resources of the kingdom could provide for.

Had the three other Italian states taken an equal share with Charles Albert—had the archduke and the Bourbon—had the pope especially—given the national cause only the support of their countenance—had they taken the cross for Italy, it were needless to say, not only that the result could not for one moment have been doubtful, but that, on the very field of victory, the princes would have settled the matters of their league, and shared among them the enemy's spoil, on such fair terms as would have removed all sources of future jealousy and contention.

But, alone as he was left, Charles Albert might still have been equal to the task: and it is of importance for us to examine the causes which conspired to do away with the odds so decidedly in his favour.

Those causes must be looked for in the lack of generalship, of energy and decision, on the part of the king himself, and of order and discipline on that of his host; in the mistrust and jealousy, or else mad infatuation, or else, again, blind supineness, of the people he came to deliver; in the unsuspected vitality, in the manifold resources of the power he came to attack; and more in the genius—temporising by turns, and by turns daring and dashing—of the man that wielded that power; finally, in the checks put upon the king's movements by diplomatic advisers—short-sighted the wisest

of them—pusillanimous—unequal to the complication and suddenness of those portentous events, only calculated to harass and paralyse him in the hour of success, unable to extricate him in sudden disasters.

The appearance of the Sardinian army on the field of battle was fatally, perhaps, but inevitably, calculated to change the very nature of the national struggle. The operations of the regular troops put an end to the desultory exploits of insurrectionary warfare. It was said that the king, and the Milan government in his interest, discouraged the arming of volunteers. This is true only in part. The Griffini company, the free corps from Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, besides the students' legions from Turin and Genoa, became, from the very opening of hostilities, an integral part of the Sardinian army, and shared all its triumphs and reverses.

Still the great mass of volunteers, especially Lombards, were looked upon as a mere encumbrance by the Piedmontese generals. It was a weapon they ill knew how to wield. By its very organisation the Sardinian army had absolutely no officers to spare for the drilling of these untutored auxiliaries. The few that were set to the ungrateful task failed signally: wedded to barrack routine, they could and would understand nothing of the eccentric manoeuvres of party warfare. Possibly, also, some of those volunteers were wild and unmanageable: wilful, expensive, troublesome, quarrelsome. Such is the nature of those combatants all the world over. But in this particular case there were many reasons to make their conceit intolerable—their ambition insatiable. They were most of them the heroes of the

"Five Days" of Milan; or men, at least, that strove hard to identify themselves with that great achievement. They thought that all had been done—or, at least, that enough had been done for their part; they seemed inclined to leave the mere drudgery of what all thought would prove an uneventful war to the Piedmontese, who were paid for it; and yet, at the same time, they looked upon them with a vague jealousy, as if they grudged them the too easy laurels that Lombard blood had ripened, and as if apprehensive of the high price the royal leader of those mercenaries might put upon his tardy and insignificant services.

They had routed Radetzky: to the Piedmontese was left the comparatively safe and easy task of unearthing him. They persisted in looking upon themselves as a self-emancipated, not a rescued, people; and were very loud in their vindication of the inalienable right they had now so bravely re-asserted, of disposing of themselves at their own pleasure.

They raked up old grievances against the person of the king; who, whatever might be thought of the past, was now irretrievably committed, and staked his all on what might yet prove a hazardous game.

This was the case with the whole mass of the Lombard population. Pavia, Lodi, Crema, the first towns occupied by the Piedmontese, received them in silence. Nothing was heard at Milan, nothing was chalked on its walls, but the eternal old Guelphic cry of "*Viva Pio Nono!*" there was not one cheer for the monarch who was only anxious to shed every drop of blood for the common cause.

It took no little trouble to well-meaning patriots to

get up a little show of enthusiasm in behalf of the Piedmontese ; but every demonstration was slow, and by no means spontaneous.

Not a few of the Milanese who took up arms, consequently, far from wishing to afford the Piedmontese a help that they could by no possibility want, were only anxious to prevent the ready-made victory from being too utterly and exclusively their own ; only anxious to go hand-in-hand with them, with an emulation which, however questionable its motives, might have been happy in its effects.

But with men actuated by such jealousies, the royal instructors sent to command them could by no possibility be popular. The army and the free corps required a separate action : fortunately, the nature itself of the War of Independence seemed to point out to each party its proper sphere ; they might both march to the same goal without crossing each other's path.

The campaign was scarcely opened, when it was tacitly understood that the volunteers should take upon themselves the defence of the passes of the Alps, whilst the regular army should undertake the reduction of the fortresses.

The arrangement was less a matter of choice than of necessity, since it soon became apparent that the Sardinian army was anything but equal to both tasks ; and as the danger from the Alps seemed as yet remote, and that from the fortresses instant, hopes were entertained that the work of the army might be completed, ere the enemy could muster sufficiently strong on the borders to require a greater effort than the volunteer bands were able to make to keep him in check.

It was from the fortresses only that serious apprehensions were at first entertained. In the same breath as they assured him of the utter demoralisation of Radetzky's forces, and of their inability to take the open field, the deputations from the towns of Asola, Gazzoldo, Bozzolo, and other insignificant places, came almost daily to throw themselves at the feet of Charles Albert, representing the danger of their houses and homesteads, and urging upon him the necessity of putting a stop to the predatory sallies on the part of the garrisons of those dreaded strongholds.

The soft-hearted king dismissed none of them unheard; he suffered their importunities to prevail over his judgment. The plan of his campaign was forced upon him. The siege of the fortresses seemed then to him, no less than to all men, a matter of immediate necessity.

Those who were, and are, still determined to find fault with the slowness of the king's movements—and we must bow to their sentence, out of deference to the superiority of their military judgment, especially as some of them were anything but unfriendly to Charles Albert's memory, and their evidence is above suspicion*—did not, perhaps, sufficiently calculate the nature of the difficulties he had to contend with. Since his own share was to be not an insurrectionary but a regular war, since what was expected of him was the systematic

* "The Turin cabinet was forcibly dragged to this course—the very safety of the monarchy was at stake; but there was some moments' hesitation, and the delay was fatal at a time when daring would have been prudence, and foolhardiness wisdom."—*Custoza*, "*Insurrection et Campagne d'Italie en 1848*," Turin, 1850, p. 33.

demolition of those material obstacles against which the mere impetuosity of popular fury had proved to be of no avail, it was of the greatest moment that he should not make his appearance without an apparatus of material strength equal to the arduous task. In defiance of all pre-established opinions, we hold that the declaration of the 23d of March was made in obedience to hasty, improvident suggestions, and must, in a military point of view, be looked upon as premature. We contend that all that could be distinctly known at Turin on that day was Radetzky's retreat from Milan; the victory of the national party at Venice could by no possibility have reached that court, and had it reached it, might have been classed, from sheer improbability, amongst those absurd rumours of the fall of Mantua, of the thousands in arms from Switzerland, &c., which only puzzled the king's council, and made them doubt the authenticity even of positive facts. It was, however, in the midst of all this perplexity that the die was cast. And yet, even after the irretrievable step was taken—full six days after—all the king could muster around him at Pavia was a force of five-and-twenty thousand men; and as late as the 13th of April he had nothing with him but field-artillery wherewith to make his first attempt on Peschiera.

The Sardinian army, upon which all the princes of the House of Savoy since their restoration in 1814, and that ill-fated Charles Albert above all others, had bestowed so great a care,—on whose good *ténue*, mien, and countenance they had plumed themselves, was, however, at the best, only intended for defensive warfare. Piedmont, in its best days a second-rate power,

could only be expected to enter the field as an auxiliary ; in which case it would only have to supply its contingent, relying for generalship, no less than for more solid resources, on that among its mightier allies whose side it deemed it expedient to take. The idea, not only of entering the lists with Austria, but even of taking the field alone, would, in any normal state of things, have been scouted as preposterous ; and no preparations had ever been seriously made with that view.

We shall waste no words in praise of the gallantry of the Sardinian troops, especially of those taken from Savoy and Piedmont, as friends and enemies have equally borne witness to it. The men were not only steady and resolute in sight of danger, but also long-enduring and cheerful under privations and hardships. There was a liveliness and good-humour among these "merry men" worthy of the French campaigners of the old republican school, ready to put a good countenance on the gloomiest aspect of things. They were sadly off, to say the truth, on the score of discipline ; but its want was made up for by a ready willingness and eager zeal, no less than by an easy dependence on, and rather familiar attachment to, their officers. These latter, chosen with obvious partiality from the aristocratic orders, were modest men, well-bred, and well-principled, keenly alive to feelings of duty and honour, thoroughly free from bravado and boasting. Excessive spruceness, ermine-like exclusiveness and fastidiousness, might be discernible amongst them, but nothing like *morgue* and superciliousness. They had been somewhat too long estranged from their soldiers during the dissipations of garrison life, but they had not been

three days on the march ere a mutual good will—a kind of family compact—had bound them to their men. Not much of the effeminacy and languor consequent on Italian idleness and sensuality was to be seen here.

The Piedmontese have sometimes been called the English of Italy: by their love of horses, by their earnestness of manners, high-breeding, and gentlemanly behaviour, the Sardinian officers certainly resembled men of the same calling in England, rather than those of any other army on the Continent.

The ultra-liberals of Lombardy affected to find fault with the aristocratic pride of these officers, and with their lack of patriotic zeal. The Savoyards were certainly strangers to Italy, and could be actuated by no enthusiastic devotion to its cause. But they had embraced it with no less ardour, notwithstanding, out of the finest spirit of chivalrous adventure, out of mere professional amateurship; the very darkest ingratitude cannot charge them with having been chary of their blood for its sake.

On the 29th of March, at Pavia, the king had only three divisions with him, amounting altogether to 23,000 men; the army was not complete before the end of April, when it numbered about 60,000 men, 6500 horses, and 120 cannon. To these must be added 5000 Tuscan volunteers and regular troops, and 3000 men from Parma and Modena. Altogether it may be questioned if Charles Albert had, at any time, more than 70 to 75,000 men under his immediate orders. The 5000 Lombard volunteers in the Tyrol, and, perhaps, as many Venetians in the Julian Alps,

together with the 17,000 Romans under Ferrari and Durando, were intended for frontier war, and seldom acted in combination with the Sardinian forces.*

The pride of the army was its horse and artillery; the cavalry was not on the war-footing at the outbreak of hostilities, and was always imperfectly mounted. It consisted only of six regiments, all armed with long and rather ponderous lances. The artillery was faultlessly equipped, and well trained; and it opposed sixteen-pounders against the Austrian pieces, which only carried twelve pounds.

The *bersaglieri*, also, or sharpshooters, of which

* The Piedmontese army consisted of ten brigades of infantry:—

1. Guards—Four battalions, grenadiers, and two of chasseurs.
2. Savoy—1st and 2d infantry regiments.
3. Piedmont—3d and 4th „
4. Aosta—5th and 6th „
5. Cuneo—7th and 8th „
6. Queen's—9th and 10th „
7. Casale—11th and 12th „
8. Pinerolo—13th and 14th „
9. Savona—15th and 16th „
10. Acqui—17th and 18th „

The cavalry of six regiments, each five squadrons, about eight hundred horses:—

- | | |
|--------------------|------------|
| 1. Royal Piedmont. | 4. Novara. |
| 2. Genoa. | 5. Nizza. |
| 3. Savoy. | 6. Aosta. |

The artillery of twelve batteries, of eight pieces.

The army was divided into three corps: the first, commanded by Lieutenant-general Bava; the second by Sonnaz; the third, reserve, by the Duke of Savoy. The cavalry under General Visconti; the artillery under the Duke of Genoa. See Willisen's "*Italienische Feldzug*," p. 41; "*Guerra dell' Indipendenza*," p. 26; Custozza, "*Insurrection et Campagne de 1848*," p. 42; Ferrero, "*Campaign of Lombardy*," p. 3.

there were only two battalions, armed with a rifle of new invention, were, to say the least, a match for the best tirailleurs from Styria or the Tyrol.

The Piedmontese infantry might, also, have been as good as any in Europe, but for some defects in its organisation. The men are generally small, but broad-chested, muscular, healthy, and active. They are drilled to a greater rapidity of movements than the Germans, and to a greater precision than the French. Their fire is well-aimed, but they are thought to be "not fond of close action, unable to stand, much less to repulse, a bayonet attack." This, however, in the estimation of their enemies.*

The organic fault in the infantry to which we allude results from its mode of recruitment. The conscription binds them to sixteen years' service. They are, however, only fourteen months under arms, during which period they are made to go through all their drilling, and are then sent home for the remainder of their time, under liability to be called out as a reserve on any emergency. As a reserve they do not form a separate body, but are made to join their respective regiments, and to take their place in the ranks with their comrades already in active service. This system—analogue to, and grounded upon, that of the Prussian landwehr, though it has the apparent advantage of doubling the forces of the state on the shortest notice—has, however, also the effect of bringing under the standards men unfitted for arms by long desuetude, by domestic ties, and family cares and concerns. The

* Hackländer, "Soldaten-leben im Kriege," Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1849, p. 193.

number of officers also becomes inadequate to the sudden filling up of their *cadres*, upon a transition from the peace to the war-footing. Those evils were not much felt at the opening of the campaign, and during the excitement of a triumphal march; but as the difficulties of the undertaking became apparent, and the length of the campaign obvious, nothing contributed to the disorganisation of the Piedmontese battalions more than the weariness and home-sickness of the husbands and fathers that had been too freely admitted into their ranks.

The horse and artillery are, to a great extent, free from similar inconvenience, hence their superior steadiness and higher sense of duty.

So much for the body of the army: the soul of it was nowhere to be found. Once out of their snug quarters of Alessandria, Genoa, or Turin, away from their annual muster-field of Cirié, the Sardinian generals, together with their royal commander-in-chief, seemed to have lost the very rudiments of strategy. With utter improvidence had they set out without maps, without knowledge of a country so near to their own, with the utmost confusion in their commissariat. Never before was army more sorely tried by hunger during a career of success. Orders were issued without number; but as a wag of a staff-officer once coolly observed, "there was always something stronger than even a king's order, and that was Disorder." On the very first start a detachment of the vanguard, encamped at Marcaria, on the road to Mantua, on the left bank of the Oglio, and only a few miles from the great fortress, was caught napping at three o'clock in the

morning by a squadron of Hulans and some companies of Tyrolese sharpshooters, which had sallied forth from Mantua in the dark. There was no great harm done, besides the killing of three or four men, and the capturing of seven or eight of the fine lancers of the Genoa regiment; but it was an earnest of the slovenly manner in which the war was conducted by the king's generals, and of the enemy's readiness to profit by their oversights* (April 6).

Notwithstanding all the disadvantages we have hitherto noticed, and in spite of that first rebuke, the army advanced in the very best spirit of gallantry, burning with impatience to come up with the enemy.

This only took place on the banks of the Mincio, nearly a fortnight after the march had begun. The king had his head-quarters at Lodi on the 30th, when he heard that Radetzky had taken up his position at Montechiari, the muster-field of the Austrians in the spring of every year, and had there entrenched himself. Instead of attacking the enemy in front, the king pursued his march along the Po, through Crema, Cremona, Bozzolo, and Asola, to Castiglione delle Stiviere, where he had his camp on the 8th of April. Radetzky had hastened to leave his strong position, and retired across the Mincio, leaving only a rear-guard on the banks of the river, which made semblance of a determination to dispute the passage. The Piedmontese made, on the 8th of April, a first attack upon Goito, and on the 10th and 11th at Borghetto and Monzanbaqo, everywhere with signal success. Goito, a small town on the right

* " *Guerra dell' Indipendenza d' Italia*," Turin, 1850, p. 31.

bank, was defended by the Wohlgemuth brigade, and by a few companies of riflemen, who had fortified the houses and barricaded the streets. The brigade retired upon Borghetto, up the river, also on the right bank ; but the sharpshooters defended themselves with great obstinacy, and had to be driven from house to house, after a combat of four hours. They then withdrew across the river, endeavouring, but clumsily, to blow the bridge in the air ; so clumsily that one of the parapets was left standing, and upon that the Piedmontese crossed the river, in spite of a sharp fire from the enemy. Once on the left bank they were masters of the position, and the Austrians fell back upon Mantua.

This first encounter, in which only part of the first division was engaged, and in which the *bersaglieri*, the *Real navi*, or marines, and the volunteers of the Griffini company, chiefly distinguished themselves, was hailed throughout Italy as a brilliant victory, and certainly reflected sufficient lustre on the valour of troops who had never before seen fire. The "Vienna Gazette"* did not fail, nevertheless, to describe that feat of arms as an Austrian victory ; whilst other Austrian authorities contend that it never was Radetzky's intention to dispute the passage of the Mincio, and even that the Tyrolese fought at Goito against the express orders of the marshal.† If, however, it was the marshal's intention to avoid all collision with the Piedmontese, surely his wisest plan would have been to abandon the

* "Wiener Zeitung," April 14.

† Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 42 ; Pimodan, "Souvenirs de la Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes," Aug. 1850, p. 636.

right bank altogether, and limit himself to the demolition of all the bridges.*

The positions of Goito, as well as Monzanbano and Borghetto, where also some skirmishing took place, were held by a division of 11,000 Austrians. Of the Piedmontese, only the divisions D'Arvillars and Broglia took part in the action. That useless show of resistance only gave the enemy good reason to boast of a first success, and it was not easy to dream at the time that it entered into the marshal's plans to be beaten.

It was very questionable as yet, whether he could place any reliance on his soldiers for an open engagement. Twenty-four of his Italian soldiers crossed over to the enemy in the very heat of the affair at Goito. Eight-and-thirty of his more trusty men were taken prisoners, and a field-piece was abandoned. On their own side the Piedmontese had to lament the loss of two young officers, and about fifty men. The colonel of the *bersaglieri*, La Marmora, and Maccarani, of the marines, were wounded.

Master of the three bridges of Goito, Monzanbano, and Borghetto, Charles Albert ordered Valleggio to be occupied. It was evacuated by the Austrians on the 11th. The king advanced his head-quarters to Volta.

Faithful to his plan of shutting up the enemy, as far as could be practicable, within his fortresses, anxious also to test the truth and correctness of the exaggerated reports current throughout Lombardy, concerning the utter demoralization of the Austrians, and the readi-

* Custozza, "Campagne de 1848," p. 39.

ness on the part of the population of the beleaguered cities to co-operate with any attack from without, Charles Albert resolved upon his attempts against Peschiera and Mantua, which had no other object than mere reconnoitering.

He had at the time no proper artillery for a siege, and it was only, as we have seen, with field-pieces, that he opened his fire on Peschiera, on the 13th of April: after a very harmless cannonade of a few hours, he summoned the garrison to surrender—an intimation which was treated with all the contempt it deserved.

At Mantua the enemy had still his advanced posts at Le Grazie and Rivalta, whence he harassed the country with frequent excursions. Those positions were attacked with four columns, each 3000 men strong, on the 19th. They had, however, been given up by the enemy on the first approach of the Sardinians, who proceeded unchallenged till under the very cannon of the fortress. The Austrians opened then their fire upon the assailers, and even ventured upon repeated sallies, which were steadily repulsed. The Sardinians, having thus given the Mantuans all the chance in their power for a rise, resolved upon a retreat, which was executed in the best order, notwithstanding the harassing attacks of the enemy.

These manœuvres, which in a military point of view have justly been styled ridiculous, had, however, the good effect of making the Sardinian rulers aware of the real nature of their position, and to set a correct value on the extent of their enterprise. By that time, it is well known, Radetzky had operated his junction

with D'Aspre at Verona, and had at least 50,000 men under his command. The archduke Victor and General Nugent were collecting a reserve on the frontier of the Isonzo. The fortresses were all well victualled, and in the very best order of defence. A communication with Vienna, through the Tyrol, continued uninterrupted to the end of the war, on the left bank of the Adige. Nothing more was to be hoped from the disorganisation of the Austrian army. The officers were loud in their demonstrations of almost romantic loyalty, at Mantua and Verona. They declared that, had even the revolutionary government at Vienna thought of yielding up Lombardy, they would never disgrace their arms by surrendering; they would blow the fortress into the air; they would perish sword in hand; they would sell the victory at the highest rate.* The soldiers, on the other hand, were held to their banners by sheer exasperation and despair. Austrian discipline had already regained its wonted ascendancy. The marshal was hailed by the name of "Vater Radetzky;" the regiment had become the soldier's family, the camp his country.†

With 50,000 men of this temper, Radetzky might, at the end of April, have considered himself, even on the open field, a match for all Charles Albert's 70,000 combatants; but within four fortresses of the very first order, upon his own ground—a marshy ground intersected by deep streams and canals, ill suited to rapid

* Pimodan, "*Guerre d'Italie*," p. 636.

† Pimodan, as above, 638.—Willisen's "*Italianische Feldzug*," p. 69.

movements, especially of horse and artillery—a ground with every inch of which he was thoroughly familiar, and upon which his adversary moved as if blind-folded, he had a decided advantage, of which it is only surprising that both parties remained so long unaware.

There seems to be no great sense in comparing Charles Albert's campaign of 1848 with that of Bonaparte in 1796. The French came as conquerors, the Sardinians not even so much as liberators, but rather as protectors and defenders. The republican general of 1796, who made war at the expense of the Italians, little scrupulous as to the damage his own troops occasioned, was not likely to trouble himself about the injuries the enemy might inflict on the provinces he left behind: he marched straight to his object, only anxious to come up with the Austrian for a decisive grapple. Charles Albert came to shut up an enemy who had already, it was then fancied, been beaten off the field. Radetzky was not to be attained, except within strongholds Don Quixote himself could not have ventured to take by storm. Bonaparte had to deal with one only of those four fortresses, and Mantua had not even then all the strength it received from subsequent works. Free in his movements all over the Lombard plain, he had no hesitation in leaving that one citadel in its rear: one after another he confronted four armies that crossed the Alps to its rescue. He routed them, and suffered their scattered remnants to withdraw into that their only refuge. When the Austrians could no longer take the field, the fortress fell of itself.

But Charles Albert could only advance through the

very middle of that formidable quadrangle. The inaccessible enemy could equally fall upon him on all sides. From one to the other of the fortresses was only a short night's march. The Austrian was as much invisible as he was intangible: owing to lack of prompt information on the part of the stupified Veronese population, there was never an instance of Charles Albert's positive knowledge of the marshal's movements.

Had the king possessed genius and daring, had he left Peschiera and Mantua, and the line of the Mincio behind him, strongly occupied the passes of the Tyrol, and checked Nugent in his first onset on the Venetian provinces, as many find it easy, after the event, to advise, he might have come to some great result; but he would undoubtedly have suffered the 50,000 men of Verona and Mantua to run riot upon the Lombard provinces. Cremona, Lodi, and Brescia, were in constant alarm. Milan itself was not safe. The same hand that struck Vicenza, and before that other cities of the Venetia, would not have met with greater resistance on the part of defenceless Lombardy. Only, in that case, Charles Albert would have put Radetzky in his rear; and although he might have prevented the junction of Nugent with the marshal, he would no less have placed himself between those two enemies, and exposed himself to a double attack, if Nugent had at length assembled a sufficient force for a decisive stroke.

As matters turned out, there was certainly no safety except in the most uncompromising, inconsiderate daring. But such were not the calculations with which the campaign was undertaken: the king could hardly escape the universal delusion. He also felt that Fate

had done all, and that only as much activity was required on the part of its chosen instrument as might complete the victory at the least possible cost.

In a blind anxiety to save all, all was lost. Up to the end of April, also, the danger from the Alps appeared remote and insignificant. Nugent had no more than five or six thousand men, and those, it was said, not in the best plight or order. Zucchi was thought more than sufficient to keep him in check with his volunteers at Palmanova; the Neapolitans under Pepe were also ready to cover Venetia; the Romans of Ferrari and Durando might be better employed in the blockade of Mantua; and the combined efforts of the Sardinian and Sicilian squadrons ought certainly to have given some uneasiness to an enemy that marched along the coast.

The defection of the King of Naples, the endless delays of the Roman expedition, the Papal encyclic of the 19th April, entered into no man's views. Venice was, of course, impregnable, and her territories did not seem seriously exposed. The king's own field of operations was, therefore, Lombardy; the four fortresses his own share of the war.

This is no time for us to examine the political question; but it should be kept in mind that Venice was a republic, and had recourse, by preference, to republican aids.

But, even upon the ground of his own choice, it is said the king might have done better than to ride irresolutely from one to another of those four citadels, and idly patrol around them. Had the king possessed intelligence equal to his position, a more daring course

was most assuredly open before him. He should have made abstraction of either Lombardy or Venice. He should have called upon the cities of either province, to warn them of the necessity of shifting for themselves. He should have perpetuated the insurrection, given it the utmost spread. He should have taken the Italians at their own words, put their proud boastings of self-sufficiency to the test. He should have bid the youths of the cities to stand to their barricades, suffered the enemy to trouble their slumbers by constant alarms. Regardless of them, he should have taken up his position astride the Adige above Verona, kept all his host compact and in full array, and hence watched the enemy's movements, ready to charge upon him on his first breaking loose, and to cut him off from his shelter.

The boldest manœuvres are often the safest: they are always sure of the world's applause.* But such a plan of operations would not only have required a power of combination of which the king and his generals proved themselves sorrowfully destitute, it would have demanded a swiftness and steadiness of movement of which the Sardinian army was found incapable—above all, it would have relied on a zeal and devotedness, on

* Willisen ("Italianische Felszug," p. 69) thus ably sums up the arguments which should have made the necessity for some decisive stroke imperious on Charles Albert:—"He should have felt that it was here a question of brave and rapid deeds; that only a heroic struggle with few words, and not many vain-glorious words with few deeds, would give him some kind of right to introduce an innovation in history, which, to call things by their right name, had begun with treachery and sudden aggression:" that is, rapid success could have hallowed the treason and reconciled the world to a breach of what the world calls "the law of nations."

the part of the Lombards, of which their Venetian brethren, placed in analogous circumstances, gave but indifferent examples.

Charles Albert was no man for such heroic conceptions. He followed the war in his own plodding way, and having now received sufficient reinforcements, resolved upon the investment of Peschiera.

This was the first fortress in his path ; and it was already blockaded on the west. Peschiera lies on both banks of the Mincio, on the very spot where that stream issues from the Garda lake. The lake itself was in the power of the Italians, whose gun-boats and steamers cut off all communication by water. Between the lake and the Adige is a range of hills, the last outskirts of the Montebaldo, constituting a strong position which has always played a main part in all Italian warfare. Radetzky still held this position with 20,000 men. The King of Sardinia attacked it with 25,000. He crossed the Mincio on the 26th and 27th of April, and advanced as far as Villafranca. The heights of Custoza, Somma-Campagna, and Sona were occupied without resistance. Not so the hills of Colà, Sandrà, and St. Giustina, where the enemy had fortified himself, and whence he was only driven after various engagements. The way was thus open for a decisive attack on Piovezzano and Pastrengo, the key of the whole position, where the Austrians made mien of holding out to the last. They were under the orders of General Wocher, and had, according to their own accounts,* only the brigades

* Willisen's " *Italianische Feldzug*," p. 42; Pimodan, " *Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes*," Aug. 1850, p. 659. Radetzky's own account, however (" *Wiener Zeitung*," May 6, 1848), coincides

spread the alarm on the Tuscan and other troops that blockaded it, on the sides of Le Grazie and Governolo, on the following day. The engagement, in short, took place along the whole line, but the Austrians were nowhere strong enough to obtain the slightest advantage.

During this combat, in which the Piedmontese, notwithstanding the advantageous position of the enemy, suffered but trifling losses, several deeds of heroism occurred which augured well for the results of further operations. The young Marquis Bevilacqua, from Brescia, who had only on the eve of the battle joined the cavalry regiment, Royal Piedmont, carried away by his ardour, dashed forward alone against a battalion of retreating Croats, to pluck the banner from the hands of its bearer. He fell, pierced by a hundred bayonets. The Austrian officer who describes this deed,* adds, that it struck with awe and admiration his brother officers, who rejoiced at the idea of having to contend with such foes.†

* Pimodan, as above, p. 640.

† It cannot enter our purpose to give particulars of this nature. Lest, however, we should be suspected of partiality to Bevilacqua on account of his title, we subjoin the following:—

"A scouting party were preparing to make an entrance into a farm-house, where several Croats had taken refuge, when the under-lieutenant, Cocatrix, an intrepid officer, advanced first to force the door. He was just accomplishing this perilous task, when a soldier named Benoit Carrier, a native of Pont Beauvoisin, held him back and threw himself before him. At the moment the door gave way under his effort, he fell dead, wounded in the chest with three shots, exclaiming, 'I am content to have saved the life of my officer.'"—*Ferrero's "Campaign of Lombardy,"* London, 1850, p. 34. For anecdotes of this nature read this writer, and the "*Guerra dell' Indipendenza d'Italia*," written by a Piedmontese officer. Turin, 1850.

The Parmesans, both regular and volunteers, but all equally novices in the art of war, who had but lately joined the army (April 23d), gave signal proofs of gallantry in these encounters.

The king, who had been unwilling to push on to Verona on the evening of the combat of Pastrengo, limited himself to the occupation of the strong positions on the left side of the Adige. The detachments sent to reconnoitre found that district completely cleared by the enemy, who had withdrawn from Bussolengo and Pontone, and removed the bridges to the right bank. Some slight skirmishing near Pontone and Rivoli, on the 5th of May, completed the operations of the Sardinians on that side, and extended their forces from the Po to the Montebaldo, along a line of about fifty miles. This absurd state of things could lead to no harm so long as the Austrians were unable to take the field with effect; but when Radetzky was superior even in numbers, he found the king's army like the loose bundle of rods which he was allowed to break one by one.

It is possible that this tardiness and irresoluteness of the king's movements proceeded merely from mental helplessness and lack of moral courage; but there were also evil agencies at work, which in no slight degree contributed to disturb his plans and retard his course.

Three days only after the fight at Pastrengo, General Broglia, who was at Bussolengo with a strong division, had orders to throw a bridge on the Adige two or three miles above that position.* That was certainly a sig-

* The writer of these pages, who was at the head-quarters of General Broglia with the Parmesan volunteers, can testify to the correctness of this assertion.

nificant step, and must have been followed by a general decisive move. On the following day, not only was no bridge made, but the position itself of Bussolengo had been suddenly abandoned. Two days later the king turned all his forces against Verona, and ventured on his sanguinary attack of St. Lucia (May 6th).

Charles Albert, it must be remembered, had not only declared war to Austria, but had involved himself into difficulties with the whole of Europe. The Prussian and Russian ministers had quitted Turin, together with their Austrian colleague. France professed herself no friend of kings at the time: it was, in reality, no friend to Italy, whether monarchical or republican, if united and powerful. So late as the 11th of April, Lord Palmerston was still thundering from London, through his agents, Lord Napier at Naples, and Mr. Abercromby at Turin, against the flagrant violation of the sacred treaties of 1814; and treating the *levée des boucliers* of all Italy as an infringement of the law of nations.* It was only on the 8th of May that he seemed to have become aware of the uselessness of further remonstrances on the subject of the departure of volunteer bands for Lombardy.† The king's ministers at Turin warded off these importunate attacks as they best could, by the iteration of their specious arguments about the spread of republican views in Lombardy, and even throughout Piedmont and Genoa, which had driven the king to his warlike measures in self-defence; arguments which, wilfully taken to the

* Despatches, London, April 11th. "Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 307.

† "Correspondence," p. 415.

letter by men who might, however, have known how to set a right value upon them, were afterwards retorted against the king and his cabinet as evidence of their premeditated treachery to the Italian cause.*

Certainly the king and the royal party showed themselves but "men of little faith." They took up the national war with trepidation and misgiving. They put themselves at the head of a revolution with a vain hope to be able to legalise it. "To become king of Italy," Mazzini has said, "Charles Albert should have forgotten that he was king of Piedmont."† A more decided, more venturous course, would, at least, have been attended by a more glorious fall.

Success, we seriously believe, was almost altogether out of the question.

The panic of Austria was of no long duration. It was only for one day that the fortunes of the House of Habsburg were despaired of. The despatches of Lord Ponsonby, during the whole of that eventful April,‡ give

* See Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti," the first chapter throughout.

† Mazzini, *ibid.* p. 13.

‡ Lord Ponsonby, Vienna, April 2, 7, 10, and 16, "Corresp." pt. ii. pp. 290, 320, 342, 552. "There is in this city so much anger against the Italians, that crowds of men have already volunteered to serve with the Austrian army in Lombardy. The popular feeling has been so great that it has prohibited the Italian opera. The Hungarians being now content with what has been done by the Austrian government, have offered with eagerness to furnish the Imperial government with any number of men that can be wished for by that government. The Croatsians, &c., have also offered Count Ficquelmont any number of men for the same service." This on the 2d of April: it would be easy to multiply quotations to the same effect from all the subsequent despatches. See also, Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 69.

us a distinct idea of the state of the Austrian capital, no less than of its provinces. The indignation of the Viennese at the presumption of their despised Lombard vassals far exceeded their fears. There may have been titubation in the council, but there was none amongst the people. Volunteers, in great numbers, hastened to swell the ranks of Nugent: Styria mustered up under the old standard of "good" Archduke John. Tyrol, German Tyrol, appealed to the manes of Andreas Hofer, and called loudly to Germany for "powder and lead." The Italian portion of that province, we have seen, was either awed into silence by superior forces, or wearied with the exigencies, and in some instances insolence, rapacity, and violence of their Swiss and Lombard deliverers. Hungary and Croatia, then not yet at war between them, rivalled each other in their display of loyal devotion. They would suffer no constitutional innovation to interfere with the interests of the dynasty and the integrity of the monarchy. Austria could also count on her own Crusaders. The very ferment of men's minds throughout the empire redoubled her energies, and brought forth unexpected resources.

Behind Austria, Germany also ranged itself. The German press was loud in its denunciation of Italian high treason and Sardinian treachery: it was preparing the mind of the nation for that Frankfort assembly, so eager in the vindication of its claims of nationality against the weak, so overbearing in its pretensions against Holland and Denmark, and yet so haughty and scornful in its rejection of the humble petition of the members for South Tyrol, pleading their ties of tongue and race, and insisting upon their rights of withdrawing

from the Teutonic confederacy;—the Frankfort assembly, whose first act was the election of an Austrian prince to the rank of representative of the German empire—whose first resolutions were an identification of German with Austrian interests—whose first definition of its territorial limits was a gross encroachment on Italian lands, even to the Adige and Mincio!

All this English diplomacy did not fail to urge upon the consideration of the Sardinian king. It admonished him not to drive a fallen foe to extremity, not to enlist powerful Germany in a cause which Austria herself might, perhaps, have regarded as otherwise hopeless; to beware, above all things, of Russia, and of the issues of a general war; as a general war could not fail to place him, as well as Piedmont and Italy, at the mercy of other powers,—at the mercy of France.

It was not merely as a king, not merely as a Piedmontese, but especially as an Italian, that Charles Albert had reason to dread France, either as friend or foe.

He had scarcely set his foot on Lombard soil, when his rear was threatened by a band of desperadoes from Lyons invading his provinces beyond the Alps. The loyalty of his own Savoyards, the disorderly and cowardly behaviour of those assailers, was indeed sufficient to drive them back without recourse to armed force, or to very strong measures. But Lyons, the most riotous city of France, was roaring with vengeance on the report of their defeat. Thirty thousand workmen out of employ were ready to march to the rescue, and Savoy had no better protection against their wanton fury than their own want of means and unsteadiness of purpose; unless

reliance could be placed on the soothing words of the wise and temperate Emmanuel Arago.*

That storm had scarcely blown over, when more mature designs seemed to be entertained upon Italy by the provisional government of Paris, then busy at the creation of its "army of the Alps."

Those were not yet the days of Louis Napoleon, and the world had not yet learned to look with unconcern upon the condensation of sixty thousand Frenchmen on the frontier. The allusion to the exploits of their predecessors of 1796, in the proclamation of General Bourjoully,† could bode no good to the monarchy of Sardinia. Lamartine, it is true, spoke in a friendly, reassuring language; but he became at times enigmatical, and let out some ominous phrases about "the consideration he owed to France, and to what she would expect and require."‡ Lamartine had shown some disposition to go hand in hand with England for all that concerned Italy; he was generous enough to allow Italy all chances of fair play—"Laissez à l'enfant gagner ses éperons:" but he was always ready for an "armed" diplomatic interference on the first news of a Piedmontese reverse.

But how far did Lamartine's power extend? What

* See Lord Normanby's despatch, April 8, "Correspondence," part ii. p. 296.

† See the *Ordre du jour*, March 30, in "Correspondence," part ii. p. 265.

‡ See Lord Ponsonby's "Conversations with Lamartine, respecting the Affairs of Italy," April 24 and March 3. "Correspondence," part ii. pp. 378, 400.

were its chances of durability? Around him, behind him, were men of different tendencies,—men who held the rights of nationality fully as cheap as those of private property,—men whose evil passions would not have failed to set all Europe on fire, had they not been quenched in their own blood by the fearful executions of Cavaignac.

Up to the events of May and June, the French revolution presented itself under gigantic dimensions in the eyes of affrighted Europe. Its socialism and communism were as firmly expected to make the tour of the Continent as ever did the sansculottism of 1793. Sardinia, at the head of an insurrectionary movement, was, however, for the sake of its own respectability, of the sacredness of its cause, anxious to disavow all connexion with revolutionary France. How this could be effected without giving offence or provoking hostilities from that jealous power, was the problem in the solution of which Italian patriotism was lost.

Had the French of Ledru Rollin and his colleagues set their foot on Italian ground, no matter under what pretext, that was the signal for a general rush from Germany and Russia. In such a struggle of all powers of evil, it was easy enough to foresee what part was left for insignificant Piedmont and Lombardy to play. A European war would be to Italy only a renewal of all the horrors of Napoleon's campaigns.

To avert the evil, only two different and indeed opposite means suggested themselves; to push on the Lombard war with such vigour as to bring it to the speediest termination, or to limit it to such operations as would give the least possible provocation.

The counsellors of Charles Albert, most unfortunately, suggested the latter course.

A very rapid issue to the war, however, with the material obstacles of those impregnable fortresses, was not to be obtained by human efforts: Sardinia undertook the reduction of the fortresses, trusting that the rest of Italy, and especially her Roman and Neapolitan allies, should at the same time assume such an attitude at the frontiers as might impress Austria with the uselessness of further attempts, and bow her to the necessity of coming to terms.

To this plan Sardinia adhered with pusillanimous strictness. From March to August 1848, and later, Mr. Abercromby was absolute ruler at Turin. England meant all for the best, and played throughout the most honourable part; but it was fated that those dolorous events of 1848 should throw the coolest statesmen off their guards; that all of them should too soon come to the conclusion that all was over with Austria;* that

* "After the manner in which the Austrian troops have been expelled from Milan and other places, and have of their own accord evacuated several strong positions, there does not seem any reasonable ground for expecting that any attempts by Austria to reconquer Italy could be attended with success."—*Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby*, April 20, "*Correspondence*," part ii. p. 252. Nor was it the well-meaning Whig minister alone who thought so in England:—"Austria has fallen into a ruinous disorder, which, it seems but too probable, may prove fatal to the monarchy: it cannot be expected that a capital in the hands of a rabble of street depredators—students and half-crazy professors—acting under the instigation of foreign agitators, can command the obedience of tributary states, or reconquer the submission of revolted provinces."—*Quarterly Review*, clxv. p. 241. June 1848.

they should lend too willing an ear to her first proposals of almost unconditional surrender.

Diplomacy was too eager—was too soon allowed—to step in between the combatants. Charles Albert was too soon assured that enough had been done for the honour—more than enough for the safety—of Italy; that negotiation could now secure as fair and splendid terms as the most signal victory. Charles Albert should have suffered no diplomacy either in his camp or council. He should have ignored the under-hand managements of friends or foes. He should at least have remained true to the conviction, that peaceful negotiations are best sped by warlike successes.

Instead of this, he listened to the warnings of those who represented his inroad upon Lombardy as an enormous blunder,—who insinuated that it could only be repaired by lessening its magnitude and avoiding its worst consequences.

Austria was, above all things, vulnerable by sea. Inferior to Sardinia in naval forces, even in her normal state, she was now completely disabled by the loss of Venice, by the frequent defection of ships and mutinous disposition of her Italian crews, no less than a riotous spirit rife in her Illyrian provinces. She stood in dread of the Sardinian navy; and the greatest apprehensions were entertained, not only in the Imperial cabinet, but also in the city of Trieste, for the safety of the latter city.* The immediate presence of the Sardinian squadron in the Adriatic would not only have reassured

* Lord Ponsonby's despatches, April 4 and 5, "Correspondence," part ii. p. 306, 307; Consul Raven, Trieste, April 7, p. 337.

Venice, and all the sea coast, but would have retarded the operations of General Nugent upon the Isonzo, and turned his attention to the danger at home. The blockade of the Adriatic would have thrown the whole Austrian empire into utter distress; it would have cut off Austria and Hungary from the rest of the world.

But a blockade of that nature, prudence suggested, did not merely imply an interruption to Austrian trade; the blow would be severely felt throughout Germany and the north; England and France themselves were interested in the maintenance of a free intercourse by sea. Even had they limited themselves to a strict neutrality, they could not feel justified in hindering Russia from stepping forward for her own interests; and Russian interference would speedily overpower such forces as Sardinia, even in combination with Naples, could bring into action.

Consequently, as early as the 29th of March,* Mr. Abercromby had it in his power to announce, that the Sardinian government would abstain from hostilities against Austrian vessels, and issue no letters of marque; and although orders were given on the same day to equip three frigates, one brig, and one sloop of war, these measures were taken in conjunction with the armament of the harbour of Genoa, and were, or appeared to be, entirely of a defensive nature.

Soon after, on the 5th of April, the Marquis Pallavicini, Sardinian minister at Munich, was entering into secret negotiation with the Austrian chargé d'affaires,

* Despatch, "Correspondence," ii. 265. See also the acts of the Admiralty, in date April 24, "Correspondence," ii. p. 381.

Baron Brenner, and this through the intermediation of a Russian agent, for the purpose of "confining the contest between Austria and Sardinia to hostilities on the main land, and preserving the relations of maritime commerce between the two countries in their present state."*

This step, which so far committed the Sardinian government, and which was hailed by the Austrian cabinet as "a first step in a better direction" on the part of Charles Albert, was, however, justly attributed by them to the "proceedings of her Britannic majesty's minister at Turin."

It was owing to the same sinister influence that the Sardinian squadron, which was made ready on the 28th of March, only sailed from Genoa on the 27th of April. Even then its operations were understood to be merely of a defensive character; and its forces were to be divided, so as to extend their protection to the merchant vessels of Sardinia no less in the eastern seas than in the Adriatic.† Austria, meanwhile, had so far presumed upon the forbearance and inactivity of her enemy as to publish a decree for the blockade of Venice, on the 30th of April, and her fleet actually made its appearance before the lagoons on the 6th of May.‡ It was

* See the letter of Baron Brenner to Count Ficquelmont, dated Munich, April 5, "Correspondence," part ii. p. 397.

† Abercromby, Turin, April 27; and the Proclamation of the Sardinian consul at Venice, April 20, "Correspondence," part ii. pp. 395, 401.

‡ See Lord Ponsonby, Vienna, May 1; and the Proclamation published at Trieste, May 3, "Correspondence," part ii. pp. 406, 440. The blockade of Venice was understood to date from April 23.

only on the 23d of the same month that the Sardinian squadron operated its junction with the Neapolitan at Venice, and hence removed the field of hostilities to Trieste. Even then the ominous voice of England was raised to deprecate the fate of the devoted Trieste; a protest of all the foreign consuls in that port, and the positive instructions from Lord Palmerston, had put a bombardment out of the question.*

The same hand that paralysed the movements of Sardinia and her allies at sea, where the advantage was so decidedly on their side, kept an equally tight rein on the ardour of the land forces, which had much more serious material obstacles to overcome. From the very first moments of consternation into which the Milanese insurrection, the loss of Venice, and the total disorganisation of her empire had thrown her, Austria had, it seems, acknowledged the necessity of coming to terms. Her wary rulers were far from sharing the enthusiastic hopes of the aroused population, or from firmly relying on its support. In Lord Ponsonby's despatch of the 2d of April, we find the cabinet of Vienna inclined to listen to reason, and anxious to solicit the friendly medi-

* See the protest of the consular body at Trieste, May 23, and Lord Palmerston's despatch to Mr. Abercromby, May 31, pp. 537, 519. Also Mr. Abercromby, Turin, May 29, p. 533:—"I observed to the Marquis Pareto that a measure of this nature (the bombardment of Trieste) was a most questionable one, as it might afford a pretext for the armed interference of the German confederation in the question of the Italian War of Independence.

"I received from the Marquis Pareto positive assurances that no intention to bombard Trieste existed, nor had any orders been given for such a measure; the Sardinian government having been fully alive to the difficulties and complications to which an event of such a nature might possibly give rise."

ation of England: on the 4th, an official application was made for a suspension of hostilities, with a view to allow time for a mission of Count Hartig, who was forthwith to proceed to Lombardy with the "most liberal terms" from Austria to her rebellious subjects. Count Hartig, it seems, did not leave Vienna before the 10th; and his efforts did not extend beyond a proclamation, by which the Lombards were summoned to return to their allegiance.* Count Dietrichstein, however, did not fail to insist with Lord Palmerston, in London, on the 15th of April, in order that, by the good offices of England, Count Hartig's proceedings might be aided by an armistice between the belligerent parties. Lord Palmerston wrote in that sense to his agent at Turin, on the 17th. From the 22d to the 30th, Pareto was in the greatest perplexity, well knowing the utter impossibility of an armistice in the present condition of Italy, and yet at a loss for arguments with which to satisfy the English minister, and fearful of his displeasure if his well-meant and, in a diplomatic point of view, rational advice, should be met with by too flat a denial. Count Hartig's negotiation, however—even if it was not altogether a feint, even if Austria's object, from the very outset, was not merely to gain time—proved abortive from the sheer absurdity of his first steps; and Lord Palmerston, on the 3d of May, informs his agent at Vienna, that Sardinia would not listen to proposals of a truce made on such unrea-

* See the proclamation in the "Wiener Zeitung," April 22, 1848.

sonable conditions, adding his opinion, that the views taken of the matter by the Sardinian government appear to himself "correct."*

Nevertheless, although the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs must have considered himself as duped by Austria in this Hartig intrigue,—although the cabinet of Vienna, on the 1st of May, coolly assured Lord Ponsonby that they, after all, were by no means anxious for a suspension of hostilities, and left such matter entirely to the discretion of the marshal in command of their forces in Lombardy;† yet so earnest was his desire for peace, and so anxious his apprehensions of French interference, that, upon the strength of that at the time equally awful bugbear to all parties, he intimated on the 8th of May to Austria the actual necessity of a cession of her rights upon Lombardy to Sardinia, the desirableness of "encouraging and exhorting the Milanese to enter into communication with Hartig, with a view to settle the conditions upon which they should negotiate, either for a modified connexion with, or for an entire separation from, the Austrian empire."‡

Austria pretended to listen to such suggestions with deference, and on the 15th of the same month Baron Hummelauer was despatched to London to

* See Lord Palmerston to Mr. Abercromby, April 17, "Correspondence," part ii. p. 349; Mr. Abercromby to Lord Palmerston, April 30, p. 409; Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby, May 3, p. 401, &c. &c.

† Lord Ponsonby, May 1, "Correspondence," ii. p. 404.

‡ Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby, and to Mr. Abercromby, May 8, "Correspondence," ii. pp. 415, 416.

enter into the preliminaries of a negotiation that was continued throughout and after the war.*

As to Sardinia, we have no proof of any proposals for peace being made or accepted by her agents. The "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," presented to the Houses of Parliament on the 31st of July, 1849, "makes no mention of the political intrigues which the king's emissaries set on foot with England." This is asserted by Mazzini himself, who adds that "the Marquis Pallavicini was disavowed by his government, as having exceeded the limits of his mission," in his conference with Baron Brenner at Munich.†

But, on the one hand, it is impossible to suppose that the king and his advisers were not staggered in their warlike resolution by the constant repetition of the solemn and earnest remonstrances of the only friendly power they had left; and, on the other, there could be no doubt that rumours of these negotiations should not spread abroad, and that Austria should not find her interest in allowing her plans for a cession of Lombardy, implying a sacrifice of Venice, to transpire; and should not endeavour to represent Sardinia as privy to these proposals and well-disposed to agree to them.

Her schemes succeeded beyond her most sanguine

* Lord Ponsonby's despatches, May 12 and 15, "Correspondence," ii. p. 444, 466.

† Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti," pp. 65, 67. We may add also, that the Marquis Pareto being questioned, officiously, by Mr. Abercromby, as to the terms upon which Sardinia would come to an agreement with Austria, "distinctly stated, that the immediate and entire evacuation of Italy by Austrian troops would be the leading feature in any negotiation that might be commenced."—Mr. Abercromby, Turin, May 24th, "Correspondence," ii. p. 515.

expectation. As the sad blunders of that jobbing diplomacy got wind, they gave rise to the bitterest conjectures. The ominous word, "Campo formio!" resounded in every man's ears. Nothing else was heard, not in Venice merely, but at Milan, and in the very king's camp, from the very earliest April. Charles Albert, a second Bonaparte, was about to immolate Venice. He wished to secure half the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom to himself, at the expense of the other half. It was thus that Italy was to be baffled of her *sure* victory. All her endeavours for independence — now on the eve of crowning success—were to lead to no other results than to the gratification of Charles Albert's ambition. It was for this purpose alone that unprincipled king had taken the lead of the Italian movement, that he could paralyse it in its first irresistible impetus, and frustrate it in its aim.

Then came the implacable reflections on the past. What wonder? Had not the same king twice (1820, 1831) proved a traitor to his country's holiest hopes? His campaign of Lombardy would, in the end, only prove his third and darkest treason.

The inactive and dilatory nature of that most unfortunate war, upon which, as we see too obviously, diplomacy had cast its fatal spell, was but calculated to give ample consistency to these sinister rumours. Charles Albert had no other means of refuting them than to advance. His soldiers had been too long wearied and worried by marches and counter-marches. All their frugality and good humour were not proof against the bad quarters and worse fare they had invariably to put up with. As the heats of early spring began to be felt, disease no less than famine were

rapidly thinning their ranks, especially around the Mantuan marshes. Before the end of June the army had above six thousand invalids in the hospitals.* In their natural impatience of unprofitable hardships, they clamoured for an encounter with the enemy—the unattainable enemy. Charles Albert was just the general to allow his soldiers to take his councils by storm. The desperate attack on St. Lucia was nothing but a sacrifice the king and his generals were compelled to make to the improvident ardour of those ill-regulated troops.

An attack upon the Austrians under the walls of their most formidable stronghold, Verona, was an act of rashness, bordering on utter madness. The king, we are told, had some intelligence with the town which led him to expect not only the co-operation of the population (60,000 inhabitants) but also the defection of some of the enemy's troops, which were still said to number about 5000 Italians and 4000 mutinous Hungarians. A small number of Italians, twenty-seven men of the Haugwitz regiment, had, it is true, deserted on the 29th of April, on the eve of the affair of Pastrengo; but a whole battalion of those troops had been engaged on the open field on the day itself of the combat, and evinced anything but a friendly disposition to the Piedmontese. As to the people of Verona, though bitterly hostile to the Austrians,† and weary of the privations and exactions

* "Guerra dell' Indipendenza d' Italia," p. 29.

† Pimodan, "Souvenirs de la Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes," Aug. 1850, p. 645, gives a long description of the animosity of the Italian people throughout the country, and at Verona, especially among the women.

of a long siege, they were, as any man conversant with the position of that terrible fortress must be aware, in the utter impossibility of aiding the efforts of their deliverers. Any stir on their part would have led to a massacre and destruction from the surrounding forts, without the least hindrance to the troops engaged outside the walls. Radetzky had, we are told, taken the precaution of confining the citizens to their houses, and ordering them, under penalty of death, to leave doors and windows open throughout the day and night.*

The preparations of the Piedmontese were completed on the evening of the 5th of May, and early on the following day the whole army left its position on the hills of Somma Campagna and St. Giustina, and marched in four columns upon the enemy.

The Austrians had taken up their position outside the walls, on a long line extending from Chievo over Croce Bianca, St. Massimo, and St. Lucia, down to Tomba and Tombetta. The line was too long for the forces that they could bring upon the field; but they had given all their utmost strength to the centre upon Croce Bianca and St. Lucia, which, lying on the main roads to Peschiera and Villafranca, were more immediately exposed to attack.

A position of greater natural strength, by the confession of all parties, could not easily be imagined. The rising ground of St. Lucia is all cut up by strong fencing walls in the shape of as many terraces, which render it utterly inaccessible to the horse, and even the lightest artillery. It is planted all over with long rows

* "Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 52.

of mulberry-trees, from which hang the vines in the picturesque festoons which characterise the North-Italian landscape, and by which the view is obstructed at a few paces' distance in every direction. The Austrians had not failed to make the best of these natural advantages. Every one of the above-named villages, and the isolated farm-houses, which by their peculiar Italian construction, with their towers and moats, have already the look and strength of minor citadels, and were originally meant for defence, had been furnished with loopholes. The trees had been felled down in all desirable spots, palisades and earth-mounds had been erected; the churchyard of St. Lucia, especially, had been made into an entrenched camp.

The king determined to make the greatest effort upon the central position. The first division, where Bava and himself commanded, marched upon St. Massimo. Owing, however, to utter ignorance of the ground, they came up with the enemy at St. Lucia, right against the very front of the position. The king had with him the brigades Aosta and Guards, with a good number of *bersaglieri*, and the Griffini legion of Lombard volunteers, who had a few days previously made a reconnoitering excursion on the spot.

This part of the position was defended by the brigade Strassoldo, above a thousand sharpshooters, with the Anthon battalion of Italian grenadiers and cannon. The attack began at nine o'clock in the morning, and lasted four hours. The havoc of the Austrian grape-shot, the deadly aim of their invisible tirailleurs, had well-nigh exhausted the courage of the assailers, when the second division, which, owing to

the eternal mismanagement of the Piedmontese leaders, and also to the mazy difficulties of the ground, only came up at one o'clock, by giving the assailers a considerable preponderance of numbers (the Austrians hitherto engaged on this side were, we are told, only five battalions), succeeded at last in forcing the enemy from his entrenchments. Master of St. Lucia, the king could see the whole extent of the city and its fortifications, and assure himself that no movement was attempted within.

In the meantime, the third division (Broglia) had made an effort upon Croce Bianca, where it had met with the same resistance that had almost proved insuperable to the king at St. Lucia. The attack was vigorous and obstinate on this side also, but one of the regiments of the Savona brigade, the 16th, after seeing the ground strewn with 140 of their men ere they had even obtained a view of their foe, fell back in the greatest disorder. It was in vain, we are told,* that a young ensign remained stubbornly at his post, calling on his companions to rally round their standard. The regiment fled in all directions, and determined the backward movement of the whole division. The colonel and one of the majors of the 16th were cashiered in the evening.

The check suffered at Croce Bianca defeated all the object that could have been obtained by the hard-won success on the other side. The position was only half-carried, and therefore untenable. The king gave the signal of retreat, which took place in

* Ferrero, "Campaign of Lombardy," p. 42.

the best order, and was covered by the Duke of Savoy at the head of the Cuneo brigade.

Radetzky had already brought together vast masses, with which he meditated a general onset on St. Lucia had the king tarried in that position. His operations, however, were only completed at four o'clock, when the main body of the Piedmontese was already in full retreat. An attack was, nevertheless, made upon the rear of the Piedmontese, by the Clam brigade, as soon as their retreat was surmised; but the Duke of Savoy repulsed it with great firmness, once more carried the village of St. Lucia by storm, and slowly and threateningly brought up the rear.

It was then only four o'clock, and the length of day would have admitted of pursuit. The marshal, however, did not dare to follow up his advantage, and the king was allowed to take breath at Fenilone, where the Austrians had their advanced posts in the morning, to give his humane dispositions about the dead and wounded.

This ill-advised and ill-concerted attack cost the Piedmontese 1500 men, dead and wounded. The loss of the Austrians did not exceed 900. Eighty of their men and two officers, however, fell into the hands of the Sardinians, at the storming of St. Lucia, whilst of the Piedmontese themselves not one surrendered, except the wounded.* Officers of high rank fell on both sides. Amongst the Austrians, the generals Strassoldo and Salis, and Colonel Lingendorf;

* See the Marshal's own report, "Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy," part ii. p. 443.

of the Italians, Colonel Caccia, with a few other young officers, gave their life for their country.

The Marshal's own bulletins, and all other Austrian accounts, tell with enthusiasm the praises of the valour displayed by the Italian soldiery in this their first earnest encounter. With the exception of the ill-fated 16th regiment above-named, there is no instance of hesitation on the part of the men to throw themselves into the jaws of certain destruction, whilst the voice of their officers loudly ringing with shouts of encouragement was heard by the Austrians from behind their cover, all along the line of attack.*

The Duke of Savoy and the Archduke Francis Joseph both played a most brilliant part in this fight—this fight, which had no slight consequences on the fate of the two states so soon and so suddenly to be trusted to their guidance.

But although the king and his generals, by their personal intrepidity, come in for their share of the eulogy which was due to their troops, they must no less bear the blame of all the disasters of this day, and of all its fatal consequences of the following campaign.

The attack on St. Lucia could under no circumstances, be attended with favourable results. The king had at Peschiera on the 13th of April, and at Mantua on the 19th, a sufficient earnest of the hopes he could build on the disposition of the garrisons or of the population of the invincible citadels he had to contend with. An assault on Verona, or even on its scarcely less formidable outposts, was tantamount to a

* Pimodan, p. 643.

dash made by a madman with his bare head against a stone wall. The king, it seems but natural to conjecture, acted merely in obedience to a necessity of doing something, and in his actual inability to devise a more plausible plan of operations. Had the attack been crowned with complete success, had the king been able to take and retain possession of the whole position, and thus invested Verona as Mantua already was, the respective position of the two armies might have been materially altered; but we doubt, indeed, if the thought of victory over such dreaded obstacles by the king's unaided forces could be seriously entertained, and if the assault could ever be meditated without that fond expectation of co-operation from within.

As matters actually stood, even the partial result at St. Lucia, the taking of half the position, must be looked upon as a sheer prodigy; the troops achieved more than any rational commander would have demanded of them; but it was a useless waste of their energies, and it was not long before they, in their own way, called their leader to account for the blood thus wantonly spilt. Their ardour and impatience, which had been so inconsiderately listened to, was not only miserably quenched in that blood, but, by too natural a reaction, it was followed by a discouragement which brought into light all the latent imperfections and organic defects of that army of mere recruits. A few days after the affair of St. Lucia a single regiment reckoned above two hundred deserters.*

Whilst, however, even in our sheer ignorance of

* Custozza, "Insurrection et Campagne de 1848," p. 63.

military matters, we are ready to join in the universal outcry of all connoisseurs against the wretched generalship of Charles Albert, we do not hesitate to express our conviction of the insufficiency and utter inappropriateness of all other plans that have been suggested by the very critics who were loudest and most inexorable in their condemnation of the king's strategy.

No one has been at greater pains on the subject than the Prussian General Willisen, who, having laid the basis of a general theory of the art of war, brought his principles to bear on the vicissitudes of the Austro-Sardinian campaign; and who, as he was mostly at Verona during the whole period, and dedicated his work to Marshal Radetzky, with a profession of the most profound admiration, may be naturally suspected of *one-sidedness* in his strictures.*

It is not that we have to complain of harsh severity on his part against the plans of the Sardinian leaders. We should say rather, that, as a theorist, he overrates their talents, and attributes to them vast and deep designs and motives even when they most probably proceeded at haphazard, obeying no rule save that of irresistible circumstances. He was right enough, perhaps, when he rated them for their presumption in taking upon themselves an enterprise for which they had been fitted neither by previous study nor experience. His hits upon the "idle diversions of garrison-life, and the vanities of the parade-ground," were certainly not far from the mark, and his admonitions on

* "Theorie des grossen Krieges, Dritter Theil, Der Italienische Feldzug des Jahres, 1848." Von W. v. Willisen, Königl. Preuss. General Major. Berlin, 1849, pp. 44-83.

the necessity of "long lucubrations" and "brooding over the maps," applied as surely to the Piedmontese generals as ever they did to truant school-boys. Unfortunately, the theorist himself was soon afterwards called upon to put his deep knowledge and wide views to the test of actual practice in Schleswig-Holstein, and it was rather remarkable that he should fall into the same errors, into the very same egregious blunders, which he had so lucidly exposed.

He starts from a notion, which seems plausible enough in itself, that the war waged by Charles Albert was of an aggressive nature. The loud boastings of the Milanese, however, and the disorderly retreat and all but total dissolution of the Austrian army, had, as we have seen, unfortunately given the Piedmontese, no less than the whole of Italy and Europe, a false impression of the extremities to which Radetzky and his host were reduced. To beat him seemed less urgent upon his pursuers than to press close upon him, to shut him up so as to reassure Lombardy from the consequences of his despair. This impression did never entirely wear off before the battle of St. Lucia. Till that time the war had been, if not altogether of a defensive, at least of a compound character. The faults that Willisen and other critics detect in Charles Albert's earliest plans, in a military point of view, find, however, an easy explanation in the political situation of the country.

Thus it was an error, for instance, from the first, to send a division, under General Bes, over Milan and Brescia, whilst the main body of the army followed the course of the Po along Crema and Cremona. The king confessed his mistake in his proclamations, and assigned

its reason, which was to tranquillise, by the presence of regular forces, those towns which had only turned out the Austrians by a surprise, and might equally have been fallen upon by a *coup de main* of the same enemy. The writer of these pages was at Brescia on the 6th of April, when General Bes was already on the traces of Radetzky at Montechiari, and the singular aspect of that city, the almost absurd solidity of its hundreds and hundreds of barricades, testified the very imminent danger to which it had been exposed, or at least the great alarm that it had not unreasonably laboured under. Are we told that by thus venturing a single division the king exposed his own troops to the same risk that threatened the towns, and that Radetzky, had he had a distinct knowledge of their weakness, could have turned upon Brescia and battered it about Bes's ears? We must let the event answer for us. It seems that Charles Albert, even though he acted at random, made a tolerably correct estimate of his adversary's helplessness, since, in fact, that weak division was not only sufficient to protect Milan and Brescia, but actually drove the marshal from Montechiari, and fell in with the Piedmontese line on the Mincio without even as much as seeing the back of the foe.

Again, fault is found with Charles Albert for his waste of time round Peschiera and his attack on the heights of Pastrengo. The blame on this score falls on the Austrian marshal no less than on the Sardinian king. The central point of Radetzky's defence, it is stated, should have been, as it actually was, at Verona. It was an error on his part to entertain any serious thought of defending the formidable position of those

far-famed hills, and it was no less an error on the king's part to attack him there. That Austrian division thus ventured at Pastrengo might have been a feint, to lure the king into an attack by which he might have exposed his rear to a general onset of the whole garrison of Verona. Here, also, we must allow the result to be instead of argument, for the garrison of Verona actually made a sally on the Piedmontese rear on the day of the combat of Pastrengo, and its ill-success was owing either to the feebleness of the attack or to the strength of the resistance, both of which the Piedmontese generals may take the credit of having duly calculated.

After the victory at Pastrengo, the critic continues, the king, aware at length of the real state of matters, felt that the strength of his enemy's position was at Verona; hence the attack upon St. Lucia.

We have already enumerated the causes, extraneous most of them to mere strategic considerations, which we suppose to have brought about that senseless encounter. We doubt, however, whether the King of Sardinia could, in the peculiar combination of his political and military circumstances, have taken a resolution likely to be attended with more favourable results. General Willisen has little hesitation on the subject. Charles Albert should have left Peschiera, Pastrengo, and even Verona behind him; he should have chosen a strong position on the Adige, above or below Legnago; he should have firmly established himself on the Po at Governolo, and on the lower Mincio, so as to keep Mantua in check, and would thus have been able to carry the war either into Lombardy or Venetia, against Radetzky or Nugent, according as either the one

or the other had ventured to meet him in open campaign.

This is, however, mere *ex post facto* judgment. Nugent was not deemed formidable till after the taking of Vicenza, on the 11th of June; before that time the Roman and Neapolitan contingents had been daily expected. Those contingents, together with the combined squadrons, were judged more than sufficient to the defence of Venetia; had they not been so, the honour of the King of Naples was engaged in the support of his troops, and he had ample means for further efforts. Charles Albert's own task, we can never repeat it too often, was Lombardy; and Lombardy, be it remembered, was not merely threatened by Radetzky: rumours were afloat of great armaments in Styria and Tyrol. The Archduke John was at the head of his beloved mountain peasantry, the very Swiss were in alarm about their passes of the Engadine in the Grisons, through which the Austrians made semblance of making their way into the valley of the Adda, down to Como and Milan.* Had Charles Albert had a Willisen

* Mr. Peel's despatch from Berne, May 7, "Corres." part ii. p. 427:—

"Intelligence has reached the Federal Council of War, which has induced the directory to summon the diet five days earlier than was originally intended. It appears that a considerable army, under the direction of the Archduke John, is being concentrated in the Tyrol, with the intention of forcing a passage through the district of Engadine in the Grisons, and entering Lombardy; of deploying in the rear of the Italian army, and thus to cause a diversion in favour of Radetzky, who, up to the last account, is hemmed in between Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera.

"Colonel Gerwer, of Berne, at present commanding a division of 3500 men in the Grisons, has demanded a reinforcement of 20,000,

in his councils, had he taken up his quarters between Verona and Vicenza, the Veronese and Mantuan garrisons might have received sufficient reinforcements to force him upon the Adriatic, when the whole of Lombardy and Piedmont itself would have lain utterly at the mercy of any armed force that Austria could have poured down from the Alps.

Willisen, it is true, takes it for granted that behind the 60,000 Piedmontese actually under the standards of their king, Sardinia and Lombardy would, by their combined efforts, in two or three months have organised a second army, equal at least in number to the first. It will be our task presently to examine the causes which opposed the completion of this armament. In the meantime we need only state that no army of reserve was there; that all the ground in the rear of Charles Albert was open on every side; and that it was too much to expect that the king should give up defenceless Lombardy for the sake of Venetia, apparently so well secured by its natural position, by the strength of its fortresses, Osopo, Palmanova, and Venice itself, and more by the allies that hastened to its rescue.

All considered, we do not think that Charles Albert deserves blame for not foreseeing the defection of Ferdinand of Naples, the scruples of Pius IX., and the consequent loss of Vicenza.

in order to form a *cordon militaire* of sufficient strength to repel this threatened invasion of territory. 1500 additional troops have been sent to him, but it has been deemed advisable to convoke the diet as to the further steps to be taken in this emergency."

The expedition of the Archduke John was afterwards abandoned; and the whole or part of this force was sent to swell the ranks of Welden, who had 15,000 men in South Tyrol.

He had undertaken and hitherto pursued the campaign under a two-fold illusion—of the utter demoralisation of Radetzky's army, and of the no less total dissolution of the Austrian empire. The battle of St. Lucia broke the spell of the first misconception; the advance and victory of Nugent was soon to bring the disenchantment of the second. But had even the King of Sardinia had any suspicion of the real vitality of Austria—had he actually expected an attack on her part—it was not easy for him to guess on which side the attack could be made, whether from the Isonzo, or from the Tyrol, or the Valtellina; and it is not improbable that Austria for some time hesitated, and only came deliberately down upon him when the treachery of Charles Albert's allies had rendered Venetia his most vulnerable side.

The battle of St. Lucia ought certainly to have opened Charles Albert's eyes; it ought, as Willisen expresses it, to have made him aware that the war had now come to a crisis—that the Austrians had reached the utmost limit of their backward movement—and would soon prepare to take the offensive. Had Charles Albert been a man of genius, this very first check would have called forth his energies and prompted some great measure equal to the emergency.

What that measure should have been it is not perhaps easy to determine; still, a concentration of his forces on some commanding point between Mantua and Verona, so as to watch the movements of both garrisons and prevent all communication between them, seemed obviously to have suggested itself. Instead of this, Charles Albert fell back upon his positions at

Somma Campagna, and having at last, towards the middle of May, been joined by his heavy artillery, he was thereby enabled to pursue his siege of Peschiera, and turned almost all his attention upon this comparatively easy and irrelevant object.

Had his forces been more carefully kept together, this almost total inaction on his part might not have been attended with any serious consequences; for the enemy, on his own side, was not very eager to come to an open attack, and his first efforts in that way were gallantly and steadily repulsed. It was enough for the king to keep his position in Lombardy, if his allies in the Venetia had equally kept theirs. Our task now leads us to the examination of the state of things in that province, and of the causes that led to a first reverse there—a reverse that all circumstances had conspired to render as sudden as it was decisive.

CHAPTER V.

Italian Frontiers—The Tyrol—The Isonzo—Nugent in Friuli—Fall of Udine—of Belluno and Feltre—Durando—Ferrari—Volunteers—The People's Warriors—Nugent on the Piave and Brenta—Before Treviso—Before Vicenza—Junction of Nugent's Corps with Radetzky—Vicenza—Radetzky's sally from Mantua—Curtatone—The Tuscans—Goito—Fall of Vicenza—Loss of Venetia—The Italian Combatants and their Leaders—Charles Albert's March on Rivoli—On Verona—His Helplessness—Precariousness of his Situation.

WHILST Charles Albert of Sardinia was thus, with indifferent skill and declining fortune, measuring his forces against the enemy in the interior of the country, the people of Lombardy and Venice, together with their Roman and Neapolitan allies, were expected to cover his back by watching at the passes of the Alps.

The aim of all Italian revolution is the revindication of this natural frontier; to drive the "barbarians" beyond it is the first cry that bursts from the heart of that people, whenever circumstances admit of spontaneous utterance. However deplorably misled in the attainment, the nation has, at all times and in all places, shown sufficient consistency in the nature of its aspiration.

Consequently Milan and Venice were scarcely rid

of the hated foe, when a universal rush was made "to the Alps!" The multitude obeyed there an unerring instinct. With reckless generosity it abandoned to the half-prostrate enemy its own defenceless homes on the plain, eager only to secure those mountain-fastnesses which alone have power to place Italian liberty beyond all chances of future aggression.

The Alps, however, are only vaguely said to be the frontier of Italy. On the western side, the House of Savoy, by its original position, by its valour and craft, was able not only to keep the eternal barrier inviolate, but even to overstep it, both in Savoy and at Nice; but on the north, the Swiss has been treading on Italian ground for the last three centuries: whilst the House of Austria, profiting by the endless divisions and confusion of feudal times, contrived to gain an early footing on the valley of the Adige; and the republic of Venice, engrossed by maritime conquests, was almost daily losing ground on the Istrian frontiers on the main land.

By the arrangements of the peace of 1814, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was left open to incursion from all the parts of the neighbouring crown-lands. Tyrol, like an immense wedge, was made to stretch between the two kingdoms, down to the north-coast of the Lake of Garda; from its numerous passes, commanding nearly all the most important inlets into the plain. Further east, the whole chain of the Julian Alps, from the Isonzo to the Gulf of Quarnero, was included in the Istrian and Illyrian provinces, and Italy was left on that side with no other frontier than an insignificant stream.

Up to these limits the revolt of 1848 had been triumphantly carried by the people before the end of March. All the passes that could lead from Tyrol into the valleys of the Adda, Oglio, and Chiese, had been strenuously occupied. The territory of Milan and Brescia had not only been made safe by the first free corps, but, pursuing their advantage, and aided by the good-will of the Italian Tyrolese, these gallant adventurers had carried their conquests far into the territory which German Austria, as well as the German Confederacy, claimed as their own. The Milanese volunteers had been but coldly supported; partly owing to their own inconsiderate ardour and presumptuous insubordination, and to a change in the feelings of the Tyrolese peasantry; partly to the improvidence and imbecility of the Milanese government; partly, also, to the pusillanimity of Charles Albert, who suffered the threats of the Frankfort diet, and the warnings of an officious diplomacy, to interfere with the natural and inevitable course of his warlike enterprise.*

So far as the king and government were concerned, the war in Tyrol was to be limited to mere defensive

* Messengers, pretending to act in the name of the German Confederacy, came to the camp of Charles Albert on the 13th of June, with warnings and threats of hostility on the part of Germany if the Piedmontese had ventured upon the *German* soil of *Italian* Tyrol. See "*Guerra dell' Indipendenza d' Italia*," by a Piedmontese officer, Turin, 1850, p. 82. Several large districts of South Tyrol, such as Val Lagana, Val di Ledro, Val di Tizme, Val Lagarina, Val di Sarca, Val d'Adige, Val del Sole, Val di Non, were ancient dependencies of the provinces of Brescia, Bergamo, Verona, and Vicenza, never were associated with Tyrol till 1799, and never definitively annexed to it till 1815.

operations; and the volunteers, though independent enough in their movements, were, however, too ill-supported, too ill-supplied with arms and ammunitions, too loose and wayward, to follow any well-determined plan of aggression. With the exception of a few daring inroads, which led to no important results, they were gradually driven from the Tyrolese valleys, and limited themselves to the defence of their own positions.

On the other side, however, the higher summits of the Montebaldo, down to Garda and Rivoli, all the left bank of the Adige, and the passes that led to the territories of Verona and Vicenza, were never permanently occupied by the insurgents. From his headquarters at Verona, Radetzky issued orders to arm a few gunboats at Riva and Torbole, with which he made some show of disputing the possession of the lake, notwithstanding the two steamers and armed flotilla that cruised upon it in every direction.* Welden had assembled nearly 16,000 men at Trent;† and a

* Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 90.

† "All the passes of the Tyrol are cleared by Marshal Welden." Count Ficquelmont to Count Dietrichstein, Vienna, May 3d, "Correspondence," p. 428. This was, however, only true on the Veronese and Venetian side; the passes of the Tonale, Caffaro, and others on the side of Brescia, Bergamo, and the Valtellina, were stoutly disputed by the volunteers, and effectually blocked up to the very end of the war. See Princess Belgiojoso, "Guerre dans le Tyrol Italien," in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," vol. xxv. p. 221. For a clear understanding of the position of the volunteers on the frontier of Tyrol on the 22d of May, the reader may refer to the report of General Giacomo Durando, bearing that date, from Monte Suelo di Caffaro. The free corps held those positions, always in presence of an active enemy, during the whole of May, June, and July. See Dandolo, "I Volontarii e i Bersaglieri Lombardi," Turin, 1849.

column of about 5000, under Colonel Zobel, extended its operations as far as the plateau of Rivoli, on the left wing of the Piedmontese.

Still it was on the eastern side that the greatest effort of Austria was intended ; and this, partly because the Venetian provinces had from the very outset shown less ardour and vigour in the revolt ; partly also because, in moments of utter despondency, it is possible that the Austrian statesmen contemplated the contingency of the irreparable loss of Lombardy, and were therefore all the more obstinately bent on securing their hold upon Venetia, a province of more vital importance to their commercial prosperity, and in the possession of which they knew all Germany was equally interested. Their agents in London had already opened negotiations to that effect ; Lombardy was to be either united to Sardinia, or erected into an independent state ; but Venice was, though with a separate government, to continue to form part of the Austrian monarchy.

In order that diplomacy might be brought to acknowledge her claims, Austria felt, therefore, how important it was to make those claims good by the sword.

From the earliest days in April, indeed, a small corps of observation was silently forming on the frontier of the Isonzo. On the 15th of that month Nugent had collected 20,000 men there, and was now able to commence offensive operations.

Close upon the frontier, on the Italian side, stands the fortress of Palmanova, which had fallen into the hands of the insurgents without a stroke, and where

now Zucchi was, with 5000 or 6000 men, and a company of Piedmontese artillery. The province of Friuli had issued decrees for the mobilisation of 10,000 national guards; the towns had been strongly barricaded and entrenched, and crusaders from Venice and all its provinces, and more lately, also, from all Italy, were swarming there.

Nugent saw the impracticability of any attack upon Palmanova, and, leaving it in his rear, marched boldly upon Udine. It was at this moment that the strength and determination of the Italian people were for the first time put to the test. If the Italians of former ages ever gave proof of warlike heroism, it was in the defence of their cities. It was their peculiar mode of warfare in the middle ages, and it has given rise to some ungenerous reflections upon a valour that only exhibits itself behind stone walls. It answered some good purpose in those times, nevertheless; Crema, Tortona, and other towns perhaps more insignificant than Udine, had the boldness to provoke the anger and withstand the might of a Barbarossa. In these latest vicissitudes, Brescia, Bologna, Ancona, and Rome, have shown not a little of the stubborn valour of the Guelphic burgesses of old. But it was fated that the first experiment should be tried in Friuli, a province, both by its natural position and by its backward civilisation, incapable of any strong national feelings.* Udine

* "The people in Friuli have shown but little enthusiasm in the cause of the insurrection; and, notwithstanding the accounts published here to the contrary, I have reason to believe the presence of the free corps is beginning to give great dissatisfaction in many parts of the country."—*Consul-general Dawkins*, from Venice, April 28, "*Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy*," part ii. p. 417.

counted the many thousand wild warriors of Nugent ; it beheld his thirty field-pieces, which could, however, have but little effect upon stone walls ; a panic seized on its craven defenders, and they accepted a capitulation offered on very liberal terms by the invader (April 22).

Having thus easily left the line of the Isonzo behind him, Nugent marched on, without any serious resistance, to the plain, flooded over by the broad streams of the Tagliamento. The long wooden bridges had all been cut down, and he was for three days busy in their reconstruction ; the peasantry, however, ran to him on all sides with the necessary materials, and aided him in his work.* Leaving thus Osopo on his right, far away up the river, as he had left Palmanova, he advanced to the Piave, and reached Conegliano on the 27th of April.

This rapid inroad, the fall of Udine, the helpless situation of Zucchi, immediately spread the alarm throughout Venice ; and the Venetian government, which had hitherto carefully avoided all contact with Charles Albert, and sought his auxiliaries in Switzerland, in France, and elsewhere, now so far overcame its antipathies as to send Paleocapa to the Sardinian head-quarters, to obtain from the king that Durando, with his Roman forces, should be allowed to march to the rescue of Venice.†

* Count Fiequelmont's despatch, Vienna, May 3, "Correspondence," 428. See also Nugent's bulletins, and Dawkins' Letters from Venice, April and May 1848, "Correspondence," part ii.

† The town of Vicenza had already solicited the aid of Charles Albert, by an address dated April 19th. See "Sunto Storico Critico

Durando, who, wearied by the delays and tergiversations of the Roman government, had put himself under the immediate orders of his native sovereign, had crossed the Po on the 21st of April, and occupied Ostiglia and Governolo, agreeably to the directions of the king, who was then bent on completing the investment of Mantua, and preventing any incursion on the part of that garrison upon the territories of the church and the duchies. The first rumours of the advance of an Austrian force in Friuli had been treated with little regard at head-quarters; partly owing to the exaggerated notions of the utter prostration and dissolution of the empire then prevalent in Italy; partly, also, to the air of security and defiance set up by the Venetian population. The Neapolitan forces, the king imagined, were more immediately destined to the protection of those eastern provinces, and 4500 men, their vanguard, had already landed at Ancona (April 27); Palmanova and Osopo, as well as Udine, could well hold out till these auxiliaries came up. The King of Sardinia, who conceived no other than his own plodding mode of warfare, fancied Nugent could not advance without making sure of the fortresses in his rear. Under all these false impressions, and harassed by the importunate

dei Fatti avvenuti nelle Province Venete," Vicenza, 1850, p. 27. "The Venetian republic is hourly losing ground in the eyes of the upper and wealthier classes, and it now seems generally understood that the republican form of government will only be maintained provisionally, and until the future destinies of the country shall be decided. The expression of feeling on the part of the towns on the main land is daily more hostile to the reconstruction of the republic of Venice."—*Consul-general Dawkins*, Venice, April 28, "*Correspondence*," p. 418.

remonstrances, especially of Parma and Modena, he had too long detained Durando under the walls of Mantua. The fall of Udine, however, and the pressing entreaties of the Venetians,* induced him at last to consent to the departure of Durando, who, by a rapid march of three days, traversed all the space between Ostiglia and Treviso, reaching the latter town on the 29th of April. Two of his best battalions had, however, preceded him by a few days; and behind him were Ferrari, with 10,000 Roman volunteers, and General La Marmora, also with some free corps from Piedmont and Lombardy.

As the lines of the Isonzo and Tagliamento were already irreparably lost, these copious reinforcements could only meet the enemy on the Piave. The upper district, a mountainous region, seemed sufficiently guarded by its excellent position, by its population animated by the best spirit, and by the towns of Feltre and Belluno, both of them naturally strong, and which had given liberal assurances of the most gallant defence. Durando, who at first had only his own 7000 regular men under his orders, and could, therefore, only occupy a part of that long line, trusted those

* The provisional government at Milan showed no less anxiety for the safety of the Venetian provinces, and urged the king to hasten to their rescue, promising, on their own part, all the most liberal subsidies in men and money. They were well aware that both themselves and the king were strongly suspected of selfish designs of sacrificing Venice for the sake of Lombardy, and were, therefore, eager to give evidence of their determination to make common cause with Venice. See their address to the king, May 19, and the king's answer, as well as his reassuring proclamation to the Venetians, May 23, in the official gazette of the Milan government of the latter date.

citizens with the defence of the upper river, and took up his position at Montebelluno, directing La Marmora to extend himself further down the river, so as to cover Treviso. Nugent, however, turned all his efforts against the towns of Belluno and Feltre, both of which fell on the 5th and 6th of May, without drawing a sword, without even the ceremony of a capitulation, without giving one day's time to Durando, who was hastening to their rescue, and was already far advanced on his way to the latter town.

The line of the Piave was thus equally lost, and Durando was compelled to fall back on the Brenta. Ferrari had, in the meanwhile, arrived at Treviso (May 7), and the forces under him and Durando were at last nearly equal to those of the enemy; equal in number, however,—for with the exception of the Swiss infantry and the papal dragoons, about 7000 altogether, it was merely an army of volunteers.

The states of the church were, perhaps, the portion of Italy in which "the people" took the most active part in the national struggle. Owing, perhaps, to a greater fierceness and love of strife—characteristic, especially, of the population of Romagna—and to the unsettled state in which those provinces had been since the accession of Gregory XVI. in 1831, or, perhaps, to the higher degree of excitement prevalent in those countries in consequence of the impulse given by the new pope, there certainly seemed to rise in Rome, and all over its territory, a half-patriotic, half-religious spirit, which partook of the enthusiasm of the crusades. Swarms of popular combatants, dignified into legions and phalanxes, marched out of Rome, with hardly one

day's preparation ; they armed, dressed, and equipped themselves on the road. On the road they chose their officers, and made some indifferent attempts at self-organisation : real martial discipline was too much out of the question. Ferrari, who had come to Rome only a lieutenant-colonel, was generalissimo of all the volunteers ere they reached Bologna.* In the same measure epaulettes sprang up like mushrooms on the shoulders of men grown old in the church, the bar, or the shop. Not a few staff-officers and aides-de-camp could be mentioned who had never in their life bestriden a horse. On they marched, however, with a speed and ardour that had nothing to envy the first rough adventurers of Peter the Hermit. How all that host could subsist on the road would be an enigma to those unacquainted with Italian open-handedness and hospitality, under the impulse of general excitement. The many scenes of violence and wanton outrages registered against those crusaders in the pages of malevolent writers we willingly omit in this narrative;† not because we absolutely disbelieve them, but because given with gross exaggeration, and with malicious disregard of the circumstances that provoked them. That the host marched in the greatest disorder is, however, sufficiently evident. Whole companies and battalions were disbanded ; and especially after the publication of the encyclic of the 29th of April, not a few of the pious or selfish became anxious to withdraw from an undertaking upon which

* Pepe, "Events in Italy," vol. i. p. 253.

† See especially Macfarlane, "A Glance at Revolutionized Italy," vol. i. p. 318 ; vol. ii. pp. 21, 22 ; D'Arincourt's "L'Italie Rouge," p. 56. The reader may give these writers the credit they deserve.

the pope had no longer spiritual or temporal remuneration to bestow.

The ranks that might thus have been thinned were, however, rapidly filled up by new, eager recruits. Every one of the ardent cities of Romagna had its own legion under the standards; and when at last Ferrari had reached Treviso, he was at the head of as fine-looking an army as "the people" ever sent into the field.

Since this word, *the people*, has too often been used with little discrimination, especially by those who do not scruple to associate it with a far higher and more revered name, "God and the People!" it may be not altogether unseasonable to determine what should be understood by it, at least in Italy.

With the exception of a few momentary outbursts, always the result of grievances that touched them personally, such as Masaniello's revolt against the tax on vegetables in 1647, and Balilla's resentment of the Austrian lash at Genoa in 1745, there has been, properly speaking, no people in Italy from Charles V. to Napoleon. During the great convulsions consequent on the French invasion, from 1796 to 1814, the great mass of the Italian population gave no sign of life, save only where religious fanaticism aroused their fury, as at Verona, in Calabria, and in some Apennine districts. Since 1814 the idea of Italian nationality has gradually sunk from the higher—we mean more intelligent—into the lower classes. It is, however, with the latter a mere abstraction; and as the tyranny, especially of the Austrian government, always weighed upon mere thought and feeling, and the mate-

rial welfare of the people, if not virtually promoted, was, at least, little interfered with, it followed that the popular ill-will against it was not based upon actual sufferings, but upon a mere instinct, the developement of which was commensurate with the different degrees of education.

Since 1846 the supposed interest taken by the pope in the national cause, his solemn "benediction upon Italy,"* had, for a short space of time, sanctified the revolution, even in the conscience of men of more limited understanding; and on the first tidings of the outbreak at Milan, on the first call upon national enthusiasm, it was certainly in the power of Pius IX. to drag the whole unthinking mass after him. The pope, however, first hesitated, then withdrew altogether; and Italy was left to look for support to those who loved her for her own sake alone. Now love for Italy and hatred to the foreigner, though universally innate, was only active where Thought and Feeling had ennobled it. The country population, always in a state of mental isolation, could not only not comprehend, but not even hear the call. In the towns, the students—or the youths from the ranks to which students belong—the whole "young blood of the land," heard and answered it. Around them not a few of inferior rank clustered; men, accustomed to read and converse, warming up to the subject in obedience to an agitation of which they did not understand the nature or tendency. These students and artizans were the "people"

* "Benedite, o Dio, l'Italia!" the famous words of one of his earliest proclamations.

of the national crusade : of such men Italy could very easily have made an army of 200,000 combatants.*

The wealthy station to which many of those citizen-warriors belonged enabled them to carry on the war at their own expense, and an excess of disinterested devotion, in many instances, prompted them to decline ranks to which their superior education gave them undisputed claims.

Only the genius to give this vast body something like order and shape ! to separate the pure gold from the alloy that defiled it. Faintness of heart and infirmity of purpose must naturally enough be found in so vast a mass and so hurriedly collected. Selfish designs, immoderate ambition, a variety of baser motives, must be expected to mingle with the enthusiasm of genuine patriotism.

* " If among so many thousand militia (in Venice) many deserved the appellation of vagabonds, many others, perhaps a good half of the entire garrison, had left their families, who were, more or less, in easy circumstances, through love of Italy. Oftener than would be believed, I found in the ranks young volunteers of high families, either from the city or the provinces. I was particularly grieved that advancement was given, not to merit, but to satisfy the demands of the patriotic club."—*Pepe's "Events in Italy,"* i. p. 238. Dandolo, " *I Volontarii e i Bersaglieri Lombardi,*" pp. 34, 35, after a long enumeration of the good and bad qualities of his fellow-combatants, made with great candour and great regard to persons, concludes :—" The free corps were, therefore, composed of the very flower and the very dregs of society." After serving with honour, always by the side of Massara, in both the campaigns of Lombardy and Piedmont, as well as in Rome, where his commander, his brother, and best friends fell around him, that ingenuous youth is compelled, to some extent, to reveal the *universal* insubordination, and the not unfrequent profigacy, of those free corps ; and winds up with a protest, that nothing could ever induce him to take service with volunteers again.—Pp. 40-46.

Assuredly, no proper organisation of the Italian volunteers was ever attempted, unless it be, perhaps, in later times, in Venice and Rome. The very virtues of the most earnest and generous were turned to account by base adventurers and intriguers. The titles and offices that deserving modesty dreaded to accept, fell to the lot of unblushing pretension. The appointment of officers, on the principle of popular election, submitted the honest patriot to the command of the unprincipled demagogue. Nothing more blind than the favouritism of the multitude. The Italian legions were under the control of men that could inspire no confidence: hence their endless insubordination, jealousy, and suspiciousness. Princess Belgiojoso, who writes altogether under the influence of democratic convictions, states that "the anarchy rife in the first volunteer corps sent into the Tyrol, the readiness of every officer to disregard the orders of his superiors, the perversity by which they seemed to rival each other in thwarting the object of the expedition, could not but shock and disgust those single-minded mountaineers who had invoked them as auxiliaries."* Tommaseo, one of the republican chiefs of the Venetian Government, wrote to Pepe to request him to rid the sea-girt city "of this troop of idle, undisciplined men, more dangerous than useful to Venice."† We ourselves, at the very opening of the campaign, on the 6th of April, at Montechiari, were witnesses of a scene which, but for the prudence of some Piedmontese officers, would have

* Princess Belgiojoso, "*Guerre dans le Tyrol, Revue des Deux Mondes*," vol. xxv. p. 216.

† See his letter to Pepe, "*Events in Italy*," i. 237.

led to bloodshed, and this owing merely to the intolerable presumption of some of the self-created chiefs of one of the volunteer bands. We are not willing to give credit to the most sinister rumours that circulated at the time to the disparagement of the worst class of these patriot-soldiers, though we can vouch for the belief which was then pretty generally added to them: that the band of Torres was dissolved, because "his comrades accused him of having made a speculation on their pay;"* that some of the Neapolitan volunteers, and nominally of those who had come with the Princess Belgiojoso, were guilty of personal violence upon some Tyrolese women:†—we repeat, the worst of these reports might be entirely unfounded, or, at any rate, grossly exaggerated; but coupled with the undeniable indiscipline of the free corps, and their unnecessary exposure to want and danger, they contributed to deter the best men from the volunteer service, and instead of undergoing a thorough sifting and winnowing, the free corps fell every day into a more deplorable state of dis-

* Ferrero, "Campaign of Lombardy," London, 1850, p. 21.—"Deplorable disorders happened in that city—Crema—owing to the misconduct of the self-styled General T——" (on the 29th of March). "He threatened death and plunder unless his exorbitant demands were instantly complied with."—*Dandolo*, p. 39. This circumstance led to a division among those bands at that very early period.

† "The greatest harm arose from the want of discipline and the unpardonable excesses committed by the B—— G—— battalion, although it was now under the orders of a better leader, Major Beretta. The profligacy of a few men indisposed those good Tyrolese rustics."—*Dandolo*, p. 59. For another account of that same corps, and one called "*La Compagnia della Morte*," see also *Dandolo*, p. 44, &c.

order and corruption, and lost more and more of their efficiency.

We repeat it distinctly: no country, not excepting even the North Americans of George Washington, ever supplied finer elements for a national army than Italy did by the volunteers that crowded, or would have crowded, under her standards on the first appeal of 1848. But the good elements were suffered to go to waste, and the bad ones, as a necessary consequence, increased even to luxuriance. Needy adventurers from every quarter flocked to Lombardy, and even more to Venice, attracted by the extravagantly liberal pay that the country awarded to its chivalrous defenders.* The volunteer received thrice the soldier's wages; no limit to his exactions, if the peasantry were not already too eager to anticipate his wishes and supply his demands. Petty officers, who should have been shot for quitting the camp without leave, insisted upon travelling post at the expense of the communes, as if they had been princes or ambassadors, often under pretence of being bearers of despatches.† Nothing more ruinous, nothing more insane, in short, than this volunteer warfare; such, at least, as it was practised in Italy. It only pro-

* The pay was $1\frac{1}{2}$ fr., about 1s. 3d. per diem, for a simple soldier. One of Ferrari's aides-de-camp, well known to us, who had never been on horseback in his life, and was in the physical impossibility to mount, received, besides the pay of two Roman scudi a-day, also *forage for three horses*. He had the rank of a captain. Nor was this a rare instance.

† It was by the civility of one of these heroes, a simple lieutenant in a volunteer corps from Parma, that the writer of these pages was enabled to ride in the style above described from St. Giustina to the latter city, at a time when no money could have procured a conveyance.

duced a lot of soldiers who expected to reap all the benefit and the honour of the campaign with hardly any of its hardships or dangers. Most of these men evidently defined a volunteer to be a man who was allowed to follow no rule but his own will, whereas the efficiency of such a service depends entirely on his renunciation of it. As a man who fights from mere principle, no volunteer is worth his salt who is not ready to greater self-denial, to more absolute passive obedience, than the merest hireling.

Well, the defence of the Venetian provinces was, with the exception of 7000 regular troops, entrusted to volunteer legions. The Roman free corps had, as we have observed, collected here in the largest mass, and not a little was expected of them.

After the fall of Belluno and Feltre, Durando, whose main object was to prevent Nugent from operating his junction with Radetzky at Verona, retired upon Bassano on the 8th of May; and as he expected the enemy might descend from the mountains of Feltre, either by Primolano or by Pederoba, he occupied the former place with 1200 of his men, remaining himself at Bassano with 3000. Ferrari was with all his forces at Montebelluno and Narvesa; his task was, therefore, to keep Nugent in check on the other side. Nugent made a simultaneous attack on both points, directing 2000 men on Primolano and as many on Pederoba. The Roman vanguard, under Ferrari, fell back from the latter position on Cornuda, and there, being supported by their general, who hastened to their reserve with 3000 men of his main troops, gave battle to the enemy. The battle, in which the Italians had the ad-

vantage of numbers, was interrupted by the night. On the morrow, May 9th, the attack was renewed, and after a few hours' contest the Roman troops began to lose ground, and were driven back to Montebelluno. Here these troops, who appeared thus far to have done their duty, were thrown into utter disorder by the non-appearance of Durando, who, they fancied, *ought* to have come to their rescue, and setting up that base cry, "Treason!" which has ruined so many things in Italy, they broke up in sheer panic, without even any attack on the part of the enemy, and insisted upon a further retreat on Treviso. Ferrari was obliged to bring up the rest of the division, and his position on the Piave was thus abandoned before only 2000 of the enemy, who were even anything but eager or violent in their attack. Ferrari, having collected these demented fugitives at Treviso, endeavoured in vain to bring them once more into the field, with the hope of being able to re-occupy Montebelluno previous to Nugent's arrival. One of his corps, the Guidotti brigade, positively refused to obey orders.*

Nugent, free from all hindrance, marched (May 10th), upon Montebelluno, and hence, as if his object was merely the submission of the cities of Venetia, advanced as far as Falzé, bringing all his forces to threaten Treviso. This city had nothing to fear, for it has a circuit of strong walls, and its approaches, on one side at least, are defended by the marshy banks of the Sile. The population exceeds 15,000 souls; and Nugent, it was well known, had only field-artillery with

* Custozza, "Insurrection et Campagne d'Italie, en 1848." Turin, 1850, p. 69.

him. As Nugent advanced, Ferrari wished to lead his Romans to meet him, but on a first view of the enemy this disorderly soldiery took flight in every direction.* Unable to keep the open field with such troops, and wishing to rid the city of their presence, Ferrari led them to Mestre, leaving only 4000 of his most reliable men, in his estimation a sufficient garrison, at Treviso.

Willisen has had no hesitation to blame the conduct of Nugent, who was thus wasting time under the walls of Treviso, whilst he might have trod down the vastly inferior forces under General Durando, the only obstacle that rose now between him and Radetzky,† and professes himself unable to account for his obvious want of settled plan. Nugent seemed, however, to know too well what enemies he had to deal with. Durando, obliged to leave his position at Bassano in consequence of Ferrari's precipitate retreat from Cornuda, and still wishing to dispute the passage of the Brenta so long as it was in his power, took up his position at Piazzola, on the left bank of that river, ready to march either on Fontaniva or on Padua, according as the enemy should choose to attempt to cross at either point. Nugent, however, tarried under Treviso, and although he never came to a determined attack, and limited himself to plunder the neighbourhood, yet such was the alarm of the town, such the outcry set up there and at Padua and Venice against the treasonable desertion of that city by Durando, that this general, thrown off his guard by importunate remonstrances, and allowing

* Custozza, "Insurrection et Campagne d'Italie," p. 70.

† Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," p. 96.

them to prevail over the dictates of his better judgment, came to the conclusion that the object of Nugent's efforts was really the taking of Treviso, and moved his camp from Piazzola to Mogliano, to cross the Sile at Quinto, and hence to meet the enemy under the walls of Treviso. Nugent had thus obtained his intent. He marched in one day from the Piave to the Brenta, crossed the latter river at Fontaniva, and hastened on the road to Vicenza.*

Too late aware of his error, Durando, who had only

* "These trifling occurrences" (says Willisen, after his account of the affair at Cornuda) "have been detailed at full length, because they formed a crisis in the warlike operations in the Venetian provinces. In consequence of it, and also of the pope's declaration of his unwillingness for war, the ill-organised corps of General Ferrari broke asunder. Part of the volunteers and civic guards went back to their homes, and Durando was left on the field with his two Swiss regiments and some Roman troops, chiefly cavalry."

"This series of events," he continues, "affords an opportunity for the most interesting remarks. General Durando, the real patriot, looked upon all that here happened as so sore a point for Italian honour, than nothing but the most intemperate accusations and calumnies induced him to lay it bare to the world's gaze. Whereas the tacticians and politicians of *cafés* and "Gazettes," attacked the general with so unguarded a virulence as to let out not a little of their own shame in their eagerness to denigrate him."—*Italienische Feldzug*, p. 98.

After being dragged in the dust for many months, Durando's name emerges from those sad events with unimpaired lustre. Not only is every doubt removed as to the uprightness of his intentions, but although chargeable with lack of resolution and excessive sensitiveness to the world's blame, he seems to have displayed abilities superior to those of most generals on the Italian side. Princess Belgiojoso, a woman of generous instincts even in the worst aberration of judgment, did not fear to uphold Durando's honour, although at a loss how to account for his conduct, and unable to answer the manifold charges with almost universal perversity brought against him. See "Revolution Italienne de 1848, *Revue des Deux Mondes*," xxiii. p. 808.

reached Mogliano, turns instantly upon Mestre, and with the aid of the railway conveys all his troops to Vicenza. His vanguard, under Colonel Gallieno, was already within its walls on the 19th, just as the first columns of Nugent appeared before it, and ventured upon a first attack, which was vigorously repulsed. In the midst of this skirmishing, May 20th, and before noon on the following day, the whole of Durando's force, as well as some of the volunteers of the Venice garrison, under the command of General Antonini, were all safely within the walls of Vicenza. Nugent, unable or unwilling to run the risk of a serious engagement, suddenly raised his camp, and continued his route to Verona. He had scarcely reached Olmo, when some of the most daring defenders of Vicenza, especially the legion Antonini—a band of Italian, Polish, and French adventurers, who had been collected in France, and after landing in Genoa, on the 24th April, had entered the service of the Venetian republic—boldly sallied forth in pursuit. They were, however, warmly received by Nugent, who had hastily taken position at Olmo, and being deprived of their leader by a severe wound on the right arm, they were forced to fall back upon the city. The Austrians did not the less continue their March; Nugent fell ill on the 22d, and the command was taken by Prince Thurn and Taxis, who at last fell in with Radetzky at San Bonifacio, the marshal having hastened to meet him from Verona.

Strange to say, Radetzky was far from pleased at the result of Nugent's operations; and having supplied his lieutenant, Prince Thurn and Taxis, with heavy artillery, ordered him to return on his own footsteps,

and to make another and more strenuous effort upon Vicenza. Vicenza had then about 10,000 defenders, besides its population of 30,000 inhabitants, which showed then the best disposition for a gallant defence. The attack commenced on the 23d of May, towards evening, and was continued with great alacrity until midnight. It slackened then, only for a few hours, to recommence with still greater earnestness at the first breaking of the early dawn of that season. The endeavours of the assailers were baffled by the admirable firmness of the defenders. Before the close of the 24th, Vicenza was once more rid of the presence of the enemy, who returned to Verona; not, however, without leaving 2000 of their number under the walls of the victorious city.*

The writers more partial to Austria, at a loss, by their own confession, to account for this wanton waste of precious time and blood on the part of Radetzky, do not hesitate to assert that "the attempt on Vicenza was not intended as a serious assault," and that "the Italians attached to their own success more importance than it really deserved."†

Radetzky had, in the meanwhile—thanks to the faintheartedness of the people of Udine and Feltre, to the insubordination and pusillanimity of the Roman volunteers, to the mismanagement and misunderstanding among their leaders, and still more, perhaps, to the improvidence of Charles Albert, who should have sent Durando at an earlier period, and with more numerous and efficient forces—obtained his great intent. The

* Custozza, p. 73, and all Italian accounts.

† Willisen's "*Italienische Feldzug*," p. 101.

army immediately under his orders at Verona, on the 26th of May, was equal, even in number, to that of Charles Albert; no consideration could any longer hinder him from meeting the king in open campaign.*

Whilst the fate of the Venetian provinces was thus being rapidly accomplished, Charles Albert, who had never been willing to believe in the descent of any considerable force from that quarter, who was daily in expectation of his Neapolitan allies, in a sufficient force to relieve the Venetians from all apprehensions, was still tarrying on the Mincio, busy with his siege of Peschiera: his confidence in the ascendancy of his fortune was still so great, that he wrote to Durando to join him, if not immediately, at least on the first appearance of the long-expected Neapolitans. The first attack on Vicenza, be it remembered, coincides with Pepe's arrival at Bologna (May 23), and precisely with his reception of the fatal despatch from Naples of the 18th, which was to bring the fine corps under his orders to so speedy and disgraceful a dissolution. Durando, however, obeying the king's orders to the letter, continued still at Vicenza. He continued there till the genius and craft of his enemy had matured the fate of that town, and with it that of the country.

* Willisen (p. 103) gives the following statement of the forces collected at Verona:—

1st Corps, Wratislaw ..	15 batt.	8 squad.	36 can.
2d „ D'Aspre	17 „	8 „	36 „
Reserve, Wocher	11 „	28 „	79 „

Altogether .. 43 bat. 44 squad. 151 cannon.

amounting in numbers to about 45,000 combatants.

The king had pushed on the siege of Peschiera to the best of his abilities, and with so much success, that on the 26th of May the Austrian commander, General Rath, seemed at last to listen to the king's offers of a capitulation. That, however, was merely a feint; the feeble garrison, unable to fight, hoped to gain time by negotiation. Twenty-four hours were granted for consideration; and in the meantime Radetzky, by a combined effort, attempted to raise the siege.

The marshal's plan, if carried into effect with a deliberation equal to the daring, might not only have led to the rescue of Peschiera, but would, by one single stroke, have put an end to the war.

The king occupied the heights of St. Giustina, Sona, and Somma Campagna, and all along the line of the Mincio, down to Mantua, where five thousand Tuscans and Neapolitans were entrenched at Curtatone and Montanara, close to the lake; Radetzky proposed to remove all his forces from Verona to Mantua, to drive the Tuscans before him by a sudden sally, to place himself in the rear of the Piedmontese at Goito, and there, by a single conflict, cut off their retreat upon Lombardy, and drive them up to the Alps. His order of march from Verona to Mantua (27th to 29th May), over Isola della Scala, was so perfect,* that the Piedmontese were attacked ere they had the slightest idea of the extent of the enemy's forces. Radetzky had taken 35,000 men along with him from Verona, and as he had already in Mantua a garrison of 10,000 or 12,000 men, he was able to, and did actually, issue into the open

* See Willisen, p. 104; Pimodan, p. 652.

field with 40,000. With all this might he fell first on the Tuscans. These, who had for above a month held the positions of Curtatone and Montanara, and repulsed repeated attacks on the part of the garrison, prepared themselves for an obstinate resistance (May 29th).

Their position was naturally of great strength, as they were encamped behind dikes and canals; and they had had time, by their works, to secure additional advantages. The enemy, however, left them no chance of successful defence. He poured forth the whole mass of his first corps, with a great display of artillery, to which the Tuscans could only return fire from eight small field-pieces. The brigades Benedeck and Wohlgemuth marched upon Curtatone, those of Clam and Strassoldo on Montanara; after six hours of manly fighting, the Tuscans were overpowered at both places. The whole position was carried by storm. Only 1200 men were able to retire in good order on Marcaria; 500 or 600 on Goito; the rest were either killed, taken, or hopelessly disbanded. The Austrians assert that 2000, among them a whole Neapolitan battalion, surrendered as prisoners; of these, 59 officers and 4 staff-officers. Five of their cannon also fell into the enemy's hands.* The students of Pisa distinguished themselves by the greatest heroism. One of the professors who commanded them, Pilla, fell dead on the spot; another, more famous, Montanelli, was taken up by the Austrians all but mortally wounded. His death was even officially announced, and was made a theme

* Pimodan, "*Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes*," Aug. 1850, p. 655. Willisen, "*Italienische Feldzug*," p. 105.

of mourning throughout Italy. The Austrians had also paid dearly for victory. They had above 800 dead or wounded; among the latter a very considerable number of officers of all ranks.*

During all this combat, General Bava, who commanded the first corps, to which the Tuscans belonged, and had his quarters at Custoza, on receiving, on the 28th, information of Radetzky's march from Verona, had communicated it to the Tuscan general, Laugier, without adding any instructions as to what should be done in case of attack. Laugier did not think himself justified in abandoning his post, as he should have done, before such fearful odds, having good reasons to expect that Bava would support him.

Owing to the irresolution of the latter general, and the habitual disorder of the Piedmontese marches, the Tuscans were sacrificed.

The whole of that ill-fated troop, and especially the students' legion, showed such a steady and veteran-like demeanour during the fight itself, that it is difficult not to echo the words of self-applause with which the

* The report of General Laugier (see "Memorie sulla Guerra d'Indipendenza," Turin, 1850, p. 231) does not materially differ from the above. The combat, he says, lasted from ten o'clock in the morning to four in the afternoon. Among the sinister accidents that contributed to throw disorder in the Tuscan ranks was the explosion of an ammunition-waggon, which caused a serious loss of life. As to the Austrian losses in officers, Pimodan remarks, that as the average in ordinary cases is one in thirty, dead or wounded, after the affair of Curtatone it was one in nine, one in eight, one in ten respectively, in the different corps that had been engaged.—*Revue des Deux Mondes*, as above, p. 656. Radetzky's own account, dated May 30th, gives the loss in dead or wounded between 200 and 300; among them forty officers. The battle lasted only three hours.

name of *Curtatone* was afterwards pronounced throughout Tuscany. The heroes of the 29th of May were greeted on their return with such an ovation as a complete victory, and the final deliverance of the country, could hardly have entitled them to. Still it should not have been forgotten that the retreat was by no means in keeping with the exploits in the trenches;* that, once scattered, the Tuscans showed no disposition to rally; that they hardly ever re-appeared on the battlefield; and, as Bava's relation rather bluntly said, "neither entreaties nor threats had power to recall the Tuscans from Brescia, which was as a new Capua to them."†

Having thus swept these first troops before him, Radetzky, who had still several hours of the day, and most of his troops fresh, might have been expected to march straight upon Goito, where the Piedmontese were in no trim to offer resistance. Happily for the latter, he tarried for about twenty-four hours on the spot; and, in the meanwhile, Bava and the king had leisure to take up their position at Goito itself, with some show of plausible tactics.

They had collected a force of about 25,000, and had strongly occupied the village of Goito with a large force of artillery; their right was on the road to Sacca,

* "With the greatest sorrow I must say, that our retreat was made in the greatest disorder, and not only did not correspond with the glorious resistance offered to the enemy, but bore all the appearance of a complete defeat; as it was impossible to keep together a single platoon, and to have a parting shot at the enemy."—*Report of Colonel Campia to General Laugier*, "*Guerra dell' Indipendenza*," p. 226.

† "Relazione del Generale Bava," &c., Turin, 1848.

where they had ranged three brigades in three successive lines of battle.

Radetzky intended to attack, by bringing up his right against them at Sacca, but had also directed a force of 11,000 to Ceresara, with a view to outflank them, and, in case of a victory, to drive them against the Mincio, and have the road into Lombardy open before him.

The Piedmontese had been in battle-array since the morning of the 30th, and had sent their scouts to reconnoitre the roads to Sacca, and even to Gazzoldo and Piubega, and having nowhere met with the enemy began to give up all hopes of an encounter. The king had already ridden back to Volta, and the brigades were on the point of following, when the cannonade was heard. The Austrians attacked both on the right and left of the Piedmontese simultaneously. On the left, in the village, the Piedmontese artillery prevailed by its wonted superiority, especially as Bava ordered a few battalions, with four pieces, to cross the river and harass the enemy from the opposite bank. On this side the victory early declared itself in favour of the Piedmontese. On the other side, one of the battalions of the Cuneo brigade, of the 8th regiment, which was in the first line, fell back in utter disorder; the whole of that line was consequently thrown into confusion: the second came on with greater resolution, but was equally driven back after some stout fighting: the third line was then engaged, but the advantage of position (a position of the Piedmontese own choosing) was clearly on the side of the Austrians, and the battle seemed likely to turn favourable to them, till the Piedmontese artillery, which had hitherto been hindered by

the unevenness of the ground, succeeded at last in gaining a proper position, when it silenced that of the enemy, and restored the chances of the day. The Duke of Savoy had rallied the remnants of the Cuneo brigade, and was now once more leading them to the onslaught. It was seven o'clock in the afternoon. Radetzky gave the order of retreat. The pursuit was short and feeble.

Such was the battle of Goito. It must be observed, on the one hand, that Charles Albert, who could never relinquish the thought of Peschiera, had little more than one-half of his forces here; and Radetzky, who aimed at a definitive result, had, by sending a whole division to Ceresara, deprived himself of one-fourth of his army. A battle, therefore, which might, and should have proved decisive, was, owing to a similar error on both sides, void of important results. The Piedmontese state, that the loss of the enemy, in dead, wounded, or prisoners—deserters should be added—amounted to 3000, whilst themselves had to lament only one-third of that number. The Austrian returns give only 600 dead, wounded, or missing.* The king and the Duke of Savoy were slightly hurt in the action; on the other side, three Austrian archdukes were personally engaged.

We have said that one of Radetzky's main objects,

* Compare Custoza, p. 87; "Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 65; Bava's "Relazione," *ibid.* p. 238; with Willisen, p. 111; Pimodan, p. 657, &c. From the 26th May to the 4th of June, the Austrians are said to have lost no less than 6000 men; 1500 Italians still found an opportunity to desert. Not a few of Radetzky's soldiers suffered severely from the unhealthiness of the climate and the inclemency of the season. Custoza, p. 91.

in his sally from Mantua, was to force Charles Albert to raise the siege of Peschiera. To the same effect, on the same day of the combat of Curtatone, and the following, May 28th and 29th, another attempt was made by Colonel Zobel, who came down from Rivoli at the head of a column of 5000 men, and a large convoy of provisions, destined to the victualling of the distressed fortress. There was sharp skirmishing on those famous heights during both those days, and especially for more than seven hours on the 29th. But the Piedmontese had watched at their posts with rare diligence, and were found ready to foil the enemy at all points, and to thrust him even further back than his former encampments. General Bes commanded the Piedmontese on this side.

The check suffered by the Austrians in these encounters, and the time lost by Radetzky at Curtatone, deprived the defenders of Peschiera of the last hopes, and determined their surrender to the Duke of Genoa : the announcement of the happy event reached the king on the field of victory at Goito, on the evening of the 30th.

The news was received with shouts of joy. Charles Albert was hailed by his soldiers, " King of Italy ! "

And, alas ! it depended on him, perhaps, to make good that proud boast on the very spot. There were still two hours' daylight, and those might have decided the fate of Italy. Radetzky was in full retreat. His second corps was still at Ceresara, and the slightest advance of the Piedmontese on Gazzoldo and Piubega might easily have cut them off for ever from the main body of their troops. On that very night, or the

earliest morrow, an attempt should have been made to force the marshal back into Mantua, and to regain the positions relinquished by the Tuscans on the 28th. The surrender of Peschiera placed several divisions of fresh troops at the king's disposal. By a rapid rush on the Adige, Radetzky might be prevented from ever again seeing the walls of Verona. Durando might thus not only be relieved from all apprehensions at Vicenza, but might be summoned to come forth on the Adige.

Alas, poor Charles Albert! On the evening of the 30th his troops wanted rest. On the morrow a deluge of rain was suffered to interfere with their movements. A puerile curiosity induced the king to leave the camp to view his hard-won prize of Peschiera. A scarcely less puerile piety prompted him to offer up a *Te Deum*, in return of thanks for his victories, on the first of June. The heavy showers continued for three or four days, during which period the unfortunate king looked on the proceedings of his adversary with helpless unconcern.

Though to have done almost anything was certainly better than doing nothing, it is not easy, however, to determine the probable results of active operations on the king's part. That Radetzky, if attacked, would have offered a stout resistance, is unquestionable. Even after his retreat from Goito—an affair which he and his partizans are anxious to represent as a drawn game—he showed no disposition to shut himself up in Mantua, or even to give up the offensive. The state of the weather was, indeed, such as to prevent the rapid movements even of the lightest horse or artillery, and the

experiments of St. Lucia and Goito were not of a nature to inspire the king with too strong a confidence on the steadiness of his infantry. To drive the marshal into Mantua was, indeed, under all considerations, a matter of vital importance, and the king, in his own dilatory manner, prepared himself accordingly. But to pursue his own advantage on the Adige was a measure too sadly at variance with the cautious policy that had invariably presided over his councils. The first report of Radetzky's breaking loose from Mantua, his occupation of Lombard lands as far as Ceresara, and his not inhuman, perhaps, but not too friendly treatment of the inhabitants, had, as we may presume, and as it results from undoubted evidence, spread the alarm all over the country, even to Brescia and Cremona.* In presence of an enemy who had been able so nimbly to slip through his fingers, Charles Albert did not venture to leave Lombardy utterly unprotected, menaced as it really was both on the south by Radetzky and on the north by Welden. His progress had hitherto been slow but safe. Goito and Peschiera were a sufficient earnest of the wisdom of the course he had adopted. The victory was equally certain in the end; but he wished to obtain it with the least possible sacrifice of the people he had undertaken to deliver.

Up to this time he either knew nothing, or still had doubts as to the defection of his Neapolitan ally.

* "It was already whispered by many that the king was abandoning the right bank of the Mincio, and exposing all Lombardy to an incursion." "The country was laid waste and desolate; the troops not only exacted heavy contributions, but went about in marauding parties, with such savage fury that the Brescians themselves were terrified."—*Guerra dell' Indipendenza*, pp. 66, 72.

Pepe, at any rate, was on the Po, not without hopes of bringing his division into Venetia, in spite of his faithless sovereign. Venetia, in the meanwhile, had been relieved from her worst immediate fears. Vicenza had been tried, and showed good countenance. The enemy, though much stronger, was at least one : he had done his worst at Goito with his united might, and showed himself unable to cope with him. It mattered little when and where he should attain him ; it mattered little whether he should wear him out by temporising, or whether he should tread him down by a daring but dangerous course.

The political horizon, too, it must be observed, seemed to present, on all sides, the most auspicious phenomena in his favour. France, in utter distraction and anarchy, had relieved him from immediate uneasiness. The very "army of the Alps" had been removed from the frontier, and was soon to be summoned to the metropolis. England negotiated for him, and urged on Baron Hummelauer the necessity of an entire relinquishment of Italy on the part of the House of Habsburg. What more ? the representative himself of that ancient dynasty was, since May 17th, a fugitive in the valleys of Tyrol. Up to the 26th of that month, the powers of evil seemed to have prevailed against the empire. The Academic Legion at Vienna obtained, on that day, a new and more signal advantage. Government, order, any rational, decisive course, had become an impossibility in Vienna. Austria, the king was more than ever persuaded, was in her death-throes ; as one of his statesmen, General Perrone, not unaptly said on a later occasion, "She should be dealt with as a

mad dog: suffered, that is, to die of her own rage, nothing being more dangerous than to meddle with her in that last stage of disease."

Alas! few men in the king's camp could see that the emperor's flight to Innsbruck was a master-stroke of policy, that from it was to date the salvation of the Austrian monarchy. The king, easy on that score, only speculated on the best means of keeping Radetzky at bay; and little doubt is there, had he at least done his part well, had Radetzky succumbed, Vienna might never have seen the emperor within its walls again.

On his own part, Radetzky, after the field-day at Goito, showed also no little hesitation. He had fallen back between Goito and Mantua, and profited by the oversight of the Piedmontese, which allowed him to re-assemble his forces. The thought of a renewed attack evidently crossed his mind,* but the news of the fall of Peschiera, the report of the disturbances at Vienna of the 26th of May, seemed to have shaken his resolution. The heavy rains on the first days of June compelled him also to comparative inaction. On the third, he had already meditated a new plan,—a bold plan, evidently the offspring of genuine genius, which, although it proved a death-stroke to Italy, the bitterest of Radetzky's enemies would not hesitate to place beside the happiest inspirations registered in the annals of military exploits.

He resolved to march on Vicenza!

* See the accounts in the "Wiener Zeitung," June 8th. Radetzky during those few days ravaged the whole country as far as Medole, near Castiglione delle Stiviere, with no little alarm to Brescia and Milan itself.

Under the very eyes of his always unconscious adversary, he raised his camp on the night from the 3d to the 4th of June, and stole back into Mantua. On the 5th, directing two of the reserve brigades upon Verona, by Isola della Scala, so as to mask his real movement, and lead the Sardinians into the belief that the whole army was marching into that direction, he brought the first and second corps to Legnago and hence to Vicenza.* The reserve itself had no sooner reached Verona, than all the garrison of that town, 6000 men and two batteries, under Culoz, sallied forth in the direction of San Bonifacio, and were first at the rendezvous in sight of the devoted city.

At the same time, Welden, who had hitherto hung in suspense in Tyrol, between Lombardy and Venetia, now received orders to join the marshal in the latter province, and making his utmost speed from Trento, had stationed himself at Bassano, whence, at the appointed time, he brought also his 16,000 men to Vicenza.†

Radetzky, who had rested for twenty-four hours at Montagnana, completed his march on the 8th and 9th. On the evening of the latter day, his immense force had silently encompassed the city on all sides. The left bank of the Bacchiglione, with the railway to

* For the particulars of this wonderful march, see Willisen, 115 ; Pimodan, 660.

† This on the authority of Custozza, " Campagne d' Italie," p. 93. Radetzky, however, in his own account (published at Innspruck, June 14th) states that Welden had no part in the conflict at Vicenza, being still at Montebelluno. From Welden's own reports, it would also seem that he was engaged on the 10th at Bassano, and passed hence to Treviso.

Padua, were among the first points occupied; all retreat upon Padua and Venice was thus cut off, even before the commencement of the assault, and strong columns of troops equally advanced upon the other roads leading to Este or Treviso.

Vicenza lies at the foot of the Berici mountains, a range of hills forming, with the Colli Euganei, one of the most delicious districts in Italy. The possession of these heights, especially of those immediately commanding the town, could not fail to bring the population and garrison to immediate extremities, and Radetzky ordered, before all things, the occupation of those all-important points.

Durando had then the supreme command in Vicenza, and had, besides his Swiss and Roman regular troops, a large number of volunteers, amongst them the Antonini legion, altogether 12,000 combatants, besides the population and its national guards.

It has been deemed a grave error on his part to tarry on the spot on the approach of so powerful a host, for Radetzky had certainly no less than 43,000 men, with a large force of heavy artillery, under his orders. But, on the one hand, it is not unlikely that Durando was far from expecting that the enemy could muster up in such terrific numbers, without the total abandonment of all his positions on the Adige, and that he very reasonably concluded, that if the marshal was guilty of such an imprudence, Charles Albert would not fail to profit by his errors, possess himself of Verona, and then press closely on the marshal's footsteps. On the other hand, there seems little doubt but that Radetzky's measures were taken with so much foresight,

accuracy, and rapidity, that the Italian general only became aware of the extent of his danger when it was no longer in his power to escape it.

Durando had heard that Radetzky was with 24,000 men encamped at Montagnana on the 6th. Of the movements of the rest of the army he had no knowledge. The false report of a victory of the Piedmontese at Sanguinetto, naturally enough led him to believe that Radetzky was in full retreat, and that his other corps would have enough on their hands in disputing the passage of the Adige against Charles Albert's triumphant army. From the attack of even such a force as was reported at Montagnana, Durando thought he had nothing to apprehend. A corps of 18,000 men with forty cannon had been driven back from Vicenza only twelve days before, and since that time he had been at great pains to augment and arrange his means of defence. He had ordered entrenchments to be dug on the most important heights of the Monti Berici, he had occupied them with 3000 of his best men, under Massimo d'Azeglio and Colonel Cialdini, and had distributed the rest of his forces in the suburbs and before the several gates of the city, which he had also fortified in great haste with trenches and barricades.

He had urgently, but with little effect, been soliciting Venice, and even Rome, for supplies of ammunition and cannon, and had, we are told, assured the King of Sardinia that, at all events, he could always hold the city for six or eight days;* a

* Princess Belgiojoso, in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," vol. xliii. p. 807; Custozza, p. 98.

promise he would probably have made good against the odds that Radetzky might in reason be expected to bring into action.

The transcendent daring and power of combination of the old marshal defeated all these plausible calculations.

The investment of the city was accomplished with great accuracy on the 9th. The attack commenced at daybreak on the 10th. Radetzky directed Culoz, with about 12,000 men, to take possession of the heights overhanging the city: besides the immense advantage in numbers, the Austrians brought twenty-four field-pieces into play. The defenders, chiefly Swiss and Roman regular troops, held their ground with rare manliness. D'Azeglio, Cialdini, and other commanding officers, were severely wounded. The latter-named, especially, a man who had won the highest reputation for personal prowess and singular military abilities in Spain, fell pierced through the body, and was left dead, to all appearance, on the ground. Notwithstanding the loss of their leaders, the post was disputed inch by inch for many hours. The defenders had to be driven from house to house, from every cover, and repeatedly returned to the charge, and were often on the point of wrenching the victory from the overwhelming enemy.

The Austrians established themselves on the heights in the end, and hence their artillery, sixty-two pieces, immediately opened its fire on the city. The other divisions of Radetzky had not been inactive in the meantime; a simultaneous onset had been made against all the outposts, against all the gates of Vicenza. To-

wards evening, most of the outward defences had been taken by storm, and the garrison had fallen back upon their barricades at the town gates.

The night did not put an end to the fight. But the garrison was under arms since thirty-six hours. It had to contend with an enemy who could still bring fresh troops to the onslaught, part of the artillery was dismounted; the bravest men lay disabled by wounds; ammunitions fell short; no rescue at hand; no tidings of the King of Sardinia; no prospect, but death and destruction. The municipal authorities, and part of the troops and people, insisted upon burying themselves under the ruins of the houses. The white flag was twice hoisted up, twice fired upon and hurled to the ground, by the most desperate among the defenders.

Durando saved them in spite of themselves. He obtained what is called an honourable capitulation. The garrison was allowed to leave the town with all the honours of war, on condition of not serving against Austria for the space of three months. The citizens' life and property were to be spared, and a general amnesty was amongst the most explicit terms.

The capitulation was signed on the 11th, at six o'clock in the morning. The town was to be delivered up at noon. The Austrians, however, only entered it at three o'clock. The same Culoz brigade, who had mainly contributed to the reduction of the city, received orders for an immediate march back into Verona, which city it reached on the night from the 12th to the 13th. The marshal himself was already at Vicenza on the 12th, and the whole of his first corps joined him there on the 13th, at noon.

Other divisions of the marshal's forces were directed to complete the subjugation of the Venetian mainland.

Padua, a large town of 50,000 inhabitants, with a strong circuit of walls, and partly surrounded by water, might have offered better chances of defence than Vicenza; Pepe had just arrived with the sad relics of his Neapolitan division and a good number of volunteers at Rovigo, on the 9th of June. He had about 6000 men with him, and his vanguard was already at Monselice. That vanguard marched forward to Padua, but the thought of defending that city never seems to have crossed the general's mind. He followed with the rest of his troops, but only to proceed through Padua and Caverzere to Venice.* Padua, left to itself, had neither time for capitulation nor defence. Its own civic guards forsook it, and that so precipitately, that some of the artillery and baggage fell into the enemy's hand. This was on the night between the 12th and 13th. Treviso had a garrison 4000 men strong; these suffered themselves to be surrounded by Welden, with the 2d corps of reserve, on the 14th, and accepted a capitulation analogous to that of Vicenza. Palmanova, with about 1800 volunteers, and a company of Piedmontese artillery and 100 cannon, might have held out against widely superior forces. Zucchi, however,

* Pepe, "Events in Italy," p. 230; Custozza, "Insurrection et Guerre d'Italie," p. 97. The order to withdraw the garrisons from Padua and Treviso had been issued by the government at Venice on the 12th. The garrison of Padua obeyed, that of Treviso insisted on an obstinate defence, and only capitulated after tumultuous remonstrances on the part of the people.—*Sunto Storico Critico dei Fatti accaduti nelle Province Venete*, pp. 47-49.

without money or provisions, found himself in the impossibility of resisting the importunity of the inhabitants, who pressed him to surrender.* The place had been besieged since the end of April. It was now reduced to extremity, and the garrison gave signs of mutiny. It fell, therefore, by capitulation, on the 24th of June.† All the Venetian kingdom, with the exception of the Lagoon itself, and of the Alpine stronghold of Osopo, was thus at the mercy of the Austrian.

The loss of this territory, but especially the red-
dition of Vicenza, was by far the most grave and
calamitous of all those cruel Italian vicissitudes. As
it too often happens in great and sudden disasters,

* Custoza, p. 97.

† "Already, towards the end of April, General Zucchi had been on the point of stealthily abandoning the fortress of Palmanova, then threatened by the Austrians, in order to repair, by the aid of a disguise, to the head quarters of Charles Albert. It was the wife of the greatest Italian tragedian, Madame Modena, who caused the general to give up this venturous plan. The invasion of Venetia by the Austrians, after the capitulation of Durando, seemed, at least, a favourable opportunity for the execution of his projected retreat, in which the Piedmontese artillery-men had now entered. The Venetian volunteers, who were part of Zucchi's corps, had to submit, not without regret, to the will of their general."—*Princess Belgiojoso*, "*Revol-
ution de Venise, Revue des Deux Mondes*," xxiv. 815. It is difficult to resist the impression that it was the riotousness of the volunteers that drove that feeble-minded Zucchi to distraction, and made him think of deserting his post. We are told otherwise, that Palmanova was well supplied with means and provisions.—*Sunto*, &c., 53. See the Austrian account of dissensions and even actual fighting within the place, as well as of Zucchi's intended flight, in Lord Ponsonby's despatch, May 24th, "Correspondence," part ii. p. 519.

it gave rise to the darkest suspicions, to the bitterest recriminations. General Durando was most especially the aim of all the shafts of envenomed malignity. We have seen how dexterously he acquitted himself of a difficult task, in the defence of the Piave and Brenta. He was unsuccessful there, owing to a variety of circumstances beyond human control. We have equally examined the reasons urged in exculpation of his imprudence in suffering himself to be shut up in Vicenza. If we acquit him of that error, we must still rate him severely for his unwillingness to commit the town to a resistance *à outrance*. All military authorities agree, that a renewal of the fight on the 11th would have been an act of the most wanton cruelty. A few hours' bombardment would have reduced the city—the city of Palladio—into a heap of ashes. Upon the burning ruins the garrison and the people would mercilessly have been put to the sword. Materially, the very few hours that it would have cost Radetzky to take Vicenza by storm, would not have affected the sequel of the campaign; but the moral effect of that terrible execution would have passed all calculation. It was the demolition of Milan under Barbarossa, in 1162, and nothing else, that brought forth the victory of Legnano fourteen years later, and several centuries of vigorous independent existence for Italy. That country, we are firmly convinced, can be redeemed at no other price than blood—blood, shed wisely and sparingly, if circumstances admit of it, but in torrents also, and with utter recklessness, if necessity require it. Udine, Belluno, and Feltre had already

given too glaring a scandal by their dastardly submission. But Vicenza was large enough, and had combatants in sufficient number to make amends for it. It was good for Italy that Vicenza should cease to be. If its buildings and helpless population pleaded irresistibly to the hearts of the defenders, then a thousand ways for an honourable death awaited these latter outside the walls. Many were willing to bear witness to their country's cause with their blood, and we cannot thank Durando for hindering them. Woe to him who teaches a revolutionized nation that there are two issues to an engagement! A national war is no game of chess. Strategic combinations may aid its success, but are not to interfere with its reverses. Where the soldier is allowed to strike his colours, the patriot is bidden to die.

Are we told that these exaggerated notions of a citizen's duty are no longer suitable to our refined and humanized age? We might refer to Saragozza and Moscow for a different conclusion, but we limit ourselves to this assertion merely—that out of the strictest rules of old-fashioned heroism there is no possible resurrection for Italy. The capitulation of Vicenza established a fatal precedent, of which Milan was too eager to avail itself a few months later; and if the Italians better learned how to stand on their city bastions at Brescia, Bologna, Messina, or Rome, it was only when the great national game was irreparably lost, and when their sacrifice could only remain as a glorious warning to future generations.

But before the surrender, on the heights of Mount Berico, at Castel Rombaldo, in the church and con-

vent of the Madonna del Monte, at every one of the threatened points, brave deeds had been done. For the honour of mere soldiers more than enough had, indeed, been accomplished; noble lives were lost, and the Austrians had to purchase their victory at a terrible rate. Prince Taxis, Colonels Kavanagh and Koppal, with a great number of officers, lost their lives; not many withdrew from the contest unhurt. On the Italian side, the Swiss lost 600 men and 14 officers. During those eighteen hours' conflict thousands fell on both sides.*

The accounts on the Austrian side are, indeed, less favourable to the native Italian part of the defenders. "The Swiss proved themselves brave men," says Pimodan,† "but the Crusaders were arrant cowards; they suffered the former to bear alone the brunt of the combat: scarcely did I see two Italians among the heaps of dead bodies with which their Helvetian confederates had strewn the ground." He adds, that as the garrison filed out of the vanquished place, the whole of the Austrian soldiery crowded round those gallant Swiss and took them by the hand, whilst the Romans, in spite of their fine looks and grand bearing, were suffered to pass on in silence, followed by looks of ill-disguised contempt.

There may be prejudice and ill-nature in these remarks, though the young officer has been lavish of

* The Austrian accounts give only 150 dead and above 600 wounded. Willisen's "*Italienische Feldzug*," p. 123. 600 men and 40 officers were lost, says Radetzky's own account, published at Innsbruck, June 14th.

† "*Guerre d'Italie, Revue des Deux Mondes*," Aug. 1850, p. 666.

the highest encomiums both of Piedmontese and Italian valour in other encounters. A certain spite towards the men who had taken the cross against his party as if against heathens, or, indeed, mere wild beasts, may be naturally attributed to him. The cheering of the Swiss by their German victors might arise as much from a natural feeling of *quasi-consanguinity* as from a deeper design to wean such stout defenders from a cause to which, since the pope's encyclic of April 29th, only a questionable sense of duty in reality bound them ; but we were willing to quote the young hussar's own words—with whatever caution they may deserve to be accepted,—because we thought that some limit should be put to the intolerable boastings of those heroic Crusaders. Like the Tuscans of Curtatone, the *Reduci* of Vicenza—as the volunteers restored to the Roman States by virtue of that capitulation were styled,—were not only inexhaustible in the recital of their miraculous deeds, but they actually converted an honourable defeat into a victory, and thought more of the ovations and rewards that were due to their valour than of the necessity the country was in to look for reparation to their losses.

It is well for the Italians that they should accustom themselves to hear the truth, even from an enemy's lips. All that is false and exaggerated in such assertions falls easily to the ground ; but enough remains to impress them with the necessity of greater exertions on their part on some future emergency : for it is as much as an honest Italian can make good if he assert that in these disastrous transactions the honour at least of the country was saved.

The stain of cowardice has been virtually washed away, we think, whatever sneering strangers may say to the contrary. Had mere lavishing of life been sufficient to the ransom of Italy, we doubt not but eager martyrs would have stepped forward till the scores were settled. But the Italians, especially volunteers, are to abate not a little of their insufferable presumption ere a man may be found able to render their sacrifices of some avail ; no genius or valour can achieve anything with troops that have not learned the sacred virtue of obedience. Every bayonet in Italy, every sabre, or even drum, was thinking, censuring, murmuring. The soldier's duty seemed limited to fault-finding. Every volunteer-band was "an army of generals." Nor was it merely the commander's tactics, his skill or providence, that were called into question. The honesty of his motives, his integrity, his devotion, were the theme of most ungenerous comments.

That stupid word "*Tradimento*" was the first that occurred to Italian lips.

Whilst Radetzky was thus, by the bold execution of a bold plan, strenuously reasserting Austria's claims over the Venetian provinces,—whilst his lieutenants were actively disarming the terrified population, and striking silence into them by the proclamation of a state of siege,—whilst thousands of the bravest youth, the very nerve of the people, were leaving Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso, scattered beyond hope of ralliance,—where, one may well ask with indignation, where tarried the astounded Charles Albert of Sardinia ?

Charles Albert had, on the 4th of June, effected his grand march upon Mantua ; he had fallen in with a few

scattered stragglers, the sick and wounded, and, more numerous, the deserters of the decamped enemy. He found everywhere palisades, entrenchments, and other fresh proofs of the activity of his octogenarian adversary, which assured him of the design he had long harboured of a long stay before Mantua; he found whole villages in flames, swarms of houseless rustics, all isolated hearths desolate. Charles Albert advanced as far as the old Tuscan posts of Curtatone and Montanara, and then, satisfied that Radetzky could *only* have returned to Verona, he led his host back to his favourite positions of Sona and Somma Campagna. On the 7th, at Valleggio, we are told,* he received positive information that Radetzky had made his appearance at Montagnana, and threatened Durando at Vicenza; the king had then four days to hasten to the rescue of that place, which only fell on the 11th. Had he crossed the Adige without delay—all military authorities aver,—and occupied the heights of Caldiero, and given timely warning to Pepe and Durando, he would have fallen upon the enemy, as this latter, in his eagerness to compass Vicenza round about, had scattered his forces in every direction, and compelled him to a battle in which his Roman and Neapolitan auxiliaries might have played a significant part.

Instead of this, he accomplished absolutely nothing during the fatal week which decided the fate of Venetia,

* Custozza, p. 98. The minister of war, Franzini, wrote on that day from Valleggio, to inform Durando that "the Austrians were marching upon Legnago, with a view to act against him," without, however, adding to this mere warning either orders or directions.

save only the conquest of the *plateau* of Rivoli, which the enemy hardly dreamed of disputing.

We have seen how, on the occurrence of the combats of Curtatone and Goito, the left of the Piedmontese army had been somewhat endangered by the sudden attack of an Austrian column, which descended from that very *plateau* with some hope of succouring Peschiera. The king wished to obviate the recurrence of similar surprises by occupying Rivoli itself, and extending his conquest to the natural strongholds that have power effectually to close all the outlets from those parts of the Tyrol.

He marched upon Rivoli with a considerable force, on the 16th of June, and on the following day on La Corona. Both places were given up by the enemy without contest.

On his return after this poor expedition, on the evening of the 10th, at Garda, he received confirmation of the rumoured movements of Radetzky, which he probably had disbelieved on the 7th. On the morrow (11th), one of Durando's officers, who had left Vicenza on the 9th, brought more positive details. It was only then that, aware of the almost defenceless state of Verona, he moved against it with nearly all his host. His host was all gathered together at Villafranca, on the morning of the 13th, but nearly the whole of that day was lost in clumsy preparations; a heavy rain rendered an attack impracticable in the evening, and the news of the fall of Vicenza soon made the king aware of the uselessness of his movement. Radetzky had already followed Culoz into Verona on the previous night, and Verona had by this time a sufficient force within its

walls to render it the inaccessible fortress it ever was.

But, the military critics continue, if a *coup de main* on Verona was already out of the question, could Charles Albert, with the 40,000 men he had ready at hand, attempt nothing else? Could he not throw his whole force across the Adige, and leaving Verona behind him, turn against the several Austrian corps in the Venetian provinces, and revive the courage of that prostrate population? Venice, they contend, with its open sea, and his own fleet, was always there for a safe shelter in case of defeat. The king had already too long jeopardised his position from want of determination. It was at length necessary that he should feel the necessity of risking—in order to save or lose,—everything.

But, alas! in Charles Albert the duties of a military chief were fatally associated with the obligations of a political prince. His army was not—as it should have been,—everything to him. A plan such as we have sketched would, in case of a reverse, have exposed, not Milan and Lombardy alone, but his own states beyond the Ticino, to the ravaging inroad of the enemy. He could not but think with dismay of the terms his own subjects would have to accept, if a lost battle should have shut him up in Venice, or compelled him to seek safety in the wooden walls of his fleet. Eagle-flight of genius was out of the question with him. He did not even conceive the necessity for any such extraordinary exertion. He was still slumbering on a treacherous security. His adversary made no mien of disturbing him. A demonstration on the Adige, to show his readiness to dispute the passage of that stream, and an

unsuccessful attempt at regaining the position of La Corona, was all that Radetzky ventured upon for some weeks after his subjection of the Venetian *terra firma*. The inaction was equal on both sides. Both parties were awaiting reinforcements.

Only the situation of the two armies and their spirit was far different indeed from what it had hitherto been. Master of Venetia, and of all the mountain passes that lead from Tyrol into that province, Radetzky breathed freely. His communications with Germany were fully re-established, and the subdued provinces had become tributary to all his wants. From behind his unconquerable walls he could bide his own time and opportunity : give battle only when, and where, and as he listed. The humbled population of Venetia, the strong garrison still in arms at Venice, inspired him with no uneasiness. He knew the Italians too well not to be aware of their inability to rally after a defeat.

His soldiers had been able to appreciate his talents ; he had made at Vicenza but too ample amends for his blunders at Milan. The devotion of those troops knew no bounds. The consciousness of great achievements had raised their spirits. Ease, plenteousness, even luxury and pleasure, enlivened the dulness of garrison life. They had several members of the Imperial family amongst them ; men of rank, of wealth, of name, as spectators, as adventurers, from all parts of Germany, rendezvoused at Verona.

Confidence in their leader—the great secret of Austrian discipline,—was restored to its fullest extent. Radetzky had no thinking bayonets in his camp. His will stood his soldiers instead of Providence. In their

judgment, the marshal could do no wrong. Whatever the result of his manœuvres, all had been ordained for the best.

The Piedmontese, on the contrary, suffered much ; and had hitherto, as they must feel, accomplished but little. The improvidence of the *commissariat* was daily more glaring, more unpardonable. Food was ever scarce, ever of the most wretched description. The long spring rains, the inclement summer heats, did severe execution amongst troops that were hardly ever under a roof, and never under barracks or tents. We have seen whole regiments of the Savoy brigade lying for days and nights in mire as deep, black, and offensive, as that in which Dante doomed his gluttons to wallow. In the lowlands near Mantua, the men's sufferings were especially intense.

The rewards of such hardships were as yet irrelevant. The taking of Peschiera was but a meagre trophy by the side of Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso. St. Lucia was but a profitless carnage ; Goito, at the utmost, a passive success, void of results.

The Piedmontese had hitherto been led like sheep to the slaughter ; they did not fail to perceive it. Had they had any doubt on the subject, there were demagogues enough in the camp to make them aware of it. There were plotters and schemers, with and without uniform, ever ready to improve any fit of ill-humour or despondency on the soldiers' part. The task was not only a hard, an objectless, hopeless one,—it was also a thankless task. Who were Charles Albert's warriors toiling for ? Was it for these Mantuan or Veronese hinds, so ready to vanish at their approach, so dull, so

shy, so sullen, so unconquerable in their fears? Who suffered them to starve on the most fertile of soils, from whom neither good treatment nor money could obtain good-will or sympathy, co-operation, or even knowledge of the enemy's movements?*

The cowardice, especially of the Veronese peasantry, is not to be described, though it may be easily accounted for. Those poor countries were too often the theatre of unbridled military brigandage. Not a few still lived of the wretched spectators and victims of Bonaparte's glorious campaigns. The tactics which necessity taught them to adopt against the ruthless fury of foreign armies were now inexorably applied with regard to their Sardinian allies. To fly, to hide all that could tempt the trooper's cupidity, to turn their villages into as many "cities of the dead," were the only means of safety they could think of. No plague-stricken land could exhibit such an aspect of voiceless desolation as those smiling Veronese districts.

Or was it for the Milanese, for the rich and idle burghers of Cremona and Lodi, that the Piedmontese

* The charge so often brought against this poor peasantry of being in their heart favourable to the Austrians, and of evincing their partiality by supplying them with all information respecting the movements of the Italian troops, strikes us as utterly absurd. Their ruling god was fear, and they thought they could best provide for their safety by a craven neutrality. The Austrians, at any rate, did not seem greatly satisfied with these boons. "The Sardinian army are most accurately informed by the peasantry, which is favourable to their cause, of every movement of the Austrian army; whilst the latter find great difficulty in obtaining any knowledge of the movements of the enemy."—*Consul Magenis's despatch*, Vienna, June 9; "*Correspondence*," ii. p. 579. The Austrian generals who opposed Bonaparte in 1796, 1797, made the same complaint of ill-will on the part of the inhabitants.—See Botta.

were dying of hunger and disease even more than of wounds? for the Milanese, who had looked upon them with jealousy and ill-will from the first, whose newspapers came to them loaded with abuse of themselves, of their generals, of their king; for the Milanese, who left their allies alone to fight out *their own* battles; who grudged them food and raiment, who strutted and swaggered about their *cafés* with ponderous broadswords clattering at their sides, bragging of the undying achievements of their "five days," twaddling about the inalienable rights their blood had then purchased, squabbling about "the people's sovereignty, constituent assemblies," disposing of themselves on their own terms, as if the war were long since at an end, and its close were the undeniable result of their own exertions?

For a Piedmontese no less than for a French, no less than for any but, perhaps, a Teutonic army, stagnation will always be synonymous with corruption. The vices in the organisation of Charles Albert's troops began to burst forth in all their glaring hideousness. There had hardly ever been anything like police in the camp. Absence without leave for an indefinite period of time was not accounted desertion. Never had army more inconceivable swarms of stragglers. From the very earliest days, the march of those regiments was anything but encouraging to behold. At Asola, Bozzolo, Gazzoldo, &c., whole regiments were to be seen careering whole nights with the jolly townspeople, with whom they were allowed to *fraternise* over their cups. Till a few severe lessons taught them better habits, the very duties of guard and patrol were discharged with but indifferent attention.

The Piedmontese, it is fatal to record, were, in their own mind, marching to a certain victory. So long as the enemy shunned all encounters, the enforcement of too strict a discipline was deemed needlessly vexatious as applied to the "champions of freedom." Every regiment had its own tribunes and ringleaders; and when the position of the army became more precarious, the evil, always inveterate in Italian troops, had, from contrary reasons, become incurable. The disaster of St. Lucia broke the last bonds of subordination.

It is thus that an army, especially a southern army, passes from overweening confidence to groundless, abject despondency. It loses all faith in itself, sees itself doomed to certain defeat. The inexperience of its leaders, the falseness of its position, its isolation, the lukewarmness or open defection of its allies,—a combination of evils, seems to render such a finale inevitable; and when once come to this conclusion, there is no lack of men who hasten with their secret wishes its speedy consummation: the soldier who has despaired of victory is but too often apt to long for defeat.

CHAPTER VI.

State of Parties—Mazzini—His Views—His Position—His first Steps—The Lombard Government—Venetian Government—The Scheme of Annexation—Its Motives and Objects—Mazzini's Objections—When and how the Annexation Scheme was proposed—at Parma and Modena—at Milan—at Venice—Its Effects—in Lombardy—in Piedmont—Remarks on Charles Albert's Policy—His Opponents.

THUS was Charles Albert losing time; and, in 1848, time was all for him—all for the enemies he had before and behind him. Every day of inaction on the part of the king was breathing-time for Radetzky and Mazzini.

We owe the chief of "Young Italy" this justice, that he was by no means exaggerated or uncompromising on his first appearance at Milan.

Whatever may be thought of his ambition or tenacity of opinion, Mazzini, like all high-minded Italians, loves his country far better than himself, and sets its union and independence far above all other political considerations. He clings to his ideas, because he sees no possible redemption for Italy except through them only; and he aspires to power because he has faith in no other man under the sun,—because no one, he thinks, can wield power so as to work out his own purposes therewith. He has made an idol of his system—such as it is,—and deems himself alone competent to minister to

its altar. He stands friendless, companionless among the high-minded and generous. No man was ever allowed to graft a single thought in the conception that sprang up complete and mature in his brains.

His faith is in "God and the people"—he alone God's interpreter—the people his blind instrument!

Had he had faith in royalty, in aristocracy, in an armed power, in other men—had he reckoned the odds like other political gamblers, he would have felt the necessity of seconding Charles Albert with all his powers, at least, until the close of the war.*

But Mazzini himself, with all his uprightness and consistency, was not, however, keen-sighted enough to escape the common delusion of the times. He also seemed to think slightly of the chances of that unfortunate war. He seemed only apprehensive that the Piedmontese would conquer too easily, and conquer without him. After having achieved so much for the emancipation of Italy, it was rather mortifying to see it accomplished by other means than his own, in obedience to views he had so long denounced and opposed.

Had the thought of a contrary result crossed his mind, had he been apprehensive of the final defeat of Charles Albert, the narrowness of his views would equally have kept him from a cordial co-operation. His reliance was in "God and the people." Cannons and

* "With all my aversion to Charles Albert, the executioner of my best friends, with all my contempt for his weak and cowardly nature, with all my popular tendencies, if I deemed him capable of true ambition, capable of uniting Italy for his own advantage, I should say, Amen."—Mazzini's *Letter to De Boni*, Jan. 3, 1848, in the "*Archivio Triennale delle cose d'Italia*," Capolazo, 1850, vol. i. p. 443.

bayonets had no weight in his scales ; ideas alone work wonders.

His *début* at Milan was cautious and considerate, notwithstanding.

Mazzini had left London on the 27th of March, under the impression, arising from false newspaper reports, that Charles Albert had not only flatly refused to march to the rescue of the Milanese, but had actually opposed the departure of armed volunteers from his states. He found far different accounts on his arrival in Paris, twelve hours later. The king's proclamation of the 23d, and the advance of his vanguard upon Milan, left no doubt as to the triumph of the national cause. Mazzini met there the friends of the "Association" which he had established since January ; and a determination was entered into that "the kings" should not triumph without them. They that had lived in France had, by a strange hallucination, come to the rash conclusion, that the republic must needs make the tour of the world. Mazzini himself scarcely needed the February revolution to confirm him in that long-cherished opinion. The republic was the fate of the world. Even if he admitted reasons which could put off its consummation in aristocratic England or chivalrous France, democracy, he thought, was a matter of vital necessity in Italy.

We need not dwell to any length on the arguments brought forth by him in support of these sweeping theories. They are all grounded on the traditions of the country. All symptoms of strong vitality, he says, always developed themselves under republican forms. "The initiative of progress in Italy has always

belonged to the people,—to the democratic element. All her memories of insurrection against the foreigner are memories of the people.”* Italy, in short, never has been—never can be—except by virtue of her people.

There is much that is true, but much also that is incorrect,—much that is specious and hollow, in this manner of reasoning. It is not true, for instance, that “almost everything that has worked its difficult way in art, in literature, or in political activity, is plebeian.”† Michael Angelo, Dante, Macchiavello, Galileo—all poets, save Pietro Aretino, Metastasio, and the like—had fine blood in their veins. In Italy, also, “blood is not water.” Even if we were to admit that “the Italian nobility can never be regarded as an historical element,”‡ that “the original stock being nearly everywhere extinct, the races have become degenerated amidst corruption and ignorance,”—we would still contend that the aristocracy has, directly or indirectly, been, even in Italy, the soul of the people; that, with or without constituted rights and acknowledged privileges, it will, by the very nature of mankind, long continue to be so.

There is no doubt but “the people” *lived* in Italy, when it was, perhaps, on a level with dumb cattle elsewhere. No doubt but that divine impulse which pushed Italy so far in advance of her neighbours in the middle ages, sprang from the people alone.

* See the preface to the English translation of “*Cenni e Documenti*,” under the new title of “*Royalty and Republicanism in Italy*,” p. viii. London, 1850.

† *Ibid.* p. ix.

‡ *Ibid.* p. ix.

The people, however, never organised, never built, anything. It only stood in the way of all possible organisation and construction.

We will not speak of Piedmont or Sicily, which are, however, part of Italy, and which can boast of as heroic a loyalty as ever was exhibited in England, Aragon, or Castile. The wars consequent on the Vespers of Palermo, the defence of Turin in the days of Pietro Micca, were not undertaken in the name of "God and the people." At Genoa and Venice, the popular element only achieved wonders when subjected to the calm and steady rule of an aristocratical—nay, oligarchic—power. In Lombardy and Tuscany—those headquarters of Italian democracy—the tree of liberty needed the almost yearly irrigation of patrician blood. The "splendid anarchy" of Milan and Florence, to what did it lead, save only to the tyranny of Visconti and Medici? What spectacle did those wrangling communities ever exhibit to the world, save only that of a people choked by the very exuberance of its vitality,—hurried to self-destruction by its very excess of energy?

We doubt, indeed, if, even in the most ranting periods of jealous radicalism, the Italian cities were ever free from patrician influence, however cleverly disguised; we doubt whether the revolts of Naples against the Inquisition, the very riots of Masaniello, the expulsion of the Austrians at Genoa,—nay, the very "five days" of Milan, did not arise from suggestions and rely on support of the upper classes. We doubt whether the people ever acted, ever can act, without a head. Only in Italy the head never, or, we should say, only seldom, asserted its control over the body. Hence all the evils of Italy; hence the people who could be brought under

no aristocratic or monarchic allegiance was torn by discord, and succumbed to tyranny.

"What," says Mazzini, "is the history of the monarchy or aristocracy in Italy? what vital elements have they supplied to Italian strength, or to the unification of the future existence of Italy?"* True enough, the people in Lombardy and Tuscany have proved too strong for kings and nobles; but is it not from that very reason that Italy "never organised a society," as England did; never, as France, "produced a Charlemagne, a Louis XI., a Napoleon?" The power of the people has only been a power of evil. Mazzini cannot prove the omnipotence of the Italian people, only its invincible insubordination.

We do not well see the sense of this eternal reference to the records of the past. If Italy can only be what she has been, where does Mazzini ground his hopes for future unity and independence? His arguments prove too much. Woe to us if we cannot look on the past as a blank! if we cannot contrive something more durable than the fretful democracies of the middle ages! Else will not those ominous prophets be borne out in their assertions, who contend that Italy is her own worst enemy? that the passions of her multitude are too strong for any guidance? that the seeds of dissension are implanted in her very bosom, sure always to break forth upon her first release from the crushing weight of foreign thralldom?

Mazzini, however, though unshaken in his principles, was not equally unbending in practice. He had acknowledged and bowed to the force of opinion

* "Royalty and Republicanism in Italy," Preface, p. viii.

early in January 1848, when he proposed and established in Paris that "National Association," grounded on a compromise of all parties, and on the adjournment of all merely political questions. The February riots at Paris had, certainly, disturbed the serenity of his judgment, and induced him to a rash belief that the "plenitude of the times" had forestalled his most sanguine expectations. The five days of Milan completed his bewilderment. The people's cause, he thought, had prevailed; care need only be taken lest designing ambition may frustrate its victory, or divert it from its legitimate purpose.

Consequently, in a proclamation bearing date March 31,* even in the midst of the amazement into which the sudden success of the Lombards had thrown him, his great fears lest the people should not know how to turn that success to their own account unmistakeably pierces through. The Lombards have conquered—conquered alone—conquered for themselves and for Italy. Only let them beware of that facility (*arrendevolezza*), of that mistaken generosity, which is too often characteristic of brave men. In other words, let them beware lest they should sell themselves too cheap; lest they should too incautiously abdicate the mastery their valour had given them over themselves.

Confident as he showed himself that the Lombards' success was complete, and the destinies of Italy secured, it was only with the greatest impatience that he could be induced to tarry a few days in Paris, to give way to the importunities of his associates, who clamoured to

* "Lettera ai Lombardi," Paris, March 31, "Prose Politiche," p. 251.

be led into Italy, and looked up to him for the means of armament and conveyance. His last visit to London, when his presence would have been of the greatest moment nearer to the frontier, had no other object than this collection of means. It had, however, been unsuccessful, owing partly to the dishonesty of some of his agents; and as he came nearly empty-handed, he was compelled, by concealment and seclusion, to avoid the worst consequences of the resentment of his deluded partisans. The means were, at last, found in Paris itself, and a legion, composed of Italian, French, and Polish adventurers, set out for Marseilles, under the command of General Antonini, a veteran of the French and Polish wars, and landed at Genoa on the 24th of April.* It numbered 550 combatants. The exploits of the riotous rabble from Lyons in Savoy were yet fresh in men's minds, and the reception of these auxiliaries in the harbour of Genoa was but a cold return for the patriotic enthusiasm that animated them.† Mazzini, who was then already at Milan, and who looked upon that legion as his own war-horse, wrote in a tone of great, and not unjust, indignation on the subject.‡ The legion found no favour among the

* See Mr. Abercromby's despatch, Turin, April 26, "Correspondence," ii. p. 393.

† "The Caire was anchored under the guns of the Sardinian frigate San Michele, and positive directions were given not to allow any person to land until further orders.

"Since then the Italians have been landed at the lighthouse, from whence they will be marched to the army, under the escort of 150 Piedmontese regular soldiers."—*Mr. Abercromby, ut supra.*

‡ "Lettera al Direttore della Concordia a Torino," Milan, April 27, "Prose Politiche," p. 256.

"deceived people," either at Genoa or at Milan, and had to pass over to Venice, where, as we have seen, it did very good service before the walls of Vicenza.

Mazzini had reached Milan about the 10th of April, and had, on the spot, been able better to comprehend the real position of Italian matters. He saw that the great majority of the population was bent on carrying the *royal* experiment out to the end; that, notwithstanding the slight perturbation inseparable from the great events of Paris, Italy had come back to her original plan of universal conciliation, and looked with mistrust and dismay on all that came from France, on all that could disturb the harmony with which hitherto all ranks and parties had been able to proceed.

Mazzini himself, however, was sure of the most flattering reception, for no man in Italy questioned his great claims, or doubted the purity of his intentions. He stood on the balcony of the Palazzo Marino, the government-house in Milan, in the midst of a crowd of the new rulers of Lombardy, who were too proud to exhibit him to the people, to announce the addition of the last link to the chain of parties now happily soldered together, the conversion of the man of extremes to the dominant views of mutual forbearance and moderation.*

* "My first words in Milan were words of encouragement for the government. Requested by a person attached to monarchical forms, I addressed a prayer to Brescia, to induce that city to sacrifice its local rights, in some differences with Milan, for the sake of union and centralisation, which was then so necessary to the issue of the war."—*Cenni e Documenti*, p. 36; and see the "Lettera ai Bresciani" in his "Prose Politiche," p. 254. "I know," he says, "the men that govern here, and the exigencies of their position. Did they even err, you must give up all thought of opposition, out of regard for their intentions."

The reconciliation was, however, hollow and precarious.

The victory of the Milanese, though no less certain, began now to appear incomplete. Charles Albert had yet a hard task to accomplish : Mazzini was determined that he should not accomplish it alone. The provisional government, it seemed to him, were too recklessly playing in the king's hands. They were damping the people's ardour, they paralysed its movements, they all but disarmed it. The revolution was diverted from its sacred purpose—they turned it to the account of a party—of a class—of a person. They betrayed the country and the people.

The Milanese government were, however, true to their trust. With great timidity they might be charged, and little faith, but not with any well-settled design to coerce the people's wishes, or determine their choice. On their first despondency of the people's ultimate success against Radetzky, they had solicited the aid of all Italy ; by a natural instinct turning first to the nearest and mightiest auxiliary. Their next step—a false one—was an appeal to France.* The apparent inconsistency of this conduct was the result of conflicting views entertained by the several members of that improvised government ; but soon after those first ill-digested measures, and even before Mazzini's arrival, a compromise had been entered into : the government had pledged itself to a strict political neutrality, and limited itself to the furtherance of the national contest,

* See the address dated March 27, in Mr. Abercromby's despatch, April 14, "Correspondence," ii. p. 354.

upon no other condition than that it should be essentially and exclusively national.

To this agreement Mazzini could not but cheerfully accede. Only he thought, and not without reason, that the government were guilty of remissness and inertia; that they either did not well conceive the magnitude of the national enterprise, or by relying too much on the ready-made instrument of deliverance brought into the field by the King of Sardinia, they, from carelessness or perverseness, neglected the means that "the people" had placed in their hands.*

The government did nothing. The volunteers that had rushed to the defence of the passes of Tyrol, were left without shoes, without arms, without food. The regular forces of foot and horse, that were mustering up at Milan, were under the control of inexperienced officers; precious time was lost in vain attempts to organise them. Mazzini came daily before the war-

* "Ignorant in war, as in all else; firmly convinced that the royal army would suffice for everything; bound, for the most part, to the pact of monarchical fusion, and stupidly thinking that the only means of conducting the enterprise to a good end was to enable the king to conquer alone, and to reduce the people to a choice between Austria and him; not very loyal, and, therefore, little disposed to believe in the loyalty of others; inclined to political intrigue from poverty of heart and of intellectual conception; the most influential members of the provisional government worked with all their strength to prepare public opinion for the Piedmontese monarchy, and to raise up enemies to our party. * * * * * Bound, even before its formation, to a pact of servitude, the government distrusted us, the people, the volunteers, itself—every thing except the 'Magnanimous Prince.' * * * * * Whilst we said, 'Aid the volunteers, encourage them, send them on towards the Alps,' the destruction of the volunteer element, republican for the most part, was already sworn—sworn from the last days of March,

ministry, with offers of Polish legions, Swiss companies, Italian and other officers from both hemispheres. The war-ministry were lukewarm, cavillous, impracticable. It was evident that they were given to Charles Albert, body and soul. They were under a false impression that he alone could conquer,—that it was expedient that he should be left to conquer alone.

The conduct of the government, though certainly as objectionable as Mazzini represents it, admits, however, of a more charitable interpretation. It was an error on their part, but a natural and, as we have seen, a very general one, to attribute at first to the national struggle less importance than it really deserved. If they did not share Mazzini's own first impression that the Milanese had already done all that was needful,* they certainly, up to the end of April and May, felt firmly assured that the Piedmontese were more than equal to the work that was yet undone. It was this false security that slackened their exertions. Princess Belgiojoso brought them 200 volunteers from Naples,

when Theodore Lecchi was named to the command of the future army. They were left without arms, without clothing, without money, and violently accused each time that necessity obliged them to provide for themselves; pushed forward to the Tyrol and the passes of the Alps, then prevented from fighting; forced to quit those positions, and to abandon the rising insurrections; and recalled at last, they, the conquerors of the Five Days, wounded to the heart—to be dissolved." —*Mazzini, "Cenni e Documenti,"* pp. 37, 38. (Quoted from the English translation.)

We have given Mazzini's own words, because they sum up all that has been said on the subject by Cattaneo, the Princess Belgiojoso, &c.; our opinion of the conduct of the volunteers ought to be sufficiently evident from the preceding chapters.

* His "*Lettera ai Lombardi*," above alluded to.

and with them the announcement that 100,000 were following.* "Save us from so much help!" cried out Count Litta; and had we been there, we should surely have felt tempted to echo his ejaculation. Volunteers were an expensive means of warfare,—an unsafe, unmanageable one. The veterans who had been sent to command them gave the most unfavourable report of their waywardness and unrestraint. The Piedmontese officers, martinets of the old school, declared them to be the pest of the camp.

We have already expressed our opinion as to the good or bad qualities of these patriotic adventurers. In proper hands they were the men to work prodigies; but the Milan government and their agents were no hands to wield that two-edged weapon, and they threw it up with an ill grace.

As to the Swiss, French, and Polish auxiliaries Mazzini had ready at his beck, Italy was not—should not, at least, have been—in a position to want them, at least as soldiers.† A just feeling of national jealousy should have made the Italians disdainful that any but patriotic breasts should be opposed to the enemy's ranks. For a handful of experienced officers the go-

* Princess Belgiojoso, "Révolution Italienne, Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiii. p. 803.

† "And whilst on our side, to rally to our cause the free thought of Europe, we offered the legions formed of French and Swiss volunteers, from the king's camp came prohibitions to the government; and to obey these prohibitions the government broke the treaties just concluded with Berne and the Canton de Vaud."—*Cenni e Documenti*, p. 40. Mazzini, however, here laboured under a mistake. No soldiers or volunteers could be obtained from the Swiss government; nor even privately, except by contraband, with the greatest difficulties. See De Brunner, "Venise en 1848-49," ch. ii.

vernment should, indeed, have been thankful; as it was no disgrace for long-disarmed Italy to have unlearned the very elements of the art of war. But the *brevets* of most of these self-styled majors and colonels were sufficiently questionable; their titles and claims grounded on services in countries the very names of which had never been heard in Milan. A few instances of actual deception soon called forth exaggerated cautiousness and offensive suspiciousness. Mazzini himself was not proof against the tricks of consummate impostors. The credit that his high honour most undoubtedly deserved, could not be explicitly extended to all that came in his name.*

* "I remember that, in answer to my reiterated requests, that in order to render the war more national, and to furnish a young army with men already formed for a war of insurrection, as its officers, our exiles, who had commanded in Spain, Greece, &c., might be summoned, I was told that 'NO ONE KNEW WHERE THEY WERE.' I was not to be thus wearied out, and as I did know where they were, I obtained authority to summon them, and to authenticate my appeal, the signature of the secretary Correnti. But when they arrived, the minister, Collegno, alleging that circumstances were changed, refused their services."—*Cenni e Documenti*, p. 40. To the disappointment of many a good officer we ourselves were witnesses; it, however, in a great measure, arose from the subserviency of the Piedmontese officers to their stupid routine. "Garibaldi himself," Mazzini continues, "when he arrived from Monte Video, was he not coolly, almost scornfully, received at the monarchical camp, and then sent to Turin to see *if* and *how* he could be employed by the minister of war?" . Garibaldi arrived very late, when Mazzini, who had always been looked upon with dislike and suspicion by the Piedmontese, was already in open opposition both with them and the government of Milan. As one of Mazzini's own creatures, and ardent republican, Garibaldi could not but meet with a cold reception at the camp. He obtained employment, nevertheless, and in that capacity for which he was most eminently qualified, as a leader of free corps.

Most of these men, also,—Italians as well as Poles, Swiss, and Germans—were men grown old in exile, wedded to the bigoted views of arrant radicalism, sore with trying adversity and hope long deferred. Of the deep rogues, revolution-mongers, and abandoned characters, that were mixed with them, we will say nothing; but even men of child-like singleness of mind, integrity, and rigid morality, were, in the peculiar situation of the country at that period, scarcely less dangerous, from the narrowness of their understanding. They came, most of them, fresh from France, drunk with the excitement of that nine-day's democracy, swayed by preconceived notions of analogous tendencies on the part of the Lombard population, loud in their declamations about the people's sovereignty, intemperate in their denunciation of royalty, of aristocratic privileges; bitter especially, as not a few of them were ancient refugees of 1820 or 1833, in their invectives against the false king, that went now by the name of "the Sword of Italy."

The members of the Lombard government were not all of them bound to the interests of Charles Albert; they were not all irrevocably attached to monarchic or aristocratic forms of government; nay, there were acknowledged republicans among them: there were those who would have opposed Charles Albert's appropriation of Lombardy to the best of their powers. Still they saw that king in the foremost ranks of the combatants: they saw him alone in earnest amongst the princes of Italy; they deemed too glaring an abuse of him, of his army, of his party, to be bad policy, no less than flagrant injustice. They wished, with good reason,

to keep clear of incorrigible ranters, of malevolent detractors. Much was certainly due to their Piedmontese ally. It is possible that they carried their regards and circumspection too far; that they met Mazzini's offers with too sweeping a rejection; that they wounded the feelings of men whose services might have been, unexceptionably, of the greatest moment to the country. But would Mazzini insinuate that the services of any really good and efficient soldier were, for all the fears and suspicions of the Milan government, ever really lost to the Italian cause? Major Enrico Cialdini, he informs us, said to Collegno, the minister of war, that he would not have come all the way for nothing, and that rather than go back to Spain he would have gone to Venetia, to seek, as a common soldier, an Italian wound.* We have already seen that the Antonini legion, with many adventurers of all nations, who had in vain been suing for employment at Milan, had equally entered the service of the Venetian republic. In Venice, at any rate, neither Mazzini, nor any man of extreme parties, could complain of the aristocratic tendencies of the government, or of its proneness to advance Charles Albert's interests. Swiss, Poles, and Germans found not only a hearty welcome there, but also the admission of their, in some instances, exorbitant claims. There should Mazzini's place have also been; and we never ceased to wonder why that consistent democrat should so long have insisted in vain

* Mazzini, "*Cenni e Documenti*," p. 40 (note). Cialdini was so far from being one of Mazzini's creatures, that after being for three months in danger of his life, from his wound at Vicenza, he is now one of the best generals in the service of Piedmont.

endeavours to urge the Milanese nobles to a course that was repugnant to their convictions, no less than to their interests, when a proper sphere of action was open before him beside Manin and Tommaseo, and where, also, it was soon discovered the enemy had found Italy's most vulnerable side.

But there were other and more cogent reasons that made that poor, imbecile, Milanese government, reluctant, and, in point of fact, unable to take too large a host of auxiliaries into their pay: they had no money.

Their finances were, like every other branch of administration, in a lamentable position. Their lack of governing capacities may, to a great extent, have contributed to bring about distress; but, as we all know, in a state suddenly withdrawn from the empire of brute force, in a state two or three provinces of which were still either altogether in the enemy's hands, or were suffering by the presence of two large armies and the waste of a lawless soldiery, it is no matter for common talent to make the revenue meet the exigencies of the circumstances. The Milan government, we are informed,* was a bankrupt from the very outset. A voluntary loan it ventured upon was void of result. Public subscription did not go much further; and the enactment of a few highly moral, popular, and humane,

* These particulars are given by the Princess Belgiojoso, a writer not certainly partial to the provisional government of Milan. The Lombard finances were bankrupt only nine days after Radetzky's expulsion. Private donations produced a sum of 4,000,000 Austrian lire (the lira at 8*d.* sterling). A voluntary loan was opened first, without interest, then with an interest of 4½ and even 5 per cent. It had no effect, the princess states, because the wealthy Milanese only

but inopportune measures, such as the abolition of the lottery and the poll-tax, and a reduction in the salt monopoly, all tended to the impoverishment of the public treasury, whilst the Piedmontese army alone, we are told,* cost the Milan government 3,000,000 Austrian lire per month; and Durando, who crossed the Po against the pope's consent, and was no less abandoned than disavowed by the Roman government, fell upon Milan with all the weight of his 7000 men, and had to be got out of difficulty by dint of hard Lombard cash.†

With all these, and a hundred other public and private calls upon them, it is no wonder if the provisional government hesitated in the purchase of means, in the enlistment of troops; some of whom were to be supported in a long journey across the Alps, some of whom came with long arrears of transatlantic travelling expenses and indemnifications, and who would, most likely—so it was thought in April—only arrive when all occasion for their services had gone by.

Those unfortunate governors were, certainly, not the men of the *Comité du Salut public*. They knew not how to force from the Milanese the wealth which they certainly possessed, and which they, if properly plied, would have yielded with no great reluctance;

receive their rents in August, or November and December, and in April, consequently every purse was empty.—“*Révolution Italienne, Revue des Deux Mondes*,” xxiii. p. 797. Vice-consul Campbell (see despatch, April 3, “*Correspondence*,” ii. p. 295) spoke in very sanguine terms of the disposition of the Milanese capitalists to take up the loan, but their enthusiasm was but of short duration. Mazzini quotes Campbell, taking the promise as a fulfilment.

* Princess Belgiojoso, as above.

† Ibid.

they shrunk from energetic measures from an invincible softness of nature, no less than from a conviction that such measures were as yet uncalled-for and unwarranted; and when at last they perceived their error, and were willing to repair it, they found that the Lombards were not to be moved out of their conceit of that cheap and easy liberty; and their fiscal contrivances, clumsy and ill-timed, were resented as a gratuitous exaction, and had no other effect than an increase of their embarrassments.

The revolutionary governments of Venice and Rome, it is urged, better knew how to call forth generous sacrifices from the people committed to their guidance. We need not advert to the difference between a city and a besieged city, where every man is within immediate reach and at the utter mercy of the government, and a large state, fallen into sudden disorganisation, and amenable to no other rule than that of unarmed solicitation and request: what we most firmly insist upon is, that the necessity of extreme measures never struck the leaders of the Milanese insurrection until the very eve of that great catastrophe that put all the wisest provisions out of the question. The energies of the country were paralysed by the consciousness of an already accomplished victory; and Mazzini, who had already so loudly proclaimed that the Milanese "had triumphed for themselves and for all Italy,"* had, to the best of his power, contributed to confirm them in that most deadly illusion.

After all, we have already repeatedly seen it, the

* "Lettera ai Lombardi," as above.

republicans of Venice, up to the defeat of Charles Albert, had evinced neither greater confidence in their own forces nor greater powers of coercion upon the subjected provinces, no greater foresight, wisdom and firmness, than their aristocratic colleagues at Milan. We do not lay their failures to their charge, for statesmen are no more to be improvised than generals or admirals; only we must not hear that it was out of base servility towards Charles Albert that the Italian deserters were disbanded at Milan, as Mazzini would seem to imply;* for the most painful scenes of that kind took place in Venice, and all the eloquence, the very tears, of the man of the people, of the artisan-governor Toffoli, failed to make any impression on these degraded hirelings, who were lost to Austria but could not be won over to Italy.†

The men at the head of affairs at Milan were certainly unfit to govern. Had "better men" been anywhere to be found, nothing could be more desirable than that the former should make way for them. Nothing easier, says Mazzini himself, than to overthrow that ill-assorted government.‡ Certainly, there is

* "*Cenni e Documenti*," p. 40.

† Princess Belgiojoso, "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," xxiv. p. 809.

‡ "It was proposed to me many times, and that by well-organised forces, to overturn the government, and to endeavour to find some means of salvation through other men. I refused, then. I did more: I prevented it."—*Cenni e Documenti*, p. 74.

Cattaneo was equally certain,—and from the beginning—that all the youth of Milan were at his beck, and that it was always in his power to substitute himself and his party instead of Casati and his colleagues. We quote some of his ungenerous words, that the reader may appreciate the real causes of the downfall of Italy's

hardly anything those weak men longed for more than their release from the awful responsibility that lay every day heavier upon them. And it was especially with a view to obtain their discharge, in the hope that the helm of the state might be trusted with abler and steadier hands, that they put forth their scheme of a *Fusione*, the annexation of the revolted provinces with Sardinia into a great kingdom of Northern Italy.

This was a declaration of war to Mazzini, and he was not slow in gathering the gauntlet thus wantonly thrown.

He had hitherto bound himself to a strict neutrality. He insisted that fair play should be allowed for the development and manifestation of public opinion; that no appeal should be made to it, till the whole country should be happily rid of the common enemy, and the people had it in their power to pronounce on their own fate by an unbiassed vote.

This "honourable proposition," as he calls it, was not of his own making. He found it, at his arrival, the watchword of all parties. Charles Albert, with more than chivalrous generosity, announced, in his pro-

dearest hopes. "The most indignant," he says, "wished for an immediate proclamation of a republic, and for the solicitation of arms and officers from France and Switzerland. Others said, that if they constituted themselves into a republic, *many politicians would not have hesitated to seek an asylum in Radetzky's camp. Assuredly these pretended workmen of liberty would with more difficulty have come to an agreement with a republic than with Austria, whose protection they had formerly accepted*, and their desertion would have struck discouragement into a people, upon which they had for some time gained a certain ascendancy, by seconding the generous hatred it cherished against its oppressors."—*Insurrection de Milan*, Paris, 1848, p. 48.

clamation of March 23d, that he tendered to the people of Lombardy and Venice "that assistance which brother may expect from brother, friend from friend." The Milan government, on its own side, ended all its declarations by that stereotyped phrase, that "after the victory the nation should decide." The democrats of Venice had, indeed, taken more resolute steps, and, so far as lay in their power, pronounced on their future destinies. But their partiality for the banner of St. Mark was looked upon as a momentary giving in to the force of ancient associations, and their proclamation of a republic was treated with indulgence as by no means detrimental to the general interests of Italy, and, at any rate, not irrevocable.

Mazzini, Cattaneo, and other men of their party, indeed, do not hesitate to charge the king, the Milanese nobles, and all the so-called "moderate" patriots, with insincerity and double-dealing; they contend that that affected neutrality was a scheme by which they gained time and prepared the ground for the execution of their royal plot. "The lion roared yet," says Mazzini;* "it was necessary it should be tamed." The militant people, he adds, the heroes of the barricades, the volunteers in Tyrol and Friuli, the Roman and Swiss auxiliaries, were all republicans.† To attack that party in

* "Cenni e Documenti," p. 33.

† How far Mazzini may be borne out in his assertion as to the republicanism of all volunteers, see Dandolo, "I Volontarii e i Bersaglieri Lombardi," throughout. The Manara legion, the bravest and best organised of those free corps, served at Rome for the republic, always declaring that they were no republicans, insisting on bearing the "cross of Savoy on their sword-belts;" and went, consequently, by the name of *aristocrates*. Pp. 164, 167.

front was impossible. Hence were they abandoned. The repeated failures in the Tyrol, the fall of Venetia, are repeatedly ascribed to wilful treachery on the part of the king. He who had only two battalions of sharpshooters to oppose the thousands of Styrian and Tyrolese riflemen of Radetzky, is taken to task for not upholding the insurrection on the Alps, where, it was justly represented to him, one step more or less might have brought him into trouble with the Frankfort diet, and endlessly as well as needlessly complicated his difficulties. He who had scarcely the means of keeping Radetzky at bay, was blamed for not carrying the war into Venetia,—a quarter from which no danger was for a long time apprehended, a quarter upon which a more than sufficient host of defenders was daily on the point of arriving from Naples.

We have too often said it. There was miscalculation and pusillanimity in all this conduct of the king; an evident incapacity of duly appreciating his position, and the character of the war he had undertaken: but we must not be told that the abandonment of Tyrol, or the tardy and insufficient help to Venetia, arose from antipathy to the *Phrygian cap* that the mountaineers of the Alps had set up above the national tricolor,* or from indignation at the lion of St. Mark precluding in Venice all chances for the cross of Savoy. Had the king felt sure of success, it would have been neither surprising nor unreasonable that he should have left Tyrol and Venice

* Princess Belgiojoso, "Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiii. 803; also, xxv. 214. As to the republicanism of Tyrol, we can find no evidence of its existence anywhere but in the fancy of the princess herself.—See Dandolo.

shift for themselves, since not only as a king, but as an Italian also, he could not but regret the demonstrations, however vain and unmeaning, by which those provinces laid the ground for future misunderstanding and divisions. But no; for his own interest, for his own safety, it was incumbent on him that he should support those provinces to the best of his abilities: and he did support them, so far as his limited means and still more limited capacities—so far especially as the considerations of a narrow-minded policy, and the suggestions of a craven diplomacy, would allow him.

For our own part, if we can find fault with the king's conduct, it is especially on the score of excessive generosity and overstrained chivalrous disinterestedness. Whatever may be thought of 1820 and 1833, he followed throughout a most honourable course in 1848. Perhaps, the very consciousness of those fatal errors of his youth made such a course imperative on him. However great his ambition, he felt that it was only in the enemy's blood or in his own that those misdeeds could be washed—only by a splendid and complete victory that his name might be rehabilitated.

Mazzini, indeed, on the faith of Cattaneo, dwells upon certain intrigues carried on on the 20th and 21st of March, between the Milan government and one Count Martini, an alleged envoy from the court of Turin;* he adds that General Passalacqua, who led the

* See the whole of those conferences in Cattaneo, "Insurrection de Milan," p. 88, &c.—We find no accounts of Count Martini's mission elsewhere. Even by Cattaneo's own words, they led to no positive agreement.

Piedmontese vanguard into Milan on the 26th of March, insisted upon distinct and positive terms of dedition; most of the members of the provisional government were not only inclined, he says, but bound to favour the king's interests—though, as we have seen on the very day following, the same government issued its address to the French republic. They had, Mazzini continues, given very unmistakeable hints of their intentions, from their very first application for the king's aid, on the 23d of March;* and yet, even were we to admit of the correctness of all these statements, we would still contend that if intrigues were indeed carried on at Milan, either by Martini or by other parties, it could only be without knowledge of the king and of the sane part of his advisers. Charles Albert marched straight to the enemy, purposely avoiding Milan, though, so long as Radetzky was at Montechiari, that city might be conveniently said to lie on his way. It is in vain for Mazzini to refer to the republican character of the men of the barricades, or of the free corps on the Alps. To the everlasting honour of Italy be it said, there were in those days no parties, all were Italians; patriots; no one troubled himself about forms, theories, or "ideas." Their aim was to fight the Austrian; and the venial error into which Venice had fallen by her proclamation of a republic was

* "*Cenni e Documenti*," p. 33. The words of the Milan government in their address of March 23d are the following: "We wish it were in our power to add more; but our position as a provisional government does not allow us to anticipate the vote of the nation, which certainly tends to a greater approach towards the establishment of Italian unity." Words to that effect occur also in their address to the French republic of March 27.

visited with the universal displeasure of all her provinces on the mainland.* The good instinct of the people led them to unanimity; and as Mazzini himself has said it, "they would have sacrificed liberty, for a time, to any prince, pope, or worse, who would have taken the lead, and made them into a nation."† We do not, consequently, think that the partisans of immediate annexation could have been stayed by the "roaring of the lion," or by the necessity of "taming him beforehand."

The Milanese showed no cordiality to the Piedmontese on their first arrival, it is true; not, indeed, in consequence of any deep-rooted republican predilections,‡ but from that jealousy to which we have already

* See "Sunto Storico-Critico, dei fatti accaduti nelle Province Venete," p. 40; also, Consul-general Dawkins' despatches, March 31. "I do not, however, learn that the provisional government, as constituted in Venice, is viewed with much respect in the towns and cities of the mainland."—*Corresp.* part ii. p. 312. "Venice has remained perfectly tranquil, but the government is becoming daily more unpopular and its opponents more loud. Accounts from the mainland represent the state of feelings as little favourable to Venice, and little disposed to acknowledge her supremacy. April 20."—*Corr.* ii. 393.

† "Cenni e Documenti," p. 4.

‡ All the arguments in favour of a disposition of the Milanese towards republicanism rest on the following words: "Until now, my lord, the greatest union had prevailed amongst all classes; but since his majesty, the King of Sardinia, has entered Lombardy, two parties have sprung up: one, the high aristocratical party, is desirous that Piedmont and Lombardy should be united, with his majesty Carlo Alberto for their sovereign; the other, the middle class, in which I must distinguish the commercial and literary people, together with all the promising youth, are for a republic."—*Vice-consul Campbell*, Milan, March 31, "*Corresp.*" part ii. p. 294. The testimony of an enlightened and unimpassioned stranger is certainly of the greatest weight, and we always refer to the despatches of English agents especially with the greatest deference. Mr. Campbell, however, to say nothing of human

adverted, which made them reluctant to share with their auxiliaries the honours of a triumph, which, in the first heat of the struggle, they fancied they had already fully achieved by themselves. It was not long, however, ere they found that much remained yet to be done, and that all their headlong impetuosity was unequal to the task. On a more accurate appreciation of their real position, all feeling of jealousy and antipathy immediately wore off; and had the annexation been immediately proposed, without after-thought or disguise, it would have been carried by general acclamation.

France, it must be kept in mind, was then doing her utmost to bring republicanism into discredit; and Mazzini had not consulted the feelings of his countrymen when he had pressed Lamartine's hand, and closeted himself with his less honourable colleagues. With all the mortal sins of the past, even Charles Albert, if he could rescue Italy from Austrian despotism, and at the same time save her from that mean, hollow, hideous French democracy, was sure of a general welcome.

We have—Heaven is our witness!—no interest in clearing Charles Albert's memory from hostile imputations; no desire to set up those poor members of the Lombard government as models of disinterested patriot-

fallibility, was a personal friend of Cattaneo, and with all his regard for truth may be supposed to have seen matters in the same light as his friend. It is, however, important to observe, that in none of the numerous despatches preceding and following the above, does any allusion occur to the peculiar bias of the Milanese for a republic; whilst both in these, and in those of Mr. Dawkins, we find clear evidence of the existence of contrary feelings.

ism. The first outburst of genuine generosity may, in the king, have made way for the subsequent calculations of princely ambition : the hope of courtly favour and promotion, the thirst for orders, titles, and dignities, may have won over to Charles Albert the suffrages of the most selfish among those Milanese governors : we are the keepers of no man's conscience—but we contend that it was possible to be essentially and exclusively Italian, nay, more, to be an earnest, staunch democrat at heart, and yet to look upon that scheme of annexation as matter of immediate necessity—the very anchor of Italian salvation.

There were men in Italy of a gloomy turn of mind, whom the experience of a long night of adversity would not allow to trust a first glimpse of prosperity—men who could not bring themselves to believe that Italian independence could be obtained on such easy terms ; and who thought, besides, that had even Providence, as it were, thrown that inestimable bliss in our way, it behoved us, at least, to make sure of that union, which alone could give stability to independence itself.

The annexation of the revolted States to Piedmont would either empower Sardinia to command new resources in the event of a protracted struggle, or would enable that government to form a strong compact state in the north of Italy, able to protect, not itself merely, but the whole of the Italian peninsula, from all outrage from abroad.

Two were the dangers Italian nationality ever had, ever would have to apprehend,—foreign aggression, and intestine discord. It was deemed advisable that war with the foreigner should become the cement of domestic

union; that union should be an end no less than a means.

The want that made itself most perceptible in that din of conflicting passions was that of a steady and uniform government. Milan did not know how to enforce the allegiance of Brescia, not even with all the earnest mediation of the well-meaning Mazzini;* the sway of Republican Venice was not acknowledged beyond the lagoon. Parma and Piacenza had gone asunder, Modena and Reggio were split into two states. We always contend that these divisions did not arise from municipal rancours, but from petty personal and local ambitions, consequent on the mean acts and paltry contrivances of the late governments. Still the divisions did exist; the provisional governments knew not how to heal them. No cry was, therefore, louder than that which called for the cessation of that provisional state. The very charges brought against the Milan government, the enumeration of their blunders, omissions, backslidings, downright treasons—if we are to admit the word—are as many irrefutable proofs of the crying evil of which Italy was seeking the remedy. “Give us a strong hand,” was the cry, “the hand of a true ruler and master, who may have power to hush up vain clamours and jealousies, who may burst our purse-strings—force open our stable-doors and granaries, take ourselves and our all, and make us perform our duty to our country, in our very spite.” Like a generous steed, a brave nation instinctively feels the want of a brave rider, no matter how much she may seem to fret and kick against it. It is by the hand of a dictator

* “Lettera ai Bresciani, *Prose Politiche*,” 254.

alone—by the iron-rule of a master-mind, for a score of years at least—that Italy can hope to be regenerated and rescued. A fretful, noisy, jangling, wrangling southern race, capable of great achievements only under him who shall bring its energies under control, who shall break and tame it so as to prevent it from working its own ruin—from perpetuating its own misery.

Mazzini knows it, and is the first to acknowledge that “the leadership of a single prince would be accepted by all.”* But he adds, “where is he to be found? God alone creates genius.” A revolution alone has power to bring forth a Napoleon; give us the hero and we are willing to worship him. We need scarcely answer that “the people” also, on whom all his faith rests, is not everywhere and at all times to be found, that it also must spring from the same ordeal, and that it is not much easier to convert a slavish rabble into a community of free men, than to make a hero and a liberator out of an ambitious and bigoted despot.

Charles Albert, at all events, was not the man for the hour. In himself he was nothing; something worse than nothing. But he was the King of Sardinia,—the head, that is, of a strong, compact, unanimous community; of the only state in Italy whose transition from utter servitude to enlightened and national views had been attended with the least subversion of existing orders; whose domestic arrangements had been least interfered with—and which was, nevertheless, the most unconditionally, irretrievably committed to the great cause of the country.

Perhaps there was error in the notion, but it was

* “Royalty and Republicanism in Italy,” Preface, p. xiv.

very generally conceived, that if Lombardy and the Duchies could be submitted to the same civil and military rule that had made Piedmont what it was, the resources of those revolutionised states could be rendered of immediate avail. Piedmontese generals and statesmen were used to command. Let their powers of organisation, such as they are, it was thought, bring something like rule and method into the chaos of the newly-emancipated communities.

The "mean conceit" (*concettuzzo*) of a North-Italian kingdom substituted to the great idea of an "Italian republic, one and indivisible, with the eternal city for its centre," gave mortal offence to Mazzini.

"The kingdom of Northern Italy," he contends, "might have become a *fact*, created by victory, accepted by gratitude, and submitted to by other princes from the impossibility of destroying it; but put forth as a programme, anterior to the fact, it was casting the apple of discord where the greatest harmony was absolutely necessary. It was an insult to the republicans, as it substituted the will of the monarchical faction to that of the nation; it was an outrage to Lombardy, which was willing to sink itself into Italy, but not to sacrifice its individuality to another Italian province; it was a menace to the aristocracy of Turin, already alarmed by the all-absorbing contact of Milanese democracy; it was a scheme of aggrandisement suspicious to France, because in favour of a monarchy for many years adverse to French movements and tendencies; it was a pretext ready-furnished to the princes of Italy for detaching themselves from the crusade to which they had been driven by their people; it was a grain of jealousy

planted in the heart of the pope ; it was a damp to the enthusiasm of all who were disposed to lend their aid, and even to sacrifice their life, to a *national* undertaking, but not for a speculation of dynastic egoism : it created a new series of obstacles, it overcame none.”*

But since Mazzini himself tells us † that “the time was not yet ripe for republican unity, that Rome had not yet shown itself worthy of being the capital of the *Italy of the people* ;” and since he enumerates with so much accuracy all the evils accruing to the cause of Italy from the incapacity or bad faith of the provisional governments, and must, therefore, have felt the necessity of putting an end to that “political neutrality” which lent itself to such flagrant abuses,‡ which, if it did no worse, deprived the popular movement of impulse and direction, we will ask him whether any other means suggested itself of bringing the Italians to act with vigour and unanimity, save only by ranging them under the standard of that only one among the Italian potentates which stood foremost in the national death-struggle ?

We need not speak of the jealousy of France, because it must since have been evident to Mazzini himself that Italy had nothing to hope from that quarter, and she was more likely to take umbrage at Mazzini’s own scheme of *one* Italy, than the one more modest and limited of only *half* an Italy ; we need say nothing

* “*Carte e Documenti*,” p. 14.

† *Ibid.* p. 35.

‡ Princess Belgiojoso not unreasonably attributes all the misfortunes of Italy to that “neutrality” to which the divided members of the Milan government, and all parties, had, by way of compromise, pledged themselves.—“*Revue des Deux Mondes*,” xliii. p. 794.

with regard to the mutual jealousies between Piedmont and Lombardy, since the proposed annexation was actually put to the test of popular suffrage, and presented serious but not insurmountable obstacles ; we need not trouble ourselves about the resentment of the baffled republicans, since, by confession of the most ardent and uncompromising amongst them, "their day had not yet come : " but it is, indeed, important for us to test the soundness of the argument brought forward by Mazzini, no less than by men of other parties, concerning the impolicy of indisposing all the princes of Italy by the projected aggrandisement of one of them.

And, first, as a question of right. No man could honestly find fault with Parma and Modena, if on their first riddance from a foreign despot, or from native princes unnaturally leagued with and sold to him, those cities disposed of themselves as they deemed fit. The annexation of those provinces to Sardinia took place in consequence of a very fair and open appeal to public suffrage. The Italians voted as freely as any people unused to the hustings could vote ; and Charles Albert would have been king of those states by the only means by which the "grace of God" may be said to shine upon monarchs.

On the very breaking out of the Lombard revolt, an appeal was equally and simultaneously made to one and all the princes of Italy. How it was answered by each of them we have seen already. We have also considered the suddenness of events, the lack of previous understanding of as much as a basis of an Italian league, as the first cause of all national misfortunes.

The seeds of jealousy and division were by no means apparent at first. The Grand Duke of Tuscany sent his own troops to the Sardinian camp; the King of Naples placed his 10th regiment at the disposal of Tuscany, and was liberal of his offers of equal subsidies to the pope.

But, we are told, the princes had thus far been driven by the people. Will, then, any man assert, that the impulse which pope and princes obeyed hitherto only ceased in consequence of the projected aggrandisement of Sardinia? Will it be contended that the holy scruples of Pius IX., or the uneasiness of Ferdinand of Naples, arose from the project of a North-Italian sovereignty? Charles Albert had stepped forth into Lombardy: he had taken the most arduous, or, as men then thought, the only serious task upon himself. Not only was he not anxious to cut off his allies, and secure the prey for himself, but he was even unmercifully blamed for abandoning Venetia; that part of the promised land which it was the duty, no less than the interest, of his southern allies to protect, and which would, naturally enough, have fallen to their share, whether the ultimate object was to be the deliverance of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom or its annexation.

Whatever may be thought of the Martini intrigues, it is very certain that, up to the end of April, no project of annexation was anywhere avowed. Had the southern princes acted with good faith, had they had an eye to their own interest, or, what answered the same purpose, had the people's control over them continued unabated, not only was Lombardy free, but it would have been disposed of, or suffered to dispose of

itself, on the most equitable terms. It was the lukewarmness, irresoluteness, and bad faith of the princes, that, of sheer necessity, threw all the national party into the arms of the only one of them that was earnestly devoted to it. It was the reluctance of Pius IX. to take the lead of the Roman crusade that, towards the middle of April, compelled Durando, at Ferrara, to apply to Charles Albert for orders, and to Milan for money. It was the want of consistency of the distracted Neapolitan government in its different phases, its difficulties in Sicily, its struggle with extreme opposite parties, that put off till May that expedition which could and should have reached the Isonzo a month before.

Both in Rome and at Naples the people forfeited—because it abused—its control over its rulers. The Bourbon by a great *coup d'état*, the pontiff by the mere force of inertia, found the means of baffling popular impetuosity; divided against themselves, those unfortunate states soon lost all power of interference in the vital affairs of the country.

Without the pope's encyclic of the 29th of April, without the recall of Pepe's expedition—or, let us say, without the fatal symptoms that at an earlier period foreshadowed those sinister events—the scheme of a *fusionne*, the notion of a North-Italian kingdom, would either never have been conceived, or would have been defeated and scouted by the unerring sense of popular justice.

A mere glance at the dates of the appeal to the people in the various provinces of Northern Italy, will satisfy us that they only gave themselves to Charles

Albert when there could be no shade of doubt but that all the princes of Italy were unwilling, and "the people" unable, to lend them assistance.

The first move in that sense was made by the city of Piacenza. Rid, almost by a prodigy, of the garrison that manned its formidable citadel, that city had, in the great days of March, hoisted the Sardinian, together with the national colours, and sent a deputation to Charles Albert to tender its allegiance. That city was, in accordance with some special treaty, *reversible* to the House of Savoy, under some not very distant contingencies; some mean grievances it had to urge against the capital, in consequence of partiality evinced in favour of the latter by the crafty princes that ruled over those countries, rendered the people of Piacenza eager for a separation, no matter on what terms. Independent of all the laws of common honesty, Charles Albert could not lend a favourable ear to the deputies of Piacenza, for he was then in the hands of a plausible diplomacy, bent on saving both princes and people; hard at work at the time to rehabilitate the Duke of Parma, and urging him forward as a candidate for admission into the Italian league.* Charles Albert was therefore compelled to limit himself to a courteous but evasive answer, and the subject dropped for above a month. The case of the Duke of Parma was, however, found desperate; he was then hiding at Parma, half a hostage, half a prisoner, in his palace. The

* See the despatch to Mr. Abercromby, "to urge the admission of the Duke of Parma into the Italian league," April 11, "Correspondence," ii. p. 308, and all Mr. Abercromby's despatches to the same purpose.

consulta appointed by him to draw up a project of constitution was forced to resign its office on the 11th of April; a provisional government was appointed in its stead, and the duchy was now busy in its deliberation as to the best means of disposing of itself. The duke was ignominiously allowed to sneak off on the 15th. In the midst of these paltry agitations, the state of Parma had been unable to do anything for the war of Lombardy; and it was only after the duke's departure that a small force, of 1500 regular troops and volunteers, was allowed to cross the Po, to reach the camp on the 23d of April. Even then, so great was the improvidence of the provisional government, that before that small and inadequate contingent had fairly set off, Charles Albert was compelled to march 400 of his own infantry to Parma, without which those helpless rulers would not answer for the preservation of order. The duchy was, therefore, already virtually, and from sheer impotence, annexed to Piedmont, and the provisional government were only there to embarrass and to disorganise.

In good time there came one who took pity on them. Chance led to Parma one of its long-exiled citizens, one of the patriots of 1831, a man of Mazzini's own party, and so far from being bound to Charles Albert by either gratitude or personal friendship, that he took a prominent part in the conspiracy against that prince in 1833. The state of things in the duchy, however, seemed to him to admit of but one solution. He called together his townspeople on the market-square, and pointed out the necessity of getting out of that false position as they best could; he dwelt on the extent of

the evil, and recommended the only remedy—a cessation of the provisional state. Public opinion was long since prepared; his words found an echo in every breast. The people rushed to the government palace with loud demands for an immediate appeal to public suffrage. The government, nothing loath, opened registers in all parishes; the citizens were to pronounce either for annexation to Sardinia, Lombardy, Rome, or Tuscany, or for a republic, or for a continuation of the ducal power. The registers were laid before the people early in May; the result was known about the middle of the month: it turned out in favour of Sardinia. Analogous experiments were made in Piacenza, Modena, and Reggio,—always with the same success, almost at the very same time.*

The government of Milan issued a decree for a registration of votes on the 12th of May, and the lists were to be closed only on the 29th. The result of the voting was made known on the 9th of June.†

On the 31st of May, a deputation from the provinces of Padua, Vicenza, Treviso, and Rovigo urged the government of Venice to come to a similar decision. The Venetian government referred the matter to a popular

* The result of the votes at Piacenza was as follows:—

For a union with Piedmont.....	37,000
„ Lombardy	69
„ States of the Church	300
„ Parma	10

The majority in favour of union with Piedmont was equally overwhelming at Parma: there the citizens were equally invited to vote for a republic if they wished, and only one vote was registered.

† 561,000 votes for immediate annexation; for putting off the discussion of political question until the successful termination of the war, 681.

assembly, to be called together on the 18th of June. Owing to the fall of Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso about that time, the assembly only met on the 3d of July. The annexation was voted almost unanimously, and the kingdom of Northern Italy was thus extended over a country embracing about eleven millions of souls.*

Not a little has been said about the unfairness, illegality, immorality, of this manner of voting. Princess Belgiojoso, who was not at that time the fiery republican she afterwards became, who had even summoned Mazzini to an interview with a hope to convert him, and was most probably converted in her turn,—Princess Belgiojoso, at the time editress of a Sardo-constitutional journal, “*Il Crociato*,”—even in the same breath as she declares that the whole of Lombardy was longing for immediate annexation,—even as she takes upon herself, and Gioberti, all the merit of promoting that measure,—complains that no alternative was left to the people—that they were only allowed a choice between the instant surrender of their rights, and a short reprieve, which entitled them to call themselves their own masters till the end of the war; but that Charles Albert was forced upon them as an inexorable fatality, which they might indeed put off but not ultimately avert.†

* The Venetian assembly, which should have numbered 193 members, did not, owing to the absence of deputies from the invaded provinces, ascend to more than 133. Their votes were as follows :—

For an immediate deliberation on the future destinies of the country	130
For a postponement till the close of the war	3
For immediate annexation with Lombardy and Piedmont	127
Against it	6

† “*Revue des Deux Mondes*,” xxiv. p. 147.

inmost soul, convinced as we are that Italy never boasted a more loyal and noble heart, as it seldom gave birth to a loftier intellect than his. Mazzini was not essentially an enemy to the *fusion*,—a scheme that would, whether at once or by degrees, tend to the unity of Italy under one sceptre, and, were it even an iron sceptre, was sure of his support, no matter how it might otherwise clash with his dearest democratic theories. He declared himself ready to sacrifice* “not his faith, which was impossible, but all active labour, for its speedy triumph in favour of any man who could have assured him of the independence and prompt unity of Italy;” but it should be a man ready “to dare all, incapable of retreating from the enterprise either from egotism or weakness.” A man who, since all the governments were hostile to him, should have broken with them avowedly, should have dismissed diplomacy from the camp, and drawn his sword not against Austria merely, but against faithless Rome and Naples, against Germany and France—against all Europe, if need be—throwing himself solely upon Italy and her people.

And Mazzini asks earnestly,—“Was Charles Albert the man?” And because he did not deem that king, as he most assuredly was not, the best instrument to work out such a great purpose, Mazzini forgot that it was perhaps easier to make him such by seconding than by thwarting him; he forgot that, since to put him aside was altogether out of the question, the best policy consisted in making as much of him as could be contrived,—in turning him into a hero in spite of himself,

* “Cenni e Documenti,” p. 46.

—in giving the arm that wielded the “sword of Italy” all the support of a unanimous people.

But, alas! Mazzini was not to be weaned from his inexorable views. It was *tout ou rien* with him. Proposals were made to him in the king’s name, or in the name of the king’s friends, that, for the sake of God and Italy, “he should constitute himself a patron of the monarchical *fusion*; that he should endeavour to draw over to the royal party the republicans.” Mazzini remained unshaken. He drew his cloak around him, and he limited himself to a war of words in his journal, only to issue forth as a *Deus ex machina* after the defeat of the king, with his magniloquent proclamation, “that the war of kings was at an end and that of ‘the peoples’ was now about to commence.”

We have too much respect, too much love for Mazzini, to wish to implicate him in the vulgar riots by which Urbino and other demagogues utterly upset the little common sense that had as yet presided over the councils of the provisional government, which provoked the suppression of the “Lombardo” newspaper, the arrest of Terzaghi, Cernuschi, and other patriots; which called into a sinister activity an *espionage* worthy of the palmy days of Radetzky, interfering with individual liberty, with private correspondence, and driving even the back-shrinking, long-enduring Cattaneo, to the desperate measure of calling for his passport;* which, in

* “Insurrection de Milan,” p. 178. It should not be forgotten, however, that a great many of these hateful measures against private rights were adopted at the suggestion of the most exalted liberals themselves, who were always urging the government to provide for the detection of the innumerable plots said to be got up by Austrian

short, was preparing the clouds of anarchy and disorder in which that fair sun of Lombard liberty was to set but too soon. We are quite willing to clear Mazzini's fair name of all complicity with such arrant evil doers;* but men at the head of a party, and in the enjoyment of wide-spread celebrity, must expect to have much evil undeservedly ascribed to them,—for the same reason indeed that they get the credit for much good they are not so clearly entitled to.

But we hold Mazzini no less answerable to Italy for that very neutrality—that very inaction—upon which he grounds his defence. Mazzini, it seemed destined, never was at the proper place at the proper time. He had been away from Lombardy, away even from its frontier at Lugano, in March and at the beginning of

agents all over Lombardy. Arrests of *spies* and suspected characters took place daily in the streets of every town by the sovereign people, without order or motive; and more mails were stopped and letters broken open by the lawless mob than by the constituted authorities. No one so loudly denounced the Lombard government for its remissness in the exercise of the police than the democratic Princess Belgiojoso. See "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," xxiii. p. 795.

* We must, however, rectify some of Mazzini's statements respecting "Urbino's recent arrival from France, his being unknown to the republicans, and his having been seen but once by Mazzini himself." ("*Cenni e Documenti*," p. 57; also Cattaneo, "*Insurrection de Milan*," p. 178.) The present writer happened to travel with that same Urbino from Lyons to Turin, on the 2d of April; he met him in the streets of Milan before the arrival of Mazzini himself. He may have been unknown to *some* republicans, as he was disavowed by them and by the whole people of Milan in the events of the 29th of May; but he had his own party amongst the lowest classes in the city: he had his own club and journal, and it is only unfortunate that a similarity of name should apparently associate the ascetic and idealistic school of a Mazzini with the sordid communism of an Urbino. They were all *republicans*.

April, when the revolution was taking its irretrievable course without him. He insisted now, in May, June, and July, upon residing at Milan, when his presence, his solemn protests, his charges upon the government that it was betraying its mission—his words and his very silence—could only serve as a pretext to the Urbinos and their set, who took the name of Young Italy in vain, and represented Mazzini as the leader of their senseless, hopeless, disorganising opposition.

He limited himself, he says, for a long time, merely to the furtherance of the war. But was the war only waged in Lombardy? Could he not better have befriended the cause of Italy by quitting the besotted aristocrats of Milan, the better to avoid all useless collision of political opinions, and betake himself to Vicenza, to Udine or Venice, from his very first arrival in April, and hence summon to the aid of that revolution according to his own heart, to the aid of a purely democratic government, those republican instruments he had, as he asserts, always at his disposal in France, in Switzerland, even beyond the Atlantic? Charles Albert and the royal party left him but too wide a field of operations open in those Venetian provinces. And when the defection of the pope and the treason of the Bourbon of Naples no longer admitted of any doubt, in May, June, and July, could Mazzini find no proper sphere of activity in Rome or at Naples, by overthrowing those vacillating governments, securing there the triumph of purely democratic principles, anticipating by a few months that Roman republic on which all his hopes for Italy were centered, and thus leading "the peoples" of the south to the rescue of the north; when

nothing would have proved easier than a fair appeal to the suffrage of the multitude, able then to pronounce in favour of its true and efficient friends and deliverers? Had then Mazzini involved even that poor King Seesaw* in the final ruin of the enemies of Italy, had he hurled against him his sweeping denunciation of monarchy, he would only have used a right conferred on him by the country's gratitude.

But by his uninterrupted stay at Milan, by his apparent indifference to all the rest of Italy, he gave much too good ground for the charge, that he was directing all his attacks against Charles Albert merely because that king happened to have his back turned upon him, and his hands engaged in a death-struggle with Italy's dreaded foe: only because the ground he engaged in was comparatively easy and safe: because he knew how far he could venture on his adversaries' timidity and irresoluteness, and on the false position in which their profession of unbounded liberalism had placed them.

Truly, we are told, although he had engaged to keep quiet so long only as the antagonist parties were also silent, and he deemed himself, therefore, free to act as he listed after their violation of the compact of neutrality by the decree of May 12th, yet he came even then to no violent resolution. He was magnanimous to the last. He did not think of upsetting the Milan government, as he felt sure he could have done in two hours. He only put forth his "Protest;" he cried out that they had "betrayed their mission."† It was not,

* "Il Re Tentenna," a nickname of Charles Albert in 1846.

† "Cenni e Documenti," p. 54.

as he said it, "taking up the gauntlet." And yet we doubt, indeed, whether an immediate overturn of the government would not have been a more expedient, no less than a more straightforward course. The word went forth amongst the multitude that the provisional government were betraying the country. The minor papers—the less scrupulous demagogues,—took up the expression, and gave it any interpretation they thought fit. Urbino acted, or attempted to act up to it. Democracy, however, was not strong enough either to build or even to demolish: but it fretted, it agitated; it gave birth to endless suspicions and calumnies. *Cafés* and clubs roared incessantly. Not government alone, but all deliberation, all resolution, had become an impossibility; such was Mazzini's mission of "peace and brotherhood," announced in his programme of the journal "*L'Italia del Popolo*,"* where he once more threw up his visor, and took upon himself the apostleship of Democracy, and *Unity* in contradistinction with the *Union*, as set forth in that "mean conceit" of the North-Italian kingdom.

Verily we say it from the depth of our soul, by that ill-timed protest—by that still more unseasonable vindication of his principles—by which the ardour of the Lombard population was thus miserably wasted in worse than unprofitable discussion, Mazzini, so far as lay in his power, stabbed Italy to the heart.

And he was yet a conscientious, "an honourable man;" but assuredly the most unmanageable, the most unconquerable, the most fatal specimen of *one-sidedness* the world ever witnessed.

* "Programma dell' Italia del Popolo, *Prose Politiche*," p. 258.

Italy must needs be saved in his own way, by "God and the people," no matter how long, how indefinitely, her redemption may be adjourned.

Truly the cause of Italy was in bad hands, and would most probably have fallen had Mazzini even remained quiet on this side of the Channel. It was fated that the very friends of that ill-starred Charles Albert, and the more disinterested promoters of that magnificent scheme of a kingdom of Northern Italy, should, with the best intentions, do that king and their own good cause more serious harm than even their most inveterate opponents.

The partisans of annexation overdid their work. Enthusiasts, with more zeal than discernment, and more genius, perhaps, than practical sense, were travelling through the Legations as propagandists of that glorious idea of the *fusionne*, and were loud, especially at Bologna, in their arguments in favour of a further extension of their North-Italian kingdom, over all the towns and lands of the *Æmilia*, all along the coast of the Adriatic down to the Rubicon.

This to the detriment of the pope. At the same time the King of Naples heard, with what feelings it is not difficult to imagine, that a deputation from Palermo was about to wait on Charles Albert at headquarters, to tender the Sicilian crown to his younger son.

Then did it become apparent that the princes, if not the people, had interests in opposition to the real interests of the country. The eagerness of the friends of *Union* too prematurely revealed their impatience for actual *Unity*. The Italian kingdom was then to absorb

north and south : a consummation which had now become inevitable but for the victories of Radetzky.*

We must not, indeed, allow that it was the result of the Lombard vote that turned Sardinia's allies into enemies. The pope and the King of Naples never were, at heart, in favour of the Lombard war ; and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who had never stirred from the Pitti palace, who took no more share in that war than he could help, had lost no time in securing his own share of the profits, by the annexation of Massa, Carrara, and the Apennine districts of Lunigiana and Garfagnana, which, by the terms of the latest treaties, belonged severally to the territories of Parma and Modena (May 12th).

Still there were *federalists* amongst the most virtuous patriots of Florence, Rome, and Naples ; and to these the idea of such a powerful union in the North caused no slight uneasiness and misgiving. All the landmarks of old Italy were about to be removed, and they did not well see on what new basis the future balance of powers could be plausibly established.

The pope, however, and the King of Naples, seemed irrevocably committed. Their existence seemed no longer compatible with Italian independence ; and since one of those rulers by personal unpopularity, and the

* " A riot has taken place at Leghorn, in which the mob vociferated, ' Viva Carlo Alberto, King of Italy ! Down with Leopold the Second ! ' " — Sir G. Hamilton, Florence, June 6th, "*Correspondence*," part ii. p. 577. The despatch adds, however, " The mob was speedily dispersed by the interference of the national guard ; " a sufficient evidence that the movement was the work of a few obscure evil-doers, and that the sense of the population was against it, even in the most riotous town of Italy.

other by the amphibious nature of his office, seemed inexorably doomed to fall, it was difficult, in case of ultimate success in the North, to foresee any serious obstacle to the establishment of Italian unity under the auspices of the House of Savoy.

The "Sword of Italy" could not fail, if victorious, to win for its bearer the sceptre of all Italy.

But, alas! Charles Albert himself had from the beginning put that *one* condition of victory too sadly out of the question. His very virtues were hardly less fatal to him than his most capital faults. A little less chivalrous sentiment. a little less romantic generosity on his part, might have saved the country in spite of itself. Charles Albert deserves blame, not merely for his vain regards to his Italian allies, for his subserviency to foreign mediators, for his dread of the French republic or of the German confederacy, or for his deference to England. His greatest crime, in our eyes, is his want of vigour and energy against his domestic opponents. He should at once have marched upon Lombardy, as on his own ground. He should, from the 23d of March, have assumed an absolute dictatorship. He should have known enough of the Italian character to feel assured that it was necessary above all things to save Italy from "her greatest enemy"—herself. He should have converted the country into a vast camp, laid it under a strict state of siege. Would he not thus have saved Radetzky the trouble of doing it so soon afterwards? The constitution in Piedmont should have remained a dead letter up to the close of the war. Those Italians that would not fight should at least have been made to hold their tongues. What was wasted in

ink and paper might be so much better employed in gunpowder and muskets. Liberty, equality—nay, even “God and the people,” should have had a compulsory holiday. He should have hushed up all discussions, adjourned all questions, till the king’s intentions should have been revealed, and his conduct justified by events. Time enough to play the part of a Cincinnatus, an Andrea Doria, or a Washington, when the sword of Italy could with honour be returned to its sheath. But during the war there should have been no “neutrality,” no “compromise between parties”—in fact, no parties: no utterance of any cry but “War with the Austrian!” All sedition-shops, clubs, and *cafés*, should have been closed. Incurrigible demagogues should—like the Viennese students on the opposite side—have been pressed for the army, and sent to the forlorn hopes. The annexation should have been a *fait accompli* from the first Piedmontese occupation. It should have been high-treason openly to mention the “individuality” of Lombardy: from the moment the name of Italy was set up, all provincial demarkations had ceased to exist.

Certainly no country more needed, none would more cheerfully have submitted to, a temporary reign of terror than Italy. It was only by showing himself terribly in earnest that the king could obtain oblivion of the past, and win confidence for the future. Every town and province of Lombardy should have been made over to Piedmontese commissioners—mererough drill-sergeants, whose political science should have been limited to a requisition of men, horses, and money.

But why should we also lose time in vain retrospective utopias? Charles Albert was weak because he

thought he could afford to be generous. The annexation of the northern kingdom of Italy did no less take place, and in consequence of as clear and spontaneous a manifestation of the public will as ever human contrivance could, under circumstances, elicit. In Venice it was even the result of long and mature deliberation of a national assembly, such an organ of the people's voice as even Mazzini proposed. And there, not only were the votes all but unanimous in favour of the *fusione*, but the almost absolute wielder of public opinion, Manin himself, acknowledged the necessity of such a measure, and recommended its adoption—at the same time that he professed “that his own convictions did not allow him to become the instrument of a monarchical power;” and with a dignity and fortitude which reconciled his opponents to what they considered excessive asperity and imperiousness of temper in him, withdrew into private life.

It has often been urged that at Venice, early in July, as in its provinces late in May, it was fear alone—fear of imminent Austrian invasion—that determined a dedition to Sardinia; that the disasters of those provinces must be imputed to a deliberate design on the king's part to force their vote by a sense of danger otherwise unavoidable: were it really so, we should have reason to lament that the “omnipotent people,” so utterly left to itself as it was said to be for above two months, should have brought itself to such dire extremities; and we are really at a loss to reconcile the conflicting assertions which charge Charles Albert with the ruin of Lombardy—by marching to its aid; and with the fall of Venetia—by leaving it to take care of itself.

We have, it is hoped, clearly laid before our readers the political and strategic reasons—narrow-minded and improvident though they might be—which limited the military operations of the King of Sardinia to their narrow and dangerous sphere. Dull and short-sighted as he was, Charles Albert must have felt that the wilful sacrifice of *Venetia* was tantamount to suicide; and that, had his intention been to make his sovereignty there a matter of necessity, or had he even contemplated its cold-blooded sacrifice, in imitation of Bonaparte, the first step would have been to secure it in his grasp.

But, independent of all risk of foreign aggression, the Venetian provinces, no less than Lombardy, no less than Parma and Modena, had fallen into too great a disorder, were too hopelessly torn by mad jealousies, too strongly averse to the government installed in the capital, not to wish for a prompt termination of a state of things that was as injurious to the honour as to the safety of the country. The *fusione* was everywhere the instinct of a people that felt in that first slackening of all social orders its incapacity for self-government, and hoped for better things from its participation in the organisation of a state subjected to a permanent, however imperfect and improvident, rule.

The annexation, however, as it was already too late, proved also an ineffectual measure. Sardinia had no more statesmen than it had military commanders to spare. The royal commissioners came only after a long delay, and only to shrink back in sheer affright before the chaos into which those few months of misrule had thrown every branch of administration. In their utter unacquaintance with the ground they trod upon, they

had to depend upon those very provisional governments—those very men that had proved so decidedly unfit for their task. The men were changed in some instances, and their titles, but the system remained—the groping, plodding system of half-measures and shuffling expedients—that blind obedience to false motives of prudence, to mistaken notions of rights and principles—that cruel necessity of reconciling the people's idle velleity of liberty with the more stern and inexorable demands of independence.

Truly Italy, in 1848, perished from sheer incapacity.

And not only did Sardinia fail in her attempt to restore something like order into the annexed provinces, but it fell into the very helpless disorganisation against which it was expected to bring a remedy. The question of the *fusione* was brought repeatedly before the newly-improvised parliament of Turin, a legislative body which had better been in no hurry to enter into the discharge of its functions, but which had hitherto done little good or harm, and was now, naturally enough, convulsed with the discussion of the grave and complicated question so unseasonably laid before it.

The provisional government of Milan had, with a view to conciliate the good-will of the most susceptible liberals, and win their suffrages for their annexation scheme, so modified the terms of their dedication as to refer all matters of political rights to a constituent assembly, to be called together at the close of the war. The strictly constitutional party in the Sardinian parliament took umbrage at the discretionary powers of that future assembly, who might, it was apprehended, call in question the very constitutional compact to which

Piedmont was already bound, and eventually prescribe new limits to the very rights of the reigning house. Serious disputes arose, also, with regard to the metropolis of the new kingdom; to which Turin laid claim by right of priority, Milan in consequence of its local and geographical importance.

We shall not follow up these long, and by no means consoling, debates, which would have been of some weight only if the rights of Savoy to her new states had been made good by warlike success.* The annexation question is with us only so far of moment as it might have been a means no less than an end, only in so far as the issue of the war of independence might be favourably influenced thereby. Unfortunately, and for the reasons already assigned, that act only multiplied em-

* See the parliamentary reports, Turin, June 28th, July 6th, &c. The result of the discussion terminating on the 28th of June was as follows:—

“ Law for the annexation of Lombardy and Venetia to Piedmont, passed in the Sardinian chamber June 28th, 1848.

“ The immediate union of Lombardy and of the provinces of Padua, Vicenza, Treviso, and Rovigo, voted by their populations, is accepted. Lombardy and the above-named provinces form, with the Sardinian states and those already united, one sole kingdom.

“ A constituent assembly will be convoked by universal suffrage, to discuss and settle the bases and forms of a new constitutional monarchy, under the House of Savoy, in conformity with the vote of the Lombardo-Venetian people already pronounced, upon the law of the 12th of May last, proposed by the provisional government of Lombardy.

“ The wording of the above-mentioned vote contains the sole object of the constituent assembly, and determines the bound of its powers.”—Adopted by 127 votes against 7.

The question of the capital was thus to be decided, not by the constituent assembly, but by the parliament of the kingdom, and was so far rather evaded than set at rest.

barrassments, and made "confusion worse confounded." Piedmont, hitherto steady and exemplarily calm, began to give signs of impatience. It evinced disgust and disdain at the return its heavy sacrifices and unwearied devotion to the common cause met with on the part of its new consorts. Parties ran high at Turin, and the consequence was a resignation of the Balbo ministry on the 6th of July, which left Sardinia without a well-constituted government up almost to the final catastrophe of Milan.

Austria looked down from the Alps, even as Italy's ancient enemies on the report of the fratricidal battles of the Lombard republics of the middle ages; it exulted at the sound of the high words with which Turin and Milan battled for pre-eminence.* It awaited the Italians at the close of their disputes, saw the first ray of hope in the breaking forth of their old incorrigible jealousies. The judgment that Heaven seemed first to have pronounced against that "fatal land," when her children found it too narrow for them—that it should make room for the stranger—was now to be prolonged, may be, to infinity.†

* "The papers, as well as private accounts, state that a strong opposition exists in Turin against the annexation of Lombardy and Venice to Piedmont.

"This fact may have a great deal of influence upon the conduct of affairs in Austria," &c.—*Lord Ponsonby's despatch from Innspruck*, July 4th, "*Correspondence*," part iii. p. 28.

† "Tu che angusta a tuoi figli parevi,
Tu che in pace nutrirti non sai,
Fatal terra, gli estrani ricevi;
Tal giudicio comincia per te."—MANZONI.

CHAPTER VII.

State of Italy—Lombardy and Piedmont—Tuscany—Rome—Naples—Position of Austria—Germany—France—England—Diplomatic Intrigues—Agitation of Parties—Position of the Armies—Affair of Governolo—Attack on Somma Campagna and Rivoli—Radetzky crosses the Mincio—Battle of Custoza—of Volta—Retreat of the Piedmontese—Fall of Milan—The Volunteers, Griffini, Durando, Garibaldi—Welden at Bologna—Conclusion.

FROM the subjugation of Venetia by the Austrians, about the middle of June, to the second occupation of Ferrara on the 14th of July, a month of inaction elapsed—a period of almost absolute, though undeclared, suspension of hostilities.

Both parties were awaiting reinforcements: these arrived in the interval, and swelled the ranks on either side to 115,000 or 120,000 combatants.

Charles Albert had, besides his five complete Piedmontese divisions, besides the fragments of the Tuscan corps, and the battalions of Parma and Modena, yet a sixth division (Visconti) formed of Lombard and Piedmontese reserve troops, and a seventh (Perrone) entirely consisting of Lombard recruits. Altogether, 78,000 or 80,000 men were ranged under his immediate orders; of these about 10,000 lay in hospitals, the sick-list swelling prodigiously, especially as the war was shifted

from the Veronese hills to the marshes of Mantua and Legnago in the fiercest days of an Italian July. Besides these collected forces, 4000 or 5000 volunteers were watching the passes of the Tyrol; 15,000 or 20,000 were garrisoning Venice, and 35,000 men were in the course of formation in Lombardy.

As the game became earnest, Piedmont drained itself of its last resources. The whole of the reserve was long since on the Mincio and Adige; a levy of 20,000 was now decreed; and soon afterwards (July 16th) the mobilization of 30,000 national guards. Charles Albert had entered Lombardy with a sum of about 44,000,000 of francs. His treasury was now exhausted, and the finance minister (Revel) came now before parliament with divers schemes which should empower him to raise 50,000,000 (June 22d). 12,000,000 were to be obtained by a mortgage on the lands of the order of SS. Maurizio e Lazzaro, valued at 60,000,000. Lombardy had also ordered a levy of 50,000 men, of which nearly 25,000 had already taken the field; and the country was laid under a contribution of 25,000,000 of francs.

Venice had a force of 6000 of her own soldiers (4000 of them sailors and marines), and perhaps 12,000 auxiliaries from every part of Italy. This force and her navy occasioned a daily expenditure of 80,000 lire.*

* "Santo Storico-Critico dei fatti avvenuti nelle Province Venete," June 18th, p. 51:—

"Venice is now completely blockaded from the land side, but the communication by sea is open. Money is getting very scarce, and the provisional government issued a decree on the 21st inst. calling upon the Venetians to contribute another 1,500,000 Austrian livres (about 50,000) to the forced loan of 4,500,000 which they have already been called upon to pay.

The city was closely blockaded by land, but had nothing to fear from the enemy, who made no serious attempt against it till after the fall of Charles Albert; and her own, no less than the Sardinian squadron, reassured her on the sea-side. Still the rapid fall of all her provinces had struck a consternation into the city, from which she only recovered when actually thrown upon her own resources. The people exhibited great want of faith in presence of a danger as yet vague and remote: they longed for French aid on the very morrow after the fall of Vicenza (June 13th).^{*} The people at Milan were equally clamorous in their demands for French intervention in behalf of their Venetian brethren after the surrender of Palmanova (June 24th). Nothing, in fact, could tranquillise the defenders of the lagoons but the presence of 2000 Piedmontese, whom Charles Albert could ill spare at that time (July 6th). From the king himself, and from the Lombard government, Venice likewise obtained such pecuniary subventions as enabled her to face her most pressing difficulties.

Such were the efforts—or, to speak more correctly—the attempts made by the annexed provinces of the North-Italian kingdom, on and immediately after the act of the *fusionne*. These measures were mostly incomplete, carried on with little confidence and less energy.

“There are about 15,000 troops in the town and fortresses, but these troops are principally newly-raised corps from all parts of Italy, without discipline or confidence in their officers; and we are fortunate that they have, up to this moment, committed no disorders in Venice, which is entirely at their mercy.

“The Neapolitan General Pepe is commander-in-chief.”—*Consul General Dawkins*, June 23d, “*Corresp.*” iii. p. 3.

^{*} Dawkins, June 13th, “*Corresp.*” ii. 615.

Their results would, nevertheless, have been far different had they been adopted at an earlier period. Had the salutary dread of defeat haunted the Italian minds from the very ephemeral success of the "Five Days," had the annexation been looked upon as a necessity from that very March, three months of incessant, combined, earnest endeavours, must have enabled Northern Italy to bring a second army—an efficient host—into the field.

Instead of this, those regiments of foot and horse (Visconti and Caccia) which began to be recruited on the very day after the revolt at Milan, were suffered to rot (literally) about the *cafés* and *guinguettes* of their garrisons; they were trained to the vain clamours of a club rather than to the stern rule of the camp; and when, at last, they were turned out in the hour of need, swelled into legions and divisions, they were found no less hopelessly demoralised as to order and discipline than they were slovenly in their dress and equipment. The honest patriots, the mettlesome youths, who had enlisted in those troops, at first, from mere principle, and might have given their corps a proper spirit of honour and duty, had long since become disgusted with the long inaction to which they saw themselves doomed, and exchanged that for the more genial, more chivalrous, service of the free corps in the mountains. Their place was, therefore, filled up by volunteers of a far lower description; loose characters, in too many instances, such as may be reformed in a troop of long standing and strongly organised, but amongst whom the elements for a new militia—especially under such officers as the provisional government trusted with

their commission—were not easily to be found. By degrees the ranks of those Lombard battalions were made up, either of uncouth rustics, fresh—and never well to be weaned—from the plough, or else of Austrian deserters—the most unmanageable, unprincipled set of wretches that ever carried a musket. The Lombard recruits, however, came too late into the field, and were too seldom engaged, to disgrace themselves, as they must inevitably have done.

For even such support as this it was useless to look to the other states of Italy. Tuscany had opened her legislative councils on the 26th of June, when the Grand Duke, after a few words of self-gratulation on what had already been done, promised further efforts for the national war. A body of 1400 troops had indeed left Florence for the camp four days previously. The chambers were loud in their encouragement, and liberal in their promises of support to the prince, in their address of July 12th. Their debates assumed even a stormy character on the first tidings of Sardinian disasters, on the 27th. But the people seconded these heroic aspirations of their representatives very indifferently. Volunteers had long since ceased to step up to the recruiting officers, and about a thousand out of the first expedition had already come home, previous to the final catastrophe of the war of independence.*

At Rome, Mamiani, compelled to steer between the intemperate passions of conflicting parties; anxious to satisfy the ardent longing of his own, no less than of every patriot's heart, for the removal, utter and final, of

* Sir G. Hamilton's despatch, July 27th, 1848, "Corresp. respecting the Affairs of Italy," part iii. p. 101.

pope and priests from the temporal government; anxious still more to make up for loss of time and former mismanagement, and sanguine about the possibility of a second crusade for Lombardy, had, at last, come with endless trouble and a broken heart to the opening of parliament and inauguration of that most hybrid of all sublunar institutions, the Roman statute. The chambers were opened on the 5th of June, and Mamiani was addressing words of fire to the deputies on the subject dearest to his heart on the 9th. The fall of Vicenza, and the arrival of thousands of *reduci*, came to complicate his difficulties and embarrass his situation. The disorder in Rome, and still more in the provinces, had reached its acme, so that even the fall of the papal government and the flight of Pius, a few months later, could hardly add to its intensity. In the midst of all this general frenzy the chambers were still urging the pope with their incessant cry of "war!" which he invariably met with his stolid sermons about "peace!" He and his subjects, he urged, had nothing to fear. The whole Catholic world was his security. Austria still revered and listened to him. His right hand raised in the act of benediction was stronger than an embattled host. Italy would sooner be free by his unarmed mediation than by the whole might of Charles Albert's troops. Already his agents, together with England, were bringing about a cessation of hostilities. This was the age of light—of brotherly love. The crozier of Rome would achieve what the "Sword of Italy" had failed to accomplish.*

* Monsignor Morichini was, in fact, despatched by the pope to Charles Albert's camp, and hence to Innspruck, bearer of a message

In this manner the dotard—for decrepitude never showed itself weaker in St. Peter's chair than in the person of this comparatively *young* pontiff—the dotard was deluding himself, and would fain have deluded his people, up to the 10th of July; up almost to the eve of the aggression of the Austrian upon his own territory at Ferrara (July 14th). Even then it was with the greatest difficulty he could be made to consent to a war of a strictly defensive nature; even then, trusting the blunt weapons he loved to handle, he launched out his second protest (July 19th), denouncing an aggression which was, after all, in the eyes of the political world, merely an act of just retaliation for the hostilities the Romans had, with or without his consent, carried on for nearly three months on Austrian lands.

Further south, Naples was still plunged into the consternation into which the sanguinary catastrophe of the 15th of May had thrown her. The revolt of Calabria, whither the baffled democrats had betaken themselves, and which had assumed a serious character in June, was at last stifled in blood early in the following month. Cosenza, where 8000 men in arms had assembled, and where 500 Sicilians, with seven cannon, had joined them, was evacuated on the 3d of July. The chiefs of the revolt took shelter in Corfu, whence the most upright and generous hastened to the rescue of Venice. But the kingdom itself no longer existed for

of conciliation to the belligerent parties (June 8th to 16th). Wessenberg, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, merely remarks, in reply to the Nuncio's proposition that Austria should give up all Italy, in consideration of some pecuniary indemnity, "Such a step has the character of mockery."—*Corresp.* ii. 618.

Italy. The king, who deemed it still necessary to impose upon the common honesty of Europe by the preservation of a vain show of constitutional forms, reassembled his parliament, under a modified electoral law, on the 1st of July, when he announced with great coolness that he was "at peace with the whole world." Exception was made soon afterwards with regard to Sardinia, whence, in consequence of the vote of Sicily in favour of the Duke of Genoa, he recalled his minister, putting himself in all but open hostility against that power, as soon as its reverses in Lombardy reduced it to the impossibility of resenting affronts.

Parliament had scarcely a word of remonstrance against the king's conduct. The elections, notwithstanding all royal precautions, had turned out extremely favourable to the liberal cause. In fact, all the members of the 15th of May were again returned on the 20th of June, with the exception of those attainted with treason; but they sat surrounded by the very bayonets that had threatened and dispersed them only a month before, and, what was far more formidable, by a fanaticised rabble, who had shown but too ready a disposition to break in upon their deliberations, and to treat them as the enemies of their king and their God.

The true patriots in Naples were downcast and mute. They looked to Northern Italy for the solution of their too intricate questions. From the very outset, the conviction of the certain victory of the Italian cause had taken in Naples and Sicily even deeper roots than in any other part of the country. Distance tended to magnify the earliest successes of the Sardinian arms,

and to palliate the precariousness of Charles Albert's actual position. The Neapolitans looked upon that king as their coming avenger. The vote of Sicily in favour of his younger son was seconded by the earnest, secret wishes, of many a noble heart on the continental side of the Straits. Victorious over Austria, it was expected the dynasty of Savoy would virtually rule north and south. Underneath its sceptre the faithless Bourbon must either bend or break. Deprived for ever of the support of the northern despots, his treacherous allies and perfidious advisers, King Ferdinand must either give in to the spirit of the age or be crushed in a vain attempt at resistance.

Fate had different conclusions in store; and the consternation into which the tidings of Charles Albert's defeat on the Mincio, and the final catastrophe of Milan, threw the most sensible and virtuous Neapolitan patriots, on the 14th of August, seems to have struck an impartial, and otherwise rather careless, spectator.*

But, indeed, this strange hallucination about the utter powerlessness and *ineluctable* ruin and dissolution of the Austrian empire was not merely proceeding from the natural sanguineness and short-sighted presumption of the Italian people; there was hardly a cool statesman in France or England,—hardly one almost in the very distracted cabinet of Vienna itself, that did not look on the 13th of March as the *suprema dies* of the monarchy. That huge Colossus, like the image described by the Prophet, and by Dante,† made up of

* Lord Napier, Naples, Aug. 14, "Corresp." iii. 203.

† Daniel, ii. 32, 33. Dante, "Inferno," xiv. 90.

heterogeneous materials—gold, silver, and brass, was by all men thought to stand on its foot of clay. It was the iron foot it stood on, nevertheless; it was that civil and military staff, which for many centuries had made of Austria a mere abstraction—an *idea*, with which all the resources, the interests, the very existence of that incongruous state, were almost miraculously identified. Even that iron support was powerfully shaken in the month of March, but not shattered nor overturned. The *idea* had no longer any other visible type than the person of the half-idiotic, rickety emperor. But that person was sacred, even in the eyes of the most exalted patriots. Around it the astounded placemen instinctively ranged themselves: they made themselves one with him. They called themselves and him, "Austria!" They dragged the helpless puppet away from the Viennese turmoils: removed him to Innsbruck—to the Alps—the native eyrie of the eagle of Habsburg. Hence they looked down north, east, and south. Out of that vast chaos of revolutions they saw only one principle clearly emerging, that of nationality. It was Austria's deadly enemy, and no human strength could subdue it; but craft could seize upon it and turn it to account. Slavonians, Magyars, and Germans, all had rebelled against Austria; not from enmity against it so much as from jealousy of each other. Austria, it seemed, had now ceased to exist, the rival nations were at liberty to indulge their long pent-up prejudices and animosities. In their eagerness for supremacy they looked back to "Austria," almost with repining and regret. Each of them turned to the emperor, aware of the importance of his moral support, even in his

present state of banishment and disgrace. Every one aspired to secure in its favour the prestige of the *Austrian* name. Austria saw her advantage, and knew how to use it. She coquetted now with the Czeck, now with the Magyar, now with the Croatian. She weighed their respective forces, their interests, and inclinations. She put off a decision to the last: even then she was neither explicit nor sincere.

In the meanwhile, her real substance—her tower of strength, her civil and military staff—was rapidly forming around her. Austria had once more a government, though *rusticating* at Innspruck. She had an army in Italy under Radetzky, another at Prague under Windischgrätz. These field-marschals, these cabinet ministers, were neither Slavonians, nor Magyars, nor Germans, but abstractedly Austrians: the men of the *idea*. In them, and by them, Austria was still what she always had been.

The first thought of the government, on its first consciousness of existence, was—the subjugation of Italy. No sympathy, it was very clear, could exist between the uncompromising Lombard rebels and the mutinous but still loyal tribes north and east of the Alps. The claims of Italy to utter independence jarred amidst the various demands for constitutions for separate assemblies, &c., set up by the other members of the empire. Nothing easier than to represent the Italian revolt as an insult to the pride no less than a detriment to the interests of the union. In all her differences with these mongrel races, Austria found all of them ready enough to help her in Italy. There were 35,000 Croats fighting her battles in Lombardy, in July.

Jellachich sent continual exhortations to remind them of their duty. Even in his greatest difficulties with Hungary, he had always numerous hordes of the same wild men to spare. The whole army under Windisch-grätz, weary with civil wars, more than once threatened to march across the Alps to meet an enemy which they could slay without scruple or remorse. All the elements of barbaric force, which have saved Austria in her worst emergencies, had not yet deserted her in this strait.

Nor did she merely rely on the co-operation of these less civilised tribes. It has long been laid to the charge of the Italians that, either from ignorance or from old associations, they designated their Austrian oppressors under the name of *Tedeschi*, and regarded the whole German nation with feelings of indiscriminate hatred. The Germans of the nineteenth century seem determined that the denomination should hold good in the present emergency. With respect to Italy, Austria and Germany were one. From the first declaration of hostilities we have seen Prussia breaking up all friendly intercourse with Sardinia. When revolutions had substituted new principles to the cold reason of state of those old-fashioned German governments; when, on the 18th of May, a constituent assembly met at Frankfort to lay the basis of a new Germany upon the sacred principles of nationality, it was found expedient to advocate Austria's claims upon South Tyrol, upon Istria, and Trieste, as integrant parts of the German empire, and by degrees also to back her pretences upon Venice, and its territory as far as the Adige and Mincio, where it was coolly proposed to establish the *German* frontier.

Anon the measure of improvidence, of arrant folly, was filled—the actual suicide of Germany, as a nation, was consummated by the election of an Austrian archduke to the dignity of vicar of the empire (July 5th). This prince (the Archduke John), who was destined to leave Frankfort with anything but the fair name he brought to that city, might have, perhaps, been recommended to the electors by personal qualities. But the Austrian predilections of that besotted Frankfort assembly did not stop here. The archduke was suffered to build up an almost exclusively Austrian cabinet; and, as if more distinctly to bring before the world the identity between the central power of Germany and the monarchy of the house of Habsburg, he had no sooner made his triumphant entry into the city of the ancient German diet, on the 11th of July, than he was called to open the national assembly at Vienna on the 22d of the same month.

From that moment, if, indeed, not before, Austria well knew she could, in case of extreme need, rely on the whole strength of united Germany. It is in vain, we think, to refer to the unsettled state of that country, to its manifold differences with Denmark, the Netherlands, &c., to argue the impossibility of a very active co-operation with Austria on her part. A war-like nation could have wished for no better remedy against intestine discords than a foreign war. Victorious Italy must, at all times, make up her mind for a prolonged struggle with Germany. In the present instance her actual interference was not called forth, but her attitude was very decided nevertheless, and it was more than sufficient to strike awe into the councils of Sar-

dinia, and incline her ears to the timid suggestions of a mystified blundering diplomacy.

We have already seen what hindrances were thrown into the way of maritime operations at the opening of the war. Forsaken by his Neapolitan ally, Admiral Albini, with his Sardinian and Venetian flotilla, still lorded it over the Adriatic, and had it in his power to bombard or blockade Trieste. He hovered round the place, keeping it in an agony of suspense. The remonstrances of foreign consuls had power to deter him from the first of those measures, even if it had been in actual contemplation. Some insults from the cannon of the harbour brought about a menace of the other measure, and the blockade of Trieste was formally announced on the 8th of June, to begin on the 15th of that month. It was, however, never strictly observed; and upon the never-ending warnings of the English agent at Turin, and the protests of Prussia and Bavaria (even this latter power was alarmed at the interruption of *her* traffic, and angry at the infringement on her maritime rights and interests), it was soon entirely abandoned, the Sardinian admiral limiting himself to the protection of the harbour and trade of Venice. Mr. Abercromby and his chief at the Foreign Office had no stronger arguments to inculcate their policy than this inevitable displeasure of the German confederacy. Without even lifting a finger, Germany paralysed the strongest arm of Sardinia.*

* See Mr. Abercromby's despatches, June 7, "Corresp." ii. 575; June 21, ii. 621, &c. &c. Also, the Protest of Consul-general Dawkins, June 14, "Corresp." ii. 614. Also, the remonstrances of the Bavarian minister at Turin, "Corresp." ii. 624. It was always

Trieste was abandoned, the free corps withdrawn from Tyrol. The members from the Italian Tyrol were *harshly snubbed* at Frankfort for a mere hint at their true nationality; Germany grew insolent upon compliance with her first demands; Prussia and Bavaria dinned the ears of the Turin cabinet with endless protests; and Mr. Schmerling from Frankfort, himself an Austrian, and at the head of an almost entirely Austrian ministry, coolly insisted on his right, *as a German*, to take part in any diplomatic transaction respecting the destinies of Italy.

Truly, the Germans had their own reward, and from the very hand of that Austria for whose sake they played false to the principle that had gathered them together on the Main. It is a meagre consolation, but it was certainly by the will of God's own retributive justice, that the whole of that country, and especially Prussia and Bavaria, should now be trodden under the very foot of that same Austria, and brought to a state of dejection and disgrace, by the side of which all Italy's losses and disasters may be looked upon as signal triumphs.

Against Austria—against her Croatian hordes—against her coalition with Germany—against the remote but certain interference of Russia—Sardinia had now, as we have seen, scarcely an ally in Italy, and absolutely none out of it. Up to the great reactionary strokes of

thought in Italy that Bavaria sent some of her troops to Radetzky, but the Austrians contend that the *Bavarian dragoons* said to have been taken by the Piedmontese were only *dragoons* of the *Royal Bavaria* (Austrian) regiment. Germans without number, and from all states, however, it is notorious, served in the Austrian ranks as volunteers.

May and June, France had given Charles Albert the greatest cause of uneasiness. The triumphs of Cavaignac had reassured him on that score. France was no longer an enemy; but could the king in any emergency look upon that country as a friend? The fears arising from revolutionised France had made it incumbent on both the belligerent parties in Italy that they should settle their dispute, as much as possible, by their unaided efforts. Woe to both of them if they trusted to the chances of a European war! A contest of that nature was sure of the most fatal results for Italy; but Austria herself could not look upon it without serious misgiving.

But now, though all men did not see it, there was an end of revolution in France. That country had found a master—the master himself hardly conscious of his power.

In a normal state, no people lends itself more easily, more passively, more unconditionally, to its leaders, than the French: it is “the flock” *par excellence*. Its old system of centralisation, its compact bureaucracy, its long habit to the yoke, as first laid on its neck by all the Louises, from the XIth. to the XIVth., improved by Napoleon, perfected by Louis Philippe, had long since rendered the nation, as a mass, incapable of legal and systematic opposition. It is of little use to try every year new experiments of one or two chambers, of larger and smaller assemblies. The executive will always be despotic in France: no medium there between passive servitude and violent resistance. The man in power is always omnipotent, till suddenly struck with utter impotence. There is no decline, no oscilla-

tion, but only sudden downfall of authority. A French king or president rules by a prestige analogous to the sway exercised by a sorcerer over the demon to whom he has bartered his soul. So long as the *bond* holds good, the whole of nature is made to bend to his sovereign will. But the hour strikes: the chains of fate are broken asunder. It is the familiar's turn now, and most unmercifully will he use his advantage.

Revolution in France is always short, unless fomented by foreign threat or intrigue. The French are always eager for a master—a hero, if it is to be found; if not, the most obscure or contemptible man will always equally do. Power will transform and rehabilitate him. The king can do no harm. The “National” storms; the “Charivari” sneers: but the people bow down and revere. The throne is the Pythoness’s tripod. Hence all happy inspirations. Its occupier is always the “Napoleon either of war or peace”—if not the Achilles, then “the Ulysses of the age.” Since Louis XIV. France has invariably had a *grand monarque* at its head. This from no feeling of loyalty, but from base, grovelling servility. The throne is no less sure to give way suddenly, unexpectedly, almost always undeservedly, at the wrongest possible moment; and then, see how mercilessly it is dragged in the mud, how wantonly assailed with the grossest contumely!

In May and June 1848, France had found a master. Cavaignac was brave and determined: he drove far “worse men” from the place that was awarded to him. He deserved the homage of the nation. Hence had he, in his turn, to make way for something less than a man,—for a mere thing,—the “shade of a great name;” that

"nephew of his uncle" that had so often called down upon him the inextinguishable laughter of the gods, by his Strasburg exploits, by the tame eagle of Boulogne. Cavaignac's firmness and capacity were hardly needed. Nothing easier in France than to put down a revolution and disavow it, when the French are tired of it.

The disavowal of the revolution implied a total overthrow of the whole system of foreign policy, a recantation of the grand promises of Lamartine.* Nothing so false in France as the maudlin sentimentality, the sickly sympathy, for the liberties of other nations, as exhibited on the morrow of a popular tumult. The real policy of France, *in a normal state*, is still that of Louis XIV. There is nothing it so much dreads, nothing it so strenuously opposes, as the formation of some great state on its frontier. A petty Piedmont, a needy Switzerland, a paltry Baden, a bewigged Prussia, are its most convenient neighbours, its "natural allies." Im-

* The French, strictly speaking, are not to be caught in disavowals or contradictions. Sam Slick says, that when a true Yankee wishes to get possession of his neighbour's watch, he should not demean himself so far as to pick his neighbour's pocket. He need only *trade* for the article, *i.e.* do his neighbour out of it. In the like manner, a French statesman need only *define* and *distinguish*. M. Bastide, consequently, on the 22d of July (see Lord Normanby's despatch of that date, "Correspondence," iii. 60), was busy at his *definition* of Italian independence. In March, that word meant free existence of the whole country from the Alps to the sea; so Lamartine understood it. In July, it meant only, according to Bastide, free existence of the Italian states, with the exception of Lombardy or Venice, or both, as the case might be. In August and September, the exception extended over Romagna and Tuscany. In November, France only guaranteed the independence of the pope. For the independence of that sacred person, France not only did not interfere with Austria's work but came forward to help her.

potent in themselves, they still enable her to keep Russia and Austria at arm's length. Germany and Italy should never have lost sight of this eternal truth. Their national existence can only be established in sheer despite of France.

The Italians felt it. The French revolution could only in so far befriend them as it gave sufficient occupation to that most jealous and restless of all nations. In their instinctive sense of their real interests, and out of a generous outburst of chivalrous feelings, men of very nearly all parties in Italy had deprecated French interference to the best of their power. There was mortal danger in their aid; danger in the consequences it should infallibly have on the policy of other European states. If the Italians lost the absolute control over their own destinies, there was an end for ever of either unity or union. Better terms on that score could be obtained from Austria herself than from that faithless, emulous France.

All this up to July: but now the time was clearly coming when Italy must either be helped or perish. An appeal was made to France, when a government was already formed, when the foreign policy of Louis XIV. was once more in the ascendant, when the old territorial arrangements were again recognised as the best suited to the safety and interests of the *grande nation*.

Cavaignac had decided that Italy should be left to her fate. He was yet far from flushed with his sanguinary success of June, and knew not, consequently, how far he could rely on the quiescence of his people in this harsh sentence. But so far as he and his cabinet were concerned, they had come to an understanding

with Austria; they had bound themselves to England, and were resolved to see with the latter power what might be obtained by friendly offices and unarmed mediation, and, in case of failure, to suffer fate to take its own course.

Austria saw it: indeed, the president and his ministers were but too eager that she should be made aware of their ultra-pacific intentions. As early as the middle of June, even whilst the great storm of the five days of that terrible month was brewing, there came a French *chargé d'affaires* at Innsbruck. Early in July, Lord Ponsonby felt sure that Austria and France were of one mind for what concerned Italian matters.* England herself was taken aback, terrified at the new tone suddenly assumed by her would-be fellow-negotiators. As one of Lord Palmerston's ablest agents in those transactions aptly expressed himself, England had hitherto been dealing with Austria as a man who holds a savage bull-dog or mastiff on the leash, and endeavours to bring an adversary to his own terms by threatening to let the brute fly at him; and was now thunderstruck at the sight of the dog cowering at his feet, or rather wagging his tail, and fawning upon his enemy.

England herself, it was always distinctly understood, would fight for no king or people on the Continent. She was a peacemaker by profession; as such, she only wished for the prompt success of the party who seemed to have the odds decidedly on its side. Nothing more upright, outspoken, nothing more consistent, than Lord Palmerston's conduct throughout; nothing, ap-

* See despatches, Innsbruck, July 3 and 7, "Correspondence," iii. pp. 23, 29, &c.

parently, more wise, nothing more generous. He wished for justice; he would have done all in his power for the freedom and happiness of the Italian nation. This as a man; as an English minister, his aim must needs be to prevent a general war and oppose the spread of French democracy all over the Continent. Both objects, he fancied, could be best secured by the speediest possible conclusion of the struggle in Lombardy, by the happiest termination of Charles Albert's enterprise. His best feelings were here found to agree with the soundest principles of his country's policy. He could not too openly pronounce in the king's favour, but he wished him success from the depth of his heart, and rather too hastily, as it turned out, framed his hopes and convictions in accordance with his wishes. He was warm, earnest, indefatigable in his exhortations to caution and moderation. Nothing easier, he felt sure, than for Sardinia to attain her aim, if she could only steer clear of extraneous difficulties; if she limited her operations to the subjugation of the enemy immediately in her presence, if she shunned a collision with Germany, and, what was of still greater moment, if she dispensed with the assistance of France.

He started from fond notion that the reign of Austria in Italy was at an end; that, victorious or defeated, she would always find it impossible to reign at peace over her Lombardo-Venetian provinces. During the whole of May and June he insisted that Austria should make up her mind to the loss of the whole of those territories.* He declined negotiation upon any

* See his despatches, June 3, 20, 28, "Correspondence," ii. 531, 598, 623; July 12, iii. 29.

other terms. It was in vain his more wary agent at Vienna tried to enlighten him on the subject.* The English minister, himself a straightforward man, seemed unable to see through the mean intrigues of the wily Austrian diplomatists. He thought the mission of Hummelauer to London (May 11 to June 10), and the proposals of an armistice—of peace on the condition of the cession of Lombardy, made by Wessenberg on the 13th of June, were meant in good earnest; that Austria had really come to the conclusion that Milan and its province were irreparably lost to her, and that she might consider herself sufficiently fortunate if, by the help of interested Germany, she could at least make good her claims to Venetia. Even those terms Lord Palmerston peremptorily refused to negotiate upon till the star of Charles Albert began to pale in the firmament.† Whenever he found Austria obdurate, he always held the bugbear of French democracy before her eyes. How cruel his disappointment when Austria could tell him, with a broad grin, “that she knew the French best, and that *that cock would not fight!*”

How far peace on the Adige or on the Mincio ever was seriously contemplated by the Austrian ministers who successively wielded the destinies of the shattered empire during that stormy period, it is now impossible to ascertain. That they did not deem themselves omnipotent or infallible may be plausibly conjectured. There are not many statesmen able to proceed on a preconceived plan, without swerving from it in obedience

* Lord Ponsonby, July 3, 7, 16, 19, iii. pp. 23, 29, 52, 64, &c.

† On the 28th of July. See his despatch, “Correspondence,” iii. p. 71.

to the course of events. Lord Ponsonby seems inclined to think the Austrian negotiators in earnest and good faith. The Archduke John, the only man in the Imperial family possessed of any brains at the time, always expressed himself rationally and moderately on the subject.* His very speech at the opening of the assembly at Vienna on the 22d of July (where he asserted that "the war of Italy was not directed against the liberties of that country; that its serious aim was to uphold the honour of the Austrian arms," &c.) was intended to encourage a belief that Austria would not abuse her victory. Even so late as the 7th of August, when the defeat of Charles Albert could no longer be matter of doubt, he assured Lord Cowley, at Frankfort, that his advice at Vienna had always been, and still was, that "Lombardy and even the Mincio, with Mantua and Peschiera, should be given up," though he adds, "the line of the Adige is necessary to us, that is, to Germany in general."† It is extremely likely that

* "His imperial highness said that the Lombards might have the absolute disposal of their own fate: they might take Charles Albert for their king, or any other person, or do what they liked as to their government. I referred to a well-known phrase, and said, 'Your highness, then, will accept peace *quand même*?' To which he replied, 'Yes, as far as Lombardy is concerned, but we must keep Verona and the Adige: it is necessary, in order to protect Trieste, which is a key to our Illyrian provinces.'"—Lord Ponsonby, Innsbruck, June 9, "*Correspondence*," ii. p. 589.

† Lord Cowley, Frankfort, August 7, "*Correspondence*," iii. p. 117. It is not easy to decide whether his imperial highness, both as for Italian and German matters, was, throughout, more of a dupe or a rogue. He was always frank enough, however, to declare himself "an Austrian prince" above all things. Happy for his name and place in history if he had never quitted his Styrian solitude!

both the archduke and the ministers at Innsbruck saw for a long time the necessity of a compromise; that they acted upon it, and were, at any rate, glad of the breathing-time the negotiation afforded; that, as time befriended them, as the mediation of England had the effect of slackening the King of Sardinia's exertions in Tyrol and at Trieste, as their position improved, their pretensions became greater; that, whilst the Adige seemed sufficient in June, the Mincio had become indispensable to them in July,* and the Ticino in August; that when they, in the end, beheld Radetzky in possession of a decided advantage, they broke up all negotiation to allow free scope for a last effort; and that upon its unhoped-for, glorious result, they exulted in their ability to reassert their sway over the whole of their rich Italian provinces, and treated with scorn any pacific mediation which would call their territorial rights into dispute.

It was to little purpose to urge upon them the consideration of the unsettled state in which those disaffected provinces would come into their hands. Austria had long known how to dispense with her subjects' good-will. She was aware that iron has in all times power to make gold. The Venetian provinces already amply contributed to pay the expenses of the war.† Let only the old yoke once more be laid on the accustomed neck. Let the Sardinian be thrust back on the

* Ponsonby, July 26, "Correspondence," iii. 76.

† Vicenza alone, on its first occupation, was submitted to a forced loan of 1,093,814 lire (June 26). The members of the provisional government, or committee of that city, were obliged to pay a fine of 350,000 lire (July 1); the other towns were treated with no greater ceremony. "Santo Storico-Critico, Province Venete," pp. 53, 56.

Ticino. The Italians are no less doomed to be slaves, because "ever-fretting slaves."* Austria was willing to take them as such, confident that fear is fully as solid a foundation of empires as love.

We have been warm—and, perhaps, harsh—in our strictures on the course adopted by foreign countries with respect to Italian matters, because, as we were firmly determined not to spare our own countrymen, we thought it due to them, in sheer justice, to prove that they were no less "sinned against than sinning;" and, also, because it seemed to us of the greatest importance again and again to remind the Italians that then only shall their sacred cause have a chance of success when they shall have learned to follow their own course, regardless of the threats of enemies and of the warnings of friends; when they shall have sufficient reliance on their own forces to trust themselves and Providence alone, well aware that God ultimately never fails to aid those that know how to aid themselves.

"I do not know," Mazzini says,† "whether peace on the Adige ever positively entered into the designs of the king." We happen to know: for we believe Mr. Abercromby,‡ when he asserts that he had seen a man who was in Charles Albert's confidence, and even a letter in the king's own handwriting, in which the king showed himself ready to treat for peace on Austria's own terms; abandoning to that power all the Venetian territory beyond the Adige, and limiting his own con-

* "Servi sì, ma servi ognor frementi."—ALFIERI.

† "Cenni e Documenti," p. 71.

‡ Abercromby's despatch, July 10, iii. p. 62. The king's letter, it is stated, was written at Roverbella, on the 7th of July.

quests to Lombardy, Parma, and Modena. The king would have accepted such terms, his generals and most of his nobles would have subscribed to them; for that letter was written on the 7th of July, when, that is, all the Venetian mainland was irreparably lost; when the king had fallen from all his illusions; when, hearing of the prodigious efforts of Austria for a decisive struggle, seeing his own ranks outnumbered by the enemy, and considering the condition of his enfeebled, dispirited troops, that unfortunate sovereign, by a despondency which, in a weak, bilious constitution like his, is always commensurate with the degree of previous excitement, only wished himself out of his arduous position, and thought that enough had been gained for himself, for Piedmont, and Italy, if a great state could be formed, which could not fail, at some future period, and under better auspices, to accomplish the little that might now be left unachieved. The king, it is impossible to deny it, meditated a "Campoformio." Unable to liberate Venice, he resigned himself to the necessity of sacrificing it. But we will not believe, with Mazzini and his partisans, that that sacrifice was long premeditated; or that, with a view "to force the people to accept *peace on the Adige*," Charles Albert deliberately "pointed the enemy's dagger at their throats," and contrived to "conclude peace with the Austrian at the gates of Milan." Charles Albert and his military advisers were, at the very worst, "men of little faith." In July they despaired of again taking the offensive, and deemed their troops, in their present demoralisation, unfit for a prolongation of defensive warfare. They may have been too credulous in supposing that

Austria's offers were made in earnest ; too easily taken in by what most probably was only a diplomatic stratagem. Had, however, the catastrophe been less sudden or complete ; had they held their ground long enough to test Austria's intentions, by demanding the cession of Mantua as a preliminary to further negotiation ; and had they strongly established themselves on the Mincio, their scheme, to judge of it merely in a political point of view, was a sufficiently plausible one. Charles Albert, be it remembered, did not, so far as we can make out, accept or decline Austria's terms, either in Piedmont's name or Italy's. He only expressed his own private opinion—to which, surely, he was as fully entitled as any journalist in Milan—that as circumstances had turned out, and “considering the relative powers of Austria and Sardinia,” the terms struck him as sufficiently honourable to the latter power. Piedmont and Lombardy were then without government, for the Balbo-Pareto ministry had resigned, and several weeks elapsed ere a cabinet could be reconstituted ; and as the king was loyal enough to refer the matter to his government, only hoping that “sufficient reasons might be given to the chambers and to the country of the wisdom of accepting such a peace,” the matter necessarily was left in abeyance till the war had reached the walls of Milan, when the terms were such as one party must needs submit to when the other has, by main force, acquired the right to dictate them.

We do not, we repeat, think that it could enter into the plans of the king, of his army, of his government, and of all the moderate party in Lombardy, to be beaten for the sake of compelling “the people,”

with the Austrian bayonets at their throats, to consent to the sacrifice of Venice : we do not believe it ; and we are grieved that Mazzini, or any other honest man, should, for the sake of argument, suffer himself to be driven to such monstrous assertions. But it is indeed true, that when Charles Albert, even for one moment, admitted the possibility of bringing the Italians to consent to any arrangement which did not provide for the independence of the whole country, and that whilst his army was still unbroken and the honour of his arms untarnished, he evinced a most deplorable ignorance of the national character, and knew not to what fearful extent he committed himself. Had, indeed, the "peace on the Adige" been a practicable sch me—had he dared to show himself at Milan, or even at Turin, with a crown on his head reft of its brightest jewel, Venice, then the most sinister surmises would have seemed flagrantly realised ; that crown would have branded him a traitor, and not only would he have fallen a victim to the fury of a mob, or else to the assassin's dagger—not only would the fate of Prina, or that of Count Rossi, inevitably have awaited him—but the new kingdom itself would have been instantly and hopelessly plunged into a civil war, to which the once more invading Austrian alone could have put an end.

Had Charles Albert only had a child's common sense, he would have felt that complete victory or total defeat was imperative on him. Any other general might think of peace or armistice ; but he—he came into the field with terrible precedents. Nothing but full success could wash him clean of the inconsiderate sins of his youth. His forced inaction, his unaccount-

able waste of time and disregard of golden opportunities, had already given rise to the most sinister interpretations. Diplomacy had already killed him by inches. Such a compromise as was now contemplated would be a *coup de grace* to him : all must be won or all lost. He must die by the hand of the Austrian, or else by that of his own people. Even his defeat at Custoza, even his humiliation of Milan, could not appease the relentless animosity of his opponents. Only on his grave could his sins be forgiven ! But whatever the king's own views and those of his generals might be, as to the expediency of coming to terms, there is no doubt but his ministers, the Milan government, and the non-combatants of all parties, at all times evinced the most stubborn reluctance to any compromise.

" Mere-lookers on," as the Italian poet* expresses it,—

" Aloof from toil and risk, will often count
The least achievements most ; will slightly think
Of what exceeds the bounds of mortal strength :
But he who deals with stubborn facts—who must
By hard-won strife work out his purpose—knows
The moment of great crises."

The provisional government of Lombardy rejected Wessenberg's proposal with as much firmness and dig-

* Manzoni, " Adelchi," act ii. scene 1 :—

" A chi lontano

Sta dagli eventi e guata, arduo talvolta,
Ciò ch' è più lieve appar, lieve talvolta,
Ciò che la possa dei mortali eccede ;
Ma chi tenziona colle cose, e debbe
Ciò ch' egli agogna conseguir con l' opra,
Quei conosce i momenti."

nity as even "the people" could desire; refusing to consider the question as purely a *Lombard* question, whilst by them it was always looked upon as an *Italian* question; an expression which the Austrian minister, a downright barbarian, and in his own German-French, professes himself unable to understand (*mot dont la définition reste à attendre*). Mazzini, indeed, looks upon that declaration as the mere interpretation of an unconquerable feeling, by which the people insisted on "liberty for all or for no one;" but he agrees, nevertheless, that even the aristocratic government knew how to behave as worthy interpreters of the people's will.* In the like manner, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marquis Pareto, a man as warm, and whose patriotic notions were as exaggerated as those of his townsman Mazzini himself, in all his intercourses with Mr. Abercromby, in the clearest language and with the greatest consistency, refused to listen to any terms of which the evacuation of the last square foot of Italian soil was not made a most distinct and absolute basis. It was in vain for the English envoy to hold out the terrors of French sansculottism or of German exaction, Pareto and his colleagues would never hear of either Adige or Piave;† and they, it is well known, only withdrew from office to make room for a still more exalted, more uncompromising set of statesmen. The king himself, whatever he might think of *peace* in July, had strong objections to an *armistice* in June; and as Radetsky

* See Wessenberg's proposal (June 13), and the government's answer (June 18), in "Correspondence," iii. p. 33.

† See Mr. Abercromby's Conversations with the Marquis Pareto, May 18, 22, &c., "Correspondence," ii. pp. 478 480, 627.

was of the same mind, the proposition, which may possibly have been made by Austria merely as a feint and to gain time, was suffered to drop, and the belligerent parties prepared for a decisive appeal to the sword.

The Italian patriots, however, in that refusal of a partial arrangement which Mazzini justly considers as "of greater moment to the future of Italy than ten constitutional kingdoms," were not merely actuated by a generous regard for Venice, and by a feeling of national *solidarity*—to borrow a French word—which induced all of them to run the same risk, to share the same fate; but their refusal must, in a great measure, be also ascribed to their inconceivable ignorance of their real position. There was as much infatuation as genuine enthusiasm in the matter; men are hard of belief against adversity. The scattered remains of Charles Albert were already at the gates of Milan, ere the blind people could make up their mind to give up the notions of its invincibility. Even when utter ruin stared them in the face, they would not suffer it to be ascribed to natural, unavoidable causes; foul play presented a less humiliating solution. Milan—Italy—could never have succumbed, had not Sardinia taken up its championship, for the express purpose of disarming and lulling it into a treacherous security.

There were, alas, but too many reasons for the most sinister surmises. Up to a certain day all was won for Italy: yet another day and all was lost! It is part of our task to search into the real causes of this final disaster; to see how far it may be laid to the charge of any person, of any party in Italy; how far it

may be imputed to the whole nation ; and how far, otherwise, it may be looked upon as the mere consequence of inevitable events ; events for a long time secretly maturing in the womb of fate, and bursting out with a suddenness to which human improvidence gave all the prestige of an unaccountable, unnatural phenomenon.

After a full month's inaction, Charles Albert, at the head of at least 70,000 combatants, master of the line of the Mincio from Peschiera to Mantua, and of that of the Adige from Rivoli to Verona, resolved on the investment of Mantua (July 13). He marched the whole of his right wing upon that fortress ; directed the Ferrere division, and the Lombards under Perrone, to take up strong positions on the right bank of the lake, from Le Grazie, over Cerese, as far as Pietole ; stationed other troops along the northern bank, at different points, from Sacca to Castellaro ; and threw a bridge on the Mincio at Sacca, to keep up the communication between the two banks.

These dispositions were scarcely carried into effect, when tidings of the occupation of Ferrara by the Austrians (on the 14th) reached the head-quarters of the king. The blockade of Mantua had no other immediate object than to reassure the legations and the duchies, which began to entertain some fears of sudden attacks on the part of that garrison. The king's measures were, however, taken too late. Radetzky had strongly occupied Governolo at the confluence of the Mincio and Po, and at the same time forwarded from Legnago over Rovigo a force of 5000 or 6000 men, under Prince Lichtenstein, for the mere

purpose of strengthening and victualling the garrison of Ferrara. The alarm which the presence of Austrian troops south of the Po occasioned throughout Romagna, Parma, and Modena—an alarm, in point of fact, utterly ill-grounded—had no little effect in confirming the king in that improvident and pusillanimous method of warfare which had from the beginning defeated the real aim of his expedition, and was now rapidly preparing its ruin. With a view to reassure those Transpadane provinces from harm, he sent General Bava, with 5000 foot, 500 horse, and 16 cannon, in pursuit of the enemy. Bava had hardly reached Borgoforte, on the Po, when he heard that the Austrian general, after having accomplished his intent, thrown two months' provisions into the citadel, and laid the city under a contribution, had recrossed the Po, and retired upon Ostiglia. Bava, unwilling to return empty-handed, and hearing that Governolo was only occupied by 1500 or 2000 Austrians, so divided and disposed his force as to surround the place, and embarked a company of sharpshooters on the Po, directing them to descend the stream as far as the confluence of the Mincio, and hence ascend the latter river, so as to operate a sudden attack on the drawbridge and secure the entrance of the main body of their troops. This manœuvre (July 18) had a complete success. The Austrians were taken by surprise; one-half of their number fell into the hands of the Piedmontese, not a few of the fugitives were hewn down by the cavalry.

The success of Governolo—of little importance in itself—had, however, the effect of reviving the drooping spirit of the army, and of reassuring the population of

the exposed provinces, ever ready to cry out against the heartless desertion of the king. It had, however, also the effect of strengthening more than ever the king in his resolution to shut up the enemy in his fortresses, by stretching out his already too widely-spread forces, so as to encompass and cover as large a surface of ground as was found practicable, heedless of all regards of common prudence. Governolo was now occupied by a Piedmontese brigade. Mantua was closely blockaded; but the Piedmontese line, which already so awkwardly stretched over twenty leagues of ground, by these new dispositions received a still further extension.

The king had then, on the 20th of July, 5000 men at Governolo, as many at Castellaro; 20,000 were stationed on the right bank of the lake of Mantua, 10,000 occupied Marmirolo and Villanova; 4000 stood at Villafranca and Castelbelforte; while about 15,000 were in possession of the heights from Rivoli to Somma Campagna; and about 8000 were scattered along the banks of the Mincio from Peschiera to Goito; and a still larger number (10,000) lay in the hospitals.

Whilst Charles Albert, weakening his extreme left, was thus concentrating his forces upon Mantua, Marshal Radetzky had assembled the best part of his host at Verona. The Austrian army was now composed of 115,000 or 120,000 men, of whom 30,000 were left in the Venetian territories, to keep the provinces in subjection and to blockade the capital. Radetzky had more than 40,000 with him at Verona, and a new corps of 20,000 men waited at Roveredo for orders to march against the positions of the Piedmontese on the

Adige. An equal force was either stationed at Mantua or Legnago, or was constantly shifting its position between the two fortresses.

The day for a decisive action had at last come for the marshal, and the absurd disposition of the king's forces naturally suggested the course of his operations. It merely consisted in falling suddenly upon some central point of that long Piedmontese line, cut it in two, and then turn right and left, to overcome the severed forces one after another. The marshal took the field on the 22d of July; he divided his army into two corps, each 18,000 men strong, supported by a reserve of 12,000,—altogether, 48,000. He left Verona on the evening of the 22d, in so violent a storm and such utter darkness, that their march was retarded for several hours, and the Piedmontese had no warning of their approach. The point upon which their efforts were directed was the cluster of hills of St. Giustina, Sona, and Somma Campagna, which was then only defended by 10,000 Piedmontese, commanded by General Broglia. The Austrians intended to fall on their enemy at one o'clock after midnight, but were not ready for attack before eight o'clock in the morning (23d). They expected a very fierce opposition (for, owing to the utter ignorance of the enemy's movements, in which the hostile feelings of the Veronese population left them, notwithstanding ill-natured remarks of men of all parties to the contrary*); they thought that the

* "As to the centre of the enemy, which was to be broken through, there was a wide-spread report, that, especially at Sona and Somma Campagna, it had been fortified with extraordinary care. Although so near, no means had yet been found of obtaining distinct information on

most had been made of a position naturally strong, and prepared themselves to leap over ditches and storm entrenchments, with a fearful lavish of blood. Alas! the Piedmontese, however, had never been cured of the rash security which their first successes had engendered: they lay *pêle-mêle* in their encampments, occupying for months a position, without ever dreaming of taking those precautions which constitute the very first rudiments of regular warfare:* no other work had been made by them in a position which they held since the end of April, besides a mound at a spot called L'Osteria del Bosco, on the road between Peschiera and Verona. Against this obstacle the Austrians came with all the strength of their right corps, and were repulsed: they turned upon Sona with redoubled energy, nevertheless, and finding easier ground and a more slack resistance, were able to attain the height. The other Austrian column had simultaneously overcome all resistance at Somma Campagna, and after three hours' fight General Broglia determined on quitting his position, and withdrew his scattered forces, first to San Giorgio, and then further back as far as Castelnovo.†

But even before Radetzky had led his own forces the subject, owing to the hostile feelings of the country."—Willisen, "*Italienische Feldzug*," p. 165; see Radetzky's bulletin, published at Innsbruck, July 26, and dated Palazzo Alzarea, near Castelnovo, July 24.

* Custoza, "Insurrection et Guerre d'Italie," p. 138.

† The Austrians took one general (Aviernoz, who fell severely wounded into their hands by an unworthy stratagem of some Tyrolese, declaring themselves ready to join the Italians), a few officers, a few hundred men, and two cannon.—Radetzky's bulletin, as above. For the particulars of Count D'Aviernoz's capture, read Ferrero's "*Campaign of Lombardy*," p. 94. London, 1850.

out of Verona to attack this main position of the Piedmontese left, their extreme lines at La Corona and Rivoli had been fallen upon and carried. Count Thurn had, by the marshal's orders, quitted Roveredo, and descending along the ridges of the Monte Baldo, had come up with the enemy at La Corona on the 22d. The count had with him at least 12,000 men, and only found a Piedmontese battalion, with a few light mountain pieces, in charge of that narrow pass: the pass was forced after a very brisk contest, and the Piedmontese fell back upon Rivoli. The ground had now become more favourable to the display of the Austrian forces; they had been at first divided into two columns, and were now drawn up together, with a powerful artillery on the borders of the famous plateau. General Sonnaz, who had the command of the Piedmontese left, had come up from Sandrà, bringing on the field all the troops he had at his disposal, and was thus able to oppose 5000 men to the Austrian 12,000. The bravery of the defenders was in this case equal to the beauty of the position, and after repeated assaults the Austrians were compelled to fall back as far as Caprino and Incanale.*

With all this splendid success, however, Sonnaz, who deemed it impossible to defend the position against such odds, who was also aware of an attack on his rear at Somma Campagna, and was afraid of being cut off, withdrew once more to Sandrà, directing part of his troops to retire on Pastrengo and Bussolengo. They

* See Radetzky and Thurn's own bulletins, published at Innspruck, July 26.

reached Colà, just as the battalions under General Broglia, after their defeat at Soanma Campagna, were rallying on the same point, on their way to Castelnovo and Cavalcaselle. The pursuit of the Austrians was of a nature to allow the Sardinian generals to effect their retreat with the greatest calmness, and without any important losses; inasmuch as Thurn, astonished at meeting with no enemy at Rivoli, where he had on the eve suffered so severe a check, advanced with great uneasiness, always in dread of an ambush; and Radetzky, who had now happily achieved the first part of his plan, and pierced through the centre of the enemy, neglected the opportunity which was offered to him of cutting off and utterly annihilating the Piedmontese left, in his eagerness to push on his success, and occupy the passage of the Mincio at Salionze or Monzanbano.

Sonnaz, availing himself of this leisure, had collected his scattered forces under the walls of Peschiera, on the twenty-third evening, whence he had it always in his power to join the main corps of the king on the right of the Mincio. He now hastened to join Visconti, who was with the reserve division in charge of the bridges of the Mincio, at Valeggio, Borghetto, and Monzanbano, and had made some vain attempt to dispute the passage of the river, especially at the last-named point. Owing to mismanagement, especially on the part of Visconti, and the want of steadiness of his Lombard recruits, Radetzky was, however, allowed to throw a bridge on the stream at Salionze on the afternoon of the 24th, whence it was easy for him to come with widely superior forces upon Monzanbano, and compel the Piedmontese to evacuate it. Sonnaz now marched

over to Volta, which he reached on the afternoon of the 24th, with about 10,000 men; one of his regiments having, in consequence of some oversight of Visconti, been cut off from his division at Ponti, and compelled to take refuge at Peschiera.

For the rest, although the Austrians had, by immense superiority of numbers, driven their enemies from all their important positions, and even made their way across the Mincio, they had not, however, obtained their main intent, which was to cut off the Piedmontese left from the main body; and had otherwise gained no signal advantage, as the losses were equal on both sides.

But now it became apparent how far the want of generalship on the part of the king and his officers may be looked upon as the main cause of the ruin of their enterprise.

The king had his head-quarters at Marmirolo, under Mantua, when, early on the 23d of July, he received tidings of the attack of the 22d by Count Thurn upon La Corona and Rivoli. Not many hours elapsed ere he could distinctly hear the boom of the cannon at Somma Campagna. It should have been plain to him that the Austrian marshal had come forth for a decisive effort, most probably in all his might. What the real extent of the Austrian forces might be, the Sardinian king might be unable to ascertain; but after the severe lesson he had received at Vicenza, the king must be aware how well Radetzky understood the advantage of bringing all his masses to bear on one point. Radetzky must then have all his host at Somma Campagna, and in that case Charles Albert had no

other plan before him than to march up to him with all his own forces. He should have raised the siege of Mantua, leaving at the utmost such forces at Marmirolo and Roverbella as could keep that garrison in check, and protect his rear ; and, strengthening the positions of Goito and Borghetto on his way, he should have brought his main force over Valeggio to Somma Campagna, where he might have cut off Radetzky from Verona, and compelled him to a battle, whence he could have no retreat.

Such is, at least, the opinion of good military judges.* But the king started from the fond notion, that the marshal could only have part of his forces with him ; that he was perhaps contemplating some plan of attack upon his positions under Mantua, or some new descent on the provinces beyond the Po. He resolved, at all events, to keep as strictly to his original plan as if he had all the game to himself. He left nearly the whole of his right on its stations round Mantua ; only taking 21,000 to 22,000 men with him out of the troops that lay on the left bank of the Mantuan lake ; he ordered up a brigade from Governolo, the Queen's, the first regiment of the Acqui brigade, and sent no direction to Sonnaz, who, according to the last accounts of the 23d, should have been, and was, with his unbroken force at Peschiera.

Charles Albert; then, with his 21,000 men, raised his camp from Marmirolo, and marched to Villafranca on the night from the 23d to the 24th. He lost a considerable part of the 24th at the latter place, holding

* Custozza, p. 143.

a council of war, which lasted six hours. His advisers resolved upon an attack on Valeggio, Custoza, and Somma Campagna; intending, if they could master those important points, to turn the enemy's position, by a conversion on the left at Valeggio, to press upon the enemy with the centre and right, and drive him to the Mincio, so as to intercept his retreat on Verona. Daring as the plan was, it might have been practicable, if the king had sufficient forces with him. But the error which had led him to undervalue the marshal's strength on the 23d was no less persevered in on the 24th and on the following day. The queen's brigade, that had orders to join the king from Governolo, only made its appearance on the 25th, late in the afternoon. Sonnaz was at Volta, waiting for orders; and the king was thus about to carry his scheme into execution, which was to envelope his enemy with only one-third of the forces the latter disposed of: Radetzky, it is proved, had at least 60,000 men under his orders.

Bava, charged with the performance of this vast plan, directed 9000 men—the brigades Cuneo and Guards—under the Duke of Savoy, to march on Custoza; 5000, the Piedmont brigade, under the Duke of Genoa, to attack Somma Campagna; a force equal to the latter, the brigade Aosta, followed between the two as a reserve; and 2000 men, two battalions of Pinerolo, and the Tuscans, remained at Villafranca. Bava paid no attention to Valeggio, which was, however, the main point, the very pivot of the whole operation. He made no attempt to occupy it, because he thought, absurdly enough, that Visconti had according to orders, which the latter had been unable to obey, kept possession of

the place. The contrary had, however, been distinctly announced at head-quarters. The main body of the Austrians was at Salionze, Oliosi, and in that direction. They held their position on the Mincio, and had only occupied Valeggio in the course of this day, the 24th. Vigorously attacked on this point, they might very probably have been promptly driven out of it; but Bava took no heed of the enemy at Valeggio, where he was, and looked for him on the hills of Custoza and Somma Campagna, where he actually was not.

Those hills were, at this moment, only occupied by that same Lichtenstein brigade, which, upon its retreat from Ferrara, had crossed over to Ostiglia; had there, by a strange accident, been separated from the prince, its commander, had marched through Sanguinetto over to Legnago, and hence received orders to join Radetzky's corps at Somma Campagna.* It marched back to Sanguinetto, and hence over Nogara and Isola della Scala to the hills, under the command of General Simbschen, and reached its destination on the 24th. Here, rather taken by surprise, and before it had time to take up any well-defined position, it had to withstand the attack of the Piedmontese, who came up with it at five o'clock in the afternoon. The guards at Custoza, Piedmont at La Berettara and Somma Campagna, Cuneo up the Val di Staffalo. The resistance was, nevertheless, obstinate, especially at the last-named narrow defile, called the Val di Staffalo, which gave the name to the combat. It cost the Austrians a loss of

* Willisen's "*Italienische Feldzug*," 163, 173. Also, Radetzky's bulletin, July 28.

400 or 500 men, two flags, and 1800 prisoners, amongst them 46 officers. The position was forced before dark, and the fugitives, not many in number, fell back, part upon Verona, part upon Oliosi, where they joined Radetzky.

Had Bava, encouraged by this first advantage, prepared for an early attack on the morning, taken Valeggio at any cost, and by summoning up his forces from Roverbella and Marmiolo, which might have come up even that night, so reinforced the two princes that they could follow up their success, the battle of Custoza, of the 25th of July, might have marked the day of redemption for Italy. But at the moment we speak of the troops round about Mantua were doomed to their inglorious repose; the brigade from Governolo had as yet only reached Goito; nothing could enlighten the king as to the real forces of his adversaries, and the whole conflict was to be sustained by the score of thousands that had been brought up on the eve. Radetzky, meanwhile, who could not think otherwise than that the king was meditating a general attack,* and that he had all his army with him, collected in the night of the 24th to the 25th all his own troops, left his positions on the Mincio, and spread his long line of 55,000 combatants from Valeggio all along the skirts of the hills which had been occupied by the princes on the previous evening.

His right was formed by the 1st corps, Wratislaw; one division occupied Borghetto and Valeggio, another

* Radetzky (see the bulletin, published at Innspruck, July 28), says that his information was that the enemy prepared to attack him with 40,000 men.

San Zeno and Fornelli. His left by the 2d corps, D'Aspre, under Custoza and Somma Campagna, as far as St. Georgio. The centre, made up of the reserve, was still at Oliosi and San Rocco, somewhat nearer to the right. The corps of Thurn was left at Castelnovo to watch the garrison of Peschiera.

A victory was for him indispensable, for he was already virtually cut off from Verona, and in case of a reverse, he would be thrust back on the Mincio and the Lake of Garda, Peschiera, and the Monte Baldo; and yet that victory was the result of no extraordinary skill on his own, or valour on the part of his troops, but merely of the improvidence, of the unpardonable blindness of his adversaries.

The aim of the Piedmontese was, above all things, to possess themselves of Valeggio. With the tardiness characteristic of all their operations, they only moved towards the town at nine o'clock (July 25), Bava and the king himself leading the attack. They found the town and the surrounding hills occupied by a might of artillery, not to be overcome by such scanty forces as they had with them—only the Aosta brigade. They, however, had put their reliance on General Sonnaz, who was, as we have seen, at Volta since the afternoon of the 24th, and had orders to make a demonstration towards Valeggio, on the right bank of the Mincio, at Borghetto. Sonnaz, unfortunately, deemed it impossible to bring on his troops before six o'clock in the afternoon, though those troops had had at least twelve hours' rest, and should have been able to set out at daybreak. Sonnaz had with him a bridge equipage, and might, therefore, either have limited his movements to a single demonstration at Borghetto, according to instructions,

or, better, have crossed the Mincio below Valeggio, and with his whole division aided the king in a mighty effort against that all-important point.

The announcement of Sonnaz's situation, and of his inability to reach Borghetto before six o'clock, was received by the king in the afternoon, at the moment in which it was calculated to dash to the ground the last hopes of the army.

Valeggio, owing thus to the fatal inaction of Sonnaz, could not be taken, and Bava determined not to press the attack ere he saw the result of the young princes' operations on the hills. The brunt of the battle was thus brought upon those memorable heights, which played so principal a part throughout the campaign. The Duke of Genoa, who should have made a start early in the morning, owing to want of provisions, to some blundering orders, to the endless disorders which seemed to increase in the Sardinian camp as the supreme crisis drew near, tarried in his position at La Berettara, on the extreme right. His delay compelled the Duke of Savoy to a corresponding inaction at the centre. The attack was thus put off on the part of the Piedmontese till the Austrians themselves commenced it; time was thus given to Radetzky to bring up six brigades from the other side of the Mincio, and even to draw out fresh troops from Verona; and to fall thus with an absurdly disproportionate might on the Piedmontese, in the midst of their preparations. The battle was at length engaged all along the line, from Valeggio, where the king and Bava still attacked the Austrians, to the hills where the princes, in their turn, sustained the enemy's onset.

Hardly any encounter in the whole campaign was more honourable to the Piedmontese soldiers than this very battle of Custoza, which Radetzky looks upon as his Austerlitz. The Duke of Genoa at La Berettara, his brother at Custoza, held their ground with an intrepidity which baffled all the efforts of the enemy, though the latter invariably opposed three of his men to every one of theirs. The Berettara was three times contested at the point of the bayonet; at Custoza, not only was the position strenuously defended, but the Duke of Savoy even gained ground so far as to be able to send part of one of his two brigades—the guards—on to Valeggio, which, co-operating with part of the brigade Aosta, took possession of one of the overhanging hills, Monte Mamaor, towards Feniletto, and was on the point of forcing its way into the town.

Against that town the king and Bava had in vain directed all their efforts; it never occurred to them to call up their reserve, from 3000 to 4000 men strong, from Villafranca, which might either have helped them or might have been of service to either or both the dukes, labouring so hard on the hills.

Weariness, at last, achieved what numbers had as yet failed to accomplish. The D'Aspre corps succeeded in gaining the brow of the hill of Custoza, though even then the Piedmontese of the Cuneo brigade disputed the lower ground inch by inch. But the whole Italian line was utterly exhausted, and found itself in presence of ever fresh enemies.* Astonishment, no

* Willisen ("Italienische Feldzug," 182) states, that on the Austrian side only five out of the twelve brigades present at the battle were fully engaged in the conflict,—those of Clam, Kerpan, Lichten-

less than despair, seized the unfortunate brave men. At six o'clock P.M., after more than seven hours' fight, tidings of Sonnaz's non-arrival being at last brought to him, Bava gave the signal for retreat. This was effected with admirable calmness and order, under shelter of the horse and artillery. Two hours later, still by daylight, the whole army had fallen back upon Villafranca. The Austrians did not make a single prisoner except the wounded: 1500 of the Piedmontese were either killed or wounded; of the Austrians 2000, amongst them a very considerable number of officers.*

But all the germs of dissolution, which had so long been developing themselves in this brave Piedmontese army, began now, upon this first serious check, immediately to break out. The men, all eye-witnesses assure us,† suffered intensely. The summer heats had

stein, Giulay, and Perin; he adds to these the remnants of the Simbschen brigade, and that of Strassoldo, who was only in the fight for some time in the morning: altogether only 20,000 to 25,000 men. The presence of the other troops could, however, not be without some effect on the Piedmontese. The Prussian general wonders, and not without reason, what could prevent Radetzky, with such a mass of fresh troops, from pursuing the fugitives. "The English proverb," he continues, "says,—in business, time is money; in war, time is victory."

* Radetzky (bulletin, July 28) reckons only 500 or 600 dead or wounded, besides 40 or 50 officers. Mr. Magenit, however (see his letter, Vienna, July 31, "Correspondence," iii. 100), says, "I am told that the losses of the Austrians are estimated much higher than is stated in the marshal's despatch; nearly 100 officers were killed and wounded."

† "Guerra dell' Indipendenza, uffiz Piemontese," p. 103. Willisen's "Italienische Feldzug," pp. 176, 183. Radetzky's bulletin, July 28. "A burning heat, of at least 28 degrees, in consequence of which several men lost their senses and died during the march; and this lasted till seven o'clock P.M., full nine hours."—This on the 25th.

reached their acme: the sun was burning with a more than Italian unmitigated fury. The glass was for several days up at 28° Réaumur; the soldiers, in great numbers, dropped dead from fatigue in their march; the Austrians, it is true, were subjected to the same scourge; but, even without taking into account the more hardy and robust frame of their Croatians and borderers, they had, on all points, the advantage. They were for the most part fresh from Verona, where they had been resting and recruiting their strength in the very best quarters for above a month; they had been fitted out for summer work with light linen coats, and had been scarcely three days in action.* Our men, on the contrary, had been hastily brought up from the marshy plain, where they had lain on the bare earth for the last two or three months; they were encumbered with the very accoutrements with which they had set out almost in the depth of winter; they had been always ill-fed, more or less, during the whole campaign, and were literally starved, especially towards its toilsome and disastrous close. The attack of the Duke of Genoa, on the 25th,

* The troops that had been lately sent from Milan had also been provided with coats made of light linen cloth. Cattaneo ("Insurrection de Milan," 199), and other writers of his party, determined to find fault with everything done by their political opponents, blame this measure in the bitterest tone. It was, however, done with a view to fit the soldiers for hot summer work; and if it be true, for we doubt it, that some of the volunteers so clad were sent up amongst the snow of the Tyrol, this must have been the result of some unexpected change in the destination of those troops: for the rest, the volunteers from Parma, we happen to know, by the end of April, asked to have a supply of light linen clothes; which were, in fact, ordered by government, and, sewn with great patriotic devotion by all the dames and damsels of the town, were sent to the camp.

was put off, chiefly from sheer necessity of waiting for provisions, lest fasting men, who had eaten so much less than fought on the eve, should be committed to a conflict that promised to last till night. The Sonnaz division, which, owing to the blunders of its leaders, had been marched and counter-marched, in a vain attempt to dispute the passage of the Mincio, came desperately tired and famished at Volta, where it found empty stores, and had long to wait for refreshments. No wonder the soldiers threw themselves on the ground sullenly and refused to stir. The sense of duty and honour was still strong enough with them in sight of the enemy. But the *morale* of the army was gone. The vast masses unfolded by the enemy in the last encounter of Custoza seized on their fevered imagination. Austria stood up before them in all its wonted omnipotence: on their own side they only saw disorder and blundering incapacity; and they soon—too soon—wearied with this unfair no less than unprofitable waste of their lives.

Had Radetzky had a distinct knowledge of the condition of the Piedmontese army, or had he, independent of other considerations, possessed sufficient decision to follow up his obvious advantage, there is no doubt but his royal adversary was already utterly at his mercy. The king was at Villafranca at eight o'clock in the evening (July 25th), and resolved upon instant retreat to Goito. The order to march was given for midnight, but could only be effected towards daybreak, and the rear-guard was still at Villafranca at seven o'clock. The brigades Cuneo, and the Guards, were directed to

follow the left road, which passes through Mozzecane, Roverbella, and Marengo; those of Aosta and Piedmont took the road to the right, so as to face the enemy at Valeggio, and marched over Quaderni and Massinbuona. The cavalry and light artillery were posted at Mozzecane; the 17th regiment (of the Acqui brigade) before Roverbella; and the queen's brigade, fresh from Governolo, before Marengo, to cover the backward movement of the troops. The indefatigable Duke of Savoy at last brought up the rear with two battalions of his intrepid Cuneo brigade. The army crossed the Mincio at noon (26th), and took up its positions round Goito. Here it met the Sonnaz corps, which had left Volta on the previous evening, and was on the spot since early morning. The king was displeased with Sonnaz for his desertion of Volta, though the general produced the king's own orders to that effect, bearing the signature of Colonel Cossato of the staff. The latter, no less than Bava and Salasco, and other staff-officers, denied having issued such orders: that billet, like the one enjoining the Duke of Genoa to put off his attack till eleven o'clock on the 25th, are among the mysteries in which the minor causes of great events are often enveloped. Without losing much time in vain attempts to clear it up, the king, deeming the possession of Volta indispensable to the safety of his position at Goito, directed Sonnaz, with the Broglia division, the brigade Savoy, and the battalions of Parma, to retrace his steps and re-conquer the place.

The place had been immediately occupied by the Austrians, who were ready to receive the Piedmontese

when these made their appearance, at six o'clock in the afternoon (26th).* Sonnaz divided his force into two columns, leading them to two different points at once. The Savoy brigade pushed forward with the bayonet on the left, and took some of the houses in the town after a murderous carnage. On the right, the other troops gained the heights that overhang the town with no little waste of their blood. Night fell, and the Austrians had lost their ground everywhere, with the exception of the church, where a few hundreds of them kept the enemy back with unparalleled obstinacy, till large masses of fresh troops came to their rescue. The darkness of the hour added to the horrors of that fierce

* According to Austrian accounts (Willisen, 186), "the whole of the second corps was marched from Custoza to Valeggio, and hence to Volta, on the 26th." The whole corps marched in one column. The Lichtenstein brigade was just in sight of the town at four o'clock, P.M., when a column of the Piedmontese was seen advancing upon Volta on the other side. The Austrians hoped to be beforehand, but in vain; the hostile parties met with crossed bayonets in the middle of the town. The fight lasted the whole night, with no advantage to either party. *The inhabitants took part with the Austrians.* There was plunder, and all the horrors of a civil war. It was a terrible night. He concludes by saying, that as the columns of the first corps and the reserve came up from Pozzolengo over Castellarò, and showed themselves at eight o'clock (morning), July 27th, the Piedmontese suddenly gave up the contest, and retired *in great disorder*, either to Goito or to the plain of Cerlungo and Cereto.—See Radetzky's own bulletin, Innsbruck, July 29th. The marshal was moving forward with his whole army on Volta in support of his second corps. That the inhabitants took part with the Austrians, though we are unwilling to believe it, would also appear from Ferrero's account of the attack on Somma Campagna, of the 23d. ("Campaign of Lombardy," p. 95.) "Several officers have assured me," he says, "that when the second regiment retired from Sona, some of the inhabitants, hid behind the walls, fired upon our soldiers."

encounter. A squadron of Novara cavalry fell by mistake on a battalion of Savoy, outside the town, and many lost their lives on both sides ere the error could be perceived. Sonnaz, who asked in vain for reinforcements, was at length overpowered, and, falling back, took up his position at the foot of the hills. It was now past midnight. At break of day, the queen's brigade and the 18th regiment having, in the meanwhile, come up, the gallant general once more dashed up to the town. Success against the enemy's numbers was, however, too much out of the question. The first Austrian corps and the reserve were now led forward. The second attack of the Piedmontese was thus repulsed with still more severe losses. Sonnaz once more drew back, hard pressed, now by the Austrian cavalry, who galloped down with great impetuosity, till the Piedmontese horse and a light battery, with other troops, were put forth from Goito to cool their ardour. The retreat of the Piedmontese was then no longer molested, and Sonnaz was able to bring back his troops in something like order to the king. It was a sanguinary affray. Above one thousand combatants fell on either side.

This new disaster achieved the demoralisation of a great part of the Sardinian army, and determined the king, rather too hastily, to sue for an armistice. The measure was proposed in full council, and acceded to by all the king's generals but one, Rossi; and even this latter was, however, willing to accompany General Bes, who was charged with the mission; and who, followed besides by Colonel La Marmora, repaired to the Austrian camp.

Bes did not see Radetzky, but his mind was conveyed to the Sardinian officers, through General D'Aspre and Prince Schwartzenberg at Valeggio; the marshal intimated to the king that he should withdraw behind the Adda, evacuate the duchies of Modena and Parma, and give up, together with other minor fortresses, also Peschiera and Pizzighettone. Such terms were equivalent to the actual surrender of all Lombardy, since, without Pizzighettone, the line of the Adda was lost, and beyond that river the defence of Milan, in a military point of view, was very clearly out of the question. Still it is not easy to see what better conditions the king could have expected; and though the asking for a truce might, in itself, be deemed a questionable policy, inasmuch as it needlessly betrayed the real position of the army, still it was perhaps wise, after such advances being made, to accept the marshal's terms, whatever they might be, for they would at any rate afford breathing-time and leisure for further deliberation. The marshal's terms, however, only aroused the indignation of that ever-improvident king, who overruled in this instance all opposition in the council, and resolved upon once more trusting the chances of war. The retreat across the Oglio was no less rendered necessary. Charles Albert's generals, as it always happens in great reverses, committed nothing but blunders. Not the men alone, but the officers, even those of high rank, gave signs of utter discouragement. The delegates of the Lombard government, the commissaries, and contractors for provisions, had disappeared from the earliest disasters, the latter even sending before them the stores and cattle intended for the sustenance of the troops.

The inhabitants fled everywhere at the approach of the fugitives; the Sardinian divisions moved, as it were, on a waste and desolate country.

And yet the best feelings of honour had not altogether deserted the Sardinian flag. A large mass of these troops held their ground with manliness at Cerlongo, on the Oglio, at Cremona, Piadena, and wherever else their rear came into collision with their not over-eager pursuers. From the Mincio to the Oglio, and hence again to the Adda, 40,000 to 45,000 men kept together, proof against toil and distress, though not a few dropped down dead, overcome by heat, hunger, and exhaustion, by the road-side.

A sudden panic at Marcaria and Canneto, on crossing the Oglio, threw a whole division into complete disorder. The men turned their bayonets upon—trod down—the officers who offered to rally them. Some of the fugitives never stopped till they reached their homes in Piedmont—their sudden appearance, their squalor and misery, their doleful recitals, spreading alarm and consternation all along the road. Between the Mincio and the Adda the army was thus diminished by at least one-third, and the country was swarming with full 15,000 stragglers.

The king had raised his camp from Goito on the evening of the 27th, having previously recalled the divisions he had around Mantua. He crossed the Oglio, on the two above-named points, on the following day, and had his head-quarters in Bozzolo on the 28th, when he issued proclamations to his soldiers, to the Lombardo-Venetian people, to the Italians in general, calling upon them for a last effort in behalf of the

country. The Oglio was given up, and the army, through three different roads, marched upon Cremona, which town it reached on the 30th. The head-quarters were next removed to Codogno, and the army was drawn up along the course of the Adda, so as to defend the stream from Lodi to Pizzighettone, and down to Grotta d'Adda, near its confluence with the Po. The division Perrone, with other Lombard troops, protected the Upper Adda, as far as Cassano and the Lake of Lecco, whilst volunteers and country people, hastily assembled, were fortifying the territories of Bergamo and Lecco.

Unfortunately, General Sommariva, a cavalry officer, who had no other reputation than that of a *beau-sabreur* in the style of Murat, had, owing to indisposition of General D'Arvillars, been entrusted with the temporary command of a large division on the extreme right, at Grotta d'Adda, composed of two of the best brigades (Aosta and queen's), three squadrons of cavalry, and three batteries. With all this force, he deemed himself unable to prevent the Austrians (who, however, throughout this march exhibited anything but ardour in the chase) from throwing a bridge on the river, and filled the measure of stolid improvidence by retiring across the Po to Piacenza (August 1st).*

* General Sommariva published a long account of his operations, in refutation of the charges brought against him by General Bava in his "Relazione" (see "Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 324). Sommariva contends, that his retreat upon the Po was not only matter of absolute necessity, determined by the superior strength of the enemy, but was even effected in consequence of the orders of the general-in-chief, Bava himself, who was then meditating a general retreat of the army across the Po. He vindicates the wisdom and opportunity of

Meanwhile Mr. Abercromby, on the request of the Sardinian government at Turin, had left that city on the evening of the 30th of July, had an interview with the king at Codogno,* and proceeded hence to Radetzky's head-quarters, with full powers from the king to negotiate for a suspension of hostilities. The English envoy fell in with the marshal at Camairago, on the right bank of the Adda (August 2d), and tried to urge the expediency of a truce, insisting on his never-failing argument of imminent French interference and consequent European war. Radetzky and Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, who was with him, seemed also fully alive to the probability of such an issue of events as the diplomatist intimated. But they were resolved to brave all contingencies, and would hear of no terms, save only the immediate and entire withdrawal of the king within the limits of his own Sardinian territories.

Radetzky's answer was scarcely needed to strengthen the king in the determination which was already irremovably taken. The Adda being lost, he had resolved upon defending Milan. The head-quarters were removed to Lodi on the 2d of August; on the 3d, or during the night from the 3d to the 4th, all the army was under the walls of Milan.

The king's move upon the Lombard capital added the last link to that long chain of errors, follies, and

such a measure, a point about which there can be no dispute; but the great matter for discussion is simply, did he, or did he not, act by order? or did he hurry across the Po before he was sure whether the main body of the army followed him or not? For an answer, the reader is referred to the accounts of the two generals.

* Mr. Abercromby's account of his mission, dated Turin, July 30th. and August 4th. "Corresp." iii. 92, 110.

calamities, which decided not of the freedom only and of the very existence of Italy as a nation, but of her honour also. The blunder admits of no defence as a warlike manœuvre, and we never heard of any attempt to vindicate it on that score. But it was no less a capital mistake in politics, and could only have commanded respect as the outburst of noble, chivalrous feelings, if the deeds had been in keeping with the words, and the king and the flower of his army had buried themselves under the ruin of the city.

Up to the 2d of August the king was free in his movements, free to consult the dictates of common prudence, to follow that blundering general, Sommariva, who from sheer instinct, and without waiting to see if he were followed, had pointed out the only safe way of retreat—across the Po.

It required, indeed, no great military capacity to trace the line which, independent of political considerations, was left for the king to follow. He should have crossed the Po, either immediately upon his defeat at Volta, or after his retreat from Cremona—(Radetzky was always slack in his pursuit, and showed no disposition to interfere with the king's backward movements, having even orders under no circumstances to cross the Ticino)*—he should have held his ground in the duchy of Parma, especially near the citadel of Piacenza; hence falling back, if necessary, upon his own territories, ready to dispute the passage of the Po and Ticino, always with a safe retreat on his own strongholds of Alessandria and Genoa.

* Lord Ponsonby, Innsbruck, August 6th, "Corresp." iii. 139.

Radetzky would then either have had to follow him in a field of his (the king's) own choice, when he would have left the whole hostile population of Lombardy in his rear; or, if he resolved on the previous subjugation of Lombardy and the taking of Milan, he would have exposed himself to new attacks on the part of the king, who could recross the Po at any point and choose his own ground of offence, either on the flank or the rear of the Austrian. By marching upon Milan, Charles Albert afforded Radetzky the greatest possible advantage, as the marshal could certainly wish for nothing better than to have to do with one enemy, and that before him.

Occupied with the recital of what actually took place, we have little leisure for conjectures on the probable results that might have been expected had a different course been resolved upon. One question, however, irresistibly presents itself, for which most writers on these dolorous subjects have endeavoured to give such a solution as too often passion, rather than judgment, suggested.

What resistance would Milan and Lombardy, if left to themselves, have offered, in August, to the enemy they had all but annihilated in March?

Friuli, and the other towns and provinces of Venetia, had given but a poor specimen of the aptitude of the Italian population for citizen warfare. Even at **Vicenza** and **Treviso** the people and national guards scarcely supplied efficient combatants; and the honour of the defence of these towns is mainly, if not solely, due to the Swiss and Roman troops or volunteers. Men of different temper were, however, to be found at **Milan**,

at Brescia, and, it was thought, all over Lombardy. The population of the plain, nevertheless, the first exposed to invasion, the stout burghers of Cremona and Lodi, showed symptoms of hopeless consternation. The Austrian was coming down upon them, in a far different plight from what they had seen him in his late flight. Before him, the best Italian soldiers were scattered like chaff before the wind. The old prestige of the Cannon too soon regained its ascendancy, and Radetzky had with him no less than one hundred and fifty of those "last arguments of German logic." With these, it was thought, he had it in his power to level with the plain, to sweep the whole population, their houses and barricades before him, ere his opponents could as much as obtain a sight of his artillery-men. How could bare citizens' breasts entertain any hope of success, where trained soldiers, with skill and war-engines to match those of the destroyer, had so miserably failed? From the Mincio to the Adda not one cry for barricades was raised. The national guards, in the large walled town of Cremona, answered no call. At the sight of the foremost stragglers from the army, vast masses of the rural population, with old men, women, and children, with all they could carry or drag along with them, joined in the senseless flight. It was in vain for the Princess Belgiojoso, who met swarms of these fugitives along the road from Milan to Lodi, to reason with them, to ask what enemy they were running from? The craven rabble, the princess adds, by a blind instinct, made for the capital; nor could the sullen, but calm and manly, demeanor of Charles Albert's troops at Lodi reassure them.*

* "Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiv. 153.

What effect the presence of this helpless multitude could have on the defenders of the great city, what inroad their hunger could make on their supplies, it is fearful to imagine.

Yet within the city, amongst the free corps on the Adda, at Brescia and Bergamo, a far different spirit prevailed. There were even there selfish and dastardly recreants; there were incorrigible croakers impressed with the notion of Austria's omnipotence, who had hung down their head in mute despondency during the whole period of the people's success, and who now looked up, half in triumph, half in dismay, claiming credit for the realization of their worst forebodings, and announcing the final doom in a tone of prophetic authority. Popular enthusiasm had still power to silence them, nevertheless. It is not easy indeed, at any time, by mere speculation, to determine how far the real firmness, the unanimity of a vast population may be relied upon. Had there been leisure, had there been mind to bring something like method and order out of that chaos of popular passions, Milan would most probably have fought; even without order and method, Milan would have perished: for there was that at Milan which is better than enthusiasm to ennoble the fall of a people—there was despair.

From that despair Charles Albert saved the Milanese.

Not for the sake of Milan and Lombardy, not even for the sake of Italy herself, but as a solution to a difficult problem in the nature of mankind, we wish that the determination of the Milanese had been put to the test of experience.

Milan had taken hasty measures for resistance.

That fatal security which had for four months allowed the Lombards to slumber on the mere fame of their exploits in March, which had disdained ever to raise a trench, ever to strengthen a wall for the defence of town or country, never belied itself to the last. Up to the 27th of July, the return of Radetzky to Milan continued a fancied impossibility.

Those who are determined to prove that Charles Albert only came to Milan with a preconceived determination to deliver up the city, depriving it of all chances of resistance,—who think with Cattaneo,* that “having failed in his plan to conquer Lombardy he was now only anxious to secure impunity for himself by abandoning the Lombards to the vengeance of their foe, and that it was above all things important to prevent them from raising a cry of distress which could not have failed to bring the French into Italy”—those who think with Mazzini,† or thought with him on the first news of Charles Albert’s arrival, that “*the Piedmontese army were only coming to go away again*,”—all these do not hesitate to assert that the king and his agents contributed to keep up that treacherous security by false intelligence of signal successes of the Piedmontese, at the very moment that these were falling prostrate before the superior abilities or the prevailing fortune of their Austrian foe. Mad rumours of every description, undoubtedly, circulated throughout Italy and Europe during the whole period of that ill-omened campaign; nor will we undertake to screen the Lombard government, or that of Venice, or even Mazzini’s own republican triumvirate at Rome, from the imputa-

* “Insurrection de Milan,” 201. † “Cenni e Documenti,” 77.

tion of purposely practising on the people's credulity, by giving a high colour to a national triumph, or endeavouring to gloze over national reverses. But, notwithstanding a great deal of vagueness and exaggeration inseparable from the first accounts of warlike affairs, it seems very evident to us, that neither the provisional government nor any official person at Milan put forth in those eventful days any information positively false ; that even such information as proved actually erroneous had a ground of truth in it, and that any incorrectness in the official accounts cannot be ascribed to a design to mislead the Milanese as to the real state of matters, and keep them in a state of apathy and tranquillity, which would prevent the utterance of their cry of distress.

We need only refer to the letters of a foreign eye-witness,* a man who took his inspirations from Cattaneo himself, from which it clearly results, that the first encounters at Rivoli, Sona, and Somma Campagna, the crossing of the Mincio at Salionze, and the retreat and partial dispersion of the Piedmontese left on the 22d and 23d of July, were distinctly and correctly known at Milan on the 25th ; that the committee of public safety did indeed announce on the 26th a victory of the Sardinians, and the taking of from 6000 to 12,000 prisoners, as having occurred on the 24th ; but their announcement rested avowedly on the faith of "an eye-witness" and of "the postmaster of Desenzano ;" and the provisional government declared themselves unable to publish any official statement. That announcement, also, was partly grounded on fact, being only an

* Vice-Consul Campbell, Milan, July 25, 26, 27, 28, "Correspondence," iii. 80, 81, 82, &c.

amplification of the encounter of Staffalo, where the Sardinians firmly believed that they had had to deal with the main force of Radetzky, where they took 2000 prisoners, with 46 officers, and were induced to attach to that unquestionably signal advantage an importance which some better management of the fight on the morrow might have fully justified. On the following day the battle of Custoza gave an unexpected turn to the affairs, and, accordingly, all the rejoicings of the Milanese were turned to wailing; as on the 27th they knew of the defeat of the army of the 25th, and the ruin of the country began to stare them in the face.

By this pitiful equivocation, the Milanese would at the utmost have lost twenty-four hours in their preparations. On the 28th, the defeats of Custoza and Volta being matter of certainty, the alarm was given and the country appealed to in right good earnest. Power was removed from the weak hands of the provisional government, and the people's own men were trusted with it. Mazzini, Cattaneo, and their party, produced their own candidates,—Maestri, Restelli, and General Fanti, who, constituted into a committee of defence, assumed the reins of government on the 28th.* Their very first

* Mazzini himself thus characterizes the members of the committee appointed by his suggestion. Maestri "was a republican of old;" Restelli "had not been one until then; and was known to us as having laboured in good faith, though under a delusion, for the annexation of Venice." Fanti "was more of a soldier than of a political character."—*Cenni e Documenti*, p. 76. Maestri and Restelli published a pamphlet immediately after the fall of Milan, entitled "Gli ultimi tristissimi fatti di Milano." It was written in good faith and in the spirit of truth, though in too great a hurry and under the pressure of too strong an excitement to be entirely free from passion. General Fanti did not write down his name by the side of those of his colleagues.

measure was that "cry of distress" on which the safety of the country was made to depend ; a cry of, " France to the rescue !" The Marquis Guerrieri, one of the members of the all but defunct government, was despatched to Paris, to solicit the armed interference of the French republic in Lombardy. General Zucchi, an ill-omened personage, sure to make his appearance on the eve of great political calamities, had been appointed commander of the national guards of Milan, and soon after of the same militia throughout Lombardy. A review of these citizen troops had been held at Milan, on the 23d of July, when more than half the active force of the city, 10,000 men, were on the ground. " Little enthusiasm," says the above-quoted eyewitness,"* was manifested by the multitude there assembled."

As the danger pressed, a decree was issued for the mobilization of these citizen guards ; one hundred were to march out of every battalion. The officers of this militia, Cattaneo states,† forgetting that they were appointed by the suffrage of their own men, " were only the creatures of the ruling party (the moderate), and few amongst them had distinguished themselves at the barricades." The lukewarmness of the whole troops might therefore be readily explained (especially as the city had to some extent drained itself of its boldest youth to fill the ranks of the volunteers and regular troops, already long since on the scene of open warfare), and the want of confidence in their own forces might also be implied from the fact, that the impolitic and cowardly measure of suing for French aid (a mea-

* Campbell, July 25, iii. 80. † " Insurrection de Milan," 293.

sure no less disloyal to the country than to the new sovereign Milan had willingly chosen) was adopted in opposition to the majority of the weak, but honourable members of the provisional government, and merely in obedience to the tumultuous remonstrances of the same national guard.*

From other decrees issued at this same period by the committee of defence, it were impossible not to argue serious apprehensions on their part of the want of steadiness and generous devotion of, at least, a portion of the wealthiest and most influential classes to the cause of the country. On the 31st of July, emigration is forbidden to all the natives of Lombardy, under penalty of confiscation of their property; new and more cogent, though inefficient, measures are taken to prevent citizens, as well as public officers, from leaving the city, under any pretext whatever.

Having thus provided that the whole population should share the same fate, the committee proceeded to the steps more immediately bearing on the great task set before them; the mobilized national guard was to leave Milan for the camp on the 29th, but its departure was put off, probably with a view to ascertain how it could be disposed of to the best advantage. As soon, in fact, as it was known that Charles Albert proposed to defend the line of the Adda, a commission was sent to take up strong positions all along the upper course of that river. The most ardent patriots, Cattaneo, Terzaghi, Cernuschi, and others, were sent to fire the spirit of the population of Como,

* Princess Belgiojoso, "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," xxiv. 149.—Abercromby, Turin, July 29, "*Correspondence*," iii. 85.

Lecco, Bergamo, and Brescia. They found everywhere the country admirably ready to second them; every man who could wield a musket was a soldier, every one who could raise a spade was a labourer, for the national cause; bridges were everywhere cut down, or blown up; large tracts of road mined. In all this there was, as may be generally supposed, as much confusion as good will. Princess Belgiojoso informs us,* that one of the most important passages of the Adda, the bridge of Cassano, had been overlooked. The Adda was, however, abandoned, for other reasons above mentioned; and, on the 2d of August, it was understood that the defence would be reduced to the walls of Milan. The party who had beforehand resolved that no faith could or should be put upon Charles Albert, implacably consistent in their principles, forthwith deserted the city. Mazzini left for Bergamo, on the night from the 2d to the 3d; Cattaneo, Cernuschi, and others, were already far away on the hills, and could not be induced to come back to their native town in its last need. These fatal mistrusts, these cruel dissensions, joined to Charles Albert's moral pusillanimity and infirmity of purpose, conspired to render the fall of Milan, which would, at any rate, have been inevitable, sudden also and ignominious. That unfortunate city was so pressed by time, that it is difficult to say to what extent a recall of the volunteers and other troops and labourers from the Adda, from the mountain region, and the towns of Bergamo and Brescia, could be found practicable.†

* "Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiv. 154.

† Cattaneo (p. 206) assures us that orders were given on the 2d to summon back all the men of the new levy, and the engineers and

But had even something been done in good time to that effect, the departure of such well-known leaders as the above-mentioned, their words, their nods, and eloquent shrugs of the shoulders, sufficiently intimated that nothing was any longer to be hoped for at Milan; and that Italy was where Mazzini and his democratic friends had betaken themselves.

Milan was thus, partly from necessity, partly from the suddenness of events, partly also from the uncompromising views of these fierce patriots, deprived of her best defenders; and whatever Princess Belgiojoso may please to say about the 50,000 national guards, both of the city and its environs, that were drawn up

labourers that had been sent to the Adda. But the levy in mass (see Campbell, Aug. 2, "Correspondence," iii. 109) was only decreed on the 1st, and it is difficult to say with what alacrity such hasty and contradictory orders could be obeyed. But General Bava, a man who had something like honour at stake, and must, without irrefragable proof to the contrary, be admitted as a witness, says in his "Relazione," "We found on our approach the environs deserted, every countenance dark and silent, with no other expression save that of sorrow and fear. Instead of the copious refreshments we were in such need of, scarcely the commonest food could be obtained for cash; so that the next day, whole regiments—the Savoy cavalry, for instance—were left unprovided for. For the whole day we waited for the labourers who were to work at the trenches of our advanced line, but not one appeared; and the inundation of the lower grounds, by which we had been promised the march of the enemy could be retarded, never took place." We need hardly say that these statements coincide with those of all other Piedmontese authorities,—especially with those of the author of "Custoza," a Frenchman, evidently a man of honour and rare intelligence, writing with great candour, and by no means partial to Italy, or in good humour with Charles Albert or his generals. He has been our surest guide throughout the campaign, and we question whether any fairer or clearer account than his ever was or will be published.

on the Piazza d'Armi on the 2d of August,* it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that, on the 3d and 4th, not many besides the sluggards and cravens had been left behind.

The king came to Milan with 25,000 men, the Sommariva division and his great park of heavy artillery hopelessly severed from him, and about 12,000 or 15,000 fugitives scattered about the country. He intended, it would seem,† to construct an entrenched camp before the town, and encamped without accordingly—owing also to some vow he had made at the opening of the campaign, not to enter that city except as a victorious liberator; but the numerous canals and watercourses that intersect those vast meadows, the absence of the labourers, and the rapid approach of the enemy, rendered that scheme impracticable, and after a first skirmish, in which his soldiers were worsted, he drew them into the town, and proposed to defend the ramparts and the castle.

Some works in the Piazza d'Armi, and on the bastions, had already been commenced from the first alarms; the citizens and peasantry, hastily assembled, were said to be hard at work; some of the gates had been walled up; trees were felled, and upon the first withdrawal of the troops into the city the houses of the suburb of Porta Romana were set on fire, with a view to remove all obstruction to the work of the cannon from the ramparts.

The town was by no means without arms; 60,000 muskets had, in that great emergency, been found in

* "Revue des Deux Mondes," 158.

† "Memorie sulla Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 119.

the engineers' barracks,—treacherously secreted, as Cattaneo supposes, by the provisional government, or by some Piedmontese general :* a provident treason, we should say, since they were produced in the hour of need. The city had also thirty-six cannon ; great loads of gunpowder (as even the Piedmontese allow, only complaining of the scarcity of projectiles). Provisions were coming forth in profusion—so far, at least, as the orders of the committee could have any effect. By virtue of their decrees, all horses, as well as arms and other means of defence, were to be taken from private men, and the town was to be supplied with 24,000 sacks of corn ; a levy in mass, no less than a forced loan of 4,000,000 of lire (470,000*l.*), had been ordered on the same day, Aug. 1. On the following, we are further informed,† great cart-loads of provisions encumbered the roads from sunrise to sunset ; and all the wealthy families had privately stored up means of subsistence for a month. Provisions, according to the same account, *rose to a fearful amount* nevertheless, the committee not having either the foresight or the power to save the people from the extortions of heartless speculators.

With these means, and abstraction made of all material aid to be expected from the burgher combatants, the Piedmontese army ought to have felt equal to a numerous host, especially behind walls and bulwarks, no matter how crumbling and tottering, provided always they were inspired with a heroic determination to die at

* "Insurrection de Milan," 207. Belgiojoso, "Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiv. 161.

† Belgiojoso, "Revue," &c. xxiv. 157.

their post, and that the citizens in their rear were at least willing to let them.

Mazzini, rather too fain to rely on the authority of that envenomed Cattaneo, asserts that Charles Albert brought with him in his pocket the capitulation, by the terms of which Milan was to be given a prey to the invader.* He adds that his promise on his honour to defend the city *à outrance*, the burning of the houses before Porta Romana, and all the preparations for a desperate conflict, were only made with a view to extinguish the last spark of warlike ardour that might still linger amongst that aroused population, with a view to let the enemy in when the very suspicion of impending evil had been thoroughly allayed.

Now Charles Albert, most certainly, did not bring the capitulation with him. The king entered the city, unmindful of his vow, in the evening of the 4th, after the last conflict before the walls. The order to clear the ground had been given to the troops as they fell back from before the enemy in the afternoon; and it was only after midnight, from the 4th to the 5th, that the English vice-consul, Campbell, and the French chargé d'affaires, Reiset,† on repairing to the Austrian camp to demand an armistice of forty-eight hours in behalf of their countrymen, fell in, on their way, with the Piedmontese generals, Rossi and Lazzari, who, as it

* "Cenni e Documenti," p. 78.

† Campbell, Milan, Aug. 5, "Correspondence," iii. p. 127. This and the following letters, Aug. 6 and 7, are the most precious documents we possess respecting those miserable transactions. It is surprising that Mazzini, who wrote with these documents before his eyes, and quotes so largely from them, should still persist in his assertions.

appears, were going to Radetzky's head-quarters to treat for a capitulation. They met D'Aspre at three miles, and the marshal himself at St. Donato, at six miles' distance from the city. The two generals had an interview of two hours with Radetzky, after which the foreign agents were admitted, and on their expressing their desire for an armistice they were informed by the Austrian that they—*i.e.* the generals—had capitulated.

The generals, however, it results from the same evidence, had only drawn up the basis of a capitulation, which at six o'clock in the morning of the 5th was laid before the king and his council, awaiting their sanction. But the king was allowed no time for deliberation. Sinister rumours of his treason began to be whispered abroad. The suspicion which had ever been lurking in every Italian heart respecting his uprightness and sincerity, and which fanatics and evil-minded persons had carefully fostered among the people, received now a most irrefragable confirmation. The king was selling them! There was riot and confusion in Milan. The king's carriages, which were about to be forwarded to the frontier, were assailed by the mob, who took the horses from them, overturned them, and with them and other materials barricaded all the streets leading to the palace, so as to preclude all possibility of the king's escape.

The king, who had as yet, according to all probability, been unable to send his final answer to the marshal, renounced all thoughts of a capitulation, and expressed his determination to brave all extremities, and remain at his post with his sons and his army. The

city—that means, the people about the streets—was thrilled with fresh enthusiasm at the announcement; but the upper classes, the few remaining of them, after innumerable interviews with the king and his officers, seemed to be of a different mind: for at sunset the archbishop, the podesta (Bassi) and some of his assessors (mayor and aldermen), went out, in the name of the municipal authorities, and signed with Radetzky that same capitulation which had only been proposed in the morning. The convention bears the signature of Hess in the name of Radetzky, and of Bassi in the name of Milan. The name of General Salasco, commander of the Sardinian staff, is appended to the document. The seventh article distinctly stipulates that “all these conditions *need the acceptance* of his majesty the King of Sardinia.”*

Late at night, still on the 5th, the king was informed by Bassi and his colleagues that the convention with Radetzky was a *fait accompli*; and no choice was left to him for accepting or objecting to it.

These are the mere facts: the reasons must be looked for in the real state of the king's troops and of the city itself. The king had, as we have said, 25,000 men, mostly horse and mounted artillery. The foot brigades were sadly reduced. Such as they were, those troops were the flower of his army: all the men who had had

* “*Tutte queste condizioni hanno bisogno di essere accettate da parte di sua Maestà il Re di Sardegna.*” See the terms of the capitulation in the inclosure of Mr. Campbell's despatch (of Aug. 6, “Correspondence,” iii. p. 134), who, by the way, gives an incorrect translation of those words. Salasco, it seems quite evident, had no faculty to sign it in the king's name; else the clause would have no meaning.

virtue to withstand the hardships and perils of such a disastrous retreat. They were, however, worn out and disheartened: sick at heart with the cause they had served, sorely displeased with the people they had come to liberate. During the retreat near Lodi, it is harshly asserted by General Bava, and the confession must have cost a Piedmontese, no matter how aristocratic, a bitter pang of wounded pride, "whole companies threw themselves on the ground, and resisted all entreaties and threats, nay, the very blows of their officers, preferring even death to the toils and sufferings of the march." *

Radetzky was following in close pursuit with 35,000 men: 3000 had been left at Cremona, 10,000 had been forwarded to Pavia, with a view to cut off the king's retreat towards the Ticino, and also to oppose Sommariva, if he came up from Piacenza. These 10,000, however, could, in case of need, be called up to Milan on the shortest notice. A brigade, with a strong accompaniment of horse and artillery, had been marched upon Brescia; and squadrons of hussars and Huns were scouring the plain in every direction.

The inferiority of numbers was, therefore, not so very great as to preclude all hope of a stout resistance, even taking into account the burgher auxiliaries, provided every man was determined to do his duty; the real difference consisted in the great might of artillery,

* "Relazione del General Bava," &c. "Never in the whole course of my life," says he, "have I seen such degradation. They would suffer all, even death, without complaining. Their word,—only fight they would say." Thus he attributes to the married men with families whom the generals had brought into the ranks; more justly to badly equipped men, as it is well known, has power to unnerve the very brave.

148 cannon, that Radetzky was dragging along on his march. The park of heavy artillery of the Piedmontese was at that moment with Sommariva across the Po, and the weakness of their ranks was especially felt in the foot soldiery,—so that the substance of an army, especially in the defence of a town, cannon and infantry, were gone.

But, independent of such losses, the Sardinian army had, since Custoza and Volta, given up all hope of meeting the enemy on the open field. The problem, in a military point of view, was, therefore, reduced to a calculation of the aid that the old crazy walls of Milan could give of doing duty as a shield to men who no longer trusted to their bare breasts.

This merely as to the *matériel*. As to the spirit of the troops little need be added. Rallied round their king, in defence of their own country, they should and would, most probably, make up by feelings of honour for any deficiency of order and discipline; though on that point we must not be too sanguine, for even within their own territory, beyond the Ticino, all imminent danger being removed, entire battalions were falling off, under the very eyes of their king.* But the march upon Milan could only be an unpopular move with them. They had a grudge with the Lombards, who, no matter how unfounded the charge, had, they fancied, neglected and starved them; who in their ignorance had looked upon them as strangers, and even drawn

* "At Vigevano a single regiment of Casale counted above 600 deserters. A regiment of Acqui dwindled from 2700 to 600 men."—*Guerra dell' Indipendenza*, p. 132. The two brigades above named were not amongst the best Sardinian troops.

unfavourable comparisons between them and the abhorred Croatians.* Even on their very entrance into the city, in these last extremities, the silly populace seemed to insult the miseries of those brave men, by crying out, "Dear, dear, what ugly soldiers! and how ragged they are!"†

Their knight-errantry was not proof against such usage, and the king was soon able to perceive that he had been too rash when he promised not in his own name only but in theirs also.

Nevertheless the experiment was made. At ten o'clock in the morning of the 4th of August, as we have hinted, an engagement took place all along the Piedmontese line, under the walls of the town. It was a various and desultory fight, and lasted nearly the whole day. Almost every battalion behaved even as its own spirit prompted it, independent of, and in some instances separated from, the others. All evidence concurs to prove, that even in this last trial the Piedmontese stood their ground with sufficient fortitude;‡ for, strange to say, it was not generally in presence of the enemy, it was not in actual conflict, that those unruly soldiers fell asunder. The Austrians, however, by the advantage of their numbers, succeeded towards evening in finding a gap in that long line; they poured in with large masses on the flank of a Casale regiment, threw them into some confusion, took a large number of pri-

* "We have driven out the Croatians—here are more of them," said the people at Milan, on the arrival of the Piedmontese vanguard in March.—See Dandolo, *I Volontarii Lombardi*, p. 25.

† Ferrero, "Campaign of Lombardy," p. 119.

‡ Willisen's "Italianische Feldzug," p. 202.

soners and a battery of six pieces, and pressing forward with great impetuosity drove the whole army back upon the walls. The order of retreat was now given, and towards evening the Piedmontese had stationed themselves on the ramparts.

In the same encounter, we are informed, the Milanese youths of the national guard behaved with great gallantry, and in their turn captured 200 men and five cannon from the enemy.*

The king had shown his countenance in the thickest of the *mêlée*, with a display of that mere physical courage that none of his enemies ever denied him; for, when on horseback, he shook off that biliousness which depressed his spirits in the council.

He was now, on the evening of the 4th, shut up in the city, with an army borne down by a new reverse. Of the real attitude of the Milanese population it was

* Princess Belgiojoso, "Revue des Deux Mondes," xxiv. The princess was, it appears, still in Milan. She left on the following morning (the 5th), together with General Antonini, who quitted his post as commander of the castle and repaired to Novara, taking with her an escort of thirty Lombard gendarmes. ("Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 129.) Mr. Campbell, who was also at Milan, and remained, a writer somewhat partial to the Milanese, makes no mention of these Milanese trophies. (See his account of the "Action before Milan," Aug. 4, "Correspondence," iii. 127.) "We expected to see arrive (to replace the dead and wounded in our ranks) all those young Milanese who had been represented to us as resolved to bury themselves beneath the walls of their town, rather than to submit a second time to the abhorred yoke; but I can mention here but twenty individuals, clothed and armed like stage heroes, who rushed out of the Roman gate, shouting with all their might, '*Morte ai Barberi!*'"—Ferrero, *Campaign of Lombardy*, p. 123. We must, however, be careful how we admit evidence from one party to the disparagement of the other.

not easy for him then, nor is it easy for us now, to form a correct estimate. The most daring and resolute youths were certainly far away. The national guard was to a great extent broken up, but a disorderly multitude was still in arms. The barricades, which the Piedmontese generals had objected to so long as the army could be hoped to confront the enemy without the walls, were now erected with the greatest zeal and alacrity. General Bava, now on his return from the conflict, does ample justice to the ardour and good humour of the people, who were fraternising with the soldiers upon the solid structures they had reared, and feasting them with a cordiality and liberality which, he adds, "had it been shown to us on our first arrival, on the previous day, would have infused new courage into our troops, and given them strength to face the enemy outside the walls with a far different result."

The soldiers had lost the battle, nevertheless, and the ardour of the population proceeded only by fits and starts. They had made up their minds for a desperate defence on the 2d;* they were silent and downcast on the 3d, appalled by the desertion of their democratic leaders, and more so by the reasons some of them alleged for their retreat. The great and the wealthy had also decamped in vast numbers, and their palaces were shut up and forsaken. The roar of the cannon without and the alarm-bell within seemed now, on the 4th, to have aroused a little of the fine spirits of March. But how long would the enthusiasm last, and what chances had it against an enemy who had nothing in common with

* Campbell, Milan, Aug. 2, "Correspondence," iii. p. 109.

the enemy routed in March, save only the galling remembrance of a defeat, and the savage prospect of speedy revenge?

Had Charles Albert found only an empty town on his arrival, he would better have known how to calculate on its support. But he also was mistrustful; his difficulties arose not so much from what he might hope, but also from what he might fear, on the part of the population. His enemies, he knew, had been long at work, bitter, relentless. Mazzini, it was represented to him, was gone; but he had left his venom behind. These two men never saw, never comprehended, each other; a thousand intermediary agents of evil had, for many years, been widening the breach between them: both exaggerated the gulf that separated them.

Measures had been taken in the king's absence which not only seemed to set the act of annexation at nought, but upset, at one stroke, the system of policy—wise and just in this instance—which the king had been firmly pursuing. Such was the mission of the Marquis Guerrieri to Paris, an open encroachment on the royal prerogative,—an act, in our opinion, never to be sufficiently vituperated. On the 3d, General Olivieri, with other Piedmontese officers, had preceded the king, dissolved the provisional government, and established a military rule, as befitted a town that would so soon find itself in a state of siege. The committee of defence was, however, suffered to continue in the discharge of its duties; but their measures, bold and somewhat arbitrary, soon clashed with the views of the plodding Piedmontese officers.

The king took up his quarters in Casa Greppi, and

the committee requested that the guard of the palace should be entrusted with the national militia. The honour was, to say the least, of a questionable nature. The committee were well-known republicans—they had been appointed by the republican party; and the militia-men chosen to surround the king's person were, or might easily be represented to him to be, democrats of the deepest hue. The king put himself in their hands, nevertheless, and, with the exception of twenty-five of his gendarmes, he was a hostage, a prisoner,—any thing that the humour of the multitude and the issue of events should determine. These symptoms of mistrust were not calculated to revive the spirits of the king, borne down as they were by the sight of the dissolution of his army, the wreck of all his ambitious hopes, and the imminent ruin of his house and kingdom.

And yet, was the people's mistrust undeserved? 1820, 1833, were visited upon the king. But the retribution, however just, was no less unendurable.

Under the influence of these feelings, the king assembled his council: it was urged by his generals that both ammunitions and provisions were not likely to last above twenty-four hours. We know that the contrary has been stoutly asserted by the committee of defence, by their friends, and even, on their faith, by the English vice-consul.* The king, however, was borne out in his

* Campbell, Aug. 14, "Correspondence," iii. p. 193. Mr. Campbell "conceives it his duty to state," that there was no want of money, no want of ammunitions, no want of provisions,—the decrees of the committee had supplied all that. The measures of the committee were, however, taken at the eleventh hour, and Mr. Campbell does not tell us how fully they had been complied with. The con-

assertions by all his officers. It is possible that such of the generals, and they were many, who did not enter into the chivalrous feelings of the king, and could see no reason why the very kernel of a brave army, the only support of an old monarchy, should be sacrificed in what seemed to them a bootless, quixotic enterprise, exaggerated the actual insufficiency of the means of defence.

After all, the question was by no means here one of mere possibility or expediency of resistance; it was a matter of honour. By coming to Milan, the king had put all military considerations out of the question. He could scarcely hope to save the city; all that was practicable was to die before its gates, and for this his men, their good swords and bayonets, sufficed.

Those who most sanguinely discourse about the means collected at Milan, do not suppose that the city could hold out beyond ten or twelve days. All they contend for is—and with this we are unable to sympathise—that time would thus have been given to the French army of the Alps to cross Mount Cenis, and appear before Milan in time to give battle to the besiegers.

The assertion is wrong on all points: wrong, be-

clusion of the letter is remarkable:—"I am informed by one of the highest Austrian military authorities here that there is such an abundance of ammunitions in this town as to embarrass the army,—so much so, that they intend to throw large quantities of it into the canals." Thus, because it suited the Austrians to set Lombards and Piedmontese by the ears, a foreign agent is willing to make himself the channel of a communication, the glaring absurdity of which renders its exaggeration innocuous. Throw it into the canals, forsooth! The Piedmontese, however, did not complain of want of powder, but of balls.

cause Radetzky needed lose no time in the siege of a place which he could reduce by one day's bombardment and assault; wrong, because the French army of the Alps no longer existed, except in name (its best troops being called to Paris since the days of June, where their presence could not be dispensed with); wrong, because Cavaignac, who had already taken his resolution before the fall of Milan, refused to see or acknowledge any Italian agent, except such as were introduced by the Sardinian minister; wrong, because the French intervention did not, even in these extremities, enter into the designs of the king (who, to the very last, deemed such a remedy worse than the worst evil), nor—be it said in good truth—into those of any good Italian.

The men who have, with false hopes of this nature, kept the country in endless agitation, till, in the following year, they actually brought a French army into Italy at Rome, may now say how far its presence contributed to the independence and freedom of Italy. The Turin cabinet had also, most probably without the king's knowledge, despatched the Marquis Ricci to Paris; they had, however, sufficient shame left not to ask for French interference, but only wished to ascertain the real disposition of the French government upon the subject. The government's mind was too soon revealed; it left no hope for any Italian suppliant, royalist or republican, except such as could be built on the results of diplomatic mediation.*

Charles Albert, therefore, as he could not by his

* Lord Normanby, Paris, July 31, Aug. 1, "Correspondence," iii. pp. 83, 84; Abercromby, Turin, July 29, p. 85.

own forces expect to come off as a conqueror, so he could not—should not—hope or wish for extraneous succour. His only prospect was—an honourable death.

How many of his soldiers, how many of the clamouring multitude would have shared this hard alternative, was not, at this stage of matters, a subject for his consideration; nor should all the blood, all the horrors inseparable from such a conflict, have deterred him from his inevitable duty. Italy—we have said it with respect to Vicenza—needed some such sacrifice. A revolution which had at the outset exhibited scenes of the deepest drama, should not end in a pitiful farce.

Of all men, Charles Albert was the least allowed to survive the fate of the country. He owed the holocaust to himself, to the royal word that had passed his lips, to that past which a noble death could not retrieve, but could, nevertheless, generously expiate.

After all, there was no escape. Only a few months more of ignominious existence: then the pang of revived hope, of rapid disenchantment, and a long, inglorious agony. Such was the future in store for him.

And Charles Albert had, most probably, personal courage to meet his fate; but he referred the matter to his advisers. Their cold reasonings prevailed over the promptings of his better nature; he weighed the chances of a combat, his heart misgave him, and he sent his messengers to the camp.

Ere his messengers had time to return, the vociferations of the city recalled him to a sense of his obligations. He tore the convention that was waiting for his signature, and came back to his first and best resolution.

The rest was not of his doing. The town, which had broken out into a yell of malediction on the first whisper of a capitulation, which had torn to pieces the first persons who only hinted it as spies and traitors, was soon dismayed at the result of its own bravado. Deputation after deputation, from all ranks and parties, came to the king and his officers, asking information as to the real position of affairs. After a short explanation the noise of their storming voices was hushed up, their crests fell, and *with the exception of two young men*, Bava assures us, all went away satisfied with the wisdom of the king's proposal.*

The king, however, had "washed his hands" of it. He had "given his word of honour"—so ran the proclamation of Pompeo Litta and the Abate Anelli, the two most honourable members of the provisional government, who alone of that body had remained faithful to their trust—"and offered his life as a guarantee" (that life, be it remembered, that was always at the people's mercy), "that he would fight with all his army to the last moment." But we are told,† "no confidence was placed in the king's word; the tocsin had ceased to ring, the people had retired to their houses, and in many parts they began to remove the barricades."

The people would have nothing to do with Charles Albert, whether he fought or surrendered.

Are we told that the king's promise was only a ruse to lull the people's wrath, and enable him to make good his escape? But what prevented the people from

* Bava, "Relazione," &c.; "Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 126, &c.

† Campbell, Aug. 6, "Correspondence," iii. p. 133.

taking him at his own word? the king and his suite were most assuredly at their mercy. The multitude was bold enough to cry, "Death to Charles Albert!" to insult the Duke of Genoa, to fire three hundred shots against the windows of the palace. The capitulation was still in abeyance, and if we are to believe Cattaneo,* the Piedmontese officers themselves evinced the greatest indignation at the dastardly conduct of their king; they tore their epaulettes, and protested they would fight in the ranks with the people. What could the bad faith of one man, and he a helpless prisoner, do against the unanimous will of so large a population?

Alas! where, on the 5th of August, was the population—where the city of Milan? The crowd that beset the palace, never very large or formidable, gave way before the gleam of the first bayonets that were summoned to the king's rescue. Charles Albert had no less been exposed to the rage of his besiegers, and to the stealthy attacks of his citizen-guard,† for the whole of that morning and afternoon, and was only suffered to quit the city at a quarter past eleven o'clock at night. They allowed the "royal traitor" to slip through their fingers, only intent upon deeds of pillage and outrage against the houses of their fellow-citizens.‡

But why should we dwell on these sad particulars?

* "Insurrection," &c. p. 210.

† "Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 130.

‡ "Last night the Duke Visconti's palace was attacked and plundered by the populace, and at this moment (ten o'clock) they are sacking that of the Duke of Litta," &c.—Campbell, Aug. 6, iii. p. 133.

The mob is a mob in all countries ; and the heroes of the Parisian suburbs, after all the prodigies of 1789 and 1793, showed neither more sense, nor valour, nor unanimity, nor, indeed, greater honesty, on the fall of their city in 1814, under circumstances strikingly analogous to these last days of Milan.

But if the mere populace evinced in these circumstances so much more exasperation than good resolution, what shall we think of the upper classes, and especially of the municipal authorities, who, on the first announcement of the king's magnanimous resolution to annul the capitulation, assembled with pale terror in their faces, and hastened, without the king's knowledge or consent, to send their own deputation to the Austrian, to take up once more the negotiation which the fury of the people and the repentance of the king, whether sincere or simulated, had broken up ?

What shall we think ? Merely that the step they took was perfectly justifiable for men who acted only in accordance to the rules of common discretion ; and that heroism, however it should be honoured, worshipped, whenever met with, either in history or romance, is not to be exacted as a duty, either from kings, nobles, or people.

Thus was Milan saved, in spite of itself.

The king, late at night, heard the result of the municipal mission. Did it rob him of the last chances of a worthy end ? We say, No ! as we would have said to Napoleon after Waterloo. There were bayonets enough outside the walls for the king and his charger to find their " bed of roses " upon. The generals of his staff, the gendarmes of his escort, would not have followed

him. What matter? a man "needs no companion in death."

And his blood would have redeemed Italy. It would have satisfied all parties; struck dumb, at last, even those for whom "to see is to believe."

The death with which the mob encompassed him, perhaps drove from his mind that other death to which he had all but pledged himself. Through the angry populace, however, he forced his way in the manner alluded to above, and turned his back upon the distracted city at half-past two o'clock in the morning (Aug. 6). He crossed the Ticino on the following day. Two days later (Aug. 9) General Salasco had signed, in his name, an armistice, which was scarcely needed to secure him from the enemy's pursuit.

What the feelings of that "poor king" might be at the time, may be argued from the fact that he threw himself into the citadel in Alessandria, never daring to show his countenance, never repairing to his capital, for above five weeks.

The Austrians entered Milan on the 6th, at noon. Two-thirds of the population, 100,000 souls, we are told, had left it previously, or quitted it on that morning.*

It was in this emergency that Mazzini proclaimed, almost in a tone of exultation, that "the royal war was at an end, and that of the people about to commence."

With that faith he took himself the field.† "The

* Cattaneo, p. 212.

† See the letter of Colonel Medici, in the work, "*République et Royauté en Italie*," Paris, 1850, p. 140. We are anxious to retract a few words occurring in one of our papers ("*New Monthly Magazine*,"

precious rifle, that *sweet and elegant weapon*, the munificence of some fair English enthusiasts had presented him with at the opening at the campaign, which he had with infinite trouble carried from London to Milan," was at last drawn out of its "cover of green baize." His campaign was, however, none of the longest. He joined the band of Giacomo Medici on the morning of the 3d of August, at Bergamo, marched under that

Dec. 1849), which gave offence to Mazzini and his friends. We were not at the time aware that Mazzini had actually borne arms for his country. It is possible, as it was supposed, that our words were written in a bitter moment, when we were chafed by Mazzini's sneer about the *royal war*; for Mazzini must be aware that a great many good men and true fought in that war who cared but little for Charles Albert, or for any crowned heads in the world; and who saw in him but the instrument, no matter how weak and imperfect, which, properly seconded, might have wrought out the deliverance of Italy. We never, however, meant to call Mazzini's strength of soul or intrepidity into question; and our sneer, if those words conveyed any, was, at the utmost, aimed at those fair enthusiasts who did not see that Mazzini was "a man of the pen," whose life was too valuable to be thrown away on the chances of a *tirailleur* fray. For the rest, we do, indeed, seriously quarrel with Mazzini for having suffered his rifle to lie inactive by his chimney-corner at Milan during the whole of that period, if he ever meant to produce it at all; when, independent of the *royal war*, from which he had such good reasons to keep aloof, its crack might be heard with so much advantage in the Venetian territories under a republican flag. Why should he have reserved his display of valour for what was merely a finale to Charles Albert's campaign? or why, since *the people's war* was now beginning, did not the people's leader show more longanimity than the royal chief, and choose some spot where he could seal the country's doom with his blood? It is true we erred—the rifle *was* aired; but did it do even as much work as the much-abused "Sword of Italy?" Better a thousand times had it lain in its green wrapper, than to come forth merely for one day's empty bravado. Charles Albert was no Gustavus Vasa, but was Mazzini a Kosciuszko?

which had in so many instances dyed the snows of the Wintsgau with the enemy's blood, was obliged to break asunder from lack of means of sustenance. Griffini, left alone at Brescia, twenty-five leagues in the rear of the enemy, withdrew through the all but impassable roads of the Aprica, or Abricca, into the Grisons. Garibaldi had taken the field too late; he had, besides, shut himself up in a triangle, between the enemy, the Lake Maggiore, and Switzerland, where he could neither stir nor find sustenance."*

All these assertions stand on never an inch of ground. If D'Apice, or any of his fellow-condottieri, knew not how to choose their ground, so that either the people's good-will or the adventurers' own good swords should supply the wants of these latter, as Garibaldi did, they betrayed either an improvidence or else a soft-heartedness which unfitted them for their task. A guerilla chief is not worth his salt who knows not how to turn the very stones into bread. As to Griffini, he may be styled a king's general, if it so suit Mazzini's argument. We have, however, his own account of the transactions at Brescia, from which it clearly results that he was anything but anxious to depend on the king's orders.†

He received tidings of the capitulation of Milan, it seems, on the 11th of August, when he immediately summoned around him his own staff (he had 5000 regular Lombard troops with him), together with all the officers of the national guards, the municipal

* Cattaneo, p. 213.

† "Relazione Storica della Guarnigione di Brescia, comandata dal Generale Griffini," in the work "Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 256.

authorities, and other citizens of well-known patriotism, and, after a fair exposition of the state of matters, offered himself ready, if they wished it, to "make a Saragozza or a Missolunghi of their town." He allowed them ample time for deliberation, and on the morrow at eight o'clock the city authorities and the staff of the city militia brought answer, requesting that the general and his troops would take themselves off and abandon the city to its fate. Griffini left on that same afternoon (of the 12th), with his 5000 for Iseo, where he arrived in the evening. In the course of those few hours' march his troops had dwindled to 3800. The general's intention was to hold on for some time, on the high mountains in Valtellina, but some of the commanding officers under him deserted him with whole battalions and regiments, unable to resist the temptation of the safe refuge that the neighbouring Grisons afforded. D'Apice had by this time, and probably for the reasons assigned by Cattaneo—want of provisions—abandoned the passes of the Stelvio; so that Griffini, finding himself with greatly reduced forces, surrounded on all sides by the enemy, was compelled to follow the fugitives across that disastrous pass of the Aprica, not without heavy losses of cannon, ammunition, and luggage.

Once on Swiss ground his men laid down their arms, and were marched by small detachments into Piedmont.

General Durando (Giacomo, the brother of that Giovanni Durando who commanded at Vicenza) had been substituted for Allemandi in the command of all the Lombard volunteers on the frontier of Tyrol, ever

since the 25th of April, and had from that time to the end of July defended those passes of the Tonale and Caffaro with various vicissitudes, but always with honour, and had only abandoned his post on the 29th of July, in consequence of the disasters of the royal army at Custoza and Volta. Even then he left a few of his most valiant companies in and about Rocca d'Anfo under Thannberg, who were still skirmishing desperately with the Austrians on the very day of the capitulation of Milan (Aug. 5).*

It had been Durando's wish from the first alarms to fall back with all his forces upon Bergamo, to join his troops with those of Griffini at that place, and with a division of about 12,000 men to operate a diversion in the king's behalf, either on the Mincio or on the Adda, in obedience to the issue of warlike events. The Milan government, the committee of defence, and Charles Albert himself, however, urged so forcibly upon him the necessity of protecting Brescia, that, much against his own judgment, he felt bound to alter his course, and came down to the Lake of Garda, through Brozza, Nozza, Vobarno, and Salò; from which last place he could either march upon Brescia or throw reinforcements into Peschiera, now already besieged by the Austrians. It was with a view to afford some relief to the garrison of that fortress that, on the 7th of August, he advanced to Desenzano, and hence, with some of his most intrepid bands, attacked a considerable

* "Cenni intorno alle operazioni difensive delle truppe e volontari Lombardi sulle frontiere del Tirolo ecc del Generale Durando," in "Guerra dell' Indipendenza," p. 281.

Austrian force at Lonato, where the Manara and the Polish legions under Kamiensky gave new proofs of that headlong and inconsiderate courage which had distinguished them throughout their romantic campaign.

Driven back before superior numbers, Durando now thought of falling back upon Brescia, especially as the first tidings of the fall of Milan had thrown great disorder amongst those always insubordinate and riotous troops. There had never been a good understanding between Durando and Griffini, as the latter had been invested with supreme and independent powers at Brescia, and the former held it essential to the safety of the country that one man should have absolute control over the whole of that district. The consequence of these bickerings was, that when Durando, on the 11th, led his forces to Brescia, he found, on his arrival on the 12th at noon, that that city had capitulated. Nothing remained, therefore, except to continue his retreat towards Bergamo, unless he preferred to follow Griffini into Switzerland, there to put himself at the mercy of the federal government.

Durando deemed it as wise and honourable to lead his division with all the honours of war into Piedmont. He consequently set out for Bergamo, on the evening of the 13th, having already sent his vanguard to occupy the city on the previous day. This vanguard, under the orders of Monti, came in sight of the town just as 1500 Austrians, under Schwartzenberg, were marching upon it on the other side. There was a race and a scramble, in which the Italians had the advantage, having taken possession of the upper part of the town, from which they could fulminate the enemy in the

suburbs below. The hostile troops remained thus in presence, and their leaders had even come to a parley as Durando came up. The 1500 Croatsians under Schwartzenberg were undoubtedly in his power, and he has been soundly rated by Cattaneo and others* for neglecting the excellent opportunity he had of crushing those enemies, and securing for himself a sum of 500,000 lire which lay at the time in the treasury of the province.

Durando was, however, deterred by his scruples respecting the Milan capitulation, to which, as a Piedmontese, he considered himself bound, and still more, perhaps, by the helplessness of his situation, for new Austrian forces could come up from Milan every minute; so he signed a convention with Schwartzenberg, by the terms of which he was allowed, and enabled, to continue his retreat into Piedmont, through Monza, Legnano, Gallarate, and Sesto Calende, with all those honours of which Swiss hospitality would have deprived him.

Before he reached Bergamo, and during his eventful stay of above twenty-four hours there, the general had to withstand the repeated attacks of Cernuschi and other republican commissioners, who not only urged upon him the expediency of capturing Schwartzenberg and his Croatsians, and the half-million already in their clutches, but with these and with his 5000 brave youths throwing himself into the mountains, where Garibaldi, Mazzini, and their party had already proclaimed the "war of the people." Durando called together all his

* Cattaneo, 213.

condottieri, and gave them full control over their own movements, only stating that, for himself, he considered his line of duty clearly laid out before him by the Milan capitulation, and that he saw no chance of success in any different course. There was some hesitation and division of opinion among those brave youths, for young they were, and valiant; and the idea of a prolongation of hostilities on those mountains which had been the theatre of their exploits was not without its fascination to most of them. A deputation was even sent by them to Lugano, to consult Mazzini himself as to the real position of affairs,* and see to what extent the cause of the country might be aided by further sacrifices on their part. They, however, came back with a conviction of the hopelessness of their projected enterprise, and although not without murmuring, yet with breaking hearts, they all followed their Piedmontese general, who crossed the Ticino without the loss of one single deserter.

And yet those volunteers were no men to allow their leader to exercise any undue influence on their resolutions. In a hundred instances, from the opening to the close of the campaign, often from trifling and whimsical motives, they had evinced the most stubborn, unconquerable wilfulness. They had never, except in presence of the enemy, been found amenable to order. They had more than once turned their bayonets against Manara, Thannberg, or any other of their most popular chiefs, whenever any attempt was made to enforce a

* Dandolo, "I Volontarii Lombardi," p. 122. That young officer was one of the deputation, and saw Mazzini at Lugano.

discipline ill-suited to their humour or convenience.* Why then did they allow General Durando to have his way in this juncture? Why did his remonstrances, or his threat that he would give himself up as a prisoner to Schwartzberg, exercise greater ascendancy over them than all the fiery eloquence of Cernuschi? Mazzini's call and Garibaldi's example were before them. Why did they resist all that, submitting to the indignity of being marched out of the country, under the escort of one of Schwartzberg's aides-de-camp, almost in the guise of prisoners?

It is not easy to say how far the compliance of Durando with Cernuschi's advice, his junction with Garibaldi, with 1500 prisoners and 500,000 Austrian lire, might have enabled Mazzini to carry his hazardous game. Garibaldi himself rather disappointed the expectations of those who had heard so much of the deeds of the hero of Montevideo. He gathered about a thousand picked men under his orders, threw himself into the mountains of Como and Varese—not confining himself to the "triangle" described by Cattaneo—not prevented by any qualms of conscience from helping himself to the means of carrying on the war, wherever they might be found—for he suddenly appeared before Arona, on the Piedmontese shore of the Lake Maggiore, took forcible possession of two Sardinian steamers, laid that and other towns under contribution, and hence once more turning against the enemy in Lombardy, fought them in various encounters, obtaining even, it is

* See Dandolo throughout,—and in particular chap. vii., entitled, "Un Episodio di Volontarii," p. 97.

stated, a signal advantage against superior forces at Luino.

All this, however, but to little purpose—unless it were to secure for himself the honour of continuing the struggle for about four weeks, and being the last to lay down his sword. He crossed over to the Canton Ticino on the 26th of August.

Such was, in 1848, the War of the People. Are we to conclude from that, that Italy fell from faint-heartedness on the part of her people no less than of her princes?

Heroism, alas! is not of every hour and place. That same Brescia, into which the presence of 5000 men could not infuse the courage of despair in August 1848, was, however, alone and unarmed, equal to the most awful sacrifices in March 1849. Those volunteers who laid down their arms, as it were, before an inferior force in Bergamo at this epoch, will seek a certain death at the mouth of the sharpest French rifles in Rome, not many months hence: that Garibaldi, who showed himself little more than a bragging brigand on the Northern Lakes, will not leave the country till he has most amply redeemed his honour on the banks of the Tiber. Mazzini himself will find there a proper field for his ample capacities. The man who slunk out of Milan, a quibbling, ranting, malignant demagogue, will only quit Rome with the mantle of a Rienzi hanging on his shoulders, the prestige of genius dazzling even those whose sober judgment might still be at variance with his views.

But, in August 1848, the people and its leaders showed no firmer countenance than kings and their armies. Italy yielded to a force, which a series of

egregious blunders, of mad divisions—the aggravation of all her old evils—had rendered irresistible.

The Italians perished, not because they “did not fight,” but because they knew not when to fight. Blood enough was spilt, during that and the following year, to achieve the redemption of more than one nation; but it was poured out unseasonably, hardly ever for the well-being, not often for the honour, of the country.

Lombardy, Venetia, the Duchies, the whole land, was swept over without an attempt at resistance. Only before insurmountable barriers, at Osopo or Venice, the onset of the Austrian paused. Charles Albert had fled from the open field: hence were mountains and streams, town-walls and bastions, and barricades unavailing.

From that universal demoralisation one only luminous exception occurred—at Bologna.

General Welden had entered the Legations on the third of August, and emboldened by the ready quiescence of Ferrara, Modena, and Parma, came before that city with between 3000 and 4000, and 12 pieces of artillery. He had been preceded by a brutal proclamation at Bondeno, in which he pointed at the reeking ruins of Sermida (whose feeble resistance had been punished by fire and sword), and in which he set no limits to his boasts and threats. He exacted obedience in the pope’s name, demanded hostages, laid a heavy fine on the city. It was then only the 7th of August. Passive submission had not yet become a watchword throughout Italy. The Bolognese had recourse to the formidable weapon of their forefathers—

they tolled the alarm from all their steeples. Driven back from Porta San Felice, where they lost seventy of their men and two cannon, the Austrians re-appeared at Porta Galliera, took up a commanding position on the Montagnola, and, unable to enter the town, they tried the effect of their cannon and rockets upon the city underneath. After several hours of that unavailing Vandalism, which set houses and palaces on fire, they were compelled to beat a retreat. The population of Romagna, with regular troops, were now mustering in arms. The Austrian was fain to seek shelter at Ferrara (August 10th).

Austria did not deem it wise to renew the attack. She even disavowed Welden's movement; the pope's protests, the meddling of English and French diplomatists from Florence, made a backward movement incumbent on her. Her time in that quarter had not yet come. Her discretion and procrastination are as remarkable as her endurance and tenacity. She felt that Central Italy was better left to itself, a prey to its implacable factions. She knew that her forerunners were already at work—hundreds of demagogues paving the way for her triumph. Yet a few months' anarchy, she felt assured, and Bologna should be entered without firing a cartridge.

But this undeniable check, this pause of Austria in the midst of her stunning success, to how many new follies did it not give rise in the heart of the incorrigible Italians? South of the Po and west of the Ticino, they fancied, Italy was still safe from attack. The losses of 1848, they imagined, had, at the worst, only brought back the position of 1847. Only the fate

of Lombardy, they contended, was decided. Welden's aggression was plainly a blunder of the old dragoon. For the rest, Austria claimed only what she deemed her own, and had troubles enough at home to be able to dream of interference abroad.

One province of Italy, they insisted, was lost; but its very fall strengthened the independence of the rest.

It was most happily decreed that the Italians should be cured even of this last delusion—that they should see that Austria only crouched back to give her spring a more irresistible impetus—that they should be made aware that their cause is indeed “one and indivisible”—that the blow fallen on Milan must needs be felt at Rome, Florence, or Turin—that, for good or for evil, their destipies are eternally associated.

But the disenchantment of their false hopes was to be only the result of long and various experiments. In order that Italy should feel this identity of her fate, it was necessary that she should be brought down to one common level of misery. New, unheard-of follies and crimes, no less than unprecedented deeds of heroism, were to signalise her further downfall. She had been prostrated in Lombardy, but would only avow herself vanquished at Novara, in Rome, Venice, and Sicily.

But in these new trials, for which Italy was now preparing herself, and which were to keep the world in suspense during that and the following year, be it remembered, the country had ceased to put her trust in her own unaided energies. The “*Italia farà da se*” of the misguided but high-minded Charles Albert, was disavowed by the fierce partisans who branded him a

traitor. Their faith was in France—in the interests of her government, or else in the passions of her people.

Strong of that support, they were determined to try the experiment to the end, to see how far that diplomacy which had driven Welden from Bologna could screen them from further aggression. Faithful to this plan they conspired, they agitated, they murdered ministers, they put to flight popes and grand-dukes; they hurried matters to such a crisis as to convince even diplomacy, that an Austrian violation of Roman and Tuscan territories might be looked upon as a minor—as a necessary evil; when England was fain to consent to it, and France only anxious to second and have a hand in it.

For the rest, the work of 1848 was complete. Italy, as a nation, had stood up for a wrestle with Austria, and succumbed. Of her own free will, and with her own forces, she could not soon be expected again to take the field. So far the national revolution was at an end. There might only be aimless agitation, infinite complication of factions run mad; a sublime disorder, not without some bright contrast of exalted and disinterested virtues, flashes of that genius and valour by which Italy now, as in all ages, seemed to know how to rise superior to her fortune, to atone for her errors, and give lustre and dignity to her fall.

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